

THE PONTIFICAL  
ACADEMY OF  
SOCIAL SCIENCES

Acta

10

# Intergenerational Solidarity, Welfare and Human Ecology

Edited by  
**MARY ANN GLENDON**



VATICAN CITY  
2004

*The Proceedings of the Tenth Plenary Session  
of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences*

29 APRIL - 3 MAY 2003

**INTERGENERATIONAL  
SOLIDARITY, WELFARE  
AND HUMAN ECOLOGY**

*Address*

THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
CASINA PIO IV, 00120 VATICAN CITY

THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Acta 10

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The opinions expressed with absolute freedom during the presentation of the papers of this meeting, although published by the Academy, represent only the points of view of the participants and not those of the Academy.

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THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
VATICAN CITY



*Joannes Paulus 10 5*



The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Casina Pio IV



The Participants of the Tenth Plenary Session of 30 April 2004





The Participants of the Tenth Plenary Session of 30 April 2004

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## ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE HOLY FATHER

Holy Father,

Today your Academy of Social Sciences comes before you in the tenth anniversary year of its founding. Many of us were present ten years ago when, in your first address to us, you exhorted us to be bold, like Thomas Aquinas who fearlessly engaged in dialogue with the best natural and human science of his time as well as with the ideas of the great minds of antiquity. You encouraged us to follow the example of Thomas by 'gather[ing] all the grains of truth present in the various intellectual and empirical approaches'.

You also reminded us on that occasion that it is not enough merely to harvest the wisdom of the social sciences. You enjoined us to bring that wisdom to bear on human realities 'with a view to finding solutions to people's concrete problems, solutions based on social justice'.

In 1998, you again encouraged us to be bold. You asked us to keep in mind that we would sometimes be called to play the role of 'pioneers ... to indicate new paths and new solutions for solving in a more equitable way the burning issues of today's world'.

Over the past ten years, Holy Father, we have tried to live up to your hopes for the Academy. Under the inspired and inspiring leadership of President Edmond Malinvaud, we have brought interdisciplinary scholarship to bear on four areas where it seemed to us that 'burning issues' posed new challenges for the human family and for Catholic social thought: the changing world of work, the risks and opportunities presented by globalization, the dilemmas of democracy, and the topic to which we gave the name 'intergenerational solidarity'.

This week we mark our tenth anniversary with our first Plenary Session on intergenerational solidarity. Partly in response to concern about the looming crisis of the welfare state in many places, we asked the speakers and commentators to focus primarily on the challenges posed by the fact that changing relations between generations have placed increasing strain on every society's capacity to provide for the needs of the very young, the

frail elderly, and the severely ill or disabled. In so doing, we heeded your reminder when you first addressed us ten years ago that the very *raison d'être* of social programs 'should be protection of the weakest'.

Our aim this week is to move well beyond standard debates over the 'welfare crisis'. For underlying the welfare crisis is a deeper crisis of meanings and values. Changes in family behavior are fueling, and being fueled by, changes in *ideas* about dependency, the human person, and family life that have far-reaching implications for the human prospect – for the world's experiments in self-government, for the health of economies, for human rights, and for the future of our social and natural environments.

By lifting up the concept of 'solidarity' we seek to challenge solutions based on conflict models that are grounded in flawed concepts of man and society. With our reference to 'ecology' we signal that we will be searching for ways to shift probabilities in favor of keeping the human person at the center of concern. Our hope for this conference is that we will emerge not only with a better understanding of the questions, but with a set of conclusions that will serve as springboards for continued exploration of this subject in future meetings and study groups.

Such, Holy Father, are the steps we are taking this week as we continue to try to serve the Church and to live up to the confidence you reposed in us when you called this Academy into being ten years ago.

Mary Ann Glendon

## ADDRESS OF JOHN PAUL II TO THE MEMBERS OF THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Your Eminences, Your Excellencies, Dear Members of the Academy,

1. I greet you all with affection and esteem as we celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. I thank your new President, Professor Mary Ann Glendon, and offer cordial good wishes as she begins her service. At the same time I express my deep gratitude to Professor Edmond Malinvaud for his commitment to the work of the Academy in studying such complex questions as labour and unemployment, forms of social inequality, and democracy and globalization. I am also grateful to Monsignor Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo for his efforts to make the work of the Academy accessible to a wider audience through the resources of modern communications.

2. The theme which you are presently studying – that of relations between generations – is closely connected to your research on globalization. In earlier times the care of grown children for their parents was taken for granted. The family was the primary place of an inter-generational solidarity. There was the solidarity of marriage itself, in which spouses took each other for better or worse and committed themselves to offer each other lifelong mutual assistance. This solidarity of the married couple soon extended to their children, whose education demanded a strong and lasting bond. This led in turn to solidarity between grown children and their aging parents.

At present relations between generations are undergoing significant changes as a result of various factors. In many areas there has been a weakening of the marriage bond, which is often perceived as a mere contract between two individuals. The pressures of a consumer society can cause families to divert attention from the home to the workplace or to a variety of social activities. Children are at times perceived, even before their birth, as an obstacle to the personal fulfilment of their parents, or are seen as one object to be chosen among others. Inter-generational relations are thus affected, since many grown children now leave to the state or society at large the care of their aged parents. The instability of the marriage bond in certain social settings likewise has led to a growing tendency for adult children




to distance themselves from their parents and to delegate to third parties the natural obligation and divine command to honour one's father and mother.

3. Given the fundamental importance of solidarity in the building of healthy human societies,<sup>1</sup> I encourage your study of these significant realities and express my hope that it will lead to a clearer appreciation of the need for a solidarity which crosses generations and unites individuals and groups in mutual assistance and enrichment. I am confident that your research in this area will make a valuable contribution to the development of the Church's social teaching.

Particular attention needs to be paid to the precarious situation of many elderly persons, which varies according to nations and regions.<sup>2</sup> Many of them have insufficient resources or pensions, some suffer from physical maladies, while others no longer feel useful or are ashamed that they require special care, and all too many simply feel abandoned. These issues will certainly be more evident as the number of the elderly increases and the population itself ages as a result of the decline in the birthrate and the availability of better medical care.

4. In meeting these challenges, every generation and social group has a role to play. Special attention needs to be paid to the respective competencies of the State and the family in the building of an effective solidarity between generations. In full respect for the principle of subsidiarity,<sup>3</sup> public authorities must be concerned to acknowledge the effects of an individualism which – as your studies have already shown – can seriously affect relations between different generations. For its part, the family, as the origin and foundation of human society,<sup>4</sup> also has an irreplaceable role in the building of inter-generational solidarity. There is no age when one ceases to be a father or mother, a son or daughter. We have a special responsibility not only towards those to whom we have given the gift of life, but also toward those from whom we have received that gift.

Dear Members of the Academy, as you carry forward your important work I offer you my prayerful good wishes and I cordially invoke upon you and your loved ones the abundant blessings of Almighty God.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely of Pope Francis, written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and somewhat stylized, with a small cross at the end.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, 38-40.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Evangelium Vitae*, 44; *Centesimus Annus*, 33.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Centesimus Annus*, 48.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Apostolicam Actuositatem*, 11; *Familiaris Consortio*, 42.

## DISCORSO DI GIOVANNI PAOLO II AI PARTECIPANTI ALL'ASSEMBLEA PLENARIA DELLA PONTIFICIA ACCADEMIA DELLE SCIENZE SOCIALI

Eminenze, Eccellenze, Gentili Membri dell'Accademia,

1. Saluto tutti voi con affetto e stima, mentre celebriamo *il decimo anniversario della Pontificia Accademia delle Scienze Sociali*. Ringrazio il vostro nuovo Presidente, la Professoressa Mary Ann Glendon, e le offro i miei cordiali buoni auspici mentre inizia il suo servizio. Al contempo, esprimo la mia profonda gratitudine al Professor Edmond Malinvaud per la sua dedizione al lavoro dell'Accademia nello studio di questioni tanto difficili come il lavoro e la disoccupazione, le forme di disuguaglianza sociale, e la democrazia e la globalizzazione. Sono grato anche a Monsignore Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, per i suoi sforzi per rendere il lavoro dell'Accademia accessibile a un pubblico più vasto attraverso le risorse delle comunicazioni moderne.

2. Il tema che state studiando attualmente, ossia i rapporti tra le generazioni, è strettamente connesso alle vostre ricerche sulla globalizzazione. In passato, la cura dei genitori da parte dei figli adulti era data per scontata. La famiglia era il luogo primario di una *solidarietà inter-generazionale*. Vi era la solidità del matrimonio stesso, dove i coniugi si prendevano a vicenda nel bene e nel male e si impegnavano ad assistersi reciprocamente per tutta la vita. Questa solidità della coppia sposata si estendeva ben presto ai figli, la cui educazione esigeva un legame forte e duraturo. Questo, a sua volta, portava alla solidarietà tra i figli adulti e i genitori anziani.

Attualmente, i rapporti tra le generazioni stanno subendo significativi cambiamenti a causa di diversi fattori. In molte aree vi è stato un indebolimento del vincolo matrimoniale, che spesso viene percepito come semplice contratto tra due individui. Le pressioni di una società consumistica possono far sì che la famiglia sposti l'attenzione dall'ambiente domestico al luogo di lavoro o a una varietà di attività sociali. I bambini, talvolta, vengo percepiti, anche prima della loro nascita, come un ostacolo alla realizzazione personale dei genitori, oppure vengono visti come un

oggetto da scegliere tra tanti altri. I rapporti inter-generazionali, pertanto, ne vengono influenzati, poiché molti figli adulti ora lasciano allo Stato o alla società in generale la cura dei loro genitori anziani. Anche l'instabilità del vincolo matrimoniale in certi ambienti sociali ha portato alla crescente tendenza, da parte dei figli adulti, a distanziarsi dai genitori e a delegare a terzi l'obbligo naturale e il comandamento divino di onorare il padre e la madre.

3. Data l'importanza fondamentale della solidarietà per costruire società umane sane,<sup>1</sup> incoraggio i vostri studi relativi a queste significative realtà ed esprimo il mio auspicio che possano portare a una comprensione più chiara dell'esigenza di una solidarietà che attraversi le generazioni e unisca gli individui e i gruppi nell'assistenza e nell'arricchimento reciproci. Sono fiducioso che le vostre ricerche in questo ambito daranno un contributo prezioso allo sviluppo della dottrina sociale della Chiesa.

Occorre prestare una particolare attenzione alla situazione precaria di molte persone anziane, che varia a seconda delle nazioni e delle regioni.<sup>2</sup> Molte di loro hanno risorse o pensioni insufficienti, alcune soffrono di malattie fisiche, mentre altre non si sentono più utili o si vergognano di avere bisogno di cure particolari, e troppe si sentono semplicemente abbandonate. Questi aspetti diventeranno ancor più evidenti, poiché il numero degli anziani aumenta e la popolazione stessa invecchia in seguito alla diminuzione delle nascite.

4. Nell'affrontare queste sfide, *ogni generazione e gruppo sociale ha un ruolo da svolgere*. Occorre prestare particolare attenzione alle rispettive competenze dello Stato e della famiglia nella costruzione di una *solidarietà efficace tra le generazioni*. Nel pieno rispetto del principio di sussidiarietà,<sup>3</sup> le autorità pubbliche devono preoccuparsi di riconoscere gli effetti di un individualismo che, come i vostri studi hanno già dimostrato, può influire seriamente sui rapporti tra le diverse generazioni. Da parte sua, anche la famiglia, come origine e fondamento della società umana,<sup>4</sup> ha un ruolo insostituibile nel costruire la solidarietà intergenerazionale. Non vi è un'età in cui si cessa di essere padre o madre, figlio o figlia. Abbiamo una responsabilità speciale, non solo verso coloro ai quali

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, n. 38-40.


<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Evangelium Vitae*, n. 44; *Centesimus Annus*, n. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Centesimus Annus*, n. 48.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Apostolicam Actuositatem*, n. 11; *Familiaris Consortio*, n. 42.

abbiamo fatto il dono della vita, ma anche verso coloro dai quali questo dono lo abbiamo ricevuto.

Cari Membri dell'Accademia, mentre proseguite il vostro importante lavoro, vi offro i miei buoni auspici oranti e cordialmente invoco su di voi e sui vostri cari le abbondanti benedizioni di Dio Onnipotente.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Giovanni Paolo II".

ANSPRACHE VON JOHANNES PAUL II.  
AN DIE DIE MITGLIEDER DER PÄPSTLICHEN  
AKADEMIE DER SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN

Eminenzen, Exzellenzen, verehrte Mitglieder der Akademie!

1. Voller Zuneigung und Wertschätzung grüße ich Sie anlässlich des 10. Gründungsjubiläums der Päpstlichen Akademie der Sozialwissenschaften. Ich danke Ihrer neuen Präsidentin, Frau Professor Mary Ann Glendon, und wünsche ihr alles Gute zu ihrem Amtsantritt. Zugleich spreche ich Herrn Professor Edmond Malinvaud meine tiefe Dankbarkeit aus für seine hingebungsvolle Mitarbeit in der Akademie hinsichtlich der Untersuchung komplexer und schwieriger Fragen wie Arbeit und Arbeitslosigkeit, Formen sozialer Ungerechtigkeit, Demokratie und Globalisierung. Auch danke ich Msgr. Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo für seine Bemühungen, die Arbeit der Akademie durch die modernen Kommunikationsmittel einem breiteren Publikum zugänglich zu machen.

2. Das Thema, mit dem Sie sich derzeit beschäftigen – die Beziehungen zwischen den Generationen – steht in engem Zusammenhang mit der von Ihnen durchgeführten wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung des Phänomens der Globalisierung. Früher war es selbstverständlich, daß sich erwachsene Kinder um ihre Eltern kümmerten. Die Familie war der vorrangige Bereich einer Solidarität zwischen den Generationen. Es bestand Solidarität innerhalb der Ehe selbst, in der die Eheleute in Freud und Leid zueinander standen und sich für das ganze Leben zu gegenseitiger Hilfe verpflichteten. Diese Solidarität des Ehepaares übertrug sich bald auf die Kinder, deren Erziehung starke und dauerhafte Bindungen erforderten. Dies wiederum führte zur Solidarität zwischen den erwachsenen Kindern und ihren älter werdenden Eltern.

Aufgrund verschiedener Faktoren sind die Beziehungen zwischen den Generationen gegenwärtig wesentlichen Veränderungen ausgesetzt. In vielen Gebieten ist eine Schwächung des Ehebundes festzustellen, der häufig als bloßer Vertrag zwischen den Partnern verstanden wird. Der Druck der Konsumgesellschaft kann dazu führen, daß die Familie ihre Aufmerksamkeit

vom häuslichen Bereich abwendet und auf den Arbeitsplatz oder andere gesellschaftliche Aktivitäten richtet. Bereits vor ihrer Geburt werden Kinder mitunter als Hindernis für die persönliche Verwirklichung der Eltern empfunden oder als ein Objekt unter vielen anderen betrachtet. Die Beziehungen zwischen den Generationen werden somit beeinträchtigt, zumal viele erwachsene Kinder heute die Sorge für ihre älter werdenden Eltern dem Staat oder allgemein der Gesellschaft überlassen. Auch hat die Unbeständigkeit des Ehebundes in einigen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen dazu geführt, daß die erwachsenen Kinder zunehmend von ihren Eltern Abstand nehmen sowie die natürliche Pflicht und das Gebot Gottes, Vater und Mutter zu ehren, auf andere abschieben.

3. Da die Solidarität für den Aufbau gesunder menschlicher Gesellschaften<sup>1</sup> von grundlegender Bedeutung ist, unterstütze ich die von Ihnen durchgeführte Untersuchung dieser wichtigen Sachverhalte und hoffe, daß sie uns klarer die Notwendigkeit einer Solidarität erkennen läßt, die über die Generationen hinausgeht und Einzelpersonen wie Gruppen in gegenseitiger Unterstützung und Bereicherung miteinander verbindet. Zweifellos wird Ihre Forschungsarbeit auf diesem Gebiet einen wertvollen Beitrag für die Entwicklung der kirchlichen Soziallehre leisten.

Ganz besondere Aufmerksamkeit erfordert auch die schwierige Situation zahlreicher alter Menschen, die je nach Nation und Region verschieden ist.<sup>2</sup> Viele von ihnen haben nur unzulängliche finanzielle Mittel oder niedrige Pensionen, einige sind physisch krank, während sich andere als nutzlos ansehen oder sich schämen, auf besondere Betreuung angewiesen zu sein, und allzu viele dieser Menschen fühlen sich einsam und verlassen. Zweifellos werden diese Probleme noch deutlicher zutage treten, da die Zahl alter Menschen ansteigt und die Bevölkerung selbst infolge des Geburtenrückgangs altert.

4. Angesichts dieser Herausforderungen kommt jeder Generation und jeder Gesellschaftsgruppe eine spezifische Funktion zu. Ganz besondere Aufmerksamkeit muß dabei den jeweiligen staatlichen und familiären Leistungen zum Aufbau einer nachhaltigen Solidarität zwischen den Generationen gewidmet werden. In voller Achtung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips<sup>3</sup> müssen die staatlichen Behörden sich darum bemühen, die Folgen jenes


<sup>1</sup> Vgl. *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, 38–40.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. *Evangelium Vitae*, 44; *Centesimus Annus*, 33.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. *Centesimus Annus*, 48.

Individualismus zu erkennen, der – wie Ihre Studien bereits gezeigt haben – ernsthafte Auswirkungen auf die Beziehungen zwischen den verschiedenen Generationen haben kann. Die Familie als Ursprung und Fundament der menschlichen Gesellschaft<sup>4</sup> hat ihrerseits auch eine unersetzliche Funktion für die Förderung der Solidarität zwischen den Generationen. In keinem Alter hört man auf, Vater oder Mutter, Sohn oder Tochter zu sein. Wir haben eine besondere Verantwortung nicht nur jenen gegenüber, denen wir das Leben geschenkt haben, sondern auch denjenigen gegenüber, von denen wir dieses Geschenk empfangen haben.

Liebe Mitglieder der Akademie, für Ihre wichtige Arbeit wünsche ich Ihnen alles Gute und erbitte für Sie sowie für alle, die Ihnen nahestehen, von Herzen den reichen Segen des Allmächtigen Gottes.

The image shows a handwritten signature in cursive script, which reads "Johannes Paulus II.". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the main text block.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. *Apostolicam Actuositatem*, 11; *Familiaris Consortio*, 12.

## WELCOMING REMARKS

MARY ANN GLENDON

Your Eminences, Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Presidents of Sister Academies, Honored Guests, and Dear Colleagues,

On this tenth anniversary of the founding of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, it is a great pleasure to welcome you to our First Plenary Session devoted to the topic of Intergenerational Solidarity.

Every year since our founding, we have been welcomed here, and our work has been guided by, our distinguished colleague Edmond Malinvaud. On Monday afternoon, when we celebrate the Academy's 10th anniversary, we will pay formal tribute to his wise and dedicated leadership through those crucial formative years. But for the moment, I know I speak for all of us Academicians when I say how grateful we are to you, our dear First President, for the generous gift of your talents and time, for your inspiring example of dedication to academic excellence, and for representing us in a way that has always made us feel proud to be associated with you and with the Academy. In succeeding you, for the moment I will only say that I am aware that I am following in some very large footsteps, and that I will do my best to live up to your example of faithful stewardship. On Monday, I and others will have much more to say about what your service has meant to us.

I would like to extend a very special welcome this morning to our distinguished guest speakers, Cardinal Rouco, and Professors Fukuyama and Vallin. We are delighted to have you with us, and we are grateful to you for agreeing to share your wisdom and experience with us over the next few days.

It is an honor to have so many Ambassadors here today. We thank you for your presence and hope you will join us again on Monday when we celebrate our tenth anniversary.

We are honored as well by the Presidents of sister academies who have taken the time to be with us as we mark a milestone in our common search for knowledge.



I also wish to warmly welcome our two new Academicians, Professor Kevin Ryan and Professor Joseph Stiglitz. Each of them brings such extraordinary strengths and gifts to us. I know all of your new colleagues are looking forward to getting acquainted with you and to many years of fruitful collaboration.

Finally, I must note with sadness the absence this year from our midst of our departed colleagues Serguei Averintsev and Pier Luigi Zampetti. We will remember these friends in our Masses this week, and later in the program we will pause to give thanks for their lives and to commemorate their contributions to our work.

For the benefit of our visitors and new members, a few words about the Academy may be in order. Though what I am about to say is quite familiar to my colleagues, I hope they will not mind a bit of reminiscing. After all, this is an anniversary, and on such occasions, it is often pleasant to remind ourselves of where we came from and why we are here.

As you have heard, we are only ten years old. That means, by traditional Catholic reckoning, that we are supposed to have reached the age of reason. Nevertheless, we are somewhat overshadowed by our elder sibling, the venerable Pontifical Academy of Sciences which has passed its 400th birthday, and with which we share this beautiful home.

This Academy was created by Pope John Paul II in 1994. Its membership, appointed by him, is multinational and interdisciplinary. The Academy is directly dependent on him, as distinct from being an adjunct of a department of the Holy See.

The purposes of the Academy, as set forth in our statutes, are twofold: to provide the Church with useful material to aid in the continuing 'development of her social doctrine' and to promote the study of the social, economic, political and juridical sciences. In that second capacity, we are much like other learned academies except that our international character makes us, I believe, unique. In our relation to the Church, we are somewhat like advisory bodies whose purpose is not to announce policy, but rather to make sure that those who do announce policy positions have the best possible information and ideas at their disposal.

The Church's social doctrine, however, does not consist of policy prescriptions, nor does it offer technical solutions to specific problems. As Pope John Paul II has put it,

The Church has no models to present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations, through the efforts of all those who responsibly confront

concrete problems in all their social, economic, political and cultural aspects, as these interact with one another (CA, 43).

What then is this body of social teaching whose development the Academy is supposed to aid? Here is how the Pope put it in his encyclical *On Social Concern*: the aim of the social doctrine is to offer ‘principles for reflection, criteria of judgments and directives for action’ showing that the Gospel message in all its richness and newness applies ‘to people’s lives and the life of society (8)’.<sup>1</sup>

Prior to the establishment of this Academy, the Church formulated her social doctrine in close collaboration with Catholic social movements on the one hand and social scientists on the other. She thus had the benefit of the experiences of first-hand observers and participants in Catholic social action as well as expert advice from the social sciences. From the beginning, Catholic social thought has understood that theory and practice are like the two blades of a scissors: neither one is of much use without the other.

But the task of discerning how basic Christian principles apply to constantly changing economic, social and political conditions has become increasingly complex. Thus, the establishment of this Academy in 1994 marked a step toward more continuous and deeper dialogue with the research and findings of the social sciences.

At the same time, however, the Pope signaled in 1994 that he did not expect the Casina Pio IV to be an ivory tower remote from practical experience and everyday human situations. In his first address to us, he stressed the importance of bringing our expertise to bear on concrete human problems. The Pope also made clear ten years ago his hope that the relationship between Catholic social thought and the social sciences would be a two-way street. In *Centesimus Annus*, he had already written that by entering into dialogue with the disciplines concerned with the human person, the Church not only ‘assimilates what these various disciplines have to contribute’, but also ‘helps them to open themselves to a broader horizon’ (CA, 59).

<sup>1</sup> As Pope John Paul II put it in an address to our Academy four years ago, the Church’s social doctrine is meant to be

a vehicle through which the Gospel of Jesus Christ is brought to bear on the different cultural, economic and political situations facing modern men and women. ... The Church’s task – her right and her duty – is to enunciate those basic ethical principles forming the foundation and proper functioning of society, within which men and women make their pilgrim way to their transcendent destiny.

In 1998, he asked us to keep in mind that we are called to play a role of mediation and dialogue between faith and science, between ideals and concrete situations; a role that is sometimes one of pioneers, because you are asked to indicate new paths and new solutions for solving in a more equitable way the burning issues of today's world.

For the past ten years, we have tried to live up to those high expectations. We have focused our activities on four broadly overlapping areas where it seemed to us there were 'burning issues' that pose new challenges for Catholic social thought: the changing world of work, the risks and opportunities presented by globalization, the dilemmas of democracy, and a still more diffuse topic to which we gave the name 'intergenerational solidarity' and to which we now turn.

## INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

MARY ANN GLENDON

Last year, after a preparatory meeting on Intergenerational Solidarity, we attempted to narrow the theme of this first plenary session somewhat by focussing primarily on the ways that changing relations between generations have placed increasing strain on every society's capacity to provide for the needs of the very young, the frail elderly, and the severely ill or disabled. Hence, the word 'welfare' in the conference title.

As we look back on the latter part of the twentieth century, we can see that economic transitions and demographic earthquakes have shaken all of the four pillars upon which most individuals rely for support, security and social standing – the family, market work, governmental assistance, and the broad array of associations that are known collectively in Catholic social thought as the mediating structures of civil society. Dramatic changes in birth rates, longevity, marriage behavior, and women's roles, geographic mobility (and the list could go on), have had profound effects on the 'load-bearing capacity' of each of these pillars. These changes have affected affluent and developing nations alike, in differing ways, and to varying degrees. They have jeopardized the well-being of the very young, the frail elderly, and other dependents – both in welfare states and in countries where government's role in providing social services is minimal or non-existent. No society has been unaffected, and no society has yet fully faced up to the unprecedented challenges posed by these changes – in a world where dependency remains a stubborn fact of human existence.

As is apparent from the reference to 'human ecology' in the conference title, our aim this week is to move well beyond standard debates over the 'welfare crisis'. For changes in family behavior, and – what is equally important – changes in *ideas* about dependency and family life have far-reaching implications for the human prospect – for the world's democratic experi-

ments, for the health of economies, and for the future of our social and natural environments. As John Paul II wrote in *Centesimus Annus*,

The first and fundamental structure for ‘human ecology’ is the family, in which man receives his first formative ideas about truth and goodness, and learns what it actually means to be a person (39).

(Aware that the very concept of family is contested, he continued,

Here we mean the *family founded on marriage*, in which the mutual gift of self by husband and wife creates an environment in which children can be born and develop their potentialities, become aware of their dignity and prepare to face their unique and individual destiny).

By lifting up the word ‘solidarity’ in our title, we hope to engage the social sciences in dialogue about that concept, so central to Catholic social teaching. At the present time, to the extent that intergenerational relations come to public attention, they are typically presented in terms of conflict, rather than solidarity, among the generations. Consider, for example, four unsettling news stories from the past year – two from Europe, one from China and one from Africa.

