Abstract
The mainstream discourse of treating the disabled with care is based on equal dignity of all human beings, but both the Republic and early Confucian texts seem to reject this idea. As a result, the Republic proposes eugenics and euthanasia, even killing the physically and mentally disabled. Despite the problematic account, it does raise the issue of what makes a life worth living, which may serve as medicine to the sickness of many humans today, who indulge themselves in radical and self-absorbed individualism. Early Confucians, however, have a broader sense of “worth,” and believe that many of the physically, mentally, and even morally disabled people are always able to earn the worth of life through their effort. Moreover, compassion is a central virtue for Confucians, and to be a human means to care for the disabled, even for those who cannot earn the worth of life. Not to do so suggests our own moral disabilities, even our not being human. This shows that we do not have to assume equal dignity to have a theory of treating the disabled well. This broadens our discourse on how to treat the disabled and sheds some new light on this issue.
1. Introduction: alternatives to the equality- and dignity-based approach to disabilities?
Sanctity and dignity of life, and equality among all human beings, seem to be the mainstream – if not universal – values today. The Church and the secular world, for example, may differ on when life begins (and thus on the issue of abortion), and yet both sides would agree on the idea that a disabled person who is already born should enjoy the sanctity and dignity of life just as a physically-abled person does.[1] Let’s call this the equal dignity approach to disabilities (EDAD). Within EDAD, however, there can be a lot of disagreements. For example, the distinction between the abled and the disabled may not be as clear as it first appears, and can be socially and politically dependent.[2] Moreover, the aforementioned “just as” can be another source of disagreements. That is, equality in equal treatments of the abled and the disabled, as equality in any situations, is always a controversial issue.[3] Beyond this approach, we can also ask whether there can be a theory of treating the disabled with care that does not presuppose equal dignity among all. Universal as they appear to be, equality and dignity are not really universal values. To offer a path for those who reject these values to embrace some form of care for the disabled, then, may have both theoretical and practical significance.[4] After all, we live in a pluralistic world. If we don’t wish to impose one set of values on all, but still wish as many of us to embrace some form of common decency as possible, we would better “conceptually engineer” paths such as the aforementioned one.
In this paper, then, I will look into two sets of theories that do not embrace equal dignity. First, I will look into what Plato’s Republic would have to say about the treatments of the disabled. We will see, as expected, that this text seems to reject our idea of decent treatments of the disabled. Though disturbing, ideas from this text may also have some merits. To see these merits and to address them may help us to develop a more adequate theory of care for the disabled. Second, I will look into how two early Confucian thinkers, Confucius and Mencius, would deal with the disabled. Although both seem to reject today’s conception of equal dignity and resonate, to some extent, the values in the Republic, they could nevertheless strongly defend care for the physically and mentally disabled. Indeed, not to care for the physically and mentally disabled would reveal our moral disability, a much more serious disability to early Confucians. From their account, then, we can discover an alternative approach to disabilities.
2. Life worth living in the Republic
2.1 Eugenics and euthanasia in Sparta and the Republic
Plato’s Republic is a founding text in Western political philosophy, and a core issue in this text is how the ideal polis (city-state) should look like.[5] After rejecting the first proposal by Socrates as a “city of sows” (372d), from Book II to Book IV, another ideal city is constructed, which is shown to be a virtuous city (372e-434d). It is actually a slightly idealized and improved version of Sparta, as many commentators have observed.[6] It is well known that ancient Sparta employed many means to produce the most fierce and fearless soldiers, including the elimination of all the physically and intelligently disabled on every stage, which starts from infanticide. In Book III of the Republic, Socrates discussed such eliminations.[7] In Book V, he went one step further by proposing a radical reform of the family structure. Together, we see a very early account of eugenics and euthanasia, some of which would be considered murders even by those who defend euthanasia today.
In Book III, Socrates praises Asclepius the medical doctor, saying that he revealed an art of medicine for those whose bodies are by nature and regimen in a healthy condition but have some distinct and definite disease in them … But with bodies diseased through and through, he made no attempt by regimens … to make a lengthy and bad life for a human being and have him produce offspring likely to be such as he; … on the grounds that he’s of no profit to himself or to the city (407c-e).
That is, medicine should only be applied to those who have easily curable diseases, and not to those who have diseases that cannot be easily cured, including, apparently, people with many forms of disabilities. The latter people cannot even be allowed to have children, because the children may carry the same kind of diseases.
