PATHS TO A SOUND GOVERNANCE OF THE WORLD

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Introduction

In his paper "Accountability, Transparency, Legitimacy, Sustainable Development and Governance", Buttiglione takes governance as "the product or the activity of government" that is in turn defined as "a system of organs that govern a community".

This understanding is not very useful for our search for a better governance of the world. It only suggests that the most distinct feature of governance is the lack of a government. It remains uncertain whether the world is being "governed" by a system of organs that is however not qualified as a government. The distinction between government and governance apparently lies not in the activity. The activity of government varies radically from time to time and from country to country. In the past when government governed much less, the destiny of a people was also influenced by decisions that were not taken by their government authorities but by other domestic subjects whose actions were relevant to their welfare. This is, structurally speaking, the same kind of situation like what Buttiglione has described as of today, except that there are subjects acting from outside the affected country.

In an indirect way, Buttiglione has attempted to clarify the difference between government and governance by reference to the erosion of state sovereignty. We now live, it is said, "in a world that is no more divided in a plurality of territories each one subject to the sovereign power of one state". The trouble is twofold. First, the concept of sovereignty has been subjected to changes throughout history,[1] but Buttiglione has chosen to stick to the

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[1] The most important change is the emergence of the idea of popular sovereignty, in which the sovereign is neither the state as an abstract entity nor in a concrete person such as the emperor or any other heads of the state, but in the subject–citizens in a polity. The idea of popular sovereignty has advanced to a more "radical" concept of citizens as sovereigns with "constituent power" who engage themselves actively and critically in opposition to sovereignty in Hobbesian sense and the issue fields of the state constitution, popular freedoms and constitutional limitations. See James Tully, *Public Philosophy in a New Key*, 2 Vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Westphalian tradition.[2] Second, it is important to differentiate between a "claim" to sovereignty and the "capability" to sustain it. In the old days, the concept of sovereignty referred to the claim by a state of exclusive, absolute authority to control domestic affairs within a defined territory but her capacity to sustain that claim in practice could be doubtful. Today, a large number of states are no longer able to exercise exclusive and absolute control within their territories, but still have never given up their claim to sovereignty. This claim to sovereignty, albeit with admission of limitations, and the state's monopoly of coercive power, remain an important factor in the management of world affairs. A better way of saying what Buttiglione might want to say is that the erosion of the territory principle of sovereign states calls for a novel kind and site of governance.

There is a key principle implied in the concept of sovereignty, be it traditional or modern, i.e. "independence" or "autonomy". This principle is still a reasonable, normative claim, although its practice is a different story. It boils down to the matter of legitimacy required of mutual recognition and respect of authorities involved in the business of governing human affairs. It is an indispensable defence available to the weaker "sovereign" states without adequate capacity to withstand interference from the stronger fellow-states. It is also inconsistent with the principle of subsidiarity at levels of regional and global governance.

A Way to Look at Governance

Governance is a relational, normative and institutional concept. The requirement for governance is based on the simple fact that human beings never live in isolation from others. They were born as self-interested and social beings at the same time. They enter into relations with others as a matter of necessity. As a first cut then, governance can be defined as a mechanism to coordinate human relations. This sounds too simplistic and is useful at best for description only.

We speak of coordination, instead of control or steering mechanism. To control often suggests a hierarchy of command over a subject and to steer implies a course towards a destination. Who commands whom? Who

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[2] Another important tradition is G.W. Leibniz' concept of relative sovereignty, put forward only two decades after the Westphalian Peace of 1648. It is most relevant to one of the central issue in global governance today that is how to accommodate new aspiring participants in the existing order by allowing institutional transformation without risks to peace and justice.

is to steer in whose name towards what? Who gets what, when, how and why? To give answers to these questions as normative statements we need a concept of governance as coordination mechanism based on some codes of conduct with due justification. A utilitarian justification falls back on the basic need to facilitate cooperation and to avoid conflict. The oldest needs are provision of common defence and adjudication of competing interests. An alternative justification can be grounded on a vision of the human person, as the baseline norm for the construction of a social order. Our particular vision is the human person endowed with freedom and dignity. Governance can now be understood as a steering mechanism towards a state in which man can live a dignified life both as a self and a social being.

Governance is finally an institutional concept, as the baseline norm for coordination and steering of human affairs has to be institutionalized. Governance is therefore a system of institutions based on certain organizing principles. For instance, one of such principles in global governance today is sovereignty. Ours are subsidiarity, solidarity, and so on.

Paths to global governance

Buttiglione has not said much about what organizational scheme is most appropriate for the current context of globalization, although he does stress the need of adequate instruments for the fulfilment of a "common responsibility of all men for the future of the earth and for the future of mankind". To him, a world government or state is not such an instrument. The right answer is "world governance". What is it?