In Europe, last summer, there were several reports of, on the one hand, strikes and protests over proposals to cut back on pensions or to raise the retirement age, and, on the other hand, complaints by young people of the high cost of health care for the elderly. (One German youth leader gained notoriety by suggesting that old folks should use crutches rather than have expensive hip replacements).

Then, last August, came a second troubling news story, this time from France: the report that thousands of elderly French men and women had died in a heat wave, many of them under circumstances that raised questions about how family members see their priorities and their responsibilities – in a country where government subsidies encourage in-home rather than institutional care.

The third story to which I refer concerns China, and it reveals that intergenerational conflict is not restricted to the liberal welfare states. In that country, where modern law as well as centuries-old traditions accord a high priority to care for the elderly, there has recently been an explosion of lawsuits by elderly parents against their own children who have failed to meet their legal obligations of support. In this case, the breakdown of the post-1948 ‘danwei’ system of communes and worker collectives, together with the effects of the one-child policy, has plunged that vast nation into its own version of a welfare crisis.

In Africa, solidarity among generations has been blasted by illness and poverty. Among the most poignant news stories of 2003 were those dealing with orphans of the AIDS epidemic. The deaths of so many young adults – parents and productive workers – has dealt a devastating blow to hopes of that continent’s people for a better future. In contrast to Iran, where nearly all of the 1200 children orphaned by last year’s devastating earthquake in the city of Bam were quickly claimed by relatives, many African countries have been so hard hit by AIDS that extended families cannot begin to absorb the large numbers of orphans: More than 11 million children have already lost one or both parents and that figure is rising rapidly.

While each of those four stories could be said to be a sign of the times, another unfolding story about relations among the generations has *not* been widely reported. That is the increasing conflict between the desires of adults and the needs of children in cultures where individual self-fulfillment is exalted at the expense of responsibility for dependents.

In sum, the time seems overdue to take stock of how the great upheavals of the late twentieth century (what our guest Professor Fukuyama has called ‘The Great Disruption’) have impaired the ability of families to care for their dependent members, the health of the communities of memory and mutual aid that surround and support families, and the capacity of governments to furnish the basic social services that came to be accepted in the past century as universal human rights. Ironically, the ambition of the world’s welfare states to free individuals from much of their dependence on families, and to relieve families from some of their responsibilities for their weaker members, may have succeeded just well enough to put dependents at heightened risk now that the welfare state itself is in crisis. Increasingly, one of the most influential ideas in modern political theory is showing its flaws: the concept of the human person as radically autonomous, self-determining, and self-sufficient. (In that connection, let us note in passing that next year’s plenary session will be devoted to a study of the concepts of the human person embedded in law, economics, and social theory).

As we will hear in our opening discussion this morning, the issues that arise under the heading of Intergenerational Solidarity are of special concern to Catholic social doctrine. As usual, we begin our deliberations with a session on the state of the question as it appears currently in Catholic social teaching. Then, as background to all of our work over the next few days, we will hear presentations on the demographic and cultural developments that are affecting relations among the generations all over the world in diverse ways. In coming days, we will hear a series of presentations on

the various ways in which these developments are playing out in different contexts, on what they may mean for the human prospect, and what men and women of good will might be able to do to shift the probabilities in a more favorable direction for the future. Our hope for this conference is that we will emerge not only with a better understanding of the questions, but with a set of conclusions that will serve as springboards for continued exploration of this subject in future meetings and study groups.

Now, and finally, before turning the program over to our Chairperson, I would like to note the felicitous coincidence that we begin our work today on the Feast of St Catherine of Siena, a great doctor of the Church. And I would like to suggest that we approach the work ahead in the spirit of another great Church doctor, St Thomas Aquinas, who sought out the greatest thinkers he could find – of all faiths and of no faith – and who engaged with them so intensely and so productively. Every day, before taking up his studies, Thomas prayed for wisdom in a way that we might make our own:

*Tu che sei la vera sorgente della luce e della sapienza et il Principio dal quale tutto dipende, degnati di infondere nella mia oscura intelligenza un raggio del Tuo splendore che allontanati da me le tenebre del peccato e dell'ignoranza; dammi forza per incominciare bene il mio studio; guidami lungo il corso della mia fatica; dà loro felice compimento.*

## REPORT OF THE PAST PRESIDENT MAY 2003 TO FEBRUARY 2004

EDMOND MALINVAUD

On 26th February 2004 Academician Mary Ann Glendon was appointed by the Holy Father as President of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, which was a most welcome piece of news. The new President asked me to write this report of what had happened since the previous plenary session, held in early May 2003 and on the projects which were already well under way when she was appointed. I have first the sad duty to write *in memoriam* of our two deceased Colleagues.<sup>1</sup>

Pier Luigi Zampetti (1927-2003) died on the first of November. He was a member of our Council from 1994 to his death. Academicians will always remember his sustained and passionate participation in our meetings. Indeed, Cardinal Re characterized him as 'a fighter for just causes with a strong sense of duty'. He was born near Milan. Most of his academic career developed in Northern Italy where he taught law and political science, stressing a philosophical point of view. During the fifties and sixties his research concerned a general humanistic philosophy geared to juridical and political problems. Later he turned to the elaboration of an alternative theory to both capitalism and socialism, in order to propose a system in which subsidiarity and participation would operate at all levels of society.

Serguei Averintsev (1937-2004) died on 21 February. When he was appointed Pontifical Academician in January 1994, he was well established as professor of slavistic linguistics at the University of Vienna. But, born in Moscow, he had long lived and asserted himself in Russia, both as a Christian orthodox and as an exceptional man of letters, honored by the Lenin prize at

<sup>1</sup> Longer remembrances made by Cardinal Re, Academician Schooyans and Academician Zubrzycki are here published on pages xxxvii, xlvi.



the age of thirty, for a book on the art of the literary portrait in antiquity, becoming in 1980 a corresponding member of the Moscow Academy of Sciences. A main line at the centre of his research remained devoted to the relevance of Christian ideas in the different epochs of early Byzantine and Russian literature. More generally, the cultural problems of Russia stood as a domain of application of his analysis of formal aspects of literary creativity.

Two new Academicians were appointed by the Holy Father. On 13 August it was Professor Kevin Ryan. Born in 1932 in a little village outside of New York, having served in the Navy at the time of the Korean War, he got his Ph.D. from the University of Stanford with a dissertation on the education of teachers. He held a number of academic positions from the University of Chicago to the University of Boston, where he is now Professor Emeritus. The focus of his research, writings and active teaching shows remarkable continuity since his dissertation. A main concern emerged more and more, namely to assist primary and secondary schools so that children acquire good moral judgment and the enduring habits which are at the heart of good character. This activity was distinguished by many awards.

Professor Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate in economics, was appointed Pontifical Academician on 3 October. Born in 1943 at Gary, an industrial suburb of Chicago, he conducted a very brilliant and productive research, leading in particular to create with a few colleagues a new branch in his discipline: 'The Economics of Information'. More generally many of his contributions helped explain the circumstances in which markets do not work well, and how selective government intervention can improve their performance. In 1993 he interrupted his academic work to become President Clinton's economic adviser, then after that he served three years as chief economist at the World Bank. Once again Professor of Economics, now at Columbia University, he is very involved in the debates about the globalization phenomenon, where globalization has been going and why it has failed to fully live up to its potential.

Also noteworthy is the fact that, on 20 January 2004, the Holy Father reappointed, for another ten years, twenty-three Academicians first appointed in January 1994.

### *The Study of Democracy*

Adopting on 3 May 2004 the document *Democracy in Debate – The Contribution of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences*, the Academy drew

the conclusions of its investigations on the second of three main themes selected at its first plenary session in 1994. The study had begun with a workshop in December 1996 devoted to an examination of experiences in the main regions of the world. The intention was then to obtain a worldwide view of the realities of democracy. The study went on during two plenary sessions, in 1998 and 2000. It immediately appeared useful to organize reflections under three main headings: 'Values in democracies', 'Democracy and civil society', 'Supranationality, internationality and democracy'.

After these three meetings the need remained, however, to better exhibit the relationship between democracy and the social teaching of the Church, so as to properly fulfill the Academy's mission. Three external experts, who had not been participants in the programme thus far were asked to cast a fresh eye on our publications and to point to what was in them most relevant for the Church. The reports they wrote independently of one another were presented and discussed in a roundtable held for little more than a day during the 2002 session of the Academy. The document which was to be adopted in 2004 was subsequently written by a small group of academicians, working from all this earlier material under the leadership of Professor Hans Zacher, who had been organizing activities about democracy since their beginning.

It is not possible to summarize in a few paragraphs that rich document. Shining a spotlight on to a few of its theses will, however, hopefully reveal its spirit. In the introductory Part I we read: *'Democracy is a term denoting a central responsibility. It stands for a hopeful opportunity for human life – for the values that human beings should strive for. ... Seen from the other end, "democracy" denotes an option for approaching the common good'*. And subsequently: "Democracy" is a task – not only a social, political or legal one. "Democracy" is also a moral task'.

Part II, about values, does not only examine the most important Christian values and their positions in democracy. But, after noting that 'there was never a single form of democratic system', it asks 'What institutions produce social values?' and goes on:

Principles of social ethics do not obtain their validity by democratic procedure and regulation. They were there before. They have their foundations in human nature. Democratic practices ensue from conceptions that precede democracy.

And subsequently: 'As law can only attend to the social, political and legal realization of values, its legitimacy depends on the social vitality of the given values'.

Part III, on democracy and civil society, insists on the idea that they form an entirety. *'Democracy presupposes that the connection between government and people is intensified'*. Hence

Catholic social teaching must pay attention to research in political science, which aims at identifying the imperfections of democratic systems, at exhibiting fundamental difficulties in the explanation of imperfections, at discussing possible solutions to the problems so posed. ... This research is facing a wide spectrum of challenges, running from cases that are relatively well mastered to others in which solutions are not at hand, not even in principle.

And later:

To encourage and instruct people about the merits of civil society, to instruct them to the experience already available, and to assist or replace experience by understanding thus prove to define an essential field of activity for Catholic social teaching.

Surveying various types of societal systems, as the document does, shows that some of them are highly complex. Formal democratic organizations and procedures must be adapted to each system, but will never suffice for achieving the autonomy promised by democracy. To play their productive role *'societal systems should possess the strength of initial independent action'*.

The topic of Part IV is announced in the introduction: *transnational movements, interactions, communications; supranationality; international cooperation and organization*. With globalization this subject is very new. Democracy has become not only a rule for the organization of national states, but also a demand for the organization of the world. A vision of one world and one mankind organized as a democracy has emerged. Yet this vision poses much more of a very complex challenge than it is able to provide a ready answer.

Part IV explains the difficulties, looking in succession into: 1. the relations and conflicts between national governments, in the process transforming the international regime; 2. the distance between the reality of national values and the idea of essentially human global values; 3. the concept of a transnational civil society. Responsibility for democracy in her social teaching should lead the Church to strive for a better knowledge of the structures of the evolving transnational civil society, with its specific roles, possibilities and duties.

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*Conceptualization of the Human Person in the Social Sciences*

The Council held its scheduled meeting on 15 November. Unexpectedly there were only four of us, because several councillors were suddenly prevented from coming. We went into deliberations, but also wanted to submit a number of decisions or suggestions to the approval of absent councillors. Since all these exchanges had to be made by mail or by fax, it was only on 25 February that I was able to draw the outcome. In this report only three points of the agenda remain sufficiently important and timely to be recalled: preparation of the programme for the 10th plenary session; follow-up of the programme on democracy; programme for the 11th plenary session. What has to be said about the second point has just been described. The first point needs no elaboration here: on the one hand, by 15 November the programme of the 10th session was fully settled except for a few details; on the other hand, the content of the programme, which had been organized by Professor Mary Ann Glendon, is apparent in these proceedings, as well as explained by her.

About the programme of the 11th plenary session matters were much less advanced on 15 November and even by 26 February, this notwithstanding an important email since the end of the 9th plenary session. It had then been agreed that the scientific programme might deal with 'the conceptualization of the human person in the social sciences' in 2005, if that project turned out after examination to have a good chance of being rewarding. In *Acta 9* the President's Report explained that the session would then have to deal with a more methodological and philosophical issue than those examined thus far by the Academy, and that on 7 May 2003 the Council had instructed Professors Archer and Malinvaud to investigate how the programme on this issue might be defined.

By 15 November two seemingly interesting sets of papers had been defined for sociology and economics. The Council agreed that it could recommend that the subject be definitely chosen for 2005. But, neither at that moment nor during the subsequent three months, were propositions firmly established for Christian anthropology, philosophy, law and political science. However, clarification of ideas was progressively emerging, sustaining the prospect of the Council being able to reach more precise decisions in Rome on 28 April.

*Two Joint Meetings with Others*

On November 12 three members of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Professors Battro, Germain and Léna, drafted a proposal for a joint meet-

ing with our Academy on 'Globalization and Education'. After the approval of the Council of their Academy the project was presented at our Council on 15 November. It was enthusiastically greeted, with the proviso that we should make a counterproposal which would marginally change the list of subjects to be discussed in the meeting. Since exchanges of letters within the Council were required to draft the counterproposal, I was only able to send my answer to President Cabibbo on 25 February with a list of four subjects: 1. effects of globalization on education, in particular among LDC; 2. role of communication and information technologies in this process; 3. education of immigrants and their children; 4. education in an increasingly globalized multicultural world.

Considering that two of the initiators of the project, Germain and Léna, were living in Paris and that I might meet some important potential participants in the joint workshop in Mexico City in June, our new President asked me to keep looking at the implementation of this project. Writing now at the end of June, I can report that our proposal for the list of subjects was accepted, that the workshop will meet in principle from 17 to 19 November 2005 and that Professor Léna will chair the programme committee.

In May 2003 the Mexican Ambassador to the Holy See proposed to us that a colloquium on 'Globalization and international justice' be held in Mexico City under the joint auspices of the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores and the Academy. We accepted the proposal in principle. The formal invitation of Minister Derbez Bautista was dated 11 December and accepted by me on 26 January.

For this previous engagement also, Professor Glendon asked me to be her representative. The colloquium was held from 3 to 5 June, starting with a welcome address by the President of Mexico. We had the active participation of Minister Derbez. Nine papers were delivered by: Olga Sánchez Cordero, President of the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico; Professor Félix Hernández, Autonomous University of Puebla; Professor Eduardo Aninat, former Budget Minister of Chile and former Vice-Director General of IMF; Professor Suárez-Orozco, University of Harvard; Professor Rubbia, Pontifical Academy of Sciences; our two Colleagues Professors Sabourin (in charge of our programme on globalization) and Morandé Court; finally Monsignor Sánchez Sorondo and me. We hope this material will be published soon.

## COMMEMORATION OF ACADEMICIANS

IN MEMORY OF PROFESSOR PIER LUIGI ZAMPETTI (1927-2003)

A fighter for just causes with a strong sense of duty – these are the two most characteristic qualities of Pier Luigi Zampetti; or at least they are the two qualities, combined with his profound spirituality, that I most appreciated in him during more than twenty-five years of friendship. I first met him through a colleague of mine in the Secretariat of State: Father Antonio Caruso, S.J.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to honour the memory of Professor Zampetti with you today, because the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences was very important to him and very dear to his heart. He had been a member since its foundation in January 1994. Professor Zampetti loved this Pontifical Academy, he was proud to be part of it, and he dedicated himself to its work with enthusiasm and commitment.

Suddenly and unexpectedly, on 1 November last year, he departed this life, taking us all by surprise.

He was born in 1927 not far from Milan (in Uboldo, which is now in the province of Varese); he received a scientific and classical education before entering the Catholic University of Milan where he graduated in philosophy as a student of Msgr. Francesco Olgiati. He then graduated in law, and generously committed himself to a career in university teaching and scientific research.

As a Lecturer in the Philosophy of Law, and then Full Professor of Political Theory, he taught at the University of Trieste, where he became President of the Faculty of Political Science.

He was then called to the State University of Milan in order to establish a new faculty of Political Science there. This was a difficult period for him, because it coincided with the years of student protest, and he was obliged to take a stand against violent revolutionary tendencies that he disagreed with.

On account of his firmness in dealing with this situation, he received threats and verbal attacks, but Professor Zampetti was always courageous

and unyielding in defending the principle of freedom to teach and condemnation of violence.

Later on he moved to the University of Genoa, where he did some of his best work as an academic lawyer and as a Catholic.

The range of his vast output included philosophical, juridical, economic and social research. Evidence of this is found in the theories that he developed in numerous publications, among which I should like to single out the following: *La sfida del duemila*; *La democrazia partecipativa e il rinnovamento delle istituzioni*; *La partecipazione popolare al potere*; *La sovranità della famiglia e lo Stato delle autonomie*; *La dottrina sociale della Chiesa per la salvezza dell'uomo e del pianeta*.

Careful analysis of his publications reveals an approach to the problems of contemporary society that takes institutions as its starting point and always places the family at the centre, that vital element in social life and source of personal and social well-being.

In 1981, on account of his juridical background, he was nominated by the Italian Parliament as a member of the Upper Council of the *Magistratura*, where he always sought just and equitable solutions to the many issues that were brought before him.

In his writings, and in his work as a member of this Pontifical Academy, a member of the Council in fact, he showed a profound knowledge of the social Magisterium of the Church, always desiring to be completely faithful to the teachings of the Holy Father.

He also wrote some books of a more popular character, in which he revealed his profound humanity, as in the 1984 publication entitled *Il Vangelo di mia mamma*; and he expressed his devotion to Our Blessed Lady in such books as *La profezia di Fatima e il crollo del comunismo* in 1990, which went into four editions.

A man of profound religious formation and sound spirituality, he always conformed his manner of life to just principles regarding himself, the world of scholarship and society in general.

We may say of him that he was an authentic Christian and fine scholar. May his memory bring honour to this Academy to which he contributed so much.

*His Eminence Cardinal Giovanni Battista Re*

## ÉLOGE DE SERGUEI AVERINTSEV (1937-2004)

Madame la Présidente,  
Éminences, Excellences,  
Chers Collègues,  
Mesdames, Messieurs,

Il y a un an à peine, le 3 mai 2003, Sergueï Averintsev terminait son brillant commentaire de l'intervention de Margaret Archer lorsqu'il fut frappé par un accident vasculaire cérébral au cœur même de notre assemblée. Il venait de souligner que le problème de l'État et de la nationalité n'était pas seulement un problème sociologique, juridique ou économique, mais aussi un problème anthropologique. Il constatait – je cite:

Maintenant même, nous vivons une période décisive pour la survie de *l'homo sapiens*. Nous vivons la première époque où la guerre devient à la fois impossible et intolérable, tout en ne cessant pas d'être inévitable.<sup>1</sup>

Averintsev plaidait alors pour que l'autorité morale de la littérature, de la philosophie, de la culture soit reconnue et prise en compte dans la discussion contemporaine sur l'État et la Nation. L'idée même d'État-Nation créait des conditions favorisant le prestige d'une haute culture. Ce prestige, remarquait-il, représente une alternative à l'argent et à la consommation.

Même les Bolchéviques ne pouvaient pas nier que les icônes ont une valeur intrinsèque, et qu'elles appartiennent à la fierté nationale des Russes. Les Bolchéviques ont certes détruit des églises avec une joie sadique, mais ils ne parvinrent pas à expulser les icônes des musées.

Depuis le 21 février de cette année 2004, date à laquelle Sergueï est "passé sur l'autre rive" (cf. *Mc* 4, 35), ces ultimes paroles de notre Collègue ont valeur de testament intellectuel et spirituel. Sans doute nous invitent-elles à prendre davantage en compte, dans nos analyses, ce paramètre de "haute culture" qu'Averintsev a servi tout au long de sa vie.

Sergueï Averintsev était né le 10 décembre 1937 à Moscou; il fut baptisé dans l'Église Orthodoxe. C'était l'époque de *l'Archipel du Goulag* dénoncé par Soljénitsyne – l'époque où la seule industrie florissante en URSS était

<sup>1</sup> "Right now we are experiencing a decisive period for the very survival of *homo sapiens*, because we are living in the first epoch when war becomes both impossible and intolerable, without ceasing to be unavoidable". Sergueï Averintsev, ultime communication publiée dans *The Governance of Globalisation*, cité *infra* aux *Sources utilisées*. La citation se trouve p. 165.



l'“industrie pénitentiaire”. Or à 30 ans, Averintsev reçoit le Prix Lénine pour son ouvrage sur Plutarque et l'art du portrait littéraire dans l'Antiquité. Il enseigne la philologie à l'Université de Moscou. En 1980, il devient membre de la prestigieuse Académie des Sciences de Moscou. Après la chute du communisme, il occupe la Chaire Ivanov, du nom du linguiste, poète et philosophe Viatcheslav Ivanovitch Ivanov (1866-1949). En 1991, il fonde à Moscou, avec le Professeur Patrick de Laubier, la Société Vladimir Soloviev; tous deux étaient frappés par la distinction opérée par Soloviev entre orthodoxie et slavophilie. Peu après, Averintsev devient Professeur de linguistique slave à l'Université de Vienne. Après être resté dans le coma pendant plus de neuf mois, Serguei décède le 21 février 2004, à Vienne. Il avait 66 ans. Selon son désir, ses cendres reposent au cimetière de Danilov, à Moscou.

Ma rencontre initiale avec Serguei remonte à la première Assemblée générale de notre Académie, où, comme plusieurs d'entre nous, Serguei avait été nommé le 19 janvier 1994. Le jour de mon arrivée, je n'avais pu célébrer la Sainte Messe à cause du voyage. Je demandai donc aux religieuses du Monastère des Contemplatives, voisines de notre Académie au Vatican, à pouvoir célébrer la messe chez elles. Je proposai à Serguei de m'accompagner. Cette célébration fut pour lui comme pour moi un événement spirituel de grande intensité. C'est avec beaucoup d'émotion que Serguei lut l'épître et reçut la Sainte Communion. Puis nous fûmes reçus au parloir et Serguei répondit avec joie aux questions que lui posèrent nos sœurs. Ainsi, sans que nous ne nous en apercevions alors, était né un fort lien entre nous.

Le matin du 3 mai 2003, nous prîmes ensemble la navette allant de Santa Marta à la Casina Pio IV. Serguei me parut un peu fatigué, mais il me parla avec feu de ses travaux en cours. Il travaillait à une nouvelle traduction, en russe, des *Évangiles Synoptiques*, ainsi qu'à une nouvelle traduction, scandée, des *Psaumes*. Il m'expliqua que ces nouvelles traductions étaient nécessaires. Beaucoup de textes de l'Écriture Sainte ne sont disponibles en russe que dans des traductions datant du XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle, qui ne répondent pas aux exigences scientifiques modernes. C'est pour parer à cette déficience qu'Averintsev entreprit de traduire, outre le livre de *Job*, les *Psaumes*, qu'il enregistra aussi sur CD, ainsi que les *Évangiles* de *Marc* et *Luc*.

Ce matin-là, au cours de la Troisième Session de notre Assemblée, immédiatement après l'intervention relatée plus haut, notre collègue fut terrassé par un accident circulatoire. Très ému, je m'approchai au plus près de l'oreille de Serguei pour lui donner l'absolution et pour murmurer à son oreille le *Notre Père*, l'*Ave Maria*, des versets de psaumes, des prières spon-

tanées. Un médecin présent dans la salle de réunion ne put rien faire, mais une équipe de secours d'urgence du Vatican intervint avec une rapidité et une efficacité exemplaires. Sergueï fut rapidement conduit à l'hôpital Santo Spirito, où il reçut pendant des semaines les soins les plus attentifs. Le soir même je demandai à Mgr Jacques Suaudeau, qui exerça longtemps comme chirurgien, de m'accompagner pour rendre visite au malade. Mais l'état du patient était tel que nous ne fûmes pas autorisés à lui rendre visite.

Les recherches scientifiques de Sergueï ont fusé dans différentes directions. Formé aux méthodes exigeantes de la philologie, Averintsev avait acquis une connaissance approfondie de l'hébreu, de l'araméen, du grec, du latin, du syriaque; familier des langues slaves, dont le polonais, il maîtrisait parfaitement l'allemand, le français, l'italien. Ces connaissances linguistiques lui ont permis de se pencher avec la même compétence aussi bien sur l'Ancien que sur le Nouveau Testament, sur l'hagiographie, sur l'hymnographie. Il a contribué à redécouvrir la philosophie byzantine, était familier du romantisme allemand, et passionné de poésie russe.

Riche de quelque huit cents titres, sa bibliographie révèle l'intérêt qu'il portait aux rapports entre la religion et la littérature ou entre Athènes et Jérusalem, à la Russie d'aujourd'hui, aux poètes ukrainiens. Mais Averintsev était un passionné d'unité. *L'unité face au Prince de ce monde* approfondit la réflexion qu'il avait déjà entreprise depuis longtemps et qu'il menait avec des amis venus de tous les horizons.<sup>2</sup> Dans cette production abondante et de qualité, il convient de donner un relief spécial aux textes préparés par Averintsev pour *l'Encyclopédie soviétique*. Ces textes épars ont été rassemblés par les soins d'Averintsev lui-même sous le titre de *Sophia-Logos*.<sup>3</sup> Son dernier ouvrage porte pour titre *Perles précieuses* et il fut publié peu de temps avant sa mort.

La personnalité de Sergueï Averintsev résiste à toute tentative de classification. Nous avons tous été témoins, pendant près de dix ans, de sa modestie, presque de son effacement. Tous – du moins je le souhaite – nous avons bénéficié de sa cordialité. Ce que l'on sait moins, c'est qu'il a été l'intellectuel russe le plus populaire dans son pays. Expert en la matiè-

<sup>2</sup> Le texte de Sergueï Averintsev, intitulé *Ut unum sint: L'Unité face au Prince de ce monde*, a été publié dans le volume collectif édité par Patrick de Laubier, sous le titre *L'Unité*. Ce volume est cité ci-dessus aux *Sources utilisées*. Le texte de notre collègue se trouve pp. 13-27.

