Can this infelicitous cycle be broken? Here we have to consider the role of reciprocity.
Reciprocity comes in to its own as a ‘starting mechanism’. In so doing, it solves a problem encountered in studies of participation in voluntary associations. It is regularly found that membership of them increases trust, of fellow members and in general, and trust is the common denominator of
solidarity. Yet, where does the impetus come from to develop voluntary associations in the first place?
The role of
reciprocity as a ‘starter motor’ has long been recognised. Cicero wrote that ‘There is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness’, and added that ‘all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit’. However,
homo reciprocus has often been and often is subject to a one sided accentuation (actually a distortion) of his contributions and their consequences. For example, Marcel Mauss saw reciprocal gifts as underwriting exchange relationships and, thus, inexorably leading to the Market and its ahuman principles. Conversely, Alvin Gouldner viewed
reciprocity as a generalised social norm, stabilised by a ‘mutuality of gratifications’ (a ‘
do ut des’ relationship) and socially stabilising in its turn. However, such ‘mutuality’ was always at the mercy of force which, in turn, undermined
reciprocity and replaced it by relations of coercion. Note, that neither view can sustain an active view of
justice (law working for the common good), for in the two cases Law would serve respectively to reinforce market relations and power relations.
Reciprocity is linked to free-giving.
Reciprocity can only be the key link between
solidarity and
subsidiarity provided that it retains its own linkage to free-giving – based upon affect, concern and involvement in the lives and well-being of others. There appears to be sufficient impetus towards free-giving in our populations (for example, organ donors or blood donors) that fuels
reciprocity as a process that is independent of legal injunctions or reinforcement and expansionary rather than degenerative. Crucially, for our times, the free-giving, without search for material benefit or control, evidenced on the Internet – a neutral medium, also exploited for both other purposes – is a practical exemplification of (virtual)
solidarity and effective
subsidiarity that works
because of
reciprocity and could not work without it.
It is
reciprocity that also results in an upward spiral, which reinforces
solidarity because more and more of the human person, rather than just their labour power and intellectual skills is invested in such agencies as voluntary associations – rendering their contributions ones that cannot be commodified or commandeered (e.g. dedicated child care, care of the aged, or living in an eco-friendly manner). It is an upward spiral because: (a) there is a development of mutual obligations and practices of mutual support; (b) there is an extension of ‘friendship’ (in the Aristotelian sense); (c) there is tendency for social identity increasingly to be invested in such associations.
Hence, the seeming paradox of the third millennium that
Gemeinschaft can develop from
Gesellschaft – as the solution to the problem Modernity could never solve – ‘the problem of solidarity’.
Justice should promote the common good.
Subsidiarity requires both legal protection and mechanisms for just correction. Otherwise and regardless of being buttressed by internal
solidarity it can be taken over by other forms of control and guiding principles or fragment through the crystallisation of sectional interests. Thus, on the one hand, there is a need for protection by a form of justice differentiated for different spheres of society, according to criteria appropriate to them. Most obviously, the ‘Third Sector’ requires protection from incursions from the state, beyond those measures ensuring probity in the conduct of their affairs.
On the other hand,
subsidiarity entails allocation, but of itself neither the ‘Third Sector’ nor classical definitions of justice give sufficient guidance about what is due to each social subject or human group. Without the articulation of such a theory, grievances can accumulate and hierarchies with distinct material interests become differentiated, such that no common good can really be achieved.
That’s why this Plenary Meeting will give serious attention to ‘practical exemplars’ of
solidarity and
subsidiarity in action, to prevent this from being an arid, though necessary, academic exercise. Between the theory and the practice, what we will effectively be examining are the building blocks of a new civil society able to reach new frontiers in the advancement of the common good. The following topics will be illustrated: new forms of solidary and subsidiary economy; educational initiatives in developing countries; state-family relationships; access to information goods (internet); micro-credit and the third sector.