He identifies a progressive path towards a kind of global governance without government, starting from some forms of "coordinated exercise of the sovereign power" by the nation-states, through kinds of "common exercise of sovereignty … in some areas" to a possible "constitution of new sovereignty 'sui generis' of communities of nations at the regional or even global levels". Furthermore, the path requires a qualitative shift in the meaning of sovereignty, a change from absolute to "relative sovereignty".

It is obvious that the experience of European integration has shaped his vision. It is a very rich experience in terms of evolution of a supranational authority. With the European Union, regionalism has become a formidable force in global affairs. It is nevertheless still an open question whether the EU is the only or the best model for the eventual state of global governance. After all, it has taken centuries for the idea of an integrated Europe to ferment before unique circumstances helped bring about the European Coal and Steel Community. The construction of Europe's internal market and the Euro is

the fruit of some thirty-year's hard work. We should also be reminded of instances of re-assertion of the primacy of national sovereignty on the way, e.g. Charles de Gaulle's empty chair politics in 1965. In sum, it is prudent to be aware of missing links in the qualitative jump from regional to global governance. Should the regional blocs turn themselves into rivals against each other, for instance, the harm to the future of global governance could be daunting. In a theoretical sense, we should also be aware that a path of development is never determinate. Reform of a system or an institution often involves prolonged, uncertain processes of path-breaking, habituation with the possibility of path reversal, or path resiliency. There is no iron law of path-dependency. With this caution for tolerance of ambiguity in developmental paths, let us turn to the present state of global governance and governance problems, before we proceed to the prospect for the future.

The state of our globalized world

It is a matter of perspective to characterize the state of globalization. Suffice it here to pick up a few major trends that have huge implications for good governance.

To start with the very basic ingredient of any governance of human relations, the world today is characterized by a rapid growth of population in the context of dwindling natural resources. According to UN statistics, it was inhabited by 5.3 billion people in 1990 and the figure has jumped 30% to 6.9 billion in twenty years. Experts have attributed the causes to rapid advances in the medical science and increase in agricultural productivity. While population growth carries positive benefits, it also implies a greater strain on resources. As always, competition for resources is a major if not the number one trigger of human conflicts. The more scarce and indivisible the resources concerned, the more intractable a conflict becomes, for example some territorial disputes with huge implication of invaluable resources. What is the magnitude of the risk of resource constraints? In his address to the European Parliament in September 2010, Commission President Barroso had the following to say.[3]

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[3] See the report of the WWF-ACE Resource Efficiency Conference, via http://www.beveragecarton.eu/uploads/documents/WWF-ACE_Resource_Efficiency_Conference_Report_2011.pdf, page 4; A report backed by 1,360 scientists from 95 countries is quoted by Tim Radford, science editor, the *Guardian* on 30 March, 2005 to have warned that two-thirds of the world's resources are used up. http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2005/mar/30/environment.research

> The phenomenal increase in wealth and wellbeing the 20th century has witnessed (came) with a dramatic increase in resource use: 9 times in water use; 16 times in fossil fuel use; and in fish catches 35 times. While the world's population grew 4 times, industrial output grew 40 times and carbon emissions increased 17 times.

Secondly, our world has witnessed remarkable increase in rapidly changing, evermore complex human interactions across national borders in diverse fields and different ways. Scholars have attributed this phenomenon to science-technological advances that shrunk distance and time, globalization of capitalism, information, among others. These interactions encompass almost all aspects of human life, multiplying social, economic, political and cultural activities. It seems, for a lack of hard evidence, that they are more of the cooperative nature than otherwise, especially in the fields of economy, technology and communication, where spatial division of labour in response to the logic of comparative advantage is most advanced.

Thirdly, as is generally known, the increasing frequency of interactions has fuelled the growth of interconnections and interdependencies among peoples around the world.[4] About two decades ago, most goods traded across national borders were manufactured in one country, today the globalization of production has marched by leaps and bounds, with leading TNCs such as Ford, Heinz, Sony and Tesco having hundreds of subsidiaries located throughout the world. The number of cell phone users stood at 11 million in 1990; it reached 5.6 billion three years ago. International travel has also grown immensely from 25 million in 1950 to an estimated 1.6 billion by 2020.[5] The trend of globalized connectivity is not confined to material matters, but includes emotional or moral ones. Thanks to the spread of information technology throughout the world, natural disasters have attracted widespread attention, donations, rescue efforts, and prayers too. In the same vein, horrific deeds of politicians, business corporations and others have also invited condemnation and spontaneous demonstrations beyond their domiciles. In these milliard ways of expression of humanity, the future of a reconfiguration of the ethical horizon is well in

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[4] The extent of connectivity varies a great deal in many terms. See the annual DHL Global Connectedness Index. The Netherlands is the most globalized, and Burundi the least among 140 countries. The financial crisis erupted in 2008 has reduced global connectedness that today still lags behind 2007. http://www.dhl.com/en/about_us/logistics_insights/studies_research/global_connectedness_index/

[5] These figures are taken from Kishore Mahbubani, "The Global Village has Arrived", *Finance & Development*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (September 2012), reproduced on the IMF's website, accessible via http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/09/mahbuban.htm

store. Yet the balance is complex. The interplays of trade, capital, information, and technology are, as noted by Marina Primorac,[6] leading to a new global convergence that brings both benefits in terms of health, education, communication, growth and jobs but also a lot of contagion risks, such as in finance, infectious disease, and even revolution.