<sup>3</sup> S.S. Averintsev, *Sophia-Logos. Dictionnaire. "Dukh i Litera"*, Kiev, 2000, pp. 450, cf. <[www.duh-i-litera.8m.com](http://www.duh-i-litera.8m.com)> (Référence fournie par Constantin Sigov).

re, Patrick de Laubier souligne qu'Averintsev était aussi un oecuméniste de premier ordre. Durant les années les plus sombres du régime communiste, il a fait découvrir à ses étudiants, à ses lecteurs, à ses auditeurs des trésors insoupçonnés de la littérature chrétienne. Comme l'a écrit Vladimir Zielinsky, un de ses amis intimes, Serguei était un "vrai évangéliste par le savoir" et il ajoute aussitôt ce merveilleux témoignage: "Averintsev a semé le savoir, mais le fruit de ses semailles, c'était la foi". Serguei a osé parler de la foi et de la religion quand l'Église était bannie de la société, réduite à un silence parfois complice, pressionnée par le paganisme ambiant, accusée d'exploiter la superstition populaire. Dans cette interminable traversée du désert – la sienne, mais aussi celle de tout le peuple russe – Serguei n'a pas cessé de mettre son immense érudition, son savoir encyclopédique au service de l'Évangélisation. Grâce à lui, des Russes innombrables, des Ukrainiens, mais aussi de nombreux Européens occidentaux ont découvert des Pères de l'Église. Le secret de son rayonnement ne reposait toutefois pas, en ultime analyse, sur le prestige de son immense érudition, mais sur cette contemplation intérieure permanente qui se reflétait dans son visage d'ange. Dans un message qu'il a adressé à Natacha, son épouse, nul n'a mieux croqué le portrait spirituel d'Averintsev que le Patriarche Alexis II, qui écrivait: "Sa vie tout entière a été illuminée par sa foi au Christ".

Nous avons eu le privilège de compter parmi nous une personnalité prophétique unique en son genre. A sa façon, Averintsev était un charismatique. C'était un visionnaire, et il est sans doute opportun que nous nous interroguions sur l'accueil que nous avons réservé à ses intuitions, sur la qualité d'écoute que nous avons accordée à ses interventions, sur les leçons que nous pouvons tirer de sa présence parmi nous.

Averintsev a été parmi nous et pour nous un "témoin de l'invisible" (cf. *He* 11, 27). Cet immense savant nous remémore la dimension spirituelle et religieuse qui donne sa spécificité à notre Académie. Comme Averintsev nous y invitait – avec son tact incomparable – dans son ultime intervention que j'évoquais au début de ce bref discours, il serait sans doute utile qu'après dix ans d'existence, notre Académie se demande si elle a suffisamment honoré les savoirs, cette "haute culture" qui, selon notre illustre collègue, pourraient offrir une alternative aux dérives utilitaristes et technocratiques, auxquelles la société ambiante nous expose et auxquelles il nous arrive peut-être de trop sacrifier.

A propos de l'ouvrage *Sophia-Logos*, Constantin Sigov, voulant sans doute exorciser *l'Archipel du Goulag*, évoque avec bonheur de *l'Archipel*

*Averintsev*. Archipel non seulement pour désigner une multitude d'îlots de sagesse dispersés, voire infiltrés, grâce à Averintsev, sous forme d'articles dans "les eaux mortes de la *Grande Encyclopédie Soviétique*"; mais archipel aussi au sens étymologique de mer principale, celle qui sert à communiquer et non à séparer, c'est-à-dire la mer, l'océan de la Sagesse, qui "suppose le franchissement de tout isolationnisme". D'où la mise en garde face à la double menace d'un isolationnisme qui nous guette peut-être ici même, à l'Académie. Menace, d'abord, "que l'Académicien Averintsev ressent d'une manière aiguë: ... celle de l'athéisme par le bas' – la méfiance à l'égard de la parole, à l'égard du sens comme tel. Serguei Averintsev reconnaît dans la destruction du verbe humain le souffle corrupteur du néant, puisqu'originellement l'existence commence par la force du Verbe". Menace, ensuite, d'une nouvelle figure de l'aliénation désignée comme un "isolationnisme métaphysique" qui mérite d'être explicité. Pour Averintsev, "le fondement de l'esprit de ce temps ..., c'est un 'isolationnisme métaphysique' – qui 'arrache' le Créateur à la création et la création au Créateur, qui nous sépare du Créateur, du cosmos et les uns des autres". Et Constantin Sigov conclut, résumant notre Collègue:

L'isolationnisme commence là où une île a la prétention d'avoir un statut exceptionnel parmi d'autres, lorsqu'elle rejette la mer comme moyen de communication entre les îles et se sépare elle-même de la mer de la Sagesse.

Peut-être devrions-nous reconsidérer certaines de nos options pour ne pas nous séparer de cette mer de la Sagesse et pour ne pas passer à côté des trésors de savoir et de "haute culture" qu'Averintsev a si admirablement servis, et qu'il nous a généreusement fait partager au cours de son passage parmi nous.

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*Michel Schooyans*

## SERGUEI AVERINTSEV: A PHILOLOGIST IN AN ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

At the first meeting of our Academy the twenty-eight foundation members were all required to introduce themselves by making a brief statement about their respective disciplines. Serguei Sergeevich Averintsev introduced himself as a philologist studying relevant Christian ideas and symbols in poetry and the art of the late Hellenistic and early Byzantine period. Lacking an in-depth study of Eastern Antiquity, I wondered what such a topic had to do with the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences and its declared objective of 'promoting the study and progress of the social, economic, political and juridical sciences and thus offering the Church the elements she can use in the study and development of her social doctrine'. Surely the Academy was to be concerned with the present and not the distant past?

Being an inquisitive person, I questioned Serguei during the lunch break as we walked in the gardens surrounding the Casina. But he did not seem keen to concentrate on the philology versus social science discourse. Instead he spoke movingly of his visits to Poland and recalled the magnificent stained glass windows that he had admired in Krakow's Franciscan basilica. One particular feature had caught his attention – the symbols associated with Francis of Assisi – flowers and birds. And he had heard a beautiful piece of music called *Godzinki* – the Hours performed in an antiphone form: two choirs singing responsively. So he sang the tune which I well remembered.

The mystery of Averintsev's appointment was partly revealed a year later when he presented me with a book of his poetry *Modlitwa o Slowo* (Prayer for the Word) translated into Polish. Later that week I saw him present this book to John Paul II in a moment of animated conversation. Subsequently I learned that the poetry of symbols was the link between Karol Wojtyla and Serguei Averintsev in their several encounters and, more importantly, that they both defined the word philology in its traditional and now rare meaning: the love of learning and literature – more specifically, the love of words and the Word.

It was not until much later when I began to read Averintsev in Polish translations – on Plutarch, on the search for meaning in the myth of Oedipus, on gold in the system of symbols in early Byzantium – that I came to realise that his penetrating presentation of the Hellenic roots of Byzantine civilization (and also of early Russian Orthodoxy) was akin to cultural archaeology or 'archaeology of the word' as he once described it. Averintsev finds the 'word' in Plutarch's *Moralia*, in the tragedies of Sophocles, in the poetry of Virgil, whilst searching for symbols in what contemporary sociology would describe as forms of social interaction. The



richness of Averintsev's scholarship is not the standard history of epochs and periods which could be subjected to Karl Popper's system of logic and verification. Rather, he offers glimpses of symbols characteristic of a given historical period and demonstrates their social function. Again, this is not a history of ideas in the late nineteenth century German model but philology as historic memory. And this brings me to the query I had when I first met Averintsev: his study of symbols in distant epochs differs from the accepted canons of the social sciences, seemingly a non-scientific pursuit. But it helps the social scientist to understand (in the Weberian sense of *das Verstehen*) the social dynamics of civilization. Averintsev was fond of quoting the nineteenth century German historian Leopold Ranke's penetrating question, '*Wie es eigentlich gewesen war?*'.

Finally, the matter of symbols in Averintsev's and Wojtyła's poetry. Here the affinity between two scholar-poets is striking and shows the depth of historical background and its relevance to the present in both authors: Averintsev's use of symbols of early Eastern Christianity, pleading that the Word be respected by humanity; Wojtyła's search for the hidden God in his *Cyrenean Cycle* (1958), only to find him in the contemporary 'profiles' of a car factory worker, a woman typing eight hours a day, an actor, a girl disappointed in love.

Both philosopher-poets share the same preoccupation with 'God's profile': the Creator, as Averintsev writes, cannot be seen face to face. Wojtyła finds God in the symbolism of Michelangelo's portrayal of the Book of Origin in the Sistine Chapel. As he meditates on the threshold of the Chapel, the poet muses over the rich symbolism in Michelangelo's art:

The mystery of the beginning is born with  
the Word,  
is revealed by the Word.  
He – the First to see –  
Saw, and found in everything a  
trace of his Being, of his own fullness.

The poem ends with a vision of the Cardinals assembling 'beneath this wondrous Sistine profusion of colour ... when the time comes after my death' to ponder Michelangelo's vision 'for the con-clave', a shared concern for the legacy of the keys, 'the keys of the Kingdom' (*Roman Triptych* 2003).

It is not for me to extol the merits of Averintsev's poetry and its links with Wojtyła's meditations. Nor am I qualified to fully appreciate the very depth of scholarship beneath the splendid surface of our erstwhile colleague's scholarship. But I do recall my last encounter with Professor

Averintsev when, during the Academy's Eighth Assembly, I was asked by the President to introduce and critically examine Professor Donati's paper 'Intergenerational Solidarity: a Sociological and Social Policy Issue'. I spoke in my conclusion on the disintegration of the *Oikos*, of the family, and of the forces in our culture of immediate gratification that are fostered by the entertainment industry. I concluded by repeating Dante's vision in his *Il libro dell'inferno*. In the ensuing discussion Averintsev supported my use of Dante's symbolism of hell as a consequence of the breakdown of social ties and mutual trust.

I recalled the Dante-Averintsev symbolism paradigm when I received the sad news of Serguei's death. For me our brief conversation ten years ago was the meeting of minds. Then, and only then, I fully understood why John Paul II decided to appoint a humanist to an assembly of hard-nosed social scientists!

There is a lesson in all this for myself and maybe for other colleagues. Perhaps we err in sharpening the distinction between the humanities and the social sciences too much. We need to distinguish between the sociological and the humane concern. We do need the creative imagination of the humanist – yes, the philologist. Does it really matter that this person's imagination derives from the study of symbols in the *Moralia* of Plutarch and not from a survey of Calcutta's slums? Surely both sources of insight may be equally fruitful in an epistemological sense. As a distinguished scholar whom I was privileged to know many years ago said in his Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association:

It is not the methods and the concepts that move our sociology along, but the memory and desire – the memory of other men in other times that have also asked questions about society and the desire that our answers, in our time, will be better than theirs.\*

*Jerzy Zubrzycki*

\* Robert Bierstedt, 'Sociology and Humane Learning', *American Sociological Review*, 25 February 1960.

## SELF-PRESENTATIONS OF THE NEW MEMBERS

KEVIN RYAN

Thank you Madam President. The President asked me to explain myself briefly and explain my work. I am a Professor Emeritus, I am married, I have three children, and I have seven grandchildren. I was raised in a little village outside of New York City and lived there for the first eighteen years of my life. I went to Catholic schools all the way through and, when I was eighteen, I went to the University of Toronto in Canada, to study literature and psychology. After getting my degree it was during the Korean War and, like most Americans, I was required to go in the service and I became a naval officer, spent four years in naval aviation and travelled around the world. Forty-seven years ago this month I came to Rome for the first time, one of the great thrills of my life. After military service I went to Columbia University, in New York, and studied to be a teacher of English. I did that for four years, I never worked harder in my life! The good news was I met my wife in that process. She was a teacher, and we went off together to Stanford University to work on a Ph.D. in education. I left Stanford with my degree for a position at the University of Chicago. We were there for altogether nine wonderful years. The University of Chicago is, I think, the United States' premier university.

In the middle of that, though, I had a one-year fellowship to Harvard and, when my writing project was done, I had about three or four months free and I also had a four-year-old daughter, who, as four-year-olds will do, kept asking the question when we would say, 'It's time to go to bed' or 'You should eat your vegetables', she would say 'Why, why, Daddy, why?'. And I became possessed with that question and the larger question of how a child acquires the internal self-control, a sense of what the right thing to do is, and being at the University of Chicago they allowed you to pursue your interests and so I started teaching what I did not know and I changed my career at that time. I stayed at the university for nine years and then I went off to Ohio State University, which is a big state univer-

sity in the middle of our country. I was there for seven years. I had a Fulbright scholarship to Portugal and taught there, and because of that I was invited by Boston University to head up a World Bank programme to prepare the faculties of fifteen new colleges in Portugal – it was part of the effort of the World Bank to facilitate Portugal's entry into the Common Market – and I took my family there for a second stay.

Fifteen years ago, back at Boston University, I founded an Institute called the Center for the Advancement of Ethics and Character, which is at the core of my work, and let me describe my academic interests. My work increasingly is driven by the conviction that state-run education is quietly at war with the human person. Either through a conscious effort to separate children from their religious heritage or a benign but misguided sense of trying to be fair or neutral, public education is, in my view, miseducating young people about the most profound questions: 'What is it to be a human being?', 'What is a worthy life?', 'How will you spend your life?'. This has happened at a time in history and education when the world is becoming more and more dependent on education, both nations and persons. Schooling starts earlier, it lasts longer, it consumes the energies and waking hours of children more and more. They know, when they are very young, whether the first world, second world, or third world, that their future is increasingly dependent on their schooling; it is in many ways the main event in their lives.

Now, the fundamental question people like myself, people in education, are supposed to answer is, what is most worth knowing? We are in charge of the curriculum, which is society's answer to that question, and once we answer that question we divide it up into courses and semesters and write textbooks and materials and we point to the young and we say, now you learn this, this is your schooling. And much of this, of course, whether we are talking about literacy or numeracy or a scientific sense of how the world works, is extraordinarily important. As our knowledge has grown and our social needs have changed the answer to this question, *what is most worth knowing*, has become more and more vast, more and more complex. And in that there is a problem. Socrates defined education as what we do, what we, as the adult community do, to help the young to become both smart and good, to become both virtuous and knowledgeable. What I believe has happened is that this growing priority for education has gone hand in hand with a reduction of our attention to the virtuous life, to what many would call providing the young with some sort of moral compass, some sense of what the virtues are. The state-run schools are uncomfort-

able and sometimes downright hostile to answering this question and, in trying to respond to my daughter as she is metaphorically all children, the questions of 'why?' and 'what should I do?'. Our state run schools have just the thinnest broth, the most empty meals.

But while all that has been going on, while schools have moved further and further away from answering and helping children come to grips with those questions, there has been a real move to reduce the impact of education. When I was an undergraduate at the University of Toronto I had the very bracing educational experience of being taught by Marshall McLuhan, I do not know if any of you remember the name Marshall McLuhan. He was a media guru, he lived in a house next door and he spoke about all this new mass media world. I remember him saying in a lecture once that in North America, when a child goes to school, he interrupts his education. And, like many things McLuhan said, it was a quip, but increasingly, this is true, that the first education that our children are getting, I believe, comes from television, comes from the Internet, comes from CDs, and comes from a popular culture. And while the first educational system has an extraordinary potential for enriching the human spirit, it is driving us in the other direction. Instead of engaging the child in what is most worth knowing, the various media options take the low road, what is most pleasurable, what is going to give you the most satisfaction. Children come into the world with little to no self-control or self-discipline, with no moral compass, and they are easy victims for the electronic media's masterful control of the pleasure principle. They have worked this to a fine art. On top of that, the vision of the good life they project is a very warped and narrow one.

So while our state-run schools, highly secularised schools, ignore the good and focus on scientific and a very narrow band of cultural information, our media are effectively teaching children a very vulgar, a very self-centred and pleasure-driven vision of the human person and at the same time, in these last seventy-five years I would say, we, the traditional teachers of the moral life, parents, grandparents, teachers, the community, the Church, have become much weaker, our impact is much lower. Schoolteachers, in particular, have lost what I would call their moral authority. Parents, on the other hand, are so preoccupied with work and with their own robust engagement of that pleasure principle that their impact is being continually reduced.

What I am suggesting is probably something well known, that the connective tissue between the young and the older generation has become very very thin and I think while this certainly is probably much more the

case in the United States and, as I know, the European situation, this too will affect the third world.

The result is that we have left our young vulnerable to an array of moral viruses, increasingly taking their life direction from a shallow and narrow educational system and a corrupting pleasure-driven and pleasure-obsessed culture. On the other hand, and finally, it is my deepest belief both as a Catholic and as a student of education, that our Judeo-Christian traditions have the answer to these problems, that we can reengage the young in what is a truer vision of education.

I feel deeply honoured and very humble to be with you and I want to thank all of you for the gracious welcome you have given me.

#### JOSEPH STIGLITZ

Thank you. I teach economics at Columbia, I come from Gary, Indiana, which is a steel town in the Midwest, and I was educated at Amherst College, MIT, and Cambridge. I have had a rather peripatetic academic career – as somebody said, I could not hold a job – so I taught at Stanford, Yale, MIT, Princeton, Oxford at various times. I interrupted twenty-five years of my academic work teaching research in 1993 when I went to Washington to be President Clinton's economic adviser and then after that to serve three years as chief economist at the World Bank.

The areas of my research have focused on an area called the economics of information. The particular aspect that has been widely discussed is called 'asymmetries of information', which is simply the notion – economists like fancy words – all it means is that some people know something that other people do not know and try to exploit that. The other area that I have worked in is the economics of the public sector. One of my abiding interests has been in trying to identify the appropriate role of the state and, in a way, the two areas that I have talked about, economics of information and economics of public sector come together in that question. One of the central theorems that I have proved or investigated in this area was to re-examine perhaps one of the most well known propositions in economics, Adam Smith's invisible hand, about the pursuit of self-interest or markets leading to economic efficiency. What my research showed was that when information is imperfect, which is always the case, the reason that the invisible hand often seems invisible is that it is not there, that is to say, that markets are generically not Pareto efficient, or constrained Pareto efficient,

even taking into account the cost of information. More recently, after spending time at the World Bank, I have become very involved in the discussions, debates about globalization, the problems with globalization, where globalization has been going, why has it failed to live up to its potential. I think in all these areas, economics, the public sector, globalization, there are fundamental ethical issues, fundamental issues having to do with concepts of social justice and social solidarity, both across and within generations, and these are fundamental issues facing our global society. My observation is that too few of our global institutions have focused on this central issue, and one of the reasons why I am quite enthusiastic about joining your Academy is that it is one of the few global institutions with enormous diversity, a multidisciplinary approach, that is addressing what I think are the central issues facing our society today.

## PROGRAMME

X PLENARY SESSION: 29 APRIL – 3 MAY 2004

THURSDAY 29 APRIL

*Word of Welcome*

Mary Ann GLENDON, President of the Academy

*The Subject of the Meeting*

Mary Ann GLENDON, Coordinator of the Meeting

FIRST SESSION – *State of the Questions*

H.Em. Card. Antonio M. ROUCO VARELA (MADRID): *Intergenerational Solidarity, Welfare and Human Ecology in Catholic Social Thought*

*Comment:*

Ombretta FUMAGALLI CARULLI

Jacques VALLIN (PARIS, INED): *The Demographic 'Givens': Changes in the Generational Structures of Human Populations*

*Comments:*

Msgr. Michel SCHOYANS

Edmond MALINVAUD

Jerzy ZUBRZYCKI

Francis FUKUYAMA (Johns Hopkins University): *Economic, Political and Cultural Consequences of Changes in Generational Relations*

*Comment:*

Juan J. LLACH



Margaret ARCHER: *Social Determinants of Solidarity Among Generations*

*Comment:*

H.E. Msgr. Marcelo SÁNCHEZ SORONDO, Chancellor of the Academy

FRIDAY 30 APRIL

SECOND SESSION – *Social Policy, Family Policy, and Intergenerational Relations*

Pierpaolo DONATI: *Social Policy, the Family, and Inter-Generational Solidarity*

*Comment:*

Hanna SUCHOCKA

Papal Audience and photograph with the Holy Father

Hans TIETMEYER: *Intergenerational Solidarity and the Crisis of the Welfare State: Pensions, Social Security and Health Care*

*Comment:*

Louis SABOURIN

Closed Session for Academicians

SATURDAY 1 MAY

H.Em. Card. Giovanni Battista RE remembers Professor Pier Luigi ZAMPETTI

THIRD SESSION – *Globalization, Intergenerational Solidarity and Human Ecology in Developed and Developing Countries*

Partha DASGUPTA: *Intergenerational Solidarity and the Market*

*Comment:*

Edmond MALINVAUD

Kenneth ARROW: *Speaking for Children and for the Future*

*Comment:*

Hans ZACHER

FOURTH SESSION – *The Mediating Structures of Civil Society and Intergenerational Solidarity*

José T. RAGA: *Welfare and Devolution to Local Governments or Mediating Institutions*

*Comment:*

Pedro MORANDÉ COURT

Fr. Richard John NEUHAUS (U.S.A.): *Welfare, Intergenerational Solidarity and the Role of Intermediate Institutions of Civil Society (Private and Voluntary Associations)*

*Comment:*

Vittorio POSSENTI

SUNDAY 2 MAY

Guided visit to the Necropolis and to St Peter's Tomb

MONDAY 3 MAY

FIFTH SESSION – *Conclusions; General Discussion*

*Final Report*

Mary Ann GLENDON

*Meeting on Democracy*

Hans ZACHER

Colloquium of the Tenth Anniversary of the Academy

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FIRST SESSION

STATE OF THE QUESTIONS

## SOLIDARIDAD INTERGENERACIONAL, BIENESTAR Y ECOLOGÍA HUMANA EN LA DOCTRINA SOCIAL DE LA IGLESIA

ANTONIO MARÍA ROUCO VARELA

Las nociones de “solidaridad intergeneracional”, “bienestar” y “ecología humana” son nuevas en la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia, pero no las realidades humanas a las que se refieren, tratadas antes y expresadas con otros términos. Esta constatación pone una vez más en evidencia lo que la caracteriza metodológicamente: por una parte, la continuidad de sus principios de reflexión, de las directrices fundamentales de acción y de la unión vital con el Evangelio de Jesucristo que constituyen su horizonte teórico y práctico permanente; y, por otra, la relativa novedad de sus formulaciones concretas por hallarse sometida a las necesarias y oportunas adaptaciones sugeridas por la variación de las condiciones históricas, así como por el constante flujo de los acontecimientos en que se mueve la vida de los hombres y de los pueblos (*SRS* 3). La Iglesia no entra en el campo de las respuestas técnicas a las cuestiones sociales que se plantean, pero sí ilumina la comprensión y las vías de solución adecuadas a partir de una concepción del ser humano, esclarecida a la luz de Cristo, el Hijo de Dios hecho “carne” por nosotros, imagen perfecta del Dios invisible y plena realización del hombre. Será precisamente a la luz de los elementos constantes que vertebran la doctrina social de la Iglesia como intentaré presentar una síntesis de las enseñanzas más recientes de Juan Pablo II en torno a las tres grandes cuestiones enunciadas en el título de esta ponencia, precedidas de breves y concisas referencias al Magisterio Pontificio anterior. Dichas enseñanzas permiten a los cristianos que actúan en el campo de la vida social afrontar con sólida garantía doctrinal los desafíos del presente y los retos que nos esperan en el futuro.

### *Solidaridad intergeneracional*

Lo que hoy significamos con la palabra solidaridad ha sido siempre objeto de atención por parte de la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia. Es más, lo ha considerado como principio fundamental de la concepción cristiana de la organización social y política, aunque para expresarlo y definirlo echase mano de otros términos. Por ejemplo, al postulado ético de la solidaridad recurría ya León XIII en la *Rerum Novarum* cuando insistía en que es regla elemental de toda sana organización sociopolítica procurar a los individuos, sobre todo a los más indefensos socialmente, el apoyo y cuidado de los conciudadanos y de la entera sociedad, en particular, el de la autoridad pública que habrá de recurrir a las formas jurídico-políticas de intervención que las circunstancias requieran. La categoría con que la expresa es la de “amistad”. Al mismo valor ético-social se referirá Pío XI cuando habla de la “caridad social”. Y, aunque ampliando el concepto de acuerdo con las nuevas y complejas dimensiones de la cuestión social, Pablo VI introducirá el discurso y la expresión de la civilización del amor (*Homilía en la misa de clausura del Año Santo* [25 de diciembre de 1975]: AAS 68 [1976], 145: CA 10 c).

La aplicación del principio de solidaridad la refiere el Magisterio pontificio a ámbitos cada vez mayores y, a la vez, más centrales y conformadores de la vida del hombre y de la sociedad. En la *Rerum Novarum* (a. 1891), León XIII se ocupa de la solidaridad necesaria entre obreros y patronos dentro del ámbito de la empresa, concebida según un modelo doméstico; Pío XI la proyecta al Estado mismo en la *Quadragesimo Anno* (a. 1931) al analizar y valorar los modelos de organización socioeconómica a la luz del principio de subsidiaridad; Juan XXIII extiende el radio de vigencia ética de la solidaridad al campo de la comunidad internacional en la *Mater et Magistra* (a. 1961), más concretamente, a la problemática, puesta de actualidad por el proceso descolonizador de la segunda postguerra mundial, del desarrollo (o subdesarrollo) de los pueblos; y en la *Pacem in Terris* (a. 1963) le inspira su doctrina sobre el modo de construir la paz entre las naciones y pueblos de la tierra. Pablo VI dará un paso más en esta dirección con la tesis de la *Populorum Progressio* (a. 1967) de que la llamada cuestión social ha adquirido una dimensión mundial y ha de ser tratada según directrices morales válidas lo mismo para los particulares que para los Estados y sus Gobiernos (PP 3 y 9). Finalmente, se llega a la formulación directa y refleja del principio de solidaridad con Juan Pablo II en la encíclica *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (a. 1989), que explicita tanto sus fundamentos antropológicos

y teológicos como las exigencias de su contenido moral al interior de cada nación, a las relaciones internacionales (*SRS* 38-40) y, con evidente actualidad, a las relaciones intergeneracionales. Juan Pablo II elige para ello como pautas doctrinales de partida: la unidad e interdependencia constitutiva de la entera familia humana, convocada por Dios para ser una familia en Cristo y en el Espíritu, y la dimensión social inherente a la constitución de la persona: dimensión que brota de su más íntima vocación para ser y vivir en comunión con el otro – con los otros hombres – y que, por tanto, va mucho más allá de los aspectos puramente utilitarios y funcionales.