More generally, Socrates argues that in the ideal city, killing by medicine and by court is sanctioned. Those who have terminal sickness in the body should be left untreated and let die, and the city should actively kill those who have incurable sickness in the soul (409e-410a). In the ideal city, a law for both the arts of medicine and judging should be set down, which will care for those of your citizens who have good natures in body and soul; while as for those who haven’t, they’ll let die the ones whose bodies are such, and the ones whose souls have bad natures and are incurable, they themselves will kill (409e-410a).
In Book V, Socrates proposes “we’ll make … the most beneficial marriage … sacred” (458e). The best men should have intercourse as often as possible with the best women, and reverse for the ordinary men and women. Only the offspring of the former will be reared (459c-460a). One main purpose for all these arrangements is to produce the best children, and thus this is a theory of eugenics. According to this theory, the mediocre, let alone the physically and mentally disabled, are prevented from being born, and if born, should be let die or even killed.
Later in Book V, talking about war, Socrates says that warriors who are captured alive should be given as a gift to the enemies (468a). The reason seems to be that warriors are supposed to be brave and fight to death. Being captured is a sign of cowardice and does not deserve to be respected, and such a life should not be saved. This resonates with the legendary words of a Spartan mother to her son: “either [come back with] this or upon this” when presenting the shield to him before he goes to war (Plutarch, Moralia 241f).
In sum, according to Socrates in the Republic, pregnancy with fetus that is not likely to be of the physically and mentally best should be prevented. Infants with clear disabilities should be killed. Adults with not easily curable diseases and lacking certain virtues should be let die or even be actively killed.
2.2 The idea of life worth living and its worth evaluated
The aforementioned picture from the Republic is deeply disturbing, to say the least. What is the justification of it? In Book III, Socrates explains his hostility toward medicine. According to him, the greatest sign of a bad and base education in a city is that it needs eminent doctors and judges even for those reared in free fashion (405a). For illness is often the result of being idle (404e), that is, needing medicine “not because one has met with wounds or some of the seasonal maladies, but as a result of idleness and a way of life” (405d).
An extreme example Socrates offers is that of Herodicus: “Attending the mortal disease, he wasn’t able to cure it …, and spent his whole life treating it with no leisure for anything else, mightily distressed if he departed a bit from his accustomed regimen” (406a-b). Apparently, Herodicus’s disease is not said to be the result of idleness, but he has no leisure for anything else and is thus “idle” with regard to all other things. Even worse, in contrast to the good doctor Asclepius, Herodicus invented medicines that could preserve the life of other people like him: so busy with saving one’s own life as to be completely “idle” and useless to the city.
In contrast, someone who is not idle, such as a craftsman, “had a definite job, and if he couldn’t do it, it would be of no profit to go on living” (407a). Generally speaking, “for all men obedient to good laws a certain job has been assigned to each in the city at which he is compelled to work, and no one has the leisure to be sick throughout life and treat himself” (407c).
It should now become clear that, according to Socrates, one has to have some “profit to himself or to the city” (407e) in order for his or her life to be worth living and the sickness worth curing. If a person’s disabilities prevent him or her from physical and “musical” (intellectual) education, education that is profitable to himself, herself, or to the city, this person’s life is not worth living anymore.
Politically incorrect as this theory sounds, it does pose a challenge to us. Equal dignity and equal rights sound correct and even wonderful, but what if one used dignity and right to defend an undignified life full of wrongs? If one’s leg is cut off due to sicknesses caused by chain smoking or knowingly indulging oneself in an eating habit full of fat and sugar, should this person be treated the same as someone who is born with a deformed leg? In a highly individualistic culture where one is obsessed with preserving one’s own health, isn’t it good to ask questions such as whether we are creating new diseases and disabilities through our obsession with medicine, exacerbated by the capitalistic greed;[9] whether a life of health is worth living if there is no happiness or higher purpose in it;[10] and whether one earns the right to live a healthy and happy life by contributing to the society?[11] The theory in the Republic, then, may offer a cure to the sicknesses and disabilities of contemporary societies.
Therefore, there could be some merits of a theory that rejects equal dignity and rights in general and EDAD in particular. But there are some obvious problems with the theory in the Republic. For one, “use” or “profit” is hard to define. In the case of disabilities, function and the lack of it are a matter of degree.[12] To be near-sighted is a disability, but with corrected and even contact lenses, the issue of how to treat the near-sighted would not be considered a serious issue. But in ancient Sparta, a deeply near-sighted person may be considered seriously disabled, and perhaps no use to the city, although even in contemporary Athens where one’s military abilities are not the only use valued by Athenian citizens, this person could be of some use to himself and to the city.