Fourthly, turning to a completely different dimension, we note that national sovereignty of *the traditional kind* has been eroded, accompanied by a shift in the location of authorities that have taken up an increasing role in regulating human interactions within and across nation-states. The World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization and the European Union are prime examples of new players with considerable authority, along with many other lesser authorities. Having said that however, we are reminded that national sovereignty in its adapted forms is still quite a resilient principle and force in world politics. It applies especially to big powers and in cardinal issues such as national defence and representation in world forums. Sadly, superpowers or hegemonic powers often defy non-state global authorities or international agreements in defence of what they regard as national interest. They influence, drive or formulate decisions to address global issues with greater capability than the rest. Many solutions for global problems are thrashed out as a result of inter-state diplomacy, i.e. actions of sovereign states. Most importantly, all international or regional resolutions dealing with world or regional problems still have to be carried out locally by their governments, in the ultimate sense, even in the case of international intervention. On the other hand, new, non-state players in global governance as a whole have not yet grown competent enough to provide any alternative, more coherent order for global governance. It is expected that the world will continue to be governed by an incoherent plurality of authorities in both competition and cooperation for some time to come. We shall presently dwell on this picture of haphazard development of institutions for global governance. Let's just conclude this section by saying that the development of political order in the world has been seriously outpaced by some integration on other areas, such as international finance.

Challenge of global problems

To construct a way for good global governance requires the recognition of key problems. They are of two kinds: substantive or structural. Many of

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[6] The Global Village: Connected World Drives Economic Shift", http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/new083012a.htm accessed on 19 April 2013.

the substantive problems are commonly known. They are often discussed in textbooks on globalization. The United Nations has a specific website on no less than 32 issues that transcend national boundaries and cannot be solved by any country acting alone.[7] A private person, Anup Shah, has maintained a website on global issues, with a unique emphasis on linkages among them. The list is frequently updated. The current one focuses on six issues: global financial crisis, loss of biodiversity, coral reefs, conservation, "tax, avoidance, havens", and "arms trade: big business".[8] Apparently, it is difficult for anyone to compile a representative list of global problems. A problem exists as a result of framing that in turn is coloured by selection criteria and value judgment.

To this author, the grand problem in global governance today is structural. It is much more important than all discrete, substantive problems, such as population explosion, proliferation of nuclear weapons, violations of human rights, poverty, environmental degradation, migration and refugees, infectious diseases, and cross-border crime and terrorism. The grand problem is the lack of a *coherent* mechanism to steer cross-national activities (efforts) towards a future world in which all men can live a free and dignified life as selves and social beings, mainly due to the primacy of the nation-state's quest for power, the mindset of self-interest and rational thinking, and the complexity of global life.

The problem of power in a state of nature

The first version of the grand problem of coordination/steering is represented by the realist school of international relations. In the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau,[9] man's drive for power is inborn and the moving force of world politics is the aspiration for power of sovereign states. Even national interest is defined in terms of the pursuit of power. Since there is no escape from power, the best that can be expected is for power to be tempered by prudence (what is possible). Otherwise, power has to be checked by power, as the theory of balance of power goes. World peace during the Cold War era was sustained by a balance of terror, based on the logic of "mutually assured destruction (MAD)". Unlike Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz,[10] founder of neo-realism (structural realism), believes that the root of world conflict

[7] http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/
[8] http://www.globalissues.org
[9] Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*; and *Politics Among Nations.*
[10] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics.*

lies neither in the imperfect human nature, nor much in the vice nature of the state, but in the anarchic international system. Without a global authority to adjudicate conflict and maintain justice, self-help is the ultimate recourse for the sovereign nations. The prime motivator of state action is no longer power, but the concern for security. It does not mean that power is no longer important in world politics. It still is, for two reasons. First, gathering power often ensures national security, although in some cases it provokes an arms race. Second, the distribution of power is the major factor determining the nature of the structure of the international system.