Juan Pablo II insiste con fuerza en que, no obstante el carácter fragmentario que reviste el mundo actual, evidenciado en los términos con los que hoy tan frecuentemente se presenta como “Primer Mundo”, “Segundo Mundo”, “Tercer Mundo” e incluso “Cuarto Mundo”, pesan más – y son mayores y más profundas – la unidad e interdependencia que domina de hecho la entera familia humana. Para el Papa lo que importa y urge es establecer y hacer efectivo el primado de la ética social en este nuevo entramado de las relaciones internacionales. Porque cuando la interdependencia entre las naciones se formula y practica al margen de las exigencias éticas las consecuencias para los más débiles son funestas; aunque, paradójicamente no sólo para ellos, sino también para los países más ricos que están viendo como emergen con virulencia desconocida humillantes formas de subdesarrollo en el seno de sus propias sociedades (*SRS* 17). La interdependencia podría parecer a algunos como un fenómeno neutral, “un sistema determinante de las relaciones en el mundo actual, en sus aspectos económico, cultural, político y religioso”, sin más. No debemos, sin embargo, dejarnos caer en el engaño: si la interdependencia no es “asumida como una categoría moral”, con todas sus consecuencias y exigencias prácticas (*SRS* 38), no significará nada valioso y prometedor para el futuro de la humanidad. No cabe, por tanto, otra solución a los problemas planteados por el fenómeno actual de la interdependencia que la de la solidaridad, entendida y ejercida como actitud moral y virtud social, es decir, no reduciéndola a un mero sentimiento de compasión ante los males de tantas personas cercanas o lejanas, sino comprendida y practicada como “la determinación firme y perseverante de empeñarse por el bien común; es decir, por el bien de todos y cada uno, para que todos seamos verdaderamente responsables de todos” (*SRS* 38).

El horizonte teológico último en el que Juan Pablo II sitúa el concepto de solidaridad es el de la caridad, virtud cristiana por excelencia, la que distingue a los verdaderos discípulos de Cristo. La solidaridad le da expre-

sión y efectividad; la “encarna” en el marco de las relaciones sociales y políticas (*Jn* 13, 35). La fe ilumina y fortalece sus fundamentos al poner de relieve la paternidad universal de Dios, la consiguiente hermandad de todos los hombres en Cristo, hijos en el Hijo, y la acción vivificadora del Espíritu Santo. La fe señala metas insospechadas a la solidaridad cuando descubre la vocación de todos los hombres a reproducir la unidad que se da en la vida íntima de Dios entre el Padre, el Hijo y el Espíritu, del modo como se nos ha revelado en Jesucristo. El Misterio de la unión Trinitaria es el modelo inefable e insuperable y, a la vez, alma de la vocación de la Iglesia a ser sacramento de unidad entre Dios y los hombres y de los hombres entre sí a la hora de “encarnar” socialmente el vínculo de la caridad que les une (SRS 40 c-d).

Con estos presupuestos teológicos – de teología moral y de antropología teológica – no es extraño que Juan Pablo II extendiese el campo de significación de esta concepción cristiana de la solidaridad a las relaciones intergeneracionales. Los que intervienen activamente en la vida social y económica deben tener muy en cuenta, según el Papa, las necesidades propias de cada ser humano, sea “niño, adulto o anciano” (SRS 33 e); y advierte que algunos recursos naturales, no renovables, no pueden ser esquilados, porque de otro modo se “pondría seriamente en peligro su futura disponibilidad, no sólo para la generación presente, sino sobre todo para las futuras” (SRS 34 c). Pero, sobre todo, alerta frente a la mentalidad individualista, hoy tan difundida, sobre la urgente necesidad de un compromiso de solidaridad y caridad con la familia, lugar propio y propicio para la ayuda mutua entre los esposos y para que puedan darse las atenciones que las generaciones se prestan entre sí. La familia, íntimamente enraizada en el amor matrimonial, constituye la comunidad solidaria por excelencia, imprescindible para la realización del postulado de la solidaridad intergeneracional. Las consecuencias político-jurídicas que deben extraerse, saltan a la vista. Una y principal es la del deber de los poderes públicos a “promover iniciativas políticas que ayuden a la familia, bien sea para la educación de los hijos, bien sea para la atención a los ancianos, evitando su alejamiento del núcleo familiar y consolidando las relaciones entre las generaciones” (SRS 49 b) sin constreñirlas al plano permanente económico, con olvido de su profundo contenido cultural. El establecimiento de un diálogo cultural entre las diversas generaciones, incluidas las pasadas y futuras, no admite demora (SRS 49 c).

Juan Pablo II ahonda en esta perspectiva familiar de la solidaridad intergeneracional en la *Carta a las familias* (CF). Define a la familia como

“comunidad de generaciones” (CF 10) e incluye en ella no sólo a los padres, hijos y hermanos, sino también a los abuelos y a los nietos, o mejor, a los padres de los padres y a los hijos de los hijos. La pertenencia familiar, afectiva y efectiva, debe de cubrir, según él, más campo que el estrecho perímetro de la familia nuclear. La crisis de la fecundidad familiar se pone de manifiesto en el escaso número de hijos de la familia actual, pero también en su poca sensibilidad para valorar y cultivar las relaciones de parentela en línea recta y colateral. El estilo usual de vida, sobre todo en las grandes ciudades, fuerza a una restricción de la unidad familiar, de ordinario a dos generaciones, desapareciendo las posibilidades de la familia en cuanto comunidad de generaciones. “Hay poca vida humana en la familia de nuestros días” (CF 10), constata el Papa. Es preciso trascender los límites de la familia nuclear más allá del espacio de los que viven bajo un mismo techo, lo que no se debe de confundir con un nostálgico retorno a la vieja familia patriarcal.

El valor de la propuesta de Juan Pablo II se ha visto confirmado por los estudios psicológicos más recientes. Para comprender y aprovechar positivamente las dinámicas familiares es preciso operar, se dice, al menos con tres generaciones. Las influencias intergeneracionales continúan siendo muy importantes aunque aparezcan y actúen más sutil y soterradamente que en el pasado. La experiencia clínica con las familias sigue demostrando hoy día que la pareja se constituye como el punto de convergencia y cruce de dos historias familiares que transmiten y dan significado tanto a las formas de contacto como a las de distanciamiento en la relación con la descendencia y entre sí. Un niño al nacer accede, precisamente a través de la relación con sus padres y hermanos, a una historia familiar que hunde sus raíces más allá de la de sus inmediatos protagonistas. Con el don de la vida (*matris-munus*) se comunica a los recién nacidos un patrimonio (*patris-munus*), muchas veces inconsciente, pero siempre influyente y decisivo para que cada uno pueda asumir su propia vida y destino bien inserto en una comunidad de valores culturales, espirituales y humanos.

Ser engendrado (no olvidemos que también los padres que engendran fueron previamente engendrados) supone reconocer ciertamente al otro en sí mismo; pero, considerado como miembro de una familia, vinculado desde el principio a la raíz simbólica del *matris-munus* y del *patris-munus* e inserto en una cadena intergeneracional, aunque con propia e indestructible personalidad. Por eso dice el Papa: “mediante la genealogía de las personas, la comunión conyugal se hace comunión de generaciones” (CF 10). El tiempo familiar se constituye por el presente y por el pasado, pero también por el

futuro a través del proyecto connatural a la pareja de dar vida a una nueva generación de personas: “la lógica de la entrega total del uno al otro implica la potencial apertura a la procreación. El matrimonio está llamado así a realizarse todavía más plenamente como familia” (CF 12). Si la familia pierde su memoria histórica o si se interrumpe la cadena de las generaciones, se detiene y perece la vida de la familia misma. Y, por el contrario, “el pacto conyugal se consolida con la sucesión de las generaciones” (CF 10).

La familia crece y se desarrolla, por lo tanto, en plenitud humana si sabe unir en un presente siempre nuevo pasado y futuro, si acierta a conjugar lo antiguo y lo nuevo en una síntesis original. ¡Tarea trascendental, según el Papa, para la realización de cada ser humano y de cada generación! Más aún, los vínculos con la genealogía familiar, que impregnan tan hondamente la estructura biológica y también la cultural de la persona, han de ser trascendidos y vividos a través de una relación más profunda con su modelo originario: “toda generación encuentra su modelo originario en la paternidad de Dios”. Su reflejo activo en la paternidad y en la maternidad humanas se muestra de un modo cualitativamente diverso a como ocurre en cualquier otra generación de seres vivos sobre la tierra (CF 9). Juan Pablo II retorna aquí, una vez más, a la perspectiva de la antropología teológica. La dignidad personal del hijo está por encima de cualquier valoración pragmática, sobre todo la de una posible pretensión de los padres para disponer de él como un objeto a su capricho. Ante la realidad del nuevo ser humano no cabe otra actitud en los progenitores que la de tomar conciencia de que Dios lo quiere por sí mismo y que lo llama a un proyecto de vida personal que desborda los límites del tiempo y apunta a la eternidad.

### *Bienestar*

El uso ordinario del término “bienestar” es bien conocido. Con el se quiere expresar un cierto grado de satisfacción de las necesidades materiales y el alto nivel de desarrollo económico del individuo y de la sociedad que lo posibilita. Esta concepción predominantemente socio-económica del “bienestar” es conocida y acogida desde el principio por la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia, pero matizándola y atemperándola a las exigencias antropológicas y morales de la visión cristiana del hombre, considerado en la totalidad de las dimensiones que lo integran según el orden de la creación y de la redención. Así ocurre ya con el Magisterio de Pablo VI en la *Populorum Progressio* (a. 1967) y muy ampliamente con el de Juan Pablo II en la *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (a. 1987) y en la *Centesimus Annus* (a. 1991). Ambos



enriquecen cualitativamente la forma tradicional de abordar esta cuestión por la anterior doctrina social de la Iglesia.

Pablo VI enfoca el desarrollo a partir de una perspectiva material y económica planteada de forma multidimensional, integral y mundial; es decir, a la luz de la filosofía y teología moral. Para el Papa Pablo VI el desarrollo ha de entenderse y practicarse como un proceso al servicio de todo el hombre y de todos los hombres (*PP* 14, 42). Juan Pablo II llamará luego la atención sobre la fragilidad histórica del desarrollo puramente material e intramundano: ni se trata de un proceso rectilíneo, ni automático, ni ilimitado, como creyeron los muchos iluministas desde la Ilustración. La experiencia histórica más reciente ha confirmado inequívocamente la tesis del Papa: el ideal de un desarrollo puramente economicista ha entrado abiertamente en crisis en todo el mundo. A la altura y en la encrucijada del Tercer Milenio se puede constatar cómo ni la acumulación de bienes y servicios basta para proporcionar la felicidad al hombre y a una época, ni la disponibilidad de los múltiples beneficios reales aportados por la ciencia, la técnica y la informática traen consigo la liberación de sus esclavitudes y, mucho menos, el desarrollo integral y la dignidad moral de la persona. Significativo es, en este sentido, el hecho de que también el superdesarrollo (o mal desarrollo) y el consumismo terminan por desvelarse como contrarios al bien y a la felicidad auténtica, es más, como una fuente de miserias de todo orden. Juan Pablo II subraya incansablemente que lo que importa es el ser, no el tener, no el tener del hombre. Naturalmente el tener no es malo, sino el tener que no respeta la calidad y ordenación jerárquica de los bienes hacia el verdadero ser y vocación de la persona humana. En cualquier caso lo que nunca se justifica moralmente es el que pocos tengan mucho y muchos casi nada. El desarrollo incluye una necesaria dimensión de justicia que ha de ser realizada en la ordenación económica de la sociedad que debe de procurar que los bienes indispensables para el bien “ser” y “vivir” sean accesibles al mayor número posible de ciudadanos, tanto en el ámbito interno de cada comunidad política como en la comunidad internacional. Aunque también sea incuestionable que las exigencias de la justicia, al plantearse un proceso social de desarrollo, no se agotan en la pura función distributiva (*SRS* 28). En el trasfondo de esta doctrina de la *SRS* sobre lo que implica un desarrollo auténticamente humano, laten de nuevo los principios de la antropología cristiana, más concretamente, su concepción del hombre como un ser corporal y espiritual a la vez, creatura e imagen de Dios, llamado a custodiar y cultivar los bienes de este mundo según su plan creador y redentor, junto con el imperativo ético fundamental de que el des-

arrollo no admite cualquier tipo de uso, posesión y disfrute de las cosas materiales, sino el orientado a la realización plena de la dignidad de la persona humana y de su vocación a la inmortalidad (SRS 29).

En la *Centesimus Annus* Juan Pablo II concreta esta doctrina en un contexto histórico de suma actualidad: la confrontación de la concepción de la sociedad del bienestar, vigente en el mundo occidental, con la del marxismo, situado ya en el punto histórico de una imparable crisis política e ideológica. El Papa parte del presupuesto de que ambos coinciden, al menos en la praxis, en la profesión de materialismo: “La sociedad del bienestar tiende a derrotar al marxismo en el terreno del puro materialismo, mostrando cómo una sociedad de libre mercado es capaz de satisfacer las necesidades materiales humanas más plenamente que lo que aseguraba el comunismo”, pero “excluyendo también los valores espirituales ..., – con lo cual – coincide con el marxismo en reducir totalmente al hombre a la esfera de lo económico y a la satisfacción de las necesidades materiales” (CA 19 d). Algunos Estados han evolucionado hacia el Estado de bienestar “para responder de manera más adecuada a muchas necesidades y carencias tratando de remediar formas de pobreza y de privación indignas de la persona humana” con frutos de justicia social evidentes, reconoce el Papa. “No obstante – advierte –, no han faltado excesos y abusos, especialmente en los años más recientes, que han provocado duras críticas a ese modelo de Estado calificado como *Estado asistencial*”. Deficiencias y abusos que han derivado frecuentemente de una inadecuada comprensión de las competencias, límites y deberes que le son propios, más concretamente, del olvido del *principio de subsidiaridad*: “una estructura social de orden superior no debe interferir en la vida interna de un grupo social de orden inferior, privándola de sus competencias, sino que más bien debe sostenerla en caso de necesidad y ayudarla a coordinar su acción con la de los demás componentes sociales, con miras al bien común” (CA 48 d).

Juan Pablo II aprovecha la experiencia histórica del fracaso teórico y práctico del marxismo para transformar y reformular la categoría de “alienación”. La sociedad y el Estado del bienestar han superado la explotación en las formas analizadas y descritas por Marx – reconoce el Papa – pero no en otros sentidos. El hombre también sufre alienación cuando se niega a trascenderse a sí mismo y a vivir la experiencia de la autodonación y del compromiso en la edificación de una comunidad auténticamente humana, abierta a la consecución de su destino último que es Dios. Lo mismo ocurre con la sociedad: también se encuentra alienada cuando sus formas de organización social impiden o dificultan la realización de esa donación y la

vivencia y testimonio de la solidaridad. Y en este sentido, se siguen produciendo situaciones de explotación y alienación: en la instrumentalización recíproca de las personas y en la forma de querer satisfacer – cada vez más refinadamente, por cierto – sus necesidades particulares y secundarias por encima y a costa de las principales y auténticas, admitiendo éstas sólo en las hipótesis de su cómoda satisfacción. Situaciones frecuentes en una sociedad que gira sólo o preferentemente en torno al tener y gozar y no al ser, a la verdad y al bien. La alienación adviene irremediablemente cuando el hombre se muestra incapaz de dominar sus instintos y pasiones, ordenándolos de acuerdo con la verdad y la ley de Dios que le habla en su conciencia. En estas condiciones no conseguirá ser libre y menos vencer y superar los influjos de una publicidad sistemática que le impiden, incluso, “someter a examen crítico las premisas sobre las que se fundan” (CA 41).

El fenómeno paradigmático que retrata más reveladoramente el cuadro moral de nuestras sociedades occidentales de bienestar, según el Papa, es el consumismo. El peso de las necesidades perentorias ha agobiado al hombre en el pasado muy repetidamente. Los bienes necesarios para vivir y subsistir eran pocos y escasos, fijados cuantitativa y cualitativamente por los elementos objetivos de su conformación física. La actividad económica se limitaba a procurarlos y a distribuirlos muy elementalmente. Hoy, en cambio, además de ofrecer una ingente producción de bienes de todo tipo, se ve interpelada por la demanda de calidad en todos los productos y servicios, en el medio-ambiente y en la vida social en general. Algo en sí legítimo. Sin embargo, en esta nueva época histórica de las sociedades que buscan y cuidan “la calidad de vida” como objetivo supremo de sus aspiraciones y realizaciones comunes, emergen peligros y amenazas inéditas para el bien del hombre. Lo que se puede ver, sobre todo, en la tendencia creciente a dirigir la producción de bienes y su publicidad a la pura y dura satisfacción de los instintos con el efecto masivo de creación y difusión generalizada de hábitos de consumo y estilos de vida objetivamente ilícitos y perjudiciales para la salud física y espiritual, a costa siempre de la dignidad personal y del bien moral de los individuos y de la sociedad.

Este viene a ser el resultado final, social y cultural, del moderno fenómeno del consumismo que reduce todo el sentido de la vida humana al mero disfrute de los bienes materiales (SRS 28). Su forma más llamativamente representativa es la de la droga y su propagación generalizada. El consumo de estupefacientes atenta radicalmente contra la salud y la dignidad del hombre y, por si fuera poco, disuelve y trastoca de forma nihilista la misma categoría de “necesidad humana”. No es extraño que Juan Pablo

II, después de este diagnóstico tan crítico del estado de salud moral de la sociedad contemporánea, convoque a una gran campaña educativa y cultural para hacer valer en las jóvenes generaciones la imagen verdadera del hombre contemplado en toda su riqueza antropológica y teológica, llamado a un destino eterno de gloria y bienaventuranza, a fin de que comprendan el valor trascendente de sus vidas y la necesidad de saber subordinar existencialmente lo material e instintivo a lo interior y espiritual (CA 36).

### *Ecología humana*

Nuestro tercer tema es de la ecología humana. El cambio de perspectiva operado en los dos últimos decenios del siglo pasado en la percepción social de este problema, ha sido epocal. Se pasó de valorar la explotación de la naturaleza como un símbolo de progreso a considerarla como una potencial amenaza para el futuro de la humanidad. El planteamiento de lo que pronto sería llamado la cuestión ecológica estaba servido. El Magisterio Pontificio lo acusa y capta inmediatamente. Ya en la encíclica *Laborem Exercens* de 1981 escribía el Papa Juan Pablo II que los trabajadores tenían derecho a un ambiente de trabajo y a una organización del proceso productivo que no comportasen ni perjuicios para su salud física ni daños para su integridad moral (LE 19 f). En las encíclicas *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* y *Centesimus Annus* aborda directamente el tema e introduce en el debate una nueva e importantísima variante conceptual, la de “ecología humana”. De este modo obligaba a tomar conciencia de las verdaderas y gravísimas dimensiones del problema. No sólo corren peligros la conservación y respeto de la estructura de la naturaleza y del medio ambiente en el sentido físico-químico y biológico de la expresión, sino también el respeto y protección de las estructuras naturales y morales de la vida específicamente humana. Para el Papa se impone antropológica y éticamente la elaboración de una doctrina social que aclare los contenidos y exigencias, implicadas en la defensa y promoción de “una ecología humana”. Es lo que hará en las dos últimas Encíclicas citadas, con ecos que llegan hasta la *Evangelium Vitae* (a. 1995).

En la *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* Juan Pablo II examina y valora la preocupación ecológica como un signo positivo de nuestro tiempo. Es preciso apoyar y alabar “la mayor conciencia de la limitación de los recursos disponibles, la necesidad de respetar la integridad y los ritmos de la naturaleza y de tenerlos en cuenta en la programación del desarrollo” (SRS 26 g). Un desarrollo del hombre y de los pueblos, digno de tal nombre, no puede pro-

gramarse y realizarse a costa de la destrucción ecológica del cosmos. El Papa advierte de las consecuencias nefastas de la utilización de las diversas categorías de seres vivos o inanimados para el consumo según apetezca o al ritmo exclusivo de las exigencias económicas del momento. El respeto cuidadoso a la naturaleza de cada ser y a la mutua interrelación de todos ellos es de importancia decisiva para el futuro de la naturaleza y del hombre; y, por supuesto, el caer en la cuenta, cuanto antes, de la limitación de los recursos naturales – sobre todo, de algunos básicos, no renovables –, evitando en todo caso el usarlos como si pudiéramos disponer de ellos con dominio absoluto. De otro modo, se pondría inevitablemente en peligro su disponibilidad para las generaciones futuras. En este contexto resulta obvio establecer la exigencia de un uso ecológico de los procesos de industrialización que evite la contaminación del ambiente y los peligros para la salud de la población (SRS 34 d).

En la *Centesimus Annus* el Papa amplía los términos de la cuestión ecológica con referencia directa y explícita a las economías más avanzadas y a sus postulados de tener y gozar a toda costa, en las que el gasto y consumo sin freno y sin medida es criterio y estilo habitual de conducta individual y comportamiento social. El Papa va a la raíz de lo que denuncia. En el fondo de la actual “cuestión ecológica” – de la destrucción del medio ambiente – subyace el conocido error teológico acerca de lo que significa la capacidad y vocación del hombre para transformar la naturaleza, olvidando su fundamento y origen: Dios que le ha donado todas las cosas. Es preciso reconocer esta verdad del mundo y de la tierra, originariamente obra y don de Dios – reclama Juan Pablo II –, con una fisonomía y un destino dados e instituidos por Dios Creador que el hombre ha de respetar ¡Colaborar con Dios en su obra de la creación, y no en suplantarle! Esa es su vocación. La naturaleza misma se rebela, reaccionando con catástrofes ecológicas y daños para la salud que todos conocemos, cuando el hombre pretende abusar de ella y manipularla como si fuera su absoluto señor y dueño. Para vencer eficazmente esta tentación es preciso adoptar una actitud contemplativa ante el cosmos y toda la realidad visible, descubriendo en ella la verdad y la belleza de Dios: el mensaje del Dios invisible que la ha creado (CA 37 b).

Es en este horizonte de la antropología teológica donde se sitúa finalmente, según su estilo magisterial habitual, Juan Pablo II a la hora de diseñar y explicar su noción de ecología humana. No sólo la tierra, también el propio hombre con su naturaleza corporal y espiritual, es don de Dios que ha de ser acogido, recibido y cuidado con apertura agradecida. Esta estructura natural y moral inserta en su propio ser – don de Dios – ha de ser res-

petada escrupulosamente en todos los ámbitos en los que se desarrolla la existencia humana: tanto en el íntimo y personal como en el público y social. Juan Pablo se detiene expresamente en dos situaciones muy características de nuestra época, la gran ciudad y el mundo del trabajo. En ambas han de ser aplicadas las reglas morales de la ecología humana. La vivienda, la ordenación del espacio urbano y el mundo laboral necesitan con urgencia insoslayable de una regulación acorde con la dignidad de la persona humana y con la inaplazable promoción del matrimonio y de la familia, como han sido – y son – queridas por Dios, Creador y Redentor (SRS 38 a). Dios ha conferido al hombre dignidad personal y la capacidad de trascender el concreto ordenamiento social de una época o momento histórico mediante su apertura a la verdad y el bien. Es cierto que la educación recibida y la atmósfera cultural y moral lo condicionan grandemente. Aún más, las estructuras sociales que generan pueden obstaculizar, pero también favorecer fuertemente su plena realización. En todo caso, siempre son reformables. El Papa alaba la valentía y paciencia de quienes luchan incansables para cambiarlas y sustituirlas por otras más conformes a la naturaleza, vocación y dignidad del hombre, conscientes de la permanente tarea de facilitar siempre y mejor la apertura a la verdad y a su reconocimiento y vivencia actualizada y fiel (SRS 38 a).

Para el logro de “la ecología humana” es de importancia fundamental la familia. En ella recibe el hombre los primeros conocimientos acerca de la verdad y el bien, aprende a saber qué quiere decir amar y ser amado y, en último término, qué significa ser persona. Se trata naturalmente de la verdadera familia, de la fundada en el matrimonio y en el compromiso del don recíproco y para siempre del hombre y la mujer. Sólo el vínculo estable y el ejercicio continuo de esta entrega mutua del esposo y la esposa crean el ambiente adecuado en el que puede nacer y desarrollarse el niño, tomar conciencia de su dignidad y prepararse para asumir libre y responsablemente su propio destino. La ecología humana se enfrenta actualmente a un reto pedagógico y evangelizador formidable: recuperar en muchos casos y sostener en todos el reconocimiento social del modelo de familia conforme con la naturaleza y la dignidad de la persona humana, ante el creciente desprestigio y deterioro práctico por el que atraviesa en los países económicamente más desarrollados. La cultura dominante en vez de considerar la vida y al hombre mismo como una vocación para el tiempo y la eternidad, imbuje al ciudadano medio de una visión hedonista que le induce a un esquema de búsqueda y experimentación del placer como ideal y valor supremo de la existencia. Así se explica la resis-

tencia de muchos contemporáneos a vincularse de una manera estable en matrimonio, a la donación mutua del hombre y la mujer, abiertos al amor fecundo que engendra nuevas vidas. Se tienen los hijos según los propios gustos y conveniencias, no como fruto del amor esponsal, gratuito y generoso, en el que actúan la gracia y el amor de Dios (CA 39 a).

El Papa nos urge a promover la familia como el santuario de la vida: “el ámbito donde la vida, don de Dios, puede ser acogida y protegida de manera adecuada contra los múltiples ataques a que está expuesta, y puede desarrollarse según las exigencias de un auténtico crecimiento humano. Contra la llamada cultura de la muerte, la familia constituye la sede de la cultura de la vida” (CA 39 b). La justificación y legitimación del aborto y de la eutanasia, junto con las campañas sistemáticas contra la natalidad, sometiendo a presiones intolerables precisamente a las personas y sociedades menos desarrolladas, constituyen las señas inequívocas de lo que significa hoy la cultura de la muerte. El Papa llega incluso a comparar esta campaña sistemática contra el derecho a la vida con una guerra química destinada a envenenar a millones de seres indefensos (CA 39 c: SRS 25).

La crítica de Juan Pablo II se centra no tanto en un sistema económico concreto, cuanto en la visión de la vida y de la sociedad, de moda hoy. Visión planteada ética y culturalmente al margen y en contra de la imagen trascendente del hombre con consecuencias inevitablemente negativas para la concepción de la economía y de su función social. Si se organiza la sociedad teniendo en cuenta sólo las condiciones y postulados intraeconómicos y técnicos de los procesos de producción, distribución y consumo, con total olvido de la dimensión ética y religiosa de su protagonista principal que es, quiérase o no, el hombre, entonces se hace imposible un verdadero desarrollo social de las personas y de los pueblos (CA 39 b: SRS 34). La acción del Estado no se puede quedar en la defensa y tutela del medio ambiente natural, sino que ha de dirigirse primero y primordialmente a la salvaguarda de la integridad del medio ambiente humano. Sería iluso esperar, en uno y otro caso, soluciones y garantías de los meros mecanismos del mercado (CA 40 a).

### *Conclusión: la cuestión del hombre y la centralidad de la familia*

El sucinto y panorámico análisis del reciente Magisterio Pontificio ha puesto de relieve que la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia se esfuerza por comprender y explicar las nociones de solidaridad intergeneracional, bienestar y ecología humana a partir de una adecuada comprensión teológica de lo que es el hombre.

