THE IMPACT OF REPLACEMENT MIGRATION ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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I have written this brief without having had the benefit of reading Professor Vallin's paper on demographic changes in the generational structures of human populations. I do not pretend to cover the whole range of demographic 'givens' including, above all, the analysis of future trends in fertility and mortality and their impact on the generational balance.

Given my interest in human migration and determined as I am not to intrude on Professor Vallin's territory, I propose to highlight the problem of replacement migration as a hypothetical demographic 'given' and a possible solution to population decline and population ageing. The latter topics were recently given prominence in Michael Schooyans' Dantesque vision of impending 'demographic crash' (Schooyans, 1999) and Caselli's and Vallin's Apocalyptic essay on the global 'limitless demography' postulating the average expectation of life of 85 years in 2050 and further increases to 100 years in the twenty-first century (Caselli and Vallin, 2001).

Replacement migration refers to 'the international migration that would be needed to offset declines in the population of working age as well as to offset the overall ageing of the population' (United Nations, 2001, p. 97). In what follows I propose to consider the future demand for replacement migration in Europe and Japan and the likely sources of such population flows with special reference to their impact on intergenerational solidarity in the receiving countries.

Replacement Migration: Demand and Supply

The demographic curve which features in Schooyans' analysis illustrates the extent of population decline in developed countries. In Europe,

according to the United Nations medium variant projections, the popula-
tion of the 47 countries will decline from its present (2001) size of 728 mil-
lion to only about 628 million. To prevent the decline, a net intake of 1.8
million a year or approximately twice the net number of migrants arriving
in Europe in 1997 would be required. By 2050, out of a total population of
728 million, 127 million or close to 18 per cent would be post-2000 immi-
grants or their descendants (United Nations, 2001, pp. 83-4). If we apply the
same seemingly unrealistic assumption to Japan, the country would need
17 million immigrants net up to the year 2050. At that time the immigrant
component would total 22.5 million and comprise 17 per cent of the total
population (United Nations, 2001, p. 53). Under an even less realistic sce-
nario which assumes the aim of keeping the country's working age popula-
tion constant, the proportions of immigrants would increase to 26 per cent
in Europe and 34 per cent in Japan!

All of the above calculations are indicative of the volume of replacement
migration vastly exceeding current levels of immigration. It needs to be
pointed out however, that the impact of such migratory flows would be felt
especially in countries and regions of Europe that are experiencing dra-
matically reduced levels of fertility: the Russian Federation, Germany, Italy,
Spain and the Baltic countries (United Nations, pp. 97-8).

Overall, while the UN migration projections are highly unrealistic and
do not take into account a myriad of other factors, they do underscore an
ongoing concern with, and debate about, low levels of fertility in devel-
oped countries.

Currently policy makers in developed countries are grappling with the
problems of population decline including the more than proportioned
drop in size of the working population. From which source can labour
shortages be met? Is it to be by increasing the age of retirement (Japan)
or by calling on the reserves of the female workforce (Italy, Spain) and
dealing with structural unemployment as in the former German
Democratic Republic? Or should the long term plans include substantial
changes to the present largely restrictive immigration policies to allow
entry for people from developing countries?

In the second half of the twentieth century, migration as a source of
labour supply was largely confined to the three traditional immigration
receiving countries – United States, Canada and Australia. At the same time
there was another group of countries in Europe which met shortages of
labour by immigration from former colonies – France and Britain. Germany
supplied the needs of the expanding economy by importing its 'guest work-
ers' (Gastarbeiter) from Turkey and parts of the eastern Mediterranean.

In the twenty-first century the scope for labour migration is increasing at an exponential rate. There has been a massive increase in the number of people for whom international migration has become a viable option. This applies especially to the Third World countries where increases in educational levels and massively improved transport and communication systems have increased the number of people who consider migration, whether it be legal or illegal.

Here the challenge to developing countries will be how to respond to massive gaps in world income resulting in economic pressures that force migration out of poor areas within nation states and in international migration movements. We know that 83 million people are added to the world population annually, of whom 82 will live in the developing world. Much of the increase will occur in parts of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, the two regions where poverty is currently concentrated (World Bank, pp. 81-82). In the past, pressure to migrate could be and was largely frustrated by immigration controls but in this century substantial increases in the working population could well produce uncontrollable situations. Gross over-population leading to intolerable conditions, usually combined with grave environmental deterioration, life-threatening famine and drought will all produce global emergencies. The seeking of refuge will not only be a basic matter of international peace and security, it will be also a massive challenge and call for leadership at all levels of society.

More specifically, the challenge will be for policy makers to come to grips with the prospect of a progressive but inevitable change in ethnic and racial composition of the workforce since those accepted for immigration or given asylum in Europe and other developed parts of the First World will come from the Third World.