The lesson that can be drawn from the above discussions is the imperative of power in the context of anarchy. Any governance, especially at the global level, requires some kind of authority to coordinate human interaction for certain purposes such as peace in justice. Not unlike a government, any authority must be endowed first with power to do the job it should do and then be checked against its misuse of power. To correctly recognize the nature of power and its significance for coordinating actions of human beings and their collectivities (including the states) is the first step towards the construction of sound global governance. The classical realists attempt to understand power at the agency level with a pessimist conclusion that the imperfect human nature leads to incessant drive for power and domination. Human nature is certainly imperfect, but it is empirically proven that a person is capable of doing good as well as evil deeds. A new publication by Francis Fukuyama gives us hope for the construction of good governance at the global level. In *The Origins of Political Order*, he argues that there are biological foundations of politics. In other words, human beings are not completely free to socially construct their own behaviour. He recognizes on the one hand that human beings have a natural propensity for violence. On the other hand, however, human sociability is natural in the sense that human beings "lived in these social units for a sufficiently long period of time that the cognitive and emotional faculties needed to promote social cooperation evolved and became hardwired in their genetic endowments". Furthermore, he has discovered that human beings have an innate propensity for creating and following norms or rules. What turns out to be the origins of the very first political order for humankind can therefore well represent forces for our construction of global order in the modern time. What is needed can be inferred from an insight of the neo-realist, Waltz. It is the problem of the structure of the global system that has shaped the behaviour of sovereign states as it is. We have to reform that system for the sake of better global governance, to provide security in justice for all nations in the very first instance. There is however a major defect in the theory of Kenneth Waltz. His argu-

ment about the anarchic nature of the world system that drives the behaviour of the states is empirically and methodologically problematic. Our world is anarchic only in the sense of the absence of a world government. There is however a host of orders of lesser scales and more limited domains, as constructed by human agencies to regulate many fields of human behaviour, e.g. telecommunication, health, trade, and so on, although without much coordination among each other. In other words, we have a global anarchy with pockets of functional orders. Methodologically, Waltz is wrong by ascribing too much impact to the "anarchic" *structure* of world system, probably as a reaction to Morgenthau's over-emphasis on the *agency* of the imperfect person. Both arguments suffer from the mistake of what Margaret S. Archer calls confliction, downwards conflation in the former and upwards conflation in the latter. We can ask today whether it is time in the sense of Archer's "morphogenetic sequence" for human agency to rise up to the call for changing the current structure of global governance.[11]

The problem of self-interest and rationality

The grand problem of coordination/steering knows another version that is based on the assumption of the self-interest and rationality as key factors shaping human behaviour. "The tragedy of the commons"[12] is a case in point, applicable to many environmental problems. The commons is an unowned resources pool, for instance a pasture that is open for all to use. Self-interested and rational herders have the incentive to exploit it so long they obtain thereby a direct, immediate benefit from adding more cattle and bear only a small share of a delayed cost as a collective result of every herder's overgrazing. While the herders have a common interest in the preservation of the commons for the long term, the tragedy cannot be prevented by the invisible hand of the market unless, perhaps, the public nature of the commons can be changed by the introduction of private property, or by an authoritative action of the government as mechanism of coordination.[13]

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[11] For a quick introduction to her approach, consult her "Realism and Morphogenesis", in Margaret Archer, *et al.*, eds. *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 356–381.

[12] Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", *Science*, Vol. 162 (13 December 1968), pp. 1243–1248.

[13] The assumption that there is two remedies has been proven wrong by Elinor Ostrom in her *Governing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

In game theory, the tragedy of the commons is presented as a prisoner's dilemma. The game runs as follows. Two criminal suspects were arrested and offered separately by the interrogator with the options of (C) to confess, thereby implicating the other, or remain silent (S). The payoffs are 1) if one suspect chooses to confess and the other remains silent, the one who has confessed is set free with his testimony used to charge the other for punishable crime, 2) if both confess, both get early parole as a result of two convictions, and 3) if both keep silent, the prosecutor has to settle for token sentences meted out to both. Given the parameters of the game in terms of known, fixed payoffs and the prohibition of interpersonal communication during the game, the dominant strategy of this game is to confess because no matter what the other suspect does, each can improve his own position. It is clear that here the rationality of self-interested individuals does not match the group's rationality. Armaments race is a game of prisoners' dilemma. As proven by empirical evidence, it is sometimes solvable if, for instance, the rivals are willing to communicate in a sincere way.

A similar version of the difficulty to coordinate actions of self-interested, rational individuals towards their common good was developed by Mancur Olson in his book, *Logic of Collective Action*. The logic says that rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests. Its premise is that as long as no group member can be precluded from obtaining the collective interest obtained, there is a strong incentive for free-riding. In other words, there is no incentive for self-interested, rational members to contribute their efforts towards the production of public goods, unless there is coercion backed up by monitoring and punishment, selective incentives as rewards for contribution, or a way to keep the group small. Free-riding is indeed prevalent in public life, such as tax evasion.