Es muy significativo a este respecto cómo Juan Pablo II recurre a la noción de alienación y la interpreta y remodela cristianamente. El marxismo criticó a las sociedades burguesas y capitalistas, haciéndolas el reproche de mercantilización y alienación de la existencia y proponiendo como alternativa un modelo de sociedad colectivista. La experiencia histórica ha puesto en evidencia lo que el pensamiento de inspiración cristiana había dicho siempre: que la crítica marxista se basaba en una concepción equivocada del hombre. El colectivismo no sólo no acaba con la alienación sino que la incrementa. La antropología cristiana, en cambio, proporciona aquella verdadera y completa visión del hombre como persona, capaz de explicar adecuadamente cuáles son los aspectos de la conducta humana que causan de verdad alienación, ya sea a nivel personal ya sea en la configuración del ordenamiento de la sociedad. Es más, la concepción cristiana del hombre es la que está en condiciones de explicar en qué consiste verdaderamente la alienación y su forma de presentarse en las sociedades contemporáneas, incluso en las de los países más avanzados de occidente. El hombre se aliena cuando procede a una inversión de fines y medios en su vida personal y social, cuando para satisfacer más refinadamente sus necesidades particulares y secundarias se hace sordo a las principales y más genuinamente humanas. La causa principal de su alienación reside en el proponerse como los objetivos de la vida el tener y gozar y no el ser de acuerdo con su medida divina: de su verdad según Dios. El hombre se aliena cuando rechaza trascenderse a sí mismo y se resiste a vivir la experiencia de la autodonación y de la formación de una auténtica comunidad humana, orientada a su destino último que es la posesión de la vida divina. Una sociedad sufre y produce alienación cuando su organización impide o dificulta ese autodonarse y actuar solidariamente enraizados en el amor creador y redentor de Dios (CA 41).

La llamada del Papa, a la que nos referíamos más arriba, a emprender esa gran tarea de educación integral y de evangelización de la cultura en torno a la concepción auténtica y verdadera del hombre, imagen de Dios, destinado a ser su hijo (CA 36), se explica bien. Urge ponerla en práctica. Para el logro de este gran empeño pastoral y cultural es clave la familia, como lugar privilegiado de la experiencia humana de comunión amorosa y fecunda. La familia presta a la sociedad una contribución primera y fundamental en orden al bien común, al revelar y comunicar los valores del amor desinteresado, generoso y fiel. De este modo se desvela como la escuela por excelencia de humanización y de sociabilidad. Con su ejemplo y estímulo se puede reconstituir todo el tejido de la vida social en un clima de



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justicia y solidaridad, de respeto y diálogo: de paz. La Iglesia al recordar el papel decisivo de la familia en el devenir concreto de cada persona – en su historia más íntima – desvela la raíz profunda de su contribución insustituible al buen funcionamiento de la sociedad. La familia es el aliado natural e insustituible de todo proyecto social, económico o político, que se proponga servir a la dignidad personal del hombre concreto y al verdadero bien común. Relegarla a un papel subalterno y secundario y, mucho peor, preterirla o atacarla cultural y sociopolíticamente, supone infligir un gravísimo daño al bien de la sociedad y a su sano y auténtico desarrollo. Atentar contra la familia, como hoy frecuentemente se hace, constituye no sólo un acto de desprecio a ella misma, a su dignidad y verdad institucionales, sino también un acto antihumano, anticultural y antisocial.

# SOLIDARIETÀ INTERGENERAZIONALE, WELFARE E ECOLOGIA UMANA NEL PENSIERO SOCIALE CATTOLICO

OMBRETTA FUMAGALLI CARULLI

Mi sia consentito anzitutto ringraziare la Presidente Glendon, per l'onore concessomi di commentare la conferenza introduttiva di Sua Eminenza il Cardinale Rouco Varela. A lei esprimo anche l'augurio più cordiale per l'alto mandato affidatole di presiedere la nostra Accademia. Sono certa che lo farà con l'impegno, l'autorevolezza, e la fermezza, che le ho sempre ammirato sin da quando guidò la delegazione della Santa Sede a Pechino. Personalmente collaborerò con entusiasmo.

## *Premessa*

Prima di passare al commento della Prolusione, intendo fare una premessa (che vuole anche essere un omaggio a chi non è più tra noi) ricordando quanto un nostro compianto collega, Pier Luigi Zampetti, scriveva nella Prefazione al suo ultimo libro dedicato a *La dottrina sociale della Chiesa: per la salvezza dell'uomo e del pianeta*.

Egli affermava: "In questo periodo eccezionale e problematico della storia dell'umanità, la Chiesa offre a tutti i popoli l'ancora di salvezza. Tale ancora è rappresentata dalla sua dottrina sociale, rilanciata nella sua integralità e novità da Giovanni Paolo II. In essa sono racchiusi i principi fondamentali dalla cui concreta applicazione dipende la vera ed autentica pace". E così proseguiva: "Tali principi costituiscono un *corpus* unitario, destinato a far emergere un nuovo modello di società e di Stato nel mondo intero. La persona umana, la soggettività della famiglia e della società, il principio di sussidiarietà, il bene comune universale, costituiscono il motore trainante di questo modello". Applicando poi questi principi al tipo di comunità politica in grado di attuarli ricordava: "Tali principi, debitamente interpretati, ci permettono di superare l'insufficienza della democrazia rappresentativa integrandola con la democrazia parte-

cipativa, che è la democrazia della società. Essa attiva il principio di sussidiarietà, che costituisce la quintessenza della dottrina sociale della Chiesa”. Quanto alla dialettica tra formazioni sociali e sovranità popolare concludeva: “Emerge in questa prospettiva il ruolo della famiglia, che vivifica il concetto di popolo e che dà, così, un volto concreto alla sovranità popolare come sovranità del popolo delle famiglie”.

In queste poche frasi sono sintetizzati i pilastri sui quali basa quella parte dell’insegnamento sociale della Chiesa più attinente al tema oggetto delle riflessioni su *Solidarietà intergenerazionale, Welfare ed Ecologia umana*.

#### 1. A DIFESA DELLA DIGNITÀ E RESPONSABILITÀ DELLA PERSONA: SOLIDARIETÀ, SUSDARIETÀ, BENE COMUNE

Passando ora al commento della prolusione di Sua Eminenza il Card. Rouco Varela, essa è tanto articolata che si presterebbe a molte più riflessioni di quelle che, per ragioni di tempo, potrò esporre, cercando di evidenziare analogie e differenze tra magistero della Chiesa e scelte della comunità civile.

La prima riflessione riguarda i principi fondamentali del magistero sociale della Chiesa.

Il punto di partenza e il punto di arrivo di esso appartengono alla cristologia e antropologia cristiana. Bene espressi nella prima Enciclica di Giovanni Paolo II *Redemptor Hominis* (se “Cristo si è unito ad ogni uomo”, n. 13, “tutte le vie della Chiesa conducono all’uomo”, n. 14), essi caratterizzano l’intero percorso storico dell’insegnamento sociale, sviluppatosi dai tempi di Leone XIII sino ad oggi con una lunga e concatenata serie di Encicliche, che hanno un comune filo conduttore: la dignità e la responsabilità di ogni persona come fondamento etico di ogni sistema di protezione sociale e come obiettivo al quale orientare ogni intervento.

Dalla *Rerum Novarum* di Leone XIII (1891) alla *Quadragesimo Anno* di Pio XI (1931), alla *Mater et Magistra* di Giovanni XXIII (1961) alla *Populorum Progressio* di Paolo VI (1967) e, dopo il Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II con le due grandi Costituzioni *Lumen Gentium* e *Gaudium et Spes* che fanno da spartiacque, alla *Octogesima Adveniens* (1971) di Paolo VI sino alle Encicliche di Giovanni Paolo II, da *Redemptor Hominis* (1979) a *Laborem Exercens* (1981) a *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (1987) a *Centesimus Annus* (1991), nonché ai molti documenti magisteriali (dai *Discorsi* alle *Lettere Apostoliche*, ai semplici indirizzi di saluto in significativi luoghi o momenti), le risposte date ai problemi sociali dell’umanità rappresentano

quella “sapienza” – nel senso usato da S. Paolo – con la quale deve dialogare la “scienza” nelle sue varie articolazioni (diritto, economia, sociologia, politica), quando si trovi a dovere delineare i percorsi grazie ai quali la persona possa realizzare la propria attitudine sociale.

Anche i non credenti in Cristo guardano a queste risposte con attenzione crescente via via che la Chiesa (specie conciliare e postconciliare) prende consapevolezza di dovere rivolgersi “al mondo contemporaneo” (come detto nella intitolazione di *Gaudium et Spes*), non solo dunque ai cattolici, diventando punto di riferimento di tutti coloro che nel villaggio globale come nella più sperduta località chiedono aiuto e sostegno per le condizioni di vita sociale.

La proposta della Chiesa, oggi come ieri, si sintetizza in tre principi fondamentali con i quali regolare le relazioni sociali, così da salvaguardare la dignità umana ed assicurare la giustizia sociale: la sussidiarietà, la solidarietà, il bene comune.

Sono gli stessi dai quali prende avvio anche quel sistema di protezione sociale che, nell'incrocio tra concezioni socialiste e concezioni cristiane, rimane una delle più grandi invenzioni dell'Europa del secolo XX, pur con tutte le difficoltà nel concretizzarsi in specifici modelli politico-legislativi e pur con non poche applicazioni distorsive. Quel modello entra in crisi nel momento in cui lo Stato, disattendendo i principi di responsabilità propri al pensiero cristiano, trasforma il *Welfare* in assistenzialismo. *Centesimus Annus* ne è la denuncia più articolata. Non occorrono sul punto specifiche dimostrazioni. Basta l'osservazione attenta delle involuzioni avutesi in molti Stati europei.

Le proposte, scientifiche e politiche, di superamento della crisi, che non intendano travolgere la solidarietà sociale, recuperano talvolta (ma troppo raramente), anche quando non se ne avvedano, concetti propri all'insegnamento della Chiesa, che sollecita a non rinunciare ad un sistema di protezione sociale, ma a ristrutturarlo.

Perchè ciò possa avvenire è necessario il coinvolgimento di tutti gli attori sociali (famiglie comprese) e di tutti i livelli di governo della cosa pubblica, dalle municipalità allo Stato centrale, al Terzo Settore, che ormai è diventato così importante nello svolgere funzioni di rilevanza pubblica da imporsi come nuovo protagonista sociale, destinato a dominare la scena politica del nostro secolo. Entra in gioco, in altri termini, quel duplice concetto di sussidiarietà, verticale ed orizzontale, che rappresenta uno dei più originali contributi culturali del pensiero cattolico, sin dalla *Quadragesimo Anno*.

Se sussidiarietà, solidarietà e bene comune, nel sostenere lo sviluppo economico-sociale, consentono una crescita dell'uomo integralmente considerato, essi devono essere tutti compresenti come ingredienti co-essenziali di una ordinata "città dell'uomo". La vita concreta dei popoli ha dimostrato, spesso con la crudezza delle ingiustizie sociali, che la sussidiarietà senza solidarietà diventa individualismo, e che la solidarietà senza sussidiarietà diventa omologazione. Se viene meno sussidiarietà o solidarietà, è difficile, poi, se non impossibile, raggiungere il bene comune. La persona umana, di conseguenza, anziché il fine, diventa il mezzo dello sviluppo economico-sociale.

Da sussidiarietà, solidarietà e bene comune, come perimetro di tutela della vita sociale, la Chiesa deriva un ampio ventaglio di diritti umani, che presenta alla attenzione di chiunque regga le istituzioni pubbliche, talvolta innovando o precedendo l'evoluzione avutasi in senso alle organizzazioni internazionali. Così, ad esempio, lo sviluppo dei popoli e l'ecologia umana sono rivendicati dalla Chiesa come diritti umani con largo anticipo rispetto alla consapevolezza delle organizzazioni internazionali. La presenza in queste della delegazione vaticana è spesso determinante, come dimostra l'opera di sensibilizzazione svolta all'interno della Conferenza di Helsinki sulla sicurezza e cooperazione in Europa (CSCE ora OSCE), facendo introdurre il diritto di libertà religiosa nell'Atto finale del 1975 tra i primi dieci principi, enunciati nel primo cesto dell'Atto, destinati – si dice – a reggere le relazioni tra gli Stati firmatari. Il VII, infatti, sancisce il "rispetto dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, inclusa la libertà di pensiero, di coscienza, di religione o credo".

## 2. LA CENTRALITÀ DELLA FAMIGLIA

La seconda riflessione riguarda la centralità della famiglia e della catena generazionale nel quadro della sussidiarietà.

Per comprenderne il significato istituzionale, vorrei ricordare come il pensiero cristiano possa influenzare le basi giuridiche degli Stati. Trarrò l'esempio dal mio Paese. Una delle radici cristiane della Costituzione italiana – che perciò viene definita dai giuristi "personalistica" – ha indotto i nostri padri costituenti a porre al centro del disegno costituzionale la tutela della persona nei rapporti civili e a disegnare, intorno ad essa, come cerchi concentrici le aree di garanzia giuridica anzitutto dei rapporti etico-sociali, poi dei rapporti economici ed infine – il cerchio più ampio che tutti gli altri rinvolva – dei rapporti politici. Il criterio della "socialità progressiva" (fu que-

sta l'espressione di Aldo Moro in seno alla Assemblea costituente), ben visibile nella intitolazione della Parte Prima, pone la tutela della famiglia come primo cerchio di tutela dei rapporti etico sociali.

Questo disegno costituzionale (che, per la verità, ha trovato in Italia solo timide applicazioni) si ispira al magistero della Chiesa: il personalismo giuridico è incardinato nella "socialità progressiva", che colloca la famiglia in un ruolo di primaria importanza (art. 29 Costituzione italiana).

Privo di ogni timidezza ed anzi provvisto di particolare forza è il pensiero di Giovanni Paolo II, che dedica alla famiglia una attenzione, si può dire, senza precedenti. Citare ora analiticamente tutti i passi del suo insegnamento o anche solo quelli più significativi non è possibile, tanto ingente e continua è la produzione magisteriale. Lo ha sottolineato efficacemente il Card. Rouco Varela. Ma val la pena almeno ricordare i testi o i momenti fondamentali, che si aggiungono a quella lunga catechesi sulla coppia umana delle udienze del mercoledì di inizio pontificato (protrattasi per ben cinque anni, dall'ottobre 1979 all'ottobre 1984), che può considerarsi la premessa di tutta l'evoluzione successiva.

Tra i testi e momenti fondamentali sono la convocazione del Sinodo dei Vescovi del 25 ottobre 1980 sul tema "I compiti della famiglia cristiana nel mondo contemporaneo", la *Esortazione Apostolica* del 1981 *Familiaris Consortio*, la *Carta dei diritti della famiglia* del 22 ottobre 1983 con la presentazione "a tutti i nostri contemporanei, siano essi cristiani o non" dei fondamentali diritti della famiglia, la *Lettera alle famiglie* del 1994, l'*Omelia* per il Giubileo delle famiglie del 15 ottobre 2000. Spunti e spesso approfondimenti originali si trovano in pressoché tutti i numerosi discorsi che trattano delle molteplici e continue sfide del mondo contemporaneo alla convivenza sociale.

Molti discorsi sono pronunciati durante il 1994, anno internazionale della famiglia: così, oltre alla *Lettera alle famiglie*, per ricordarne a titolo di esempio due temi ai quali il Papa riserva da sempre priorità, cioè l'infanzia e l'influenza dei *media*, possono essere menzionati la *Lettera del Papa ai bambini nell'anno della famiglia* del 13 dicembre ed il *Messaggio per la giornata mondiale delle comunicazioni* del 24 gennaio. Altri sono inseriti nelle Encicliche sociali, da *Laborem Exercens* a *Centesimus Annus*, a *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*. Altri ancora rendono qua e là pensosi i vivaci messaggi indirizzati ai giovani: dalla *Lettera Apostolica* loro rivolta il 31 marzo 1985, in occasione dell'anno internazionale della gioventù, ai discorsi delle *Giornate mondiali della gioventù*, che dal 1987 ogni due anni vedono folle giovanili raccogliersi intorno al Papa con una mobilitazione via via crescente nelle

edizioni sinora avutesi (a Buenos Aires, a Santiago de Compostela, a Czestochowa, a Denver, a Manila, a Parigi, a Roma, e così via). Altri infine sono pronunciati nelle occasioni di incontro con istituzioni o Consigli di più diretta competenza: dalle inaugurazioni dell'Anno rotale alle direttive al Pontificio Consiglio per la Famiglia.

Che la famiglia, anche nel suo essere patto intergenerazionale ed insieme agenzia sociale, debba essere garantita come bene per l'umanità – un “bene arduo, ma affascinante” – è dunque pensiero costante di Giovanni Paolo II.

Non si tratta solo di opporsi a concezioni egoistiche eredi di quel libertarismo, che nello scorso secolo, ai tempi della contestazione sessantottina, vociava sulle strade (“Non più madri, non più figlie: distruggiamo le famiglie”). Né si tratta solo di contrapporre la genuina “Civiltà dell'amore” – che nella famiglia trova le sue basi sociali e che pure Giovanni Paolo II richiama con forza, in continuità con il suo predecessore, Paolo VI, che quella espressione aveva coniato – al grido disperato di Gide (“Famiglie, focolari custoditi, possessi gelosi della felicità: io vi odio!”), oppure alla mentalità consumistica ed anti-natalista o, ancora, alla mera felicità utilitaristica, o, infine ad un collettivismo, che neghi la soggettività dei singoli come delle famiglie.

Si tratta anche di questo, ma anche di qualcosa di più. Il Papa polacco completa il pensiero del Papa italiano, aggiungendo, nella *Lettera alle famiglie* (n. 15), una originale esegesi del quarto Comandamento. “Onora tuo padre e tua madre” non significa solo doveroso rispetto del figlio verso coloro che gli hanno dato la vita. Significa rispetto delle relazioni interpersonali che legano le generazioni. Di qui l'invito alla “compatezza interiore” e alla “solidarietà nella famiglia”, che si aggiunge, completandolo, al tradizionale adempimento dei doveri di educazione.

Per rendere più chiari i termini del suo appello, Giovanni Paolo II promuove la *Carta dei diritti della famiglia*. Essa non vuole essere una esposizione di teologia dogmatica o morale, ma si propone di presentare una formulazione, la più completa possibile, di tutti i diritti della famiglia come società naturale e universale, compresi dunque quei diritti relazionali della famiglia come soggetto sociale, che oggi vengono considerati i fondamenti di una nuova cittadinanza della famiglia. In ragione di essi la *Carta* è indirizzata principalmente ai governi ed alle organizzazioni internazionali intergovernative: diritto alla famiglia e diritti della famiglia che dunque possono considerarsi diritti umani, individuali e collettivi.

La *Lettera alle famiglie* fa un ulteriore passo (n. 17), affermando che la famiglia “è soggetto più di ogni altra istituzione sociale: lo è più della

Nazione, dello Stato, più della società e delle Organizzazioni internazionali”. Ed aggiunge: “queste società, specialmente le Nazioni, in tanto godono di soggettività propria in quanto la ricevono dalle persone e dalle loro famiglie”. Di qui anche la richiesta del riconoscimento della “sovranità della famiglia”, con un esplicito appello alle istituzioni politiche competenti.

Si tratta di posizioni che interessano direttamente gli assetti istituzionali della società e che non a torto sono considerate rivoluzionarie.

Rispetto ai modelli di Stato assistenziale, che hanno ormai mostrato tutta la loro inadeguatezza e che pur continuano a sopravvivere con sempre minore credibilità ed efficacia, il riconoscimento della sovranità della famiglia è definito (Zampetti) “nuovo modello di sviluppo”.

In effetti, già la distinzione tra Nazione e Stato rappresenta una originalità concettuale di Giovanni Paolo II rispetto alle tradizionali categorie elaborate dai cultori di dottrina dello Stato.

Essa pone in termini inediti la categoria della sovranità. “Sono figlio di una Nazione – dice il Papa rivolgendosi al Corpo diplomatico – che ha vissuto le più grandi esperienze della storia, che i suoi vicini hanno condannato a morte a più riprese, ma che è sopravvissuta e che è rimasta se stessa. Essa ha conservato la sua sovranità nazionale ... unicamente appoggiandosi alla propria cultura”. E, nell’occasione del seicentesimo anniversario di Jasna Gora, definisce la sovranità dello Stato come “profondamente legata alla sua capacità di promuovere la libertà della Nazione”, così da “sviluppare condizioni che le permettono di esprimere tutta la sua peculiare identità storica e culturale, di essere cioè sovrana mediante lo Stato”.

La distinzione, ma anche la doverosa dialettica, tra Nazione (come rispetto delle culture) e Stato (come conformazione politica) ed il loro collegamento con la categoria della sovranità ricompare poi nella concezione della famiglia e diventa una sfida, anch’essa originale, che la sovranità della famiglia pone sia allo Stato sia alla Nazione.

La sfida impone a chi regge le istituzioni pubbliche di rivedere i tradizionali modelli istituzionali secondo almeno due direzioni.

Si tratta, da un lato, di ridisegnare le linee di una comunità politica partecipata, ripensando in termini nuovi il principio della sussidiarietà con un ruolo centrale delle famiglie in quanto tali, e delle catene generazionali, non solo (come è in gran parte delle legislazioni civili) come mera somma delle posizioni soggettive dei componenti.

Si tratta, d’altro lato, di favorire la partecipazione della famiglia, come soggetto anch’esso sovrano, al patrimonio della Nazione. Ad essere interpellati da queste proposte, che sono anche irrinunciabili sfide, sono tutti i



settori ed i problemi della vita sociale: istruzione ed educazione, salute, lavoro, pensioni, servizi sociali.

Trasferire tutto ciò al sistema di protezione sociale significa per ogni comunità politica, a qualunque livello si ponga, promuovere un *Welfare* a misura di famiglia.

Esso è anche un modo di sostenere le famiglie a far fronte ai crescenti pericoli di disgregazione, rinsaldando i legami tra le generazioni, e rafforzandoli anche nella funzione sociale di elemento di stabilità e garanzia di sviluppo. Soprattutto è un modo di considerare il rapporto tra le generazioni non solo o non tanto destinatario passivo di fondi pubblici di sostegno al reddito, ma anche ed anzitutto soggetto attivo di promozione sociale.

Dai servizi all'infanzia e agli anziani, alla rete socio-assistenziale, alla politica urbanistica, a quella della immigrazione, ai livelli minimi di assistenza, alla politica fiscale, i campi in cui il ruolo sociale dei rapporti intergenerazionali può dispiegarsi sono molteplici.

Un esempio tratto da alcune recenti ricerche: la generazione di mezzo (soprattutto le donne) sostiene quella dei nonni e dei parenti anziani non coabitanti, mentre la generazione dei nonni assiste quella dei propri figli assistendo e curando i nipoti. Un *Welfare*, che volesse costruire modelli sociali equi ed in grado di far crescere la società, di qui dovrebbe partire con un ventaglio di interventi politici, normativi, finanziari, organizzativi, così da agevolare il passaggio dal *Welfare State* alla *Welfare Society*, non lasciandolo (come talvolta oggi è) solo alla evoluzione dei fatti.

Relegare invece la famiglia, che sta al centro di tutti questi problemi, escludendola dalla posizione che le spetta nella società “significa – per usare le parole della *Lettera alle famiglie* – recare un grave danno all'autentica crescita dell'intero corpo sociale”.

### 3. LA FAMIGLIA UMANA

La terza riflessione riguarda la famiglia umana. Anch'essa, ricordata dalla relazione introduttiva, va coinvolta nella doverosa opera di riforma del *Welfare* non più solo a livello di comunità nazionale o locale, bensì anche a livello globale.

“Nel disegno di Dio – è detto nella *Lettera alle famiglie* – la famiglia è la prima scuola dell'essere uomo sotto vari aspetti. *Sii uomo!* È questo l'imperativo che in essa si trasmette: uomo come figlio della patria, come cittadino dello Stato e, si direbbe oggi, come cittadino del mondo”.

La famiglia in senso proprio – quella cioè che alcune Costituzioni tutelano come “società naturale fondata sul matrimonio”, per riprendere ancora a titolo esemplificativo le espressioni usate dalla Repubblica italiana – ha compiti educativi importanti non solo per la vita della famiglia coniugale e del rapporto intergenerazionale, ma anche per la costruzione e la consapevolezza della cittadinanza in ogni sua articolazione.

Si aprono qui scenari inediti rispetto a pontificati precedenti, coincidendo il lungo magistero di Giovanni Paolo II con il dischiudersi dapprima e l’imporsi poi con prepotenza sulla scena internazionale di quella globalizzazione economica, che l’unico governo globale oggi esistente al mondo provvisto di sovranità spirituale, cioè il governo della Chiesa cattolica, non può non affrontare come realtà che può pregiudicare la pace e la serenità dei popoli, se non ricondotta a parametri etici.

È l’aspetto centrale della questione sociale del terzo millennio di storia cristiana.

Il Papa la tratta nelle sue Encicliche sociali, già sopra ricordate (da *Laborem Exercens* a *Centesimus Annus*, a *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*), come in innumerevoli *Discorsi*. La preoccupazione per la crescente scristianizzazione nei paesi a tradizione occidentale, accompagnata per giunta, quasi come doloroso paradosso, in altri paesi da una nuova stagione di perseguitati e martiri cristiani (dalla Cina ad alcune regioni dell’Africa), è solo temperata dalla percezione delle nuove possibilità di evangelizzazione di popoli non cristiani grazie ad un dialogo sincero e mite. Anche il Codice di diritto canonico del 1983 se ne occupa disciplinando espressamente per la prima volta il diritto missionario alla luce del rispetto della dignità e libertà della persona.

Via via si irrobustisce, come frutto maturo del Concilio, dentro e fuori del mondo cattolico, la convinzione che nella costruzione della “città dell’uomo”, come del “villaggio globale”, sia necessario l’impegno della Chiesa cattolica, ed insieme il coinvolgimento delle confessioni religiose, a cominciare da quelle discendenti dal comune Padre Abramo (ebraismo, cristianesimo, islam), che tuttavia in questo essenziale snodo della storia dell’umanità non riescono a trovare un unico registro, come dimostra la situazione drammatica della Terra Santa.

La figura del Padre Santo (un appellativo spesso usato nel rivolgersi al Pontefice) prende allora il sopravvento e ci pone sotto gli occhi l’immagine di un Papa dolente, quasi aggrappato alla Croce di Cristo, non più al Triregno (come sino a Giovanni XXIII i Pontefici usavano), che riesce con la forza del suo dolore, compreso quello fisico, a comunicare anche con chi cristiano non è.