Replacement Migration and Intergenerational Solidarity

Given the recent history of the growth of anti-immigration political parties in Europe and elsewhere, and the continuing debate about border controls in 'Fortress Europe', an increased inflow of other races adding to the existing populations of immigrant origin and, as in the documented case of France and Britain, creating unrest among ethnic minority youths (Jolly, Rex) is bound to increase the already existing demographic and economic divide between generations – those in the workforce (the 'Young') and those living in retirement (the 'Old'). As I have argued elsewhere, this 'could prove to be one of the defining issues of the twenty-first century' (Zubrzycki, p.

204). One could speculate about how the existing discord between 'too many pensioners' and 'too few youthful workers' (Zubrzycki, p. 205) might be transformed into the reality of a racial clash between the old 'White' and the young increasingly 'Coloured'. In addition, the underlying issue of wealth sharing and economic transfers will add to intergenerational tension (Mason and Tapinos, 2000).

A comprehensive reassessment of many established economic and social policies and programs will also need to include the current practice of selective immigration of skilled workers and its impact on the brain drain from developed countries driving unskilled workers into illegal migration as has been proved in the last decade of the twentieth century (World Bank, p. 83). Even more difficult issues that will require reassessment are current policies and programs relating to the integration of large numbers of recent migrants and their descendants. From my perspective and professional experience, these can be summarized under the rubric temporary versus multicultural settlement migration. Temporary migration – as exemplified in Germany's Gastarbeiter model – produced the situation of permanent disadvantage for migrants in their access to the receiving society – the phenomenon of underclass as shown in Dr Jolly's paper. By contrast the policy of migration for settlement as practiced – for example – in Australia, Canada and Sweden is designed to remove temporary disadvantage by providing a wide range of settlement services and an offer of citizenship. In such countries we find various forms of multiculturalism favouring an equal model of rights and responsibilities, the championing of ethnic and cultural heritage within a framework of obligation to the receiving society. Only with an imaginative strategy for integrating immigrants can countries ensure that they enrich the host society more than they unsettle it.

Conclusion

I have argued in this paper that the decision to accept the newcomer – the regular immigrant or a defenceless refugee seeking asylum – will be affected not just by political considerations but also by the demographic realities of what should be seen as the West's culture of decline or Schooyans' *le crash démographique*. I have also stressed the urgency of population and migration pressures that will force developed countries to accept substantial numbers of people required to fill gaps in the workforce. Over time this process might aggravate existing tensions between the generations: the Old, predominantly white, will look askance at the coloured Young.

We were reminded in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* that 'The exercise of solidarity within each society is valid when its members recognize one another as persons. Those who are more influential, because they have a greater share of goods and common services, should feel responsible for the weaker and be ready to share with them all they possess. Those who are weaker, for their part, in the same spirit of solidarity should not adopt a purely passive attitude, or one that is destructive of the social fabric, but ... should do what they can for the good of all' (*SRS*, 39).

How can this injunction be translated into a pro-solidarity policy in a society whose social fabric may be threatened by the intergenerational tension brought about by an explosive combination of demographic 'givens'? It would appear that the settlement-multicultural model of immigration is *a priori* more conducive to the maintenance of intergenerational solidarity as laid down in the Papal exhortation. If the newcomers are recognized as persons, if their ethnic background and culture are seen as an asset that can enrich the receiving society, if they have access to the society's goods and services, then they will not adopt those passive attitudes 'destructive of the social fabric'. At the same time people in the host society committed to human dignity will take a stand against the tendency to make immigrants the scapegoats for social problems. Surely a tough prescription for societies still smarting from the events of September 11, 2001!

Here is the challenge of the multicultural state: how to integrate migrants yet foster diversity; how to let diversity flourish, maintain tight security in containing terrorism, yet foster a sense of national identity that carries divergent groups. It is a problem being played out all over the Western world. At its essence it is about how identities will be shaped in an ever-changing global landscape.

One final point for the future agenda of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. The ideas that we take on board for close examination deal mostly with the way in which reforming societies handle the problem of social cohesion and conflict. In the context of this commentary, the issue of solidarity and its promotion through immigration programs focusing on multicultural settlement is an example of social reform that did not originate from the grass roots but was launched by politicians converted to the idea by social scientists. This raises an important point of policy: what educational approaches are required to promote multiculturalism and comparable programs of social engineering? Would the Academy take multicultural education – or simply general education – as the focus of its ongoing inquiry?

From my Australian experience I conclude that multicultural education holds the key to successful social engineering. The old dogs in the population may not be able to learn new tricks. But the youngsters can. Everything will depend on the spirit in which the coming generations are raised, not only in their formal schooling but also in the respective ethnic gatherings and communal organizations. This topic could well feature in the Academy's newly revived interest in the sociologist's 'intermediate structures'.

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