The complexity problem

All the above theories have made significant assumptions about the nature of man (propensity for power, rational, self-interested) or the nature of the structure in which individuals interact with each other (open pool of finite resources, lack of a central authority, anarchy, fixed pay-offs in the absence of a trust-building mechanism/process). All the perspectives are pessimistic about human cooperation for the common good. Critiques and counter-arguments of them abound in social sciences. Elinor Ostrom[14] of-

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[14] Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

fers a less pessimistic view, arguing that even self-interested and rational users of a common pool or natural resources can develop long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed CPRs (common pools of resources), apart from the market (privatization) or the state solution (the Leviathan). James N. Rosenau[15] simply avoids the assumptions of the nature of human agency or the global structure. He stresses more on the complexity of global governance and takes a cautious and balanced view as to the future by grounding the analysis of global governance on formal and informal channels through which 'commands' flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued. Complex in what sense and why are the tasks of governance thereby made difficult? It is worthwhile to quote Rosenau's argument[16] in full:

> Not only is global life marked by a density of populations but it is also dense with organized activities, thereby complicating and extending the processes of global governance. For while organizations provide decision points through which the steering mechanisms of governance can be carried forward, so may they operate as sources of opposition to any institutions and policies designed to facilitate governance. Put in still another way, if it is the case, as many (including myself) argue, that global life late in the twentieth century is more complex than ever before in history, it is because the world is host to ever greater numbers of organizations in all walks of life and in every corner of every continent. And it is this complexity, along with the competitive impulse that leads some organizations to defy steerage and resort to violence, that makes the tasks of governance at once so difficult and so daunting.

The complex state of global governance

The Table "Coordination of Global Life" appended here seeks to chart the complex array of coordination/steering mechanisms in today's world. It is adapted from Rosenau's Table 1.1 "The sponsorship and institutionalization of control mechanisms", with substantial modification. The most significant is to organize the mechanisms of global governance into three major kinds: state actors, market players and members of society.

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[15] James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-first Century", *Global Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 13-43; reprinted in *Palgrave Advances in Global Governance*, ed. By Jim Whitman, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, pp. 7-40.

[16] *Ibid*, reprint, pp. 10-11.

The state as a steering mechanism of human affairs is distinct in its claim to monopoly of political power, potential of all-encompassing functionality and capacity to coerce. In an ideal-typical sense, it can ensure compliance of its subject with rules and decisions made in the name of public interest. The empirical reality sometimes suggests otherwise. In addition, a predatory state with great power is no cure but a cause of governance problem. Hence, the greatest downside of this mechanism is the risk that individual freedom is infringed as a result of unwarranted coercion. In contrast, the ideal-typical market has the beauty of upholding freedom. It is no more than a spontaneous order in which free persons enter into processes of exchange in goods or services under the conditions of well-defined property rights, liberalized terms of exchange and enforceable law of contract. In reality, it is indeed controversial whether such a free, competitive and fair market ever exists. Even when there are rules to uphold an unambiguous property rights system and the terms of exchange are relatively fair, the market simply cannot meet certain demands under circumstances. The biggest drawback of the market as a spontaneous order is its failure to cover the needs of those who have none or little possession for exchange through the market mechanism. It is in filling this gap that society as a mechanism of solidarity can play a major role. Society can be idealized as an arena of association for free persons to govern themselves.[17] It can be self-organizing and self-monitoring down to the individual level, such that the question of coercion and the shortfall in capability to materialistically exchange with others is rendered irrelevant. Exchange in social processes is supposedly not based on utilitarian preferences like that in the market, or on coercive authority as exercised by the state, but on norms of reciprocity and mutual care. Such an ideal society is necessarily the product of a long process of evolution from initiation through consolidation to sustainable stability. It requires a clearly defined boundary and membership below a certain scale, such that participants live side by side with each other for a certain period of time to share a past, acquire a sense of common fate and to expect a same future. It is hence difficult to imagine that such an ideal can be applied to the settings of large group size, mobile members, ambiguous boundary of the human community in question (local, national, regional, continental, global).

At any rate, these three ideal-types of coordination/steering mechanisms are used in the Appendix as a dimension together with the degree of institutionalization to inform the analysis of current global life.

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[17] In a sense, the family is the ideal unit of society, except that in the case of children as members, the principle of association is not free, but of blood or by way of adoption.

Several key features can be said about the Appendix.

1. First, there is, within each major type of mechanism, a plurality of more or less organized players[18] whose actions/decisions have some degree of impact on the coordination/steering of certain aspects of world affairs;
2. Actions of these organized players are driven by different histories, goals, interests, organizational structures and capabilities;
3. Most of them tend to address one or a few discrete problem(s) whereas organized players with intertwined problems in mind are rare;
4. There is a growing number of joint efforts from among the three types of mechanisms to coordinate/steer global problems (not apparent in the figure);
5. There are organized players engaging in check against other organized players or in war against each other;
6. Some organized players in global affairs are embedded into other organizations (not apparent in the figure).