Egli pronuncia parole esigenti in nome della dignità della persona umana, rivolgendosi non solo alle Patrie, agli Stati, al mondo, ma anche ai "figli delle Patrie, ai cittadini degli Stati, ai cittadini del mondo", invitando le famiglie a collaborare nella costruzione di vecchie e nuove cittadinanze. Qui sta il senso pieno di quel "Sii uomo!", pronunciato nella *Lettera alle famiglie*.

Si è già detto poc'anzi quanto Giovanni Paolo II senta la valenza sociale e politica rispettivamente della Nazione e dello Stato per la costruzione della comunità in cui ognuno vive, da considerarsi anch'essa in senso lato famiglia.

Il suo magistero non si limita a rivendicare libertà per la Chiesa e per i fedeli in Cristo. Diventa la voce di chi non ha voce, si schiera dalla parte dei diseredati, qualunque sia il loro credo o la loro appartenenza politica. Chiede non solo ai governi, ma anche alle organizzazioni internazionali ed alle altre confessioni religiose di impegnarsi ad edificare e consolidare un mondo di solidarietà e di pace fondato sulla giustizia.

La situazione tanto tormentata del Medio Oriente e dell'Africa (dalla povertà estrema dei Paesi subsahariani alla condizione dell'Iraq) o quella della Terra Santa (dove nonostante la presenza delle tre religioni del Libro non vi è pace) o quella dell'Argentina (paese dalle grandi risorse naturali, ma soffocato da un debito internazionale ingente), per citare esempi di differenti iniquità sociali, richiedono oggi un supplemento di impegno della "famiglia umana". Gli appelli di Giovanni Paolo II, come le missioni da Lui affidate ad esponenti della Curia romana, possono dirsi quasi quotidiani.

Il destino ed il futuro dello Stato sociale si gioca del resto ormai sullo scenario dell'epoca globale. Anche a riguardo di esso urge la risposta alla domanda antichissima, con la quale Caino si rivolge a Dio quando gli viene chiesto conto di Abele: "Sono forse io il custode di mio fratello?".

Il discorso sul *Welfare* globale diviene più complesso. Implica in modo prioritario quello sviluppo "sostenibile" (economico, sociale, ambientale) e quella integrazione multietnica e multiculturale, che comunque vanno realizzati anche a livello nazionale. Ma soprattutto implica la soluzione, tanto complessa quanto purtroppo lunga nei tempi, dei molti interrogativi connessi ai doverosi aiuti e cooperazione con i Paesi poveri e con quelli in via di sviluppo.

Ma l'obiettivo è sempre lo stesso: promuovere politiche sociali non assistenziali né deresponsabilizzanti, concependo sia la destinazione di risorse all'inclusione sia la redistribuzione della ricchezza su fasce deboli non come spesa sociale a perdere, ma come investimento. Investire nel *Welfare*, anche a livello globale, insomma, non deve significare fare elemosina di Stato, ma rimuovere le cause che provocano le diseguaglianze sociali. Non si tratta solo di un dovere etico, ma anche di un investimento nell'interesse dell'intera famiglia umana.

Alla famiglia umana dunque va riservata non minore attenzione di quanto si debba riservare alla famiglia coniugale. L'attenzione non può essere solo materiale, deve coinvolgere tutte le evidenze etiche e religiose.

Rimane esemplare al proposito il *Decalogo di Assisi*, sottoscritto il 24 gennaio 2002 dai rappresentanti di tutte le religioni, in risposta all'invito alla "Giornata di preghiera per la pace nel mondo". Esso è insieme un punto di arrivo ed un punto di partenza significativo del modo in cui Giovanni Paolo II manifesta la sua attenzione spirituale. Il quarto punto dei dieci sottoscritti è dedicato alla famiglia in senso proprio: "Ci impegnamo a difendere il diritto di ogni persona umana a condurre un'esistenza degna, conforme alla sua identità culturale, e a fondare liberamente una propria famiglia".

Può apparire curioso, e magari ingenuo, che alle sfide della globalizzazione economica, che rischiano di perpetuare all'interno della famiglia umana il paradosso della "società dei due terzi", con tutte le conseguenze di ingiustizia etica e di instabilità politica causate dalla povertà di un terzo dell'umanità, si risponda con una preghiera corale formata da sintassi religiose ben diverse tra loro, pronunciata dai capi religiosi dei più disparati popoli.

Eppure il "Decalogo di Assisi" potrebbe aiutare l'umanità a scegliere, come ha detto il Papa, "tra amore e odio", affinché ogni persona possa godere dei propri diritti inalienabili, e la famiglia umana della pace.

#### 4. SVILUPPO SOCIALE E STATO PARTECIPATIVO

La quarta riflessione riguarda i rapporti tra sviluppo e Stato. La Chiesa, se non ha vie economiche nè vie politiche da proporre come le uniche rispettose della persona e dei suoi diritti, neppure può ignorare che i meccanismi economici possono sacrificare l'uomo ed inasprire i conflitti sociali.

Già Pio XI in *Quadragesimo Anno*, a proposito dei rapporti tra economia e morale, ricorda che, se è vero che "l'economia e la disciplina morale, ciascuna nel proprio ambito, si appoggiano sui principi propri", "tuttavia sarebbe erroneo affermare che l'ordine economico e l'ordine morale siano così disparati ed estranei l'uno all'altro, che il primo in nessun modo dipenda dal secondo".

Paolo VI in *Populorum Progressio* afferma che "lo sviluppo non si riduce alla semplice crescita economica" e che, per essere autentico, "deve essere integrale, il che vuol dire volto alla promozione di ogni uomo e di tutto l'uomo".

Giovanni Paolo II, infine, in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, nel riprendere il concetto che l'autentico sviluppo della società deve rispettare "nell'uomo la

persona umana in tutte le sue dimensioni”, afferma: “Vi sono nazioni che hanno bisogno di riformare alcune ingiuste strutture e, in particolare, le proprie istituzioni politiche ... con quelle democratiche e partecipative”.

Lo Stato sociale viene così ad essere incardinato, alla luce dell'insegnamento sociale, non sulle categorie dell'assistenzialismo deresponsabilizzante (sulle quali peraltro molti sistemi di protezione sociale continuano ad essere imperniati), bensì sulla categoria della “partecipazione”. La tutela della dignità e responsabilità della persona lo impongono.

All'interno dello Stato-partecipativo il diritto proprio e primordiale della famiglia assume un ruolo centrale, al quale guardano con interesse molti Paesi latino-americani. Anche nella cultura politica europea si parla di “*Welfare* di comunità”, come di quello che garantisca la soggettività ed il protagonismo dei vari corpi sociali, del mondo del volontariato e dell'associazionismo, secondo i criteri della sussidiarietà orizzontale, facendo crescere anche da essi le nuove forme di tutela e di promozione, senza che tutto ciò significhi il venir meno della responsabilità sociale dello Stato e delle istituzioni. Quanto in particolare alle famiglie, lo Stato partecipativo non deve loro sottrarre quei compiti che le comunità famigliari possono egualmente svolgere da sole o liberamente associate.

Come è affermato in *Familiaris Consortio*: “La società e più specificamente lo Stato, devono sollecitare al massimo l'iniziativa responsabile delle famiglie”.

Se obiettivo delle politiche sociali è, come afferma *Centesimus Annus*, “rinsaldare il rapporto tra le generazioni attraverso l'aiuto dato alle famiglie”, raggiungerlo appare oggi particolarmente urgente a fronte di un fenomeno caratterizzante i nostri anni: l'indebolirsi nei Paesi così detti avanzati dei vincoli tra le generazioni, come conseguenza diretta del diffondersi nella realtà quotidiana delle ideologie individualistiche, che, in quanto tali, rendono fragili i vincoli famigliari (*Discorso all'Unione dei Giuristi Cattolici Italiani*, 1996). Esemplicative sul punto sono varie situazioni presenti nella Vecchia Europa. Anche riguardo ad esse va riferito il pressante appello di Giovanni Paolo II affinché la futura Costituzione europea salvaguardi le radici cristiane. Pochi tra i commentatori di questioni europee hanno colto le ragioni profonde dell'appello: che non attengono soltanto alla identità storica di una realtà che va concretizzando il suo profilo politico, ma riguardano una serie di categorie giuridiche attinenti ai diritti di libertà religiosa, alla solidarietà, al ruolo centrale della famiglia che, costruite in Europa sulle ginocchia della Chiesa, devono continuare ad essere i mattoni della costruzione dell'Europa politica.

L'appello al rispetto delle radici cristiane, poi, fornisce una ulteriore indicazione dell'itinerario politico-istituzionale suggerito a chi governa la società. L'indicazione è chiara: è un no deciso alla marginalizzazione delle confessioni religiose. Se la nuova cittadinanza europea non può essere costruita senza l'apporto dei valori cristiani, la rilevanza sociale (e non solo spirituale) delle confessioni cristiane, con il loro incessante appello alla tutela della famiglia, non può non essere al cuore della costruzione della intera famiglia umana, anche non europea.

D'altro canto i Paesi nei quali la solidarietà tra le generazioni trova radici storiche anche non cristiane sono spesso arretrati sotto il profilo dello sviluppo. Anche per essi la sollecitazione della Chiesa è che la comunità politica tuteli la catena generazionale.

È molto significativo che Giovanni Paolo II parli di "spirito comunitario di solidarietà tra le generazioni" in un Discorso del 1 aprile 1995 ai Vescovi brasiliani in visita *ad limina*, come di una caratteristica tra le più nobili trovata dai primi missionari del secolo XV nella cultura indigena, insieme al carattere sacro attribuito alla creazione, al rispetto per madre natura, alla lealtà ed amore per la libertà, all'equilibrio tra lavoro e riposo. Insieme cioè a tutte le componenti naturali della dottrina sociale della Chiesa e che proprio perché naturali possono applicarsi ovunque.

In ogni caso lo sviluppo è considerato dal magistero sociale un processo integrale, riguardo al quale non è corretto contrapporre i diritti civili e politici ai diritti economici, sociali e culturali.

È anche questo un aspetto centrale del pensiero della Chiesa, che fa rientrare nella categoria dei diritti umani il diritto delle persone e dei popoli allo sviluppo. *Populorum Progressio* in particolare rimane a tutt'oggi riferimento ineludibile con la richiesta – già dunque nel 1967 – di "una autorità mondiale efficace" e che sia in grado di "fraternizzare non già alcuni popoli, ma tutti i popoli".

Gli appelli per una solidarietà internazionale si moltiplicano sotto l'attuale Pontificato, spesso purtroppo rimanendo inevasi dalla comunità internazionale. Come non ricordare, ad esempio, l'appello "in nome della giustizia" lanciato da Giovanni Paolo II nell'ormai lontano 1990 dalla terra africana del Sahel? "Milioni di africani – ha detto allora il Papa – donne e bambini sono minacciati dalla possibilità di non poter godere mai di buona salute, di non giungere mai a vivere degnamente del loro lavoro, di non ricevere mai la formazione che aprirà loro la mente, di vedere il loro ambiente diventare ostile e sterile, di perdere la ricchezza del loro patrimonio ancestrale, essendo privati degli apporti positivi della

scienza e della tecnica”. Ed ha aggiunto “In quale pace potrebbero sperare dei popoli che non mettessero in pratica il dovere della solidarietà?”. Interrogativi che, a distanza di 14 anni, non hanno avuto purtroppo risposta soddisfacente.

## 5. WELFARE ED ECOLOGIA UMANA

La quinta osservazione, che prende spunto dalla conferenza introduttiva, attiene al rispetto dell'ecologia.

Se il rispetto dell'ambiente e lo sviluppo della vita senza pericoli provocati dal comportamento umano sono concetti che affiorano nella consapevolezza giuridica in tempi relativamente recenti, come “terza generazione dei diritti dell'uomo”, essi oggi appartengono a pieno titolo alla categoria dei diritti umani, anche su impulso del pensiero sociale della Chiesa.

Da *Octogesima Adveniens* di Paolo VI, che sottolinea come “attraverso uno sfruttamento sconsiderato della natura” l'uomo “rischia di distruggerla e di essere a sua volta vittima di siffatta degradazione”, a *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* e *Centesimus Annus* di Giovanni Paolo II, alle dichiarazioni della delegazione della Santa Sede nei vari organismi o conferenze internazionali, l'acutezza dei problemi ecologici stimola una riflessione anzitutto in termini di responsabilità morale dell'umanità riguardo l'“ordine della creazione”.

Usare le risorse naturali “con assoluto dominio”, come fossero inesauribili – è detto in *Octogesima Adveniens* – “mette seriamente in pericolo la loro disponibilità non solo per le generazioni presenti, ma soprattutto per quelle future”. Il dominio sul creato affidato da Dio all'uomo (*Gen 1, 28*) è un requisito della dignità umana da esercitare in modo che “sia davvero di giovamento della famiglia umana” (*Centesimus Annus*). “Dio è glorificato quando il creato serve le necessità dello sviluppo globale dell'intera famiglia umana” (*Discorso di Giovanni Paolo II al Centro delle Nazioni Unite per l'ambiente, Nairobi 1985*).

Se queste parole appaiono impegnative per una collettività – locale, nazionale o internazionale – che in larga parte del mondo sta dissipando le risorse dell'ambiente, ancor più impegnative sono le sollecitazioni a salvaguardare una autentica “ecologia umana”. “È nostra convinzione – afferma il Papa nello stesso Discorso di Nairobi ora ricordato – che ogni programma ecologico debba rispettare la piena dignità e libertà di chiunque possa essere fatto oggetto di tali programmi. I problemi ambientali dovrebbero essere visti in relazione alle necessità di uomini e donne concreti, delle loro famiglie, dei loro valori, delle loro inestimabili eredità sociali e culturali”.

Ed in *Centesimus Annus* afferma: “non solo la terra è stata data da Dio all’uomo, che deve usarla rispettando l’intenzione originaria di bene, secondo la quale gli è stata donata; ma l’uomo è donato a se stesso da Dio e deve, perciò, rispettare la struttura naturale e morale, di cui è stato dotato”. E, in un altro passo, è detto che nella famiglia “l’uomo riceve le prime e determinanti nozioni intorno alla verità ed al bene, apprende che cosa vuol dire amare ed essere amati e, quindi, che cosa vuol dire in concreto essere una persona”; in questo senso la famiglia è “Santuario della vita” e fonte centrale dell’ecologia umana.

Il richiamo alla persona poi ci conduce a tutte le coordinate della cristologia ed antropologia cristiana già sopra ricordate. Ci conduce in particolare a quella attenzione al rispetto della vita umana in ogni suo momento che spesso desta scalpore o, peggio, è bollata dalla cultura non cristiana come dannoso conservatorismo. Dalla vita nascente a quella morente, attraverso tutti gli stadi e le molteplici condizioni della persona, il pensiero della Chiesa è fedele a quel “scegli la vita”, che un antico testo del Deuteronomio ha posto alle fonti della nostra civiltà. I diritti specifici del fanciullo, e anzitutto il suo diritto alla vita sin dal concepimento, sono oggetto di costante proclamazione del Magistero.

Dalla grave questione dell’aborto, alle manipolazioni genetiche, all’eutanasia, alle frontiere della bioetica e della biomedicina, Giovanni Paolo II, in coerenza con i principi del diritto divino, non esita a pronunciare di volta in volta il suo “durus sermo”, controreplicando ad opposte teorie scientifiche.

## 6. PROBLEMI ATTUALI

Il messaggio della Chiesa è dunque chiaro: una società ed il suo futuro dipendono in un certo qual senso dalle garanzie che alla persona e alla famiglia offrono i singoli ordinamenti (tra gli altri è esplicito il *Discorso al Secondo Incontro di Politici e Legislatori d’Europa*, 1998). A sua volta la politica familiare deve essere inquadrata in un sistema di sussidiarietà, che, da un lato, esiga che Stato società e mercato lavorino in modo armonico senza mai dimenticare la centralità della persona con la sua libertà e responsabilità e, dall’altro, dia risposta ai nuovi problemi creati dall’evoluzione della società. L’invecchiamento della popolazione, ad esempio, crea quella *ageing society*, che richiede un ripensamento profondo di tutto il ventaglio delle politiche sociali, da quelle in materia di occupazione, ai servizi sanitari e sociali, alle politiche per i disabili, alla assistenza e sostegno alle famiglie, alla previdenza.



Tramontati i modelli della socialdemocrazia e del liberismo, eredi dell'Ottocento e che hanno dominato il Novecento, senza mettere al loro centro né la persona, né la famiglia, né la catena generazionale, rimangono le macerie dei loro fallimenti all'Est come all'Ovest, al Nord come al Sud del mondo. Perché il nuovo secolo possa essere – come è auspicabile – il secolo dello sviluppo, della solidarietà e della sussidiarietà, lo Stato assistenziale non serve. Serve una “Società Sociale” (*Welfare Society*) o “Comunità Sociale” (*Welfare Community*), che già in molti Paesi sta affermandosi come realtà, anche se spesso piuttosto di fatto che di diritto.

Oggi è il grande momento della sussidiarietà, da tempo peraltro indicata dai Papi, insieme alla solidarietà, come pietra angolare di ogni ordinamento sociale. Ne parlano studiosi di ogni credo religioso, politici, organizzazioni internazionali, *opinion maker*; nel suo nome si modificano Costituzioni degli Stati, si introducono nuove leggi. Si tenta cioè di precisare in un ordinamento giuridico dettagliato quanto già nel fatto in alcuni Paesi si sta realizzando.

Siamo all'inizio di un cammino difficile. Le vecchie categorie con la loro inerzia impediscono che le nuove siano definite, tanto più in un momento di recessione come l'attuale. Ambiguità e malintesi sono sempre in agguato. Talvolta dietro ad essi c'è la strumentalizzazione di una politica dimentica di essere “la forma più esigente di carità cristiana” (secondo la definizione di Paolo VI). Altre volte si assiste al tentativo maldestro di separare, come fossero alternative e non integrative, solidarietà e sussidiarietà.

Il dibattito, acceso in molti Paesi europei (dall'Italia alla Francia alla Spagna), sulla necessità di ridurre la spesa sociale ne è una dimostrazione. La riduzione è inaccettabile quando non sia accompagnata da proposte di salvaguardia dell'equità sociale: rilanciare ad esempio una economia stagnante solo attraverso i tagli alle pensioni ed ai sussidi di disoccupazione rischia di determinare la morte di un corpo sociale; riformare il sistema pubblico della ricerca scientifica o quello sanitario, togliendo ogni ossigeno al pubblico per riservarlo tutto al privato, porta a conflitti sociali pericolosissimi. Non è un caso che diversi governi europei siano bocciati dagli elettori proprio su questi temi, per il timore che lo spettro della povertà si faccia avanti.

La ricerca di un nuovo modello di *Welfare*, resa difficile già dalla vischiosità di culture assistenzialistiche dure a morire, lo è anche a causa delle continue trasformazioni sociali. Lo stesso “universo famiglia” si è frastagliato nella cultura occidentale, specie in quella (putroppo è la gran parte) segnata dal secolarismo, passando dal tipo di famiglia tradiziona-

le, costituita da genitori e, in media, due figli, ad una pluralità di forme (famiglie di figli unici, nuclei con un solo genitore, seconde unioni con nuovi figli, coppie senza figli, convivenze di fatto e così via). Mentre fino a una o due generazioni fa esistevano molte relazioni tra coetanei (fratelli e cugini) e poche tra anziani e giovani, i bambini che nascono oggi hanno mediamente almeno tre nonni e molto spesso non hanno fratelli e pochissimi cugini. La diminuzione dei matrimoni, l'aumento dei divorzi e delle separazioni, la tendenza alla denatalità sono segnali vistosi di un diffuso disagio nelle relazioni dentro la famiglia e nelle relazioni tra famiglia e società, che non possiamo certo ignorare, pur non condividendone la filosofia che ne è alla base.

Per contro nei Paesi africani, se la cultura della appartenenza salvaguarda l'unità familiare, tuttavia manca spesso ogni pur minima protezione sociale. Lo stesso vale per tutti i Paesi poveri o in via di sviluppo.

Nella cultura musulmana poi permangono disequaglianze all'interno della famiglia a carico delle donne, che pregiudicano un sano rapporto intergenerazionale. Una politica sociale per la famiglia non può infatti limitarsi a proclamare che la famiglia è elemento fondamentale della crescita demografica e della catena generazionale e che ha un ruolo di sostegno e di redistribuzione delle risorse. Deve delineare un quadro di interventi a partire dai diritti e dalle responsabilità dei suoi componenti in quattro aree: maternità-paternità, infanzia, giovani, anziani-persone non autosufficienti. Definizione che è condizione pregiudiziale per poter parlare di famiglia come soggetto politico.

Un rilevante e per ora insoluto problema sociale si sta ponendo nei Paesi industrializzati, dove, accanto alle situazioni delle classi povere, che comunque il *Welfare* è tenuto a fronteggiare, stanno emergendo, come preoccupanti novità, fenomeni di vulnerabilità anche delle classi medie. Essi si pongono in termini tali da infragilire, sino a spezzarla, la catena generazionale. In Europa ad esempio ci si domanda oggi: garantisco una buona vita ai miei genitori o mi preoccupo di dare la migliore istruzione ai miei figli? I danni alla dinamica relazionale della famiglia di fronte a questo dilemma non sono certo poca cosa.

In breve: riforma del Welfare, politica dei redditi, pensioni, politica dell'occupazione sono tutti aspetti di una nuova questione sociale, destinata a compromettere seriamente la equità orizzontale della famiglia e perfino a rimettere in causa lo stesso concetto di famiglia.

La risposta della politica agli appelli del magistero sociale della Chiesa, che invita a ricominciare da un progetto serio di famiglia coerente con i dise-

gni del Creatore, non è sempre immediata, soprattutto là dove le categorie di riferimento siano distanti da quelle proprie alla concezione cristiana.

I legislatori più attenti si sforzano oggi di elaborare nuovi sistemi integrati e sostenibili di protezione sociale. Pochi parlano di famiglia come soggetto politico; si limitano al massimo a riconoscere che la famiglia è soggetto penalizzato dal punto di vista fiscale, proponendo (ed è già qualcosa, anche se ancora poco) che soggetto del reddito disponibile sia la famiglia stessa, più che la singola persona. Quei pochi che parlano di famiglia come soggetto politico, stentano poi a definire una articolazione nei vari settori e comunque hanno difficoltà a individuarne il paradigma istituzionale. Soprattutto stenta a decollare in molti Paesi una politica organica di equità che realizzi un nuovo patto tra le generazioni, basato non sulla riduzione ma sul riequilibrio della spesa sociale e sul rafforzamento della protezione sociale a favore anzitutto dei più bisognosi.

Né le cose si pongono diversamente quanto ad altri aspetti della riforma del *Welfare*. Non è questa la sede per entrare nei particolari, differenti a seconda dei diversi Paesi. Mi limito ad accennare agli sforzi che nella cultura politico-economica occidentale si stanno compiendo, cercando di far quadrare il cerchio del sistema occupazionale e di quello previdenziale, alla ricerca di una ricetta o di un nuovo sistema che rifugga dagli eccessi del liberismo come da quelli dello statalismo. Non sta a me interloquire sul complesso di dottrine, regole, fattori, elementi che compongono il delicatissimo meccanismo del mercato del lavoro e della previdenza. Ma non posso non rilevare che contrasta con l'insegnamento sociale della Chiesa che spesso la parola d'ordine sia di sussidiarietà, ma senza l'intreccio con la solidarietà.

Mi preme soprattutto rilevare che gli sforzi per ridisegnare il nuovo *Welfare*, nelle dottrine economiche come nelle prassi politiche, attengono per lo più a temi economici (pensioni e lavoro), quasi che il benessere o, come qualcuno dice, "il fattore star bene", sia tutto riconducibile al solo Prodotto Interno Lordo (PIL). Anche questa impostazione è in controtendenza con quella della Chiesa, per la quale la solidarietà intergenerazionale non può significare solo trasmissione di ricchezza materiale per la semplice ragione che il benessere economico è solo un elemento del benessere sociale. Lo ha confermato il Card. Rouco Varela nella sua Introduzione ai nostri lavori.

La vera solidarietà intergenerazionale si ha con la trasmissione di valori: anzitutto con la trasmissione di istruzione.

È quanto in fondo già in tempi lontani i missionari cattolici (i Gesuiti nella Cina del sec. XVI sino al sec. XVIII) facevano e continuano a fare.

È quanto l'Europa va riscoprendo, pur con la difficoltà di obbligare gli Stati membri ad una coerente azione. Il "more and better job" con il quale, ad esempio, il Consiglio europeo di Lisbona ha lanciato nel 2000 la sfida della ristrutturazione per una crescita maggiore non può significare solo moltiplicazione dei posti di lavoro, deve significare rilancio di una società più competitiva basata sulla conoscenza, con ogni sforzo per rafforzare educazione, innovazione e ricerca.

I passi insomma da compiere da parte di chi regge la comunità politica, nonostante i molti suggerimenti del magistero, rimangono molti. La direzione ci è stata sintetizzata lo scorso anno da Giovanni Paolo II nel *Discorso* rivolto a noi il 2 maggio: "ogni sforzo si basi sulle immutabili virtù sociali della verità, della libertà, della giustizia, della solidarietà, della sussidiarietà e, soprattutto, della carità, che è la madre e la perfezione di ogni virtù cristiana ed umana".

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# LA DONNE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE: ÉVOLUTION DES STRUCTURES PAR ÂGES DANS LES POPULATIONS HUMAINES

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La première commande qui m'avait été faite pour cette communication était, en anglais, "*The demographic 'Givens': Changes in general structures of human populations*" mais, dans les courriers ultérieurs, le titre a varié, l'adjectif "*general*" étant parfois remplacé par "*generational*" et, finalement, c'est ce dernier qualificatif qui figure au programme définitif de cette session de l'Académie. C'est peut-être dommage, car bien d'autres aspects structurels des populations sont importants et en pleine évolution, comme la stratification sociale, ou susceptibles d'évoluer, comme la répartition par sexe, pour n'en citer que deux, mais c'est certainement plus en harmonie avec le thème général de la session. Toujours est-il qu'en français je me suis permis de n'employer ni l'un ni l'autre et de faire plus banal et plus audible pour l'oreille d'un démographe en parlant tout simplement de structure par âge. Il faut en effet, pour éviter les déconvenues, commencer par s'entendre sur les mots. Je préfère vous parler avec mes mots de démographe après vous les avoir expliqués plutôt que de risquer de placer sous les mêmes mots d'autres concepts et de semer ainsi la confusion.