This complexity with regard to function and use is actually present in the Republic. In the earlier books, the military function of the rulers (the “guardians”) is emphasized, but in the later books, it turns out that ideal rulers should be philosophers and thus intellectual capacities are more important than physical ones. If we do not think Plato is a muddle-headed thinker and a lousy writer, perhaps there is an internal dialectic movement within the dialogue. However, there is another serious problem with the Republic that prevents it from developing a more sympathetic account toward the disabled: sympathy or compassion is never considered a virtue! On this issue, let me turn to the early Confucians.
3. Life worth living in the Analects and Mencius
3.1 Life’s worth is earned
Confucius, the alleged founder of the Confucian school, lived around the same time as Plato. He and early Confucians (for example, Mencius) were known to defend some form of hierarchy, and dignity and rights are apparently not in their vocabularies. In a conversation, Confucius also raised the issue of life worth living. According to the Analects, a collection of conversations often between Confucius and someone else, Yuan Rang, an old friend of Confucius, sat casually, with his legs sprawled out, waiting for Confucius. The Master said, “when young, you had no humility and respect for your elders; when growing up, you made nothing worthy to pass on; when growing older but not dying, you are a thief [of resources or of the long life you don’t deserve].” He then rapped him on the shin with his staff [admonishing him for his impolite way of sitting when seeing a friend]. (Analects 14.43)[13]
Though jokingly, Confucius also suggested that not every life is worth living. Life’s worth consists in acquiring certain virtues, including ritual propriety, which would make a person a good member of a community, and in making contributions to society by having something worthy to pass on, such as being a good moral exemplar, preserving traditions, teaching pupils, and so on – all embodied by Confucius as presented in the Analects.
Despite apparent similarities, the worth of one’s life, for Confucius, lies in one’s moral capabilities, not in one’s physical or even intellectual capabilities. Those who are physically and intellectually disabled can prove their life’s worth by cultivating their morality. With regard to moral cultivation, another early Confucian Mencius explicitly stated that everyone can become the ideal moral sage if s/he tries (for example, Mencius 6B2). As was indicated earlier, there is an implicit movement from the emphasis on both physical and intellectual capabilities to the emphasis on the latter alone, culminating in the idea of the philosopher-king (473c-474c). This leaves a little more room for the physically disabled – but not the intellectually disabled – to have a life worth living in the ideal city of the Republic. More importantly, Socrates in the Republic also insists on educating everyone, including even women, a very unconventional, if not scandalous, idea of his times. But he also claims that this education is not open-ended, and those who fail to pass certain tests at a certain point will be excluded from education and the possibility of becoming ruling elites (414b-415d). For early Confucians, although they, too, believe that in reality, people differ and there are those who rule and those who are ruled (see, for example, Mencius 3A4), for Mencius, upward mobility is always available.
In short, by focusing on morality and acknowledging equal moral potentials, early Confucians do not have harsh attitude toward the physically disabled. Even for the mentally disabled, clearly, people with, for example, Down Syndrome can still be virtuous and thus have life worth living. They should not be “let die,” as suggested in the Republic. Even for someone with a bad “soul” such as Yuan Rang, we should keep trying to improve his morality. For in contrast to the Republic, there is no cut-off line for moral cultivation, and thus the life of an “idle” person should not be “cut off” or actively terminated. But what about those who are “diseased through and through” to such an extent that any meaningful moral cultivation becomes impossible? Lacking an account of inherent dignity of human life, Confucians seem to have to deny the worth of these people’s lives. Is this really the case? Moreover, not letting die or killing is one thing, but why should we help those with a bad soul or a “bad” (disabled) body? I will answer these questions in the following.
3.2 Centrality of compassion as a virtue
It is well known that a key Confucian virtue is ren仁, which is translated as “benevolence” or “humaneness.” Although apparently a conservative, Confucius wished to restore the old regime that is represented by rituals and music, he claimed, “a man who is not humane – what has he to do with ritual? A man who is not humane – what has he to do with music?” (Analects 3.3)
Mencius further elaborated on this virtue of humaneness. In a famous passage, he claimed that every human being has “a heart that cannot bear [to see the suffering of] others,” and he offered a “thought-experiment” to demonstrate this.