So, what is the current state of global governance? To many commentators, it is anarchy. While current global governance is close to the state of nature, there are however pockets of small orders here and there, with some powerful ones being products of inter-governmental designs and other private efforts as a result of spontaneous evolution. It is a complex and fragmented mixture of coordination/steering mechanisms. Given its un- or poorly regulated nature, global governance today witnesses many serious deficits.[19]

First, there is a deficit of efficiency. Inefficiency is inevitable because most, if not all, global players are seldom democratically constituted, some with important stakeholders excluded from organizational membership, like the Security Council of the UN, and without accountability for their performance and finance. Another source of inefficiency is derived from overlapping of each other's efforts in similar undertakings, leading to waste of resources. For instance, many global aid programmes have failed to shift resources from the world's wealthy to the world's poor. Some scholars have even argued that the most powerful club of strong states, i.e. IMF, WTO and WB, have been

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[18] An individual person with or without authority can theoretically be a player in global affairs, especially in the sense of the repercussions of his behaviour. An individual player is certainly not an organized one.

[19] The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) adopts a different perspective called gaps in global governance and lists recently nine major gaps. See news release by Declan Kelly, "Deep Gaps in Global Governance are Impeding progress on many worldwide challenges", http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2012/06/CIGI11-global-governance-gaps-impeding-progress

eager only to promote unregulated economic globalization for the benefit of the world's rich and at the expense of the destitute.[20]

Secondly, global governance is incoherent, as a logical result of fragmentation of global players' policies and implementation. A typical case in point is the "global" intervention to prevent conflicts in fragile states in Africa or the Arab world with a view to pre-empting adverse repercussions for regional and global security, such as spill-over ethnic/religious violence, terrorism etc.[21] Powerful Western states like the US and UK, emerging powers such as China and India, the European Union and its individual member states all have their own development programmes and/or security strategies for the same areas. Rarely are these programmes/strategies coordinated with other policies at the same domestic level, not to speak of coordination at the regional or global sites. Apart from duplication in efforts, a greater danger is the contradiction of aims, interests and approaches pursued by the global players, especially between the established and the emerging powers.

The greatest deficit lies in global leadership. Globalization has increased both the significance and the demand for new forms of international and supranational leadership.[22] But we have enough managers of global affairs, not real leaders, especially those who are capable of providing transforming leadership. Transforming leaders have a vision of the global society and the political will to bring it about. Global managers have transactional skills to manage conflict of short-term interests.[23] Powerful nations can play a critical role of global leadership. The U.S. is the most influential of the kind and China is emerging as an aspiring competitor. Both are however more self-interested than concerned about the global commons and have a credibility problem in some parts of the world. Global institutions certainly can have

[20] See the critical evaluation of these powerful global institutions by Jim Yong Kim, Joyce V. Millen, Alec Irwin & John Gresham, eds., *Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of the Poor*, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2000.

[21] For details, see Jonathan Couturier, "Conflict Prevention as Global Governance", *Global Policy Journal,* 1 February 2013, http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/02/2013/conflict-prevention-global-governance

[22] Alison Brysk, *Globalization and Human Rights* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; Joseph Masciulli and Richard B. Day, 'Governing a Global Community of Shared Risks', in Richard B. Day and Joseph Masciulli (eds), *Globalization and Political Ethics,* Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 681-706.

[23] This categorization is adapted from MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*, N.Y.: Harper Collins, 1978. According to him, transformational leaders focus on the beliefs, needs and values of their followers and can raise themselves and their followers to higher levels of motivation and morality.

a leadership role too, but in confined policy domains and under the influence of big national powers. The European Union as a transnational power at the regional level has started to assume certain roles in the world. It remains a new player with guarded ambition, not to speak of a transforming vision of a global order.

Conclusion

This paper has taken issue with Buttiglione on a proper understanding of governance. Grounding the concept squarely on "governing", governance is here regarded as a relational, normative and institutional concept. It can then be defined as a mechanism with institutions built on normative principles to coordinate human relations towards a state of practice in which man can live a dignified life both as a self and a social being.

The current state of global governance is found to be a complex and fragmented mixture of coordination/steering mechanisms. In simple terms, there is at the national level a solid mass of sovereign states acting as global players. At the world level, the state of governance looks like gaseous masses, close to the state of nature in Thomas Hobbes' sense. At this level as it is, the principle of subsidiarity seems in place, with the local, national and regional players enjoying autonomy in self-governing, albeit in a context of increasing interdependency. On the other hand, the principle of global solidarity is in a very weak state of development. Between the national and global levels of governance are regional efforts at functional integration. They are at a liquid state with the EU as the most advanced project with a supranational authority.

Given its un- or poorly regulated nature, global governance knows a number of serious deficits[24]. We have noted three major ones: efficiency, coherence, and leadership. As a consequence, many important problems of the world have been left unresolved, such as nuclear proliferation, climax change, wealth gap, terrorism, and so on. Such a context is certainly not conducive to a holistic pursuit of coherent and long terms policies in particular or a vision of a global order in general.