Dans les écrits des démographes, le mot génération se trouve employé, pour l'essentiel, dans deux sens différents. Le plus répandu est le sens strict, à usage technique, de *génération* entendue comme l'ensemble des personnes qui sont nées la même année, les anglo-saxons disent *birth cohort* ou tout simplement *cohort*. Ce concept de génération fonde en démographie ce

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que nous appelons l'*analyse longitudinale*, celle qui permet d'étudier les processus démographiques tels qu'ils se déroulent réellement au cours de la vie des *générations*, par opposition à l'*analyse transversale* qui s'appuie sur les seules observations faites à un *moment* donné. Ainsi pourra-t-on apprécier si une génération a été plus féconde qu'une autre, si une génération s'est mariée ou est entrée en union plus tôt qu'une autre ou, encore, si une génération a vécu plus longtemps qu'une autre. Cette analyse permet de suivre, de génération en génération, l'évolution des changements fondamentaux de comportement, alors que l'analyse transversale, beaucoup plus classique, donne la mesure de ce que vivrait une *génération fictive* qui suivrait toute sa vie les comportements observés à un moment donné, pour nous livrer des indicateurs qui permettent de suivre la conjoncture.

Parfois, cependant, les démographes emploient aussi le mot *génération* dans un sens plus proche du sens commun. La notion de *remplacement des générations* évoque en effet le remplacement d'une génération de parents par une génération d'enfants. Tout le monde connaît les fameux 2,1 enfants par femme supposés assurer le remplacement des générations. Ce n'est nullement un paramètre intangible comme peut l'être le  $I$  qui met en relation le cercle et son diamètre. C'est un résultat qui mélange trois contingences: il faut être deux pour faire un enfant, il naît généralement 105 garçons pour 100 filles (il faut donc ajouter 0,05 à 2) et un certain nombre de ces enfants meurent avant d'atteindre l'âge de la reproduction (il faut encore ajouter un correctif pour en tenir compte, correctif qui dans les pays à faible mortalité est de l'ordre de 0,05). Il faut donc, dans des populations comme la population européenne, qu'une femme ait 2,1 enfants pour qu'à la *génération* suivante une nouvelle femme en âge de procréer la remplace. Le mot *génération* est clairement employé ici dans une acception plus commune, quasi généalogique. Mais, attention, cette *fécondité de remplacement* peut se mesurer, techniquement, des deux façons, longitudinale ou transversale, et donc en s'appuyant sur le vécu des *générations* (au sens démographique strict) ou sur des données par âge du *moment*. C'est dire s'il faut prendre garde au sens que l'on donne aux mots, même au sein d'une même discipline.

C'est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles je préfère vous parler de *structure par âge* plutôt que de structures *générationnelles*. Mais ce n'est pas la seule. La plus forte est sans doute le fait que, si je dis "*structure par âge*", tout le monde comprend la même chose (y compris les démographes) alors que si je dis "*structure générationnelle*" les démographes ne comprennent rien et le reste du monde risque de comprendre autant de choses différentes que le mot *génération* peut en évoquer. Pour le *Petit Robert* le premier

sens de ce mot exprime “*la fonction par laquelle les êtres se reproduisent*” (Robert, 1981), synonyme, donc, de *reproduction*. Or notre propos n’est évidemment pas la fécondité en tant que telle. Le second sens du *Petit Robert* est “*l’ensemble des êtres qui descendent de quelqu’un à chacun des degrés de filiation*”. Nous sommes là tout proches du sens emprunté par le concept de remplacement des générations. Quant au troisième sens, c’est celui d’“*ensemble des individus qui ont à peu près le même âge*” et le dictionnaire l’illustre par des exemples tels que “*la jeune génération*”, “*la nouvelle génération*”, “*une génération sacrifiée*”. Et c’est bien là le sens qui nous importe aujourd’hui puisque cette session porte sur la solidarité inter-générationnelle. Il s’agit donc bien d’âge. Mais je vous propose de faire mieux que le *Petit Robert*, de sortir de l’*à-peu-près* pour parler d’âges précis.

Lorsque l’on veut décrire la structure par âge d’une population, il y a, en effet, trois manières très classiques de le faire, selon les données disponibles ou selon les besoins de l’analyse: répartir la population par année d’âge, par groupes quinquennaux d’âges ou par grands groupes d’âges. La première peut nous mettre aisément en relation avec la notion démographique stricte de génération, puisque, dans une population, à un moment donné, plus précisément à chaque 1<sup>er</sup> janvier (date à laquelle sont généralement fournies les estimations de population), tous les individus d’une même classe d’âge sont nés la même année et appartiennent donc à la même génération au sens strict. La seconde, généralement utilisée par souci de simplification ou faute de données détaillées, ne fait que rassembler ces mêmes générations par cinq pour en apprécier l’effectif global au moment de l’observation. En rassemblant encore plus large, la troisième permet alors de préciser la troisième définition du *Petit Robert* en donnant des limites d’âge, modulables à volonté mais précises, à des catégories telles que, par exemple, “jeunes”, “adultes” ou “vieux”, en convenant, par exemple, comme je le ferai ci-après, qu’on est jeune jusqu’à 20 ans, adulte entre 20 et 60 ans et vieux à partir de 60 ans.<sup>2</sup> On peut alors analyser l’évolution du poids démographique des “jeunes générations” par rapport à celui des adultes ou des vieux et donc du panorama dans lequel s’exerce la solidarité entre générations.

<sup>2</sup> Ces tranches d’âge sont évidemment arbitraires et contestables mais, d’un point de vue démo-économique, on peut considérer que, dans nos sociétés modernes, on entre de plus en plus rarement dans la vie active avant 20 ans et qu’on en sort le plus souvent autour de 60 ans. En tout cas, ces tranches d’âge (ou d’autre) doivent être fixées précisément pour que l’on puisse comparer, dans l’analyse des ensembles démographiquement comparables.



C'est ainsi que, me semble-t-il, la "*donne démographique*" du thème de cette session, n'est autre que "*l'évolution de la structure par âge des populations humaines*", autrement dit, les phénomènes de rajeunissement ou de vieillissement<sup>3</sup> des populations que nous connaissons depuis que s'est enclenché ce grand mouvement historique baptisé *transition démographique* qui a changé la face de l'humanité et dont la dernière phase, en cours, nous conduit vers des structures par âge qui, on le sait, appelleront de profondes transformations de nos sociétés.

Après avoir précisé, dans un premier point, les ressorts de l'évolution de la pyramide des âges d'une population, j'aborderai successivement ce qui me semble constituer les cinq thèmes majeurs de l'évolution récente et des perspectives à venir de la structure par âge des populations humaines: rajeunissement et explosion démographique, maîtrise de la croissance et vieillissement de la population, perspectives d'accélération du processus dans les pays du sud, fenêtre démographique d'opportunité économique et, finalement, perspective post-transitionnelles.

## 1. LES RESSORTS DE L'ÉVOLUTION DE LA STRUCTURE PAR ÂGE

La structure par âge d'une population résulte à tout instant de l'évolution passée en matière de fécondité, de mortalité et de migrations extérieures. On peut ainsi lire la pyramide des âges comme un livre d'histoire, gardant la trace des grands événements qui ont marqué la vie des générations. On y lit en fait deux types d'événements de nature différente: des accidents souvent tragiques mais que le temps finit par effacer et des évolutions de fond qui déterminent plus durablement la forme d'ensemble de la pyramide.

### 1.1. *Les accidents de l'histoire*

Certains pays ont vécu ces dernières décennies des histoires terriblement tourmentées dont la trace donne aux pyramides d'âges des profils par-

<sup>3</sup> Du point de vue démographique, on appelle *vieillesse* de la population toute augmentation de la proportion de population ayant un âge supérieur à un certain seuil défini de manière conventionnelle. J'utiliserai ici le plus souvent le seuil de 60 ans. Inversement, le *rajeunissement* est l'augmentation de la proportion de population d'âge inférieur à un seuil, qui peut être le même ou, au contraire, être plus spécifique à la jeunesse: j'emploierai ici le plus souvent le seuil de 20 ans.

fois hallucinants. Les figures 1, 2 et 3 en fournissent trois exemples actuels parmi les plus marquants. Ne retenons cependant ici de ces images que trois éléments particuliers illustrant l'impact d'événements majeurs spécifiques à des générations précises: seconde guerre mondiale en Russie, interdiction de l'avortement en Roumanie, grand bond en avant en Chine.

La seconde guerre mondiale a fait près de 20 millions de morts en Russie<sup>4</sup> et le taux brut de mortalité s'est brusquement élevé de 20,1 p. mille en 1939 à près de 60 p. mille en moyenne en 1941-1944.<sup>5</sup> Cependant ce traumatisme a frappé en même temps un grand nombre de générations et sa trace n'est pas immédiatement évidente à la lecture de la figure 1. Sa marque y apparaît en fait moins pour avoir brisé la continuité des effectifs entre classes d'âge successives que pour avoir rompu l'équilibre entre hommes et femmes, encore que ce déséquilibre conjoncturel ait tendance, avec le temps, à s'atténuer et à se confondre avec l'effet structurel de la très forte surmortalité masculine qui caractérise la population russe. On peut toutefois voir dans le creux que présente, côté masculin, la pyramide de 1997, entre 69 et 78 ans, la trace persistante de ce drame. (Figure 1, p. 407).

Mais l'effet le plus visible de la guerre concerne les effectifs de chacun des deux sexes à 46-49 ans, qui correspond aux générations nées pendant la guerre, beaucoup moins nombreuses que les précédentes et les suivantes en raison du grand nombre de couples séparés par la guerre. De fait, le taux de natalité russe est brusquement tombé de 37 p. mille en 1939 à 13 p. mille en 1943.<sup>6</sup> Ce *déficit de naissances*, qui affecte spécifiquement quelques générations bien précises, laisse une trace beaucoup plus évidente sur la pyramide que le choc encore plus brutal mais relativement diffus des 20 millions de morts dus à la guerre. L'impact du déficit des naissances a été si fort qu'il a induit à son tour une nouvelle perturbation dans la pyramide des âges lorsque ces générations creuses de la guerre sont arrivées aux âges

<sup>4</sup> Alain Blum (1994), s'appuyant sur les travaux les plus récents (Andreev *et al.*, 1990) estime que la guerre a fait, en Union soviétique, 26 à 27 millions de morts de plus que n'en aurait produit la mortalité en temps de paix. D'après une communication personnelle d'Alexandre Avdeev, il semble que 20 millions de ces décès de guerre concernent la seule Russie.

<sup>5</sup> Si l'on attribue l'essentiel de la surmortalité de guerre (20 millions de morts) aux années 1941-1944 et qu'on admet que, sans la guerre, le nombre annuel de morts aurait été voisin de celui de 1939.

<sup>6</sup> Il s'agit là d'estimations pour l'URSS, vraisemblablement peu éloignées de la réalité russe. Elles sont obtenues en rapportant les naissances (7,3 millions en 1939 et 2,6 en 1943) estimées par Serge Adamets *et al.* (1994) à une population totale d'environ 195 millions d'habitants.

de la procréation: les générations nées au milieu des années 1970 sont creuses à leur tour. On a là un exemple frappant de l'interaction entre la structure de la population et un élément de sa dynamique naturelle, la natalité. Tout d'abord, dans les années quarante, un brusque changement de la natalité vient modifier profondément la structure par âge par rapport à ce qu'aurait produit le maintien du niveau de natalité antérieur. Puis, un quart de siècle plus tard, cette anomalie dans la structure par âge entraîne une chute de la natalité qui va produire une nouvelle échancrure dans la structure. Et l'histoire ne s'arrête pas là, puisqu'un nouveau quart de siècle plus tard, une fois de plus, la natalité va brusquement diminuer, engendrant de nouvelles classes creuses, comme on commence déjà à le voir tout en bas de la pyramide de 1997. Notons toutefois que ce phénomène n'est pas le seul responsable du creux qui se dessine à la base de la pyramide depuis la fin des années 1980 puisqu'il s'y ajoute les effets d'un recul de la natalité dû à une réelle diminution de la propension à procréer. Les conséquences cycliques du déficit de naissances de la guerre ont au contraire tendance à se diluer du fait que les naissances des années concernées ne relèvent pas seulement de l'activité féconde des générations creuses mais aussi de celle de leurs voisines plus nombreuses, également en âge de procréer. Mais, dans le cas présent, le choc a été si grand qu'il faudra attendre encore longtemps avant que ses traces disparaissent définitivement de la pyramide des âges russe. (Figure 2, p. 407).

La pyramide des âges de la Roumanie (figure 2) est marquée par le même type de perturbations cycliques liées au choc de la guerre (on voit même, dans ce cas, encore très nettement, l'impact du déficit de naissances de la première guerre mondiale, qui a plus marqué la Roumanie que la Russie). Cependant c'est pour illustrer un phénomène inverse que je la présente ici. En 1966, en effet, le gouvernement roumain a brusquement décidé à interdire l'avortement, alors librement pratiqué et largement utilisé comme principale méthode de prévention des naissances. De ce fait, de nombreuses femmes, enceintes au moment où cette décision fut prise, se sont trouvées dans l'obligation de mener à terme leur grossesse, provoquant un brutal *excédent de naissances* l'année suivante (Ghetau, 1970 et 1983; Lévy, 1990; Muresan, 1996). Le taux de natalité a ainsi fait un bond extraordinaire, de 14 p. mille en 1966 à 27 en 1967, doublant l'effectif de la génération 1967 par rapport à celui de la génération précédente et créant ainsi, durablement, une anomalie tout à fait originale dans la pyramide roumaine. Les années suivantes, en effet, les femmes roumaines ont retrouvé le chemin de la prévention des naissances par d'autres voies, qu'il s'agisse du

recours à l'avortement clandestin ou du passage à un usage plus intense de la contraception, et la natalité est rapidement retombée en dessous de 20 p. mille (18,2 p. mille en 1973). L'excédent de naissances, si fort soit-il, se limitant ainsi pour l'essentiel aux années 1967-1968, aura donc moins de répercussions cycliques ultérieures que le déficit russe de la seconde guerre mondiale. On ne constate en effet, vingt ans après cet extraordinaire *baby boom*, qu'une légère remontée de la natalité.

Avec la pyramide des âges de la Chine (figure 3), on retrouve un exemple de déficit conjoncturel de naissances, mais au lieu qu'il soit lié à la guerre comme dans l'exemple russe, il s'agit ici des conséquences de la terrible crise provoquée par le fameux *Grand bond en avant*, décrété en 1957 par le *Grand timonier* Mao Zhé Dong. Non seulement ce brutal changement politique a provoqué 15 à 30 millions de morts entre 1957 et 1961<sup>7</sup> (Bannister, 1997, p. 85), mais la crise a aussi produit un effondrement de la natalité, tant en raison de la séparation forcée de nombreux couples que de la volonté des autres d'éviter de mettre au monde des enfants voués à la famine. Et ce déficit de naissances est lui-même accentué par le fait que la hausse de mortalité due à la crise a particulièrement frappé les nourrissons. Ainsi, la pyramide tirée du recensement de 1990 est-elle fortement marquée en creux aux âges 29-32 ans. Là encore, l'irruption de ces classes creuses dans la pyramide provoque avec le temps une nouvelle perturbation à une vingtaine d'années de distance: les effectifs nés au tournant des années 1980, âges de 9 à 13 ans en 1990, sont visiblement déficitaires, même si ce déficit particulier se confond en partie avec les effets de la politique de l'enfant unique. (Figure 3, p. 408).

### 1.2. *Les mouvements de fond*

Ces événements historiques particuliers qui affectent plus ou moins brutalement la pyramide des âges ne sont cependant qu'un aspect, sans doute pas le plus important, de l'interaction entre la dynamique de la population et sa structure. D'une manière beaucoup plus générale et fondamentale, l'évolution à long terme de la natalité, de la mortalité et des migrations donne leur forme d'ensemble aux pyramides des âges. C'est la raison pour

<sup>7</sup> D'après Judith Bannister, la surmortalité de crise est de l'ordre de 15 millions de morts si l'on tient pour correct le taux de mortalité enregistré en 1957 (10,8 p. mille). Mais cet auteur pense qu'une grande part des décès ont échappé à l'enregistrement et que l'excédent de décès du à la crise a pu être de 30 millions.

laquelle la forme générale des pyramides des différents pays varie de manière si contrastée. La figure 4 illustre cinq situations, parmi les plus classiques que l'on puisse rencontrer.

Les populations de l'Europe ancienne, mais aussi, encore assez récemment, celles des pays du Sud, présentaient une pyramide des âges presque parfaitement triangulaire, d'où nous vient l'assimilation de cette représentation à une pyramide. Cette situation est illustrée ici par l'exemple de l'Inde de 1951 (figure 4, p. 408). Elle correspond à un régime démographique où natalité et mortalité sont très élevées, mais l'accroissement relativement faible. Dans une telle population, la proportion de jeunes est très forte et celle des vieillards très faible. En Inde en 1951, il y avait 47,5% d'enfants de moins de 20 ans, 46,8% d'adultes de 20 à 60 ans et 5,7% de vieux de plus de 60 ans.

La pyramide du Kenya de 1969 (figure 4) conserve cette forme pyramidale mais sa base est nettement élargie et ses côtés présentent une forte concavité. La différence avec l'Inde de 1951 vient du fait que, dans les années 1950 et 1960, la natalité a augmenté au Kenya, en raison du recul des pratiques d'allaitement maternel et d'abstinence post-partum, tandis que la mortalité des enfants commençait à diminuer. En conséquence, le rythme d'accroissement de la population s'est vivement accentué et cette accélération a très fortement élargi la base de la pyramide. Par rapport à l'Inde de 1951, la proportion des jeunes est encore plus forte (58,5% de moins de 20 ans) et celles des adultes et des vieux plus faibles (36,1% de 20 à 60 ans et 5,4% de plus de 60 ans).

L'exemple suivant, la France de 1911 montre au contraire la pyramide d'une population où la natalité baisse depuis longtemps (figure 4). Malgré la baisse concomitante de la mortalité des enfants qui a sensiblement freiné le phénomène, la base de la pyramide s'est rétrécie, au point que l'effectif des jeunes générations adultes n'est guère inférieur à celui des classes d'âge les plus jeunes. Cette fois, la proportion des moins de 20 ans est nettement plus faible (33,3%) et celle des adultes et des vieux plus forte (respectivement 53,2% et 13,5%). La pyramide française est typique d'une population où la baisse de la natalité a constamment compensé celle de la mortalité et maintenu un taux d'accroissement très faible de la population.

La base de la pyramide italienne de 1995 est encore plus rétrécie (figure 4). Ce pays a, en effet, connu, dans les deux décennies précédentes, une chute très rapide de la natalité conduisant à un taux brut exceptionnellement bas, voisin de 10 p. mille, inférieur au taux brut de mortalité, et donc à une croissance naturelle négative. En conséquence, la proportion des jeu-

nes est encore plus faible que dans le cas précédent. Au contraire celle des personnes de plus de 60 ans est plus élevée: elle est même, dans ce cas, supérieure à celle des jeunes de moins de 20 ans (22% contre 21%).

Dans le cas de la Suède de 1950, enfin (figure 4), s'inscrivant au terme d'une évolution ayant conduit, comme en France ou en Italie, à un rétrécissement de la pyramide, le *baby boom* des années 1940 et 1950 redonne à celle-ci une base élargie et une forme générale d'as de pique.

On le voit, ce qui a, pour l'essentiel conditionné la forme générale des pyramides et sa transformation au cours des siècles, c'est l'évolution de la fécondité et de la mortalité. La baisse de la fécondité a toujours eu pour conséquences de réduire la base de la pyramide et donc, à la longue, de vieillir la population, en augmentant la proportion de personnes âgées. Le rôle de la baisse de la mortalité est plus complexe. Pendant longtemps, contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait croire, l'allongement de la vie n'a pas fait vieillir les populations, elle a au contraire eu tendance à les rajeunir. En effet jusque vers 1960 dans les pays les plus développés et encore aujourd'hui dans les pays les moins développés, l'augmentation de l'espérance de vie a toujours été principalement due à la baisse de la mortalité infantile. Et l'effet de ce recul sur la pyramide des âges est tout à fait assimilable à celui d'une hausse de la fécondité. C'est ce qui explique qu'en France, malgré la baisse très ancienne et profonde de la fécondité, engagée dès la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, la structure par âge de la population avait encore en 1911 une forme de pyramide, certes rétrécie à la base, mais où aucune classe d'âge n'était inférieure à la précédente. La baisse de la mortalité infantile a en effet freiné le vieillissement *par le bas* engendré par la baisse de la fécondité. Si j'ai choisi de montrer en figure 4 la pyramide de 1911 c'est pour éviter les perturbations entraînées par les deux guerres mondiales mais le phénomène a perduré jusqu'aux années 1950, jusqu'à ce que la mortalité infantile soit devenue trop faible pour que son recul ultérieur ait un effet majeur sur les effectifs du bas de la pyramide.

C'est aussi la chute de mortalité infantile qui, pour une grande part, fait la différence entre l'Inde de 1951 et le Kenya de 1969. En Inde, en 1951 ni la fécondité ni la mortalité n'avaient encore baissé de façon significative et la pyramide de 1951 était parfaitement triangulaire. En 1969 au Kenya, en l'absence de baisse de fécondité jusqu'à cette date, la baisse déjà profonde de la mortalité infantile (conjuguée, il est vrai avec une certaine hausse de fécondité) avait démultiplié les effectifs des jeunes générations et donné à la pyramide une forme nettement concave, typique d'un rajeunissement de population.

L'influence des migrations est en général moins importante que celles de la natalité et de la mortalité. Cependant dans certains pays, à certaines époques, la migration internationale a été si forte et sélective selon l'âge et le sexe qu'elle a fortement marqué les pyramides. La figure 5 en donne trois exemples complémentaires: l'Italie de 1911, l'Algérie de 1974 et le Koweït de 1980.

En raison d'une très forte émigration la population italienne présentait au début du siècle un déficit évident de jeunes adultes. Il se lit très nettement sur la pyramide à la vue de la discontinuité des effectifs au tournant du 20<sup>e</sup> anniversaire, tant du côté des femmes que des hommes, ce qui montre bien que l'émigration concernait à peu près également les deux sexes. La situation est sensiblement différente dans l'Algérie de 1974 car son effet se distingue difficilement ici de celui du rajeunissement dû à la baisse de la mortalité infantile. Enfin, la pyramide du Koweït de 1980 illustre le résultat d'une immigration adulte exceptionnellement forte et préférentiellement masculine. (Figure 5, p. 409).

Ainsi, la migration peut rajeunir la population en la privant d'une part de ses adultes partis chercher du travail ailleurs, comme ce fut le cas en Italie ou en Algérie, ou, au contraire, la vieillir en raison de l'afflux d'adultes venus y travailler, comme ce fut le cas du Koweït. Cependant, la notion de vieillissement est toute relative. Si l'on ne s'en tient qu'à la proportion de personnes âgées (les 60 ans et plus) la population italienne de 1911 était nettement plus vieille que celle du Koweït de 1980. Si le départ des émigrants italiens a rajeuni la population en augmentant la part des jeunes, elle l'a aussi vieillie en augmentant celle des vieux. Le même effet a été contrecarré en Algérie par la baisse de la mortalité infantile qui en jouant aussi dans le sens du rajeunissement a, au total, empêché la part des vieux d'augmenter sensiblement. Au Koweït, la situation est inverse: toutes choses égales par ailleurs, le gonflement de la part des adultes a réduit d'autant celle de vieux. Cependant, cet afflux d'adultes promettait pour les décennies à venir une véritable explosion de la population âgée.

L'influence des migrations sur la pyramide des âges peut-être beaucoup plus accusée à un échelon local marqué par des migrations internes de flux très particuliers. Ainsi, la population de Fiuminata, petite localité rurale des Apennins, en Italie, a-t-elle été frappée par l'exode de ses jeunes adultes, qui, combiné à une faible fécondité déjà ancienne, donne, à l'envers du schéma classique, une pyramide plus large en son sommet qu'à sa base (figure 6). À l'inverse et d'une façon encore plus extrême, c'est l'immigration sélective de personnes âgées qui donne à la population de Sun City, petite

ville des États-Unis dont l'activité repose quasi exclusivement sur l'accueil de retraités, une pyramide d'âges qui nous offre le spectacle à peine croyable d'un large nuage flottant au-dessus des airs, sans aucun habitant de moins de 25 ans. (Figure 6, p. 409).

Cependant, quoi qu'on en dise parfois, dans les populations de grande taille, l'effet des migrations est généralement faible, voire négligeable sur l'évolution des structures par âge. Il est, pour le moins, secondaire par rapport à ceux des évolutions de la fécondité et de la mortalité.

## 2. RAJEUNISSEMENT ET EXPLOSION DÉMOGRAPHIQUE

Au cours de la première phase de la transition démographique, celle où seule la mortalité baisse, cette baisse, on l'a vu, est facteur de rajeunissement car elle porte massivement sur la mortalité infantile, qui passe de niveaux très élevés à des niveaux très modérés. En phase pré-transitionnelle, le taux de mortalité infantile a souvent été de l'ordre de 300 p. mille. C'était le cas en France au milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et c'était vraisemblablement celui de pays comme l'Inde ou le Kenya à la veille de la seconde guerre mondiale. Au début du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, ce taux n'était plus en France que de 100 p. mille. Remarquons qu'en atteignant ce même niveau dès les années 1980 pour l'Inde et même dès les années 1970 pour le Kenya, ces deux pays ont réalisé en trois ou quatre décennies ce qui avait demandé à la France un siècle et demi de progrès sanitaire. Dans tous les cas, une chute de 300 à 100 p. mille du taux de mortalité infantile signifie que sur 1000 nouveaux-nés 900 vont survivre à 1 an au lieu de seulement 700, l'effet sur la pyramide des âges est à peu près le même que si la natalité avait augmenté de près de 30%. De plus, l'effet de rajeunissement de la baisse de la mortalité ne s'arrête pas là car il faut aussi compter avec le recul encore plus massif de la mortalité à 1-4 ans. En effet, à ces niveaux de mortalité, la proportion de survivants à 5 ans passe de 500 pour mille naissances à près de 850. L'effet sur le groupe d'âges 5-9 ans équivaut donc à celui d'une augmentation de 70% de la natalité.