If anyone suddenly sees a child about to fall into a well, he or she will have a feeling of alarm and distress, not to gain friendship with the child’s parents, nor to seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the cry of the child. From this we see that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human; whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human; whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human; whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human. The heart of compassion is the germ of humanity (ren); the heart of shame is the germ of righteousness (yi); the heart of courtesy and modesty is the germ of the observance of rituals (li); the heart of right and wrong is the germ of wisdom. A human being has these four germs, as he or she has four limbs. Possessing these four germs but claiming one’s incapability [of developing them into four virtues] is to cripple oneself … If a human being who possesses these four germs knows to develop them, it will be like a fire starting up or a spring coming out. If one can develop it, one can tend to what is within the Four Seas [i.e., the world]; if one can’t develop it, one can’t even serve one’s parents. (Mencius 2A6)
This is a key passage in the Mencius, and there are many important issues involved. For example, there is a political dimension of 2A6, but many of the relevant lines are not included in the above quotation because they are not directly related to the topic of this paper. On what I have actually quoted from 2A6, why the thought-experiment is persuasive and how persuasive it is are also important issues. Let us assume it is very convincing. That is, “the heart that cannot bear to see the suffering of others” or what we would simply call compassion is indeed universal. Still, why should this emotion be considered to be a moral sentiment? Even if it is a moral sentiment and should be the “germ” or the basis of a virtue (humaneness), where do the three other germs come from? These are controversial issues, but what is clear in this quotation is the following. In the analogy between the four cardinal virtues and four bodily limbs, we can literally say that those who fail to develop these virtues are disabled, for their moral limbs are disfigured. Among the four virtues, compassion is (the seed of) a virtue, the virtue of humaneness, and humaneness is the virtue of all virtues because Mencius seems to focus on elaborating on this virtue alone. To be compassionate is what makes us human.
In contrast, as mentioned, compassion or anything similar is nowhere to be found in the Republic. With this “tool,” Confucians can offer an additional account of treating the disabled well. Although the physically and intellectually disabled could have a life worth living by developing their potentials as human beings, it cannot be denied that it is not easy for them to do so. Compassion then requires us to help them out. As Confucius said, “a humane person is someone who, desiring to take his or her stand, helps others to take their stand; and who, desiring to realize himself or herself, helps others to realize themselves” (Analects 6.30). For morally disabled people such as Yuan Rang in the Analects or the “idlers” in the Republic, we should try to change their ways through admonishments and other means, as Confucius did to Yuan Rang. After all, Confucius only said that Yuan Rang’s life is not worth living, and did not really suggest to have him killed, as Socrates suggested with regard to the idlers in the Republic. By reminding Yuan Rang of what makes a life worth living, Confucius wished to set him straight or to show others the importance of living a worthy life. For those who are born to have some seriously disabling conditions and who are so sick as not to be able to take up even the minimal moral cultivation, we as human should be compassionate about their tragic fate and help them out as much as possible. That is, even if their life is not worth living in a Confucian sense and this cannot be changed, to help them out from our humaneness is making our own life worth living. Not to help the physically, mentally, and even morally disabled reveals our own moral, humane, and human disabilities.
Before I conclude, let me quote in full a very famous passage, the “Western Inscription,” from a later Confucian thinker by Zhang Zai 张载 (1020-1077).
Heaven [qian乾] is called my father and Earth [kun 坤] is called my mother. And I, this tiny thing, find an intimate place in their midst.
Hence, what fills Heaven and Earth is my body, and what directs Heaven and Earth is my nature. All people are my siblings, and all things are my companions. The great ruler is the eldest son of my parents, and his ministers are his retainers. To respect those great in years is the way to treat the elderly as elderly should be treated. To be loving to the orphaned and the weak is the way to treat the young as young should be treated.[14] … All in the world who are tired, infirm, crippled, or sick; brotherless, childless, widows or widowers – they are all my siblings who are helpless and have no one else to appeal to. ...
Riches, honor, good fortune, and abundance shall enrich my life, while poverty, humble station, care, and sorrow shall discipline me to fulfillment. In life I follow and serve [Heaven and Earth], and in death I shall be at peace.[15]
Let me conclude with a summary of the main points of this paper, which may be unnecessary and even annoying after quoting this beautiful passage. Not having an account of dignity and equality, Plato’s Republic does confirm our intuition that such a theory wouldn’t have an account of treating the disabled well. Indeed, it argues for actively killing the disabled. But early Confucian texts show otherwise. Such a theory can have an account of treating the disabled humanely by having a more diverse understanding of life’s worth, and by having compassion as a cardinal virtue. The above discussion, then, shows that we do not have to have dignity and equality to have an account of treating the disabled well, thus broadening the discourse. Indeed, the disabled, by definition, are those who lack certain abilities to do things. Therefore, by putting the moral burden on the abled, that is, those who are able or at least more able to take actions, the Confucian account may be more effective than an account that is based on equality and dignity.