What kind of middle-range development can then be expected? The emergence of a single world authority is certainly not in sight. Beyond that,

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[24] The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) adopts a different perspective called gaps in global governance and lists recently nine major gaps. See news release by Declan Kelly, "Deep Gaps in Global Governance are Impeding progress on many worldwide challenges", http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2012/06/CIGI11-global-governance-gaps-impeding-progress

the current trend in global governance is likely to lead in many directions. Apart from the unidirectional path suggested by Buttiglione, there are a few alternative possibilities.

One such possibility is advocated by Pascal Lamy, Director-General of WTO.[25] He calls it a "triangle of coherence", consisting of G20 as provider of political leadership and programmes, international organizations as suppliers of expertise and specialized inputs such as rules, policies and programmes, and "the G192", i.e. the United Nations, as the global forum for accountability. The drawback of this scenario is as follows. Without specifying the interrelationship between these three components, it remains a mix of governance machineries without coordination, unless we can take the common membership of big powers in all of them as a veiled vehicle providing coordination. Lamy does anticipate better coordination in the longer term, when the former two sides of the triangle start to report to the "parliament" of the United Nations and with time, "the G20 could even be an answer to reforming the UN Security Council". Lamy has high regard for regionalism. Regionalism does not belong to the "triangle of coherence", however. It is regarded as a showcase of best practice since regional integration allows a progressive familiarization with supra-nationality, representing thereby a mid-range station on the road from national to global governance. Such a view is similar to Buttiglione's vision, in the technical sense. The difference is twofold. First, Lamy is cautious about the prospect of progress from regional to global integration that may be dragged down by nationalistic tendencies. Second, his triangle is squarely based on realpolitik of cooperation among the most powerful.

In both schemes of Buttiglione and Lamy, the global civil society has no place at all. It is here that the United Nations deserves a closer look as a unique institution in global governance. In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on occasion of its 50th anniversary, the late Pope John Paul II said that the church echoes "*all those who see in the United Nations the hope of a better future for human society*". Specifically, he hoped that the UN should rise above the status of an administrative institution to become a *moral centre* where all the nations of the world feel at home and develop a shared awareness of being, as it were, a "family of nations". In his eyes, its historic task is to promote this qualitative leap in international life,

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[25] Pascal Lamy, "Global Governance is a challenge for democracy", *Europe's World*, 4 May 2013. http://www.europesworld.org/NewFrancais/Accueil/Article/tabid/190/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21575/language/en-US/Default.aspx

"by fostering values, attitudes and concrete initiatives of solidarity which prove capable of raising the level of relations between nations from the 'organizational' to a more 'organic' level, from simple 'existence with' others to 'existence for' other, …".[26]

Pope John Paul II has indeed offered an insight in the comparative advantage and unique role of the United Nations. It is an indispensable, if not pivotal institution in any improved order of global governance. As a centre of multilateral universe with universal membership and legitimacy, the UN is well placed to fill in some gaps in current global governance. There are five such gaps: knowledge, norms, policy, institutions and compliance. Knowledge is essential to the understanding of problems to be solved. Norms are a lasting device to a fair settlement of human disputes. Timely and effective policies need to be formulated to address the problems at hand. Institutions are carriers of norms and executors of policies. They also have to ensure compliance, with appropriate mechanism of monitoring and enforcement.

The United Nations has performed pretty well in the first two and probably the third one too.[27] For instance, it has made good use of its pool of expert advice to shed light on and arouse attention to the problem of population explosion in the 1970s and that of global warming in the 1980s. It has served as an essential arena in which states codify soft and hard international norms/rules in the forms of resolutions, declarations, conventions and treaties. The UN Charter itself and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are two normative pillars of global governance. In the same vein, resolutions made by the General Assembly, the Security Council and other councils are important policy statements or programmes not to be belittled, albeit not always effectively executed. Some of them, for example the Millennium Report, have focused attention to world problems with a great vision and mobilized wide-ranging resources and efforts to address the major gaps in development. What is important is the trend that this global policy seems to be sustainable. Despite its defects here and there, there is a consensus that the global targets are not to be abandoned but adjusted to the priorities beyond 2015. The United Nations performs less well in terms of an effective institution. Like many other inter-governmental organizations, it has suffered from two major problems. First, the resources made available

[26] http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1995/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_05101995_address-to-uno_en.html
[27] The following evaluation is based on the analysis of Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, *Global Governance and the UN – An unfinished Journey*, foreword by John Gerard Ruggie, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010.

have been incommensurate with the magnitude of its comprehensive port–folio. Next, it has no overarching authority over its members; some of them may incapacitate its efforts. The same problems have also affected the UN's capability with regard to the issue of compliance enforcement. Without suf–ficient backing by member states, it can at most expose and embarrass the delinquent by releasing information about the non–compliance.