Acknowledgements
This research is partly supported by China’s National Social Sciences Fund (major project, “Investigations of the Contemporary Reconstruction of the Conceptual Systems of Traditional Chinese Political Philosophy,” 23&ZD235).
References
Babbitt, Frank Cole (tr.) (1931), Plutarch’s Moralia (Vol. III). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bloom, Allan (tr.) (1991), The Republic of Plato (second edition). New York: Basic Books.
Chan, Wing-Tsit (1969), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1993), Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, including “On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns”, 3rd edition (tr. by James Ellington). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Lau, D.C.刘殿爵 (tr.) (2000), Confucius: The Analects (first paperback edition). Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
--- (2003), Mencius, revised and bilingual edition. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
Leonardi, Matilde (manuscript), “ICF: the Universalizing Conception of Disability and Functioning.”
Sen, Amartya (1979), “Equality of What?” in Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.), Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 197-220.
Singer, Peter (2011), Practical Ethics (3rd edition). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
[1] There can be relatively rare exceptions on the secular side. For example, Peter Singer has gained notoriety by justifying the (conditional) killing of a seriously disabled infant. It should be noted that his argument is partly based on the typical secular and liberal endorsement of abortion, thus challenging the consistency of the position that both supports abortion and rejects the unequal treatment of disabled people. See Singer 2011, 160-67.
[2] See, for example, Leonardi (manuscript).
[3] For example, is it adequate to give the same resources to both an able-bodied person and a disabled person? Amartya Sen says no and introduces what is known as the capabilities approach (1979).
[4] Presentations from other participants in the December 2023 PASS webinar in preparation for the 2024 PASS Plenary on Disability and the human condition and Sr. Helen Alford’s comments on my presentation helped me to develop this formulation of the significance of my paper. I thank them for the inspirations.
[5] Throughout this paper, I will rely on Bloom 1991 for the English translation of the Republic.
[6] See, for example, Bloom 1991, 380.
[7] We do not really know whether the Socrates in this dialogue represents the historical Socrates in any way, and Plato himself is completely missing in this dialogue (and most other Platonic dialogues). In this paper, I will avoid using “Plato” when discussing ideas in the Republic, and use “Socrates” instead. This “Socrates” is the one in the dialogue, not necessarily the historical one.
[8] For the English translation, see Babbitt 1931, 465.
[9] An example is to have a medicine to cure dwarfism where dwarfism is defined as the shortest 5% of the population. The recently discovered miracle drug for weight loss, Ozempic, may pose a similar challenge: what weight would be a “normal” weight? How much society should and can pay for it?
[10] A good example of this kind of absurdity of modern life is given by Woody Allen. In his movie “Annie Hall” he said, “There’s an old joke – um... two elderly women are at a Catskill Mountain resort, and one of ’em says, ‘Boy, the food at this place is really terrible.’ The other one says, ‘Yeah, I know; and such small portions.’ Well, that’s essentially how I feel about life – full of loneliness, and misery, and suffering, and unhappiness, and it’s all over much too quickly.”
[11] Many years after Socrates and Plato, Kant insisted that “an impartial rational spectator” (a Kantian God?) would not be delighted to see the happiness of “a being who is not graced by any touch of a pure and good will” (4:393; for an English translation, see Kant 1993, 7).
[12] On this point, I benefitted from Matilde Leonardi’s presentation “ICF: the universalizing conception of disability and functioning” in PASS’s webinar in December 2023. See Leonardi (manuscript).
[13] The translations of passages from the Analects and the Mencius are all mine. For different translations, see Lau 2000 and 2003.
[14] For “the way to treat the elderly/young as elderly should be treated” (所以长/幼其长/幼), see: “treat the elderly of my own family [as they should be], and extend this treatment to the elderly of other families; treat the young of my own family [as they should be], and extend this to the young of other families” (Mencius 1A7).
[15] For other English translations, see Chan 1969, 497-498 and Bryan Van Norden’s translation which is available on line (http://faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/Phil210/Translations/Western%20Inscription.pdf, accessed on 08/20/2011).