It is the weakness of the United Nations as an institution and a compliance enforcer that its critics have lamented about. Yet, there is a conventional neg–ligence of the "moral" appeal of the United Nations as an organic instrument and its coordination functions in many fields of global issues, assisted by an international civil society as a partner. This UN-global civil society partnership is the most unique, institutional characteristic of the United Nations, unri–valled by other global inter-governmental organizations. It is also what Thomas G. Weiss calls the "third" UN, as opposed to the "first" UN, i.e. the collectivity of all member states and the "second" UN, the secretariat of civil servants. The "third" UN consists of associates of world organizations such as NGOs (esp. those with formal "consultative status"), academics, consultants, experts, independent commissions, and other groups of individuals.[28] Apart from helping UN organizations to effect shifts in ideas, policies, priorities, and practices initially seen as undesirable or problematic by governments, these international civil society are engaged in every aspect of *functional* processes within the UN such as agenda setting, advocacy, rule making, stan–dard setting, promotion, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. It is in this UN-global civil society relationship that the future of the UN system for a "people-centered development" depends.[29]

Having recognized the most special characters of the United Nations, we can turn to a third alternative path to future global governance that pri–marily works through the evolution of global citizenship. Advocates of this path first hold that citizenship can be divorced from the conventional *demos* anchored in the territorial principle. Citizenship can be practiced in many sites and at various levels of governance. It is possible to construct a multi-layered, global democratic order based on the principle of subsidiarity in which no single site is dominant since power is dispersed above and below existing sovereign states. Some of these advocates perceive a need for global

[28] Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Caraynnis, and Richard Jolly, "The 'Third' United Na–tions", *Global Governance*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009), pp. 123-142.

[29] Roger A. Coate, "Growing the 'Third United Nations' for People-centered De–velopment – The United Nations, Civil Society, and Beyond", *Global Governance*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2009), pp. 153-168.

regulatory regimes to set rules in certain areas such as peace and security, human rights, the environment, and so on. Concomitantly there will be global institutions responsible for enforcement of these rules. In terms of institutions, representative assemblies should be returned by elections at every layer (local, national, regional and global), including continental parliaments and a reformed General Assembly of the UN. Last but not least, globally active organizations of civil society are welcome to contribute at the informal level of governance.[30]

To wrap up, it is in order to just repeat that the current state of global governance is very complex and its future development is open to many different directions. The paths discussed in preceding paragraphs are prominent examples in the growing global discourse but by no means exhaustive. New ideas may emerge in future. Our time is difficult in view of some intractable global problems but also exciting since significant advancements in human civilization often grew out of agonizing chaos.[31]

[30] This paragraph is paraphrased from an essay on "Citizenship" in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as of 1 August 2011, which is downloadable via http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship The essay has also covered the critique of this path to global democratic governance. The basic argument is the absence of necessary background conditions, such as a common language for communication, debates and deliberation.

[31] The period of warring states in China (475–221 BC) is a case in point. It witnesses the rise of great philosophers, establishment of government structures and consolidation of cultural patterns, all of which had long lasting impact. A short introduction to the subject can be found in *Britannica*.

Appendix – Coordination of Global Life

Degree of organization/Institutionalization
(with examples)

Coordination Mechanism	nascent <---*highly institutionalized*		
STATE ACTORS			
Individuals	unilateral strategic actions		
governments	(multilateral) diplomacy	summits: G6 → G7 → G8 → G20	
(national/sub-	EU –Asia Dialogue		
National)		sister cities	
IGOs	International IDEA		UN
(national or	GATT ---→ WTO		
(sub-	ASEAN The Nordic Region	EC-------------------------------------→ EU	
National)	(micro-regions, e.g. Pact of Lyon, Milan, Stuttgart & Barcelona in 1988)		
MARKET PLAYERS			
Individuals	manufacturers/firms w. overseas exposures		
Groups	multi-national corporations, incl.		
		mass media corporation such as Bloomberg	
INGOs (market)		credit rating agencies	
		E-trade platforms	
SOCIAL PARTICIPANTS (international civil society)			
Religious establishments			The universal Church
INGOs (Social)[32]	Int'l Association for Volunteer Efforts (IAV)		
		CARE Int'l, Transparency Int'l,	Red Cross
Movements		Pax Christi Int'l	
Advocacy networks			Green Peace, Amnesty Int'l
		Doctors without borders,	La Via Campesina
Epistemic networks	*Beidu*	CDEDN[33]	Wikipedia
HYBRID CONFIGURATIONS			
			CHIPS
		elections monitoring teams, policy networks	
Issue regimes		Basel Convention, Bretton Woods System, Human Rights	

[32] According to Public Interest Registry, there are 10 million multilateral NGOs and the number of UN accredited NGPs has grown from 40 in 1945 to 3,536 by the end of 2011. Source: http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/585/

[33] Citizenship, Democracy and Ethnocultural Diversity Newsletter, ed. & distributed by Will Kymlicka.