En France, ce recul de la mortalité des enfants n'a pas empêché la population de vieillir, car, fait exceptionnel dans l'histoire de la transition démographique, la baisse de la fécondité lui a été concomitante et a provoqué une chute de la natalité beaucoup plus profonde (une division par près de 3 du taux de natalité), mais il l'a très fortement freiné. En Inde, bien que la fécondité ait commencé à diminuer dès la fin des années 1960, la chute du taux de natalité n'a pas suffi à réduire la part des jeunes dans la population



totale avant la fin des années 1970, son effet étant presque parfaitement contrecarré par celui de la baisse de la mortalité infantile. D'après les estimations des Nations unies, de 1950 à 1980, la part des 0-19 ans est restée étonnamment stable aux environs de 50% de la population totale (figure 7). Ce n'est qu'à partir du moment où l'effet de la baisse de la mortalité des enfants, portant sur des risques de plus en plus faibles, ne parvient plus à l'enrayer, que le recul de la part des jeunes dans la population s'amorce (cette part était inférieure à 45% en 2000). (Figure 7, p. 410).

Au Kenya, non seulement la baisse de la mortalité infantile a été plus rapide qu'en Inde, mais la fécondité n'a commencé à diminuer que beaucoup plus tard (au début des années 1980), après avoir même sensiblement augmenté des années 1950 aux années 1970. Résultat: sous le double effet rajeunissant de la baisse de la mortalité infantile et de l'augmentation de la natalité, la part des jeunes de moins de 20 ans a connu une formidable augmentation, passant de 50% (comme en Inde) en 1950 à 61% en 1985 (figure 7).

Ainsi, dans un pays comme l'Inde, les rythmes et les calendriers des baisses de la fécondité et de la mortalité se sont, au départ, pratiquement compensés et la structure par âge de la population s'est maintenue à peu près en l'état. Le potentiel d'accroissement de la population inscrit dans cette structure<sup>8</sup> n'avait donc pas augmenté par rapport à ce qu'il était avant que la mortalité commence à baisser. En revanche, ce potentiel s'est considérablement renforcé au Kenya sous le double effet rajeunissant de la forte baisse de mortalité des enfants et de la hausse sensible de fécondité qui a précédé l'enclenchement de la baisse de cette dernière.<sup>9</sup> Ainsi, dans ce pays, l'effet de la baisse rapide de la mortalité sur la croissance démographique a-t-il été démultiplié par le rajeunissement de la base de la pyramide des

<sup>8</sup> On entend par potentiel d'accroissement d'une population l'accroissement que cette population connaîtrait avant de se stabiliser si, sans migrations extérieures et à mortalité actuelle constante, sa fécondité s'abaissait immédiatement au niveau strictement nécessaire au remplacement des générations et s'y maintenait constamment ensuite (Vincent, 1945; voir aussi Caselli *et al.*, 2001, p. 431).

<sup>9</sup> Dans un certain nombre de pays en développement, dont le Kenya est l'archétype, la transformation de la société (urbanisation, scolarisation, emploi féminin, etc.) et la modernisation des comportements qui l'accompagne ont d'abord poussé la fécondité à la hausse, en partie en raison de l'amélioration de l'hygiène et du recul de la stérilité, mais surtout du fait de l'affaiblissement des pratiques d'abstinence *post partum* et de la réduction de durées d'allaitement au sein. Cette hausse de fécondité est en quelque sorte une prémisse de l'enclenchement de la baisse qui sera provoquée par l'élévation de l'âge au mariage et (ou) la diffusion de la contraception.

âges. De 1950 à 2000, d'après les estimations des Nations unies, la population du Kenya, passée de 6,3 à 30,5 millions, a été multipliée par près de 5 (4,9) alors que celle de l'Inde ne l'était que par moins de trois (2,8), en passant de 357 millions à 1,01 milliard (figure 8). Rappelons que dans les 150 ans qu'il lui a fallu pour faire reculer sa mortalité infantile de 300 à 100 p. mille, la population française ne s'est accrue que de 65%, en passant de 24,6 millions en 1750 à 40,7 en 1901 (Vallin, 2001), encore faut-il préciser que cet accroissement fut assez largement redevable à l'immigration. (Figure 8, p. 410).

Bien que la chute de la fécondité désormais engagée au Kenya s'annonce nettement plus rapide que celle qu'a connue l'Inde, cet effet initial risque fort d'avoir encore d'importantes répercussions durant les prochaines décennies. D'après les projections des Nations unies, la population attendue en 2050 pourrait être, avec 44 millions, dans l'hypothèse moyenne, 7 fois celle de 1950 au Kenya, contre 4 en Inde, qui atteindrait alors 1,5 milliard (figure 8).

Il me semble que si l'on veut pleinement comprendre les conséquences qu'a pu avoir et peut encore avoir la transition démographique pour l'évolution des structures par âge, il ne faut pas jamais oublier ni cette phase de rajeunissement (ou de frein au vieillissement) liée à la baisse de la mortalité, ni le rôle majeur qu'elle a joué dans ce qu'on a parfois appelé *l'explosion démographique* des pays du tiers monde (Vallin, 2004). Non seulement parce l'une des raisons de l'accélération du phénomène de vieillissement qui est plus à l'ordre du jour de nos débats est en partie liée à la fin de cette phase, mais aussi parce que cette phase nous montre clairement à quelles conséquences conduirait, en termes de croissance démographique, toute entreprise visant à rajeunir la pyramide des âges.

### 3. MAÎTRISE DE LA CROISSANCE ET VIEILLISSEMENT DE LA POPULATION

La maîtrise de la croissance démographique, qu'elle résulte de politiques volontaristes ou de l'évolution spontanée des comportements, conduit en effet, de manière inéluctable, au vieillissement démographique. Mais ce vieillissement se fait en deux temps. Dans un premier temps, abstraction faite des migrations, il ne résulte que de la seule baisse de la fécondité, alors que, dans un second temps, la poursuite de la baisse de la mortalité au-delà d'un certain seuil d'espérance de vie, vient soit renforcer, soit prendre le relais de cette dernière.

### 3.1. *Quand la baisse de la fécondité agit seule*

Jusque vers les années 1960, seul le vieillissement par le bas de la pyramides des âges est à l'œuvre, sous l'effet de la baisse de la fécondité. Dans cette phase, on l'a vu, l'effet vieillissant de la baisse de la fécondité est généralement freiné par la baisse de la mortalité des enfants. Deux pays européens voisins, la France et l'Angleterre, ont eu, de ce point de vue, des comportements démographiques très différents qui ont lourdement pesé sur leur destinée et, indirectement, sur celle du monde. Il est intéressant de les comparer ici. Ces deux évolutions, qui sont encore plus différentes entre elles que les histoires récentes de l'Inde et du Kenya évoquées plus haut, sont en fait des cas extrêmes en Europe et elles encadrent à peu près toute la gamme des expériences vécues par les pays développés au cours de leur transition démographique.

Cependant, pour mieux comprendre les rôles fondamentaux de la mortalité et de la fécondité, il nous faudra ensuite passer de l'analyse de ces évolutions réelles à l'examen de modèles de population.

#### 3.1.1. *Des évolutions réelles...*

Les pyramides d'âges de la figure 9 sont dessinées en valeurs absolues afin de rendre compte à la fois de la croissance de la population et de la transformation de la pyramide. Dans le cas français, en réalité assez atypique de la transition démographique, puisque celle-ci n'y a dégagé qu'un accroissement minime de population, peu différent de ce qui pouvait se passer durant les périodes fastes du régime pré-transitionnel, la surface totale occupée par les tranches d'âges de la pyramide ne varie guère de 1750 à 1936 (dernier recensement avant la seconde guerre mondiale), signe de la relative stagnation de l'effectif total de la population. En revanche, la forme de la pyramide évolue dès le début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle dans le sens du vieillissement de la population. De 1750 à 1800, la baisse de la mortalité infantile et juvénile, qui tend à rajeunir la pyramide par le bas, est à peu près complètement compensée par la baisse de la fécondité déjà en marche. La pyramide reste presque inchangée (aux conséquences près des guerres révolutionnaires et napoléoniennes qui marquent les jeunes tranches d'hommes actifs). Mais de 1800 à 1851, déjà, la tendance au rétrécissement de la base de la pyramide est nette et le phénomène s'accroît ensuite, jusqu'à arriver à la pyramide de 1951, plus étroite à la base qu'aux âges adultes (du moins, si l'on fait abstraction du rebond de la tranche d'âges la plus jeune en vertu du *baby boom*). (Figure 9 et 9 suite, pp. 411-412).

En Angleterre-Galles, la forte croissance de la population, liée au fait que la fécondité ne baisse que beaucoup plus tard que la mortalité, permet au rôle rajeunissant du recul de la mortalité infantile et juvénile, combiné, comme au Kenya, à une hausse de la fécondité, de se manifester très clairement: de 1751 à 1801 et, plus encore, de 1801 à 1851, la base de la pyramide s'élargit. C'est seulement au cours de la seconde moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle que ce phénomène commence à être compensé par la baisse de la fécondité, mais celle-ci est alors beaucoup plus rapide qu'en France et à partir de ce moment, le vieillissement y est aussi plus rapide: dès 1951, la pyramide anglaise a presque rejoint la forme prise par la pyramide française (à la seule différence que la pyramide française est marquée d'une profonde échancrure provoquée par l'énorme déficit de naissances des classes creuses de la première guerre mondiale, phénomène presque imperceptible en Angleterre-Galles).

Dans la seconde moitié du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, le vieillissement est alors assez semblable dans les deux pays. Cependant, entre-temps, cette différence de comportement, aux cours des deux siècles allant du milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle au milieu du XX<sup>e</sup>, a eu d'immenses conséquences directes et indirectes. La France, qui sous la Révolution était, avec ses 30 millions d'habitants, le pays le plus peuplé d'Europe, s'est vue rattrapée par une Angleterre qui n'en comptait pourtant que 6 au départ. Du fait de la baisse très précoce de sa fécondité, la France n'a pu maintenir son effectif et même l'augmenter légèrement que grâce à la baisse continue de sa mortalité et à une immigration nette non négligeable. L'Angleterre, au contraire, a connu une telle explosion démographique qu'elle a dû exporter une bonne part de ses excédents outre-Atlantique. Jean-Claude Chesnais (1986) a proposé de mesurer la poussée exceptionnelle de croissance imputable à la transition démographique par le *multiplicateur transitionnel*. Cet indicateur est obtenu en appliquant à la population de départ le taux de croissance naturelle observé durant la période de transition à l'exclusion de toute influence des migrations externes. Cela permet de voir de combien la population se serait accrue au terme de la transition sans migrations. Autrement dit, c'est une mesure de la croissance, qui prend en compte (indirectement) la population émigrée mais défalque la population immigrée. À l'aune de cet indicateur, la population de la France n'aurait été multipliée, en 200 ans, que par moins de 1,4. Celle de l'Angleterre l'aurait été par 7,5. Il n'en fallait guère plus pour que les flux anglais submergent rapidement la poignée de Français qui régnait jadis sur le Canada et la Louisiane, ni pour que, finalement, l'Anglais, la langue du Nouveau Monde, domine l'univers.

En revanche, en matière de vieillissement de la population, la France et l'Angleterre se retrouvent, au terme de cette aventure, dans des situations très comparables. La différence tient cependant ici à la rapidité du vieillissement. Alors qu'en France ce phénomène s'est installé en douceur, dès la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, il a brutalement fait irruption en Angleterre au début du XX<sup>e</sup>.

Ainsi, au cours de la transition, alors que la proportion des jeunes de moins de 15 ans a constamment diminué en France de 1800 à 1950, après avoir stagné de 1750 à 1800, elle a d'abord fortement augmenté en Angleterre-Galles de 1750 à 1820 pour diminuer ensuite, assez lentement jusqu'en 1900 et de façon accélérée depuis. Inversement, la proportion des 60 ans et plus a constamment augmenté en France sur l'ensemble des deux siècles alors qu'elle a légèrement diminué en Angleterre-Galles jusqu'en 1900 avant de s'élever brutalement depuis (figure 10, p. 413). Vers 1750 la part des 60 ans et plus était un peu plus forte en Angleterre (9%) qu'en France (8%), mais la situation était inverse vers 1800. Dès cette époque en effet la population française vieillit, alors que la population anglaise entre dans une phase de léger rajeunissement qui va durer près de 150 ans. En 1900, la part des 60 et plus n'est plus que de 7,5% en Angleterre-Galles alors qu'elle est déjà de 13% en France. En revanche, dès 1950, alors même que cette proportion a continué d'augmenter en France, l'Angleterre-Galles a quasiment rattrapé sa voisine d'outre manche (15,9 contre 16,2) et elle va la dépasser dans les années suivantes. Ainsi le choc de la montée en puissance de la population âgée a-t-il été beaucoup plus brutal au Royaume-Uni qu'en France: en cinquante ans (1900-1950), la part des 60 ans et plus a plus que doublé en Angleterre-Galles alors qu'elle ne s'est élevée que d'un quart en France.

Le choc a été encore plus fort au Japon. Au début des années 1950, la proportion des 60 ans et plus n'était encore qu'à peine supérieure à 7%, tout comme en Angleterre-Galles en 1900. Mais, en moins de 40 ans, dès la fin des années 1980, elle rejoint les 16% atteints par la France et l'Angleterre en 1950. Et, surtout, dans les années les plus récentes, au contraire des deux autres pays, le vieillissement s'est vivement accéléré au Japon. En 2000, le Japon comptait plus de 23% de personnes de 60 ans et plus contre 20 en France et en Angleterre. C'est essentiellement parce qu'au Japon, la phase de vieillissement par le bas, beaucoup plus récente et rapide qu'en France et même plus récente qu'en Angleterre, se télescope avec celle du vieillissement par le haut, dont il sera question plus loin.

### 3.1.2. ... à leurs ressorts fondamentaux

Mais, avant d'en arriver là, insistons sur l'importance du contreponds au vieillissement par le bas que constitue la baisse de la mortalité aux jeunes âges. Pour en prendre pleinement la mesure, le plus simple est de recourir aux modèles de population stable.<sup>10</sup> D'après le théorème de Lotka, on sait en effet que toutes les populations ayant même fécondité par âge et même mortalité par âge tendent, si ces fonctions de fécondité et de mortalité restent constantes et en l'absence de migrations, vers une seule et même structure par âge, entièrement définie par ce couple de fonctions de fécondité et de mortalité. On peut donc, par exemple, pour apprécier l'effet sur la structure par âge d'un changement de fécondité, considérer les populations stables qui (à mortalité égale) correspondent à la fécondité de départ et à la fécondité d'arrivée. C'est ce qu'illustre la figure 11, en ne considérant toutefois que le sexe féminin, pour simplifier. J'y ai représenté les répartitions par âges de trois populations stables correspondant à la mortalité féminine française du milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle (espérance de vie à la naissance de 26 ans, Blayo, 1975) couplée avec trois fonctions de fécondité françaises différentes: celle de la même époque, qui donnait un taux de fécondité totale (TFT) de 5,6 enfants par femme,<sup>11</sup> celle de 1974, année où le TFT s'établissait à 2,1 (INSEE, 1990) et celle de 1999, où le TFT était de 1,8 (Prioux, 2003). (Figure 11, p. 413).

À ce niveau très faible d'espérance de vie, avec 5,6 enfants par femme, la structure par âge de la population stable est très voisine de celle de la population française du milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> (début de la figure 9) qui, de fait, n'était pas très loin de l'état stable. Il y a en outre un quasi équilibre entre mortalité et fécondité, avec un taux d'accroissement intrinsèque quasi nul (0,001%). En fait la population française de cette époque était presque stationnaire.<sup>12</sup> Si la mortalité était restée constante, la chute de la

<sup>10</sup> On appelle *population stable* une population fermée (sans migrations extérieures) où les fonctions de mortalité et de fécondité par âge sont constantes depuis assez longtemps pour que sa structure par âge soit elle-même devenue constante conformément à la loi de Lotka (Lotka, 1934, 1939; Caselli *et al.*, 1982).

<sup>11</sup> Aucune reconstitution pour la France entière n'a encore été publiée, mais d'après un calcul de Henri Leridon (communication personnelle) le TFT pourrait avoir été de 5,56 en 1700-1740. J'ai repris ici les taux de fécondité par groupes d'âge aboutissant à ce résultat.

<sup>12</sup> Une *population stationnaire* est une population stable où fécondité et mortalité s'équilibrent de sorte que le *taux intrinsèque* d'accroissement est nul. On appelle *taux intrinsèque d'accroissement* le taux d'accroissement observé à l'état stable pour un couple donné de fonctions de fécondité et de mortalité.

fécondité à 2,1 enfants par femme, niveau qui dans les conditions actuelles de mortalité assure le remplacement des générations, aurait conduit, à l'état stable, à une pyramide d'âges extrêmement rétrécie à la base et très fortement gonflée aux âges supérieurs à 40 ans, typique d'une population en décroissance (taux intrinsèque d'accroissement de  $-3,6\%$ ). Cet extraordinaire vieillissement par le bas aurait conduit à une proportion de personnes de 60 ans et plus de  $28\%$ , comparée à celles de  $8,1\%$ , prévalant au milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle (Henry et Blayo, 1975) ou de  $8,5\%$  dans la population stable à 5,6 enfants par femme. Bien entendu, aucune population réelle n'a jamais vécu une telle combinaison de fécondité et de mortalité, mais cette référence aux modèles de population stable nous permet d'apprécier la force réelle du vieillissement par le bas provoqué par le passage au niveau de fécondité qui, dans les conditions actuelles permet d'assurer le remplacement des générations. La figure 11 montre aussi, bien sûr, que si la fécondité continue sa baisse au-dessous de 2,1 enfants par femme, le vieillissement s'accroît encore. Mais ces courbes, très loin des pyramides d'âge réellement observées quand la population française a atteint ces bas niveaux de fécondité, permettent aussi d'apprécier à quel point le rajeunissement par la baisse de la mortalité aux jeunes âges, a pu, pendant longtemps, fortement modérer le rétrécissement de la pyramide des âges française.

Cet effet rajeunissant est lui-même éclatant à la lumière des données du tableau 1. Avec la fécondité du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, la proportion de jeunes de moins de 20 ans serait passée de  $41\%$  à  $51\%$  sous le seul effet de la baisse de mortalité observée jusqu'en 1950. Avec des mortalités encore plus faibles, cependant, cette proportion serait légèrement retombée. Inversement, la proportion des 60 ans et plus aurait diminué, de  $8,5\%$  à  $6,6\%$  avant de remonter brutalement ensuite.

Tableau 1. RÉPARTITION PAR GRANDS GROUPES D'ÂGES CARACTÉRISANT DIFFÉRENTES POPULATIONS STABLES CONSTRUITES À PARTIR DE FÉCONDITÉS ET DE MORTALITÉS RÉELLEMENT OBSERVÉES EN FRANCE À DIFFÉRENTES ÉPOQUES

Âge	Mortalité de l'année indiquée (l'espérance de vie à la naissance est donnée entre parenthèses)							
	1740-49 (25,6)	1810 (39,7)	1850 (43,8)	1900 (47,0)	1950 (69,2)	2000 (82,9)	2050 (90,8)	2100 (94,9)
Fécondité de 1740-1749 (TFT = 5,6)								
0-19	41,3	45,9	47,4	48,3	50,8	50,5	49,7	49,3
20-59	50,2	46,7	45,4	45,2	42,5	41,1	40,5	40,2
60+	8,5	7,4	7,1	6,6	6,8	8,4	9,8	10,5
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Fécondité de 1974 (TFT = 2,1)								
0-19	15,6	21,2	22,7	23,8	25,8	24,3	22,6	21,7
20-59	56,4	55,2	54,3	55,0	51,7	47,1	43,9	42,3
60+	28,0	23,6	23,0	21,2	22,5	28,5	33,5	36,0
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
Fécondité de 1997 (TFT = 1,8)								
0-19	13,7	18,4	19,6	20,5	21,9	20,2	18,4	17,5
20-59	55,7	54,9	54,1	55,0	51,5	46,1	42,2	40,3
60+	30,5	26,7	26,3	24,4	26,6	33,7	39,4	42,2
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Sources: 1740-49: Blayo, 1975; depuis 1810: Vallin et Meslé, 2001.

### 3.2. Quand la baisse de la mortalité s'en mêle

On le sait, en effet, lorsque la mortalité des enfants est devenue faible, même si elle continue de baisser au même rythme que par le passé, comme ce fut le cas dans presque tous les pays développés, elle ne produit plus guère d'effet en terme d'augmentation de l'espérance de vie et encore moins en terme de rajeunissement de la pyramide (ou de frein au vieillissement par le bas). Pour que l'espérance de vie continue à progresser, il ne suffit plus de gagner du terrain sur la mortalité aux jeunes âges, il faut en gagner, non pas tant aux âges adultes jeunes où la mortalité n'a jamais été très forte, mais aux âges plus élevés, notamment après 60 ans, où les risques de décès sont très élevés. Dès lors, la poursuite de la baisse de la mortalité, loin de continuer à modérer le phénomène de vieillissement par le bas de la pyramide, va au contraire provoquer un vieillissement par le haut.

Là encore, l'un des moyens les plus simples de prendre la mesure de la force de ce vieillissement par le haut, est de recourir aux modèles sta-



bles. La figure 12 illustre les changements de structure par âge que l'on observe d'une population stable à l'autre lorsque la mortalité diminue comme elle l'a fait en France depuis le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et comme elle pourrait le faire d'ici à la fin du siècle si les tendances récentes se poursuivaient. Elle présente ces résultats pour deux niveaux de fécondité différents, selon que le TFT est de 2,1 et 1,8. (Figure 12, p. 414).

Le cas à 2,1 enfants par femme est le plus didactique puisqu'il représente une situation où, lorsque la mortalité est faible, le remplacement des générations est à peu près strictement assuré et où la population est donc presque stationnaire (taux d'accroissement quasi-nul). Quand on passe de la mortalité du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle à celle de 1950, la forte dépression de la base de la pyramide est presque entièrement jugulée. C'est une nouvelle illustration de l'effet rajeunissant de la baisse de la mortalité obtenue au cours de ces deux siècles. Au contraire, quand on passe de la mortalité de 1950 à celle de 2000, puis à celle de 2100, la base de la pyramide se rétrécit à nouveau (mais de façon très différente, en conservant à chaque classe d'âge une dimension toujours égale ou supérieure à celle de toutes les classes d'âge plus élevées) tandis qu'à l'inverse, le haut de la pyramide gonfle à un point qui n'avait encore jamais été atteint auparavant. Ainsi, la part des 60 ans et plus, qui est de 22% dans la population stable correspondant à la mortalité de 1950 passe à 29% avec la mortalité de 2000 et même à 36% avec celle de 2100 (tableau 1). Et ce phénomène est encore plus marqué aux âges plus élevés: la proportion des personnes de 80 ans et plus, par exemple, passe de 3% avec la mortalité de 1950 à 8% avec celle de 2000 et à 16% avec celle de 2100; la part de ce groupe d'âges parmi les 60 ans et plus passe elle-même de 15 à 28 puis à 44%!

Avec 1,8 enfants par femme, quelle que soit la baisse de la mortalité, celle-ci ne peut évidemment jamais combler complètement la dépression de la base de la pyramide et, même aux niveaux de mortalité les plus faibles, le taux intrinsèque d'accroissement est négatif. L'effet du vieillissement par le haut n'en est que plus accusé. Avec la mortalité de 2000, la part des 60 ans et plus passe à 34% et, avec celle de 2100, elle passe à 42% (tableau 1). La part des 80 ans et plus passe quant à elle à 10 puis à 19%.

La figure 13 reprend la figure 10 pour comparer les trajectoires réelles française, anglaise et japonaise de la part des 60 ans et plus aux indications données par les populations stables du tableau 1. (Figure 13, p. 414).

Alors que, dans presque tous les pays développés, la progression de l'espérance de vie a marqué le pas dans les années 1960 et qu'il a fallu attendre les années 1970 pour renouer avec le progrès, l'espérance de vie

des Japonais a continué d'augmenter sans le moindre ralentissement, permettant aujourd'hui à cette population de battre tous les records de longévité et de vieillissement démographique. Or, cette pause des années 1960 est justement la marque du moment où s'est opéré le phénomène de bascule dans la contribution des différents groupes d'âges au progrès de l'espérance de vie. Pendant deux siècles, depuis le milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, le progrès sanitaire a surtout reposé sur la lutte contre les maladies infectieuses. Une lutte victorieuse, parfois jusqu'à l'éradication de certaines maladies, qui a surtout profité aux enfants et aux jeunes adultes. Une fois cette victoire acquise ou presque, il fallait chercher à devenir performant sur d'autres fronts, notamment sur ceux des maladies de société (accidents, tabagisme, alcoolisme, etc.), induites par les changements économiques et sociaux, et des maladies de dégénérescence, notamment dans le domaine des cancers et des maladies cardio-vasculaires, affections touchant surtout les adultes et les vieillards. Cela a pris un peu de temps, sauf au Japon, qui a, le premier, remporté les plus grands succès dans la réduction de la mortalité aux grands âges. Dans ce pays, le vieillissement par le haut de la pyramide est ainsi très vite venu renforcer le vieillissement par le bas et c'est pourquoi sur les figures 10 et 13 la trajectoire japonaise a si rapidement rattrapé et dépassé les trajectoires française et anglaise.

Cependant, la figure 13 fait apparaître un grand contraste entre la situation qui prévalait au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et celle que l'on observe aujourd'hui. Alors qu'au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, la proportion de 60 ans et plus observée en France ou en Angleterre et, probablement au Japon, était très voisine de celle qui correspondait à une population stable ayant même fécondité et même mortalité que la France de l'époque, il y a aujourd'hui un important hiatus entre les proportions, de nouveau assez semblables, observées dans chacun des trois pays et celle qui caractérise une population stable ayant un TFT de 2,1 enfants par femme et la mortalité française actuelle. Cela souligne bien le fait que dans chacun de ces trois pays la proportion de 60 ans et plus est appelée à augmenter encore beaucoup dans les années à venir. Ce serait déjà un phénomène inéluctable même si la mortalité cessait de baisser mais ce phénomène sera d'autant plus important que la mortalité continuera à baisser et il le sera encore plus si la fécondité reste, ne serait-ce que légèrement, inférieure à 2,1 enfants par femme, comme l'indique ici la trajectoire des populations stables à 1,8.

Les dernières projections de population françaises publiées par l'INSEE (Brutel, 2001) avec une fécondité de 1,8 enfants par femme et trois hypothèses de mortalité donnent pour 2050, quelle que soit l'hypo-

thèse de mortalité retenue, une proportion de 60 ans et plus encore inférieure à celle indiquée par la population stable correspondante,<sup>13</sup> ce qui signifie qu'en 2050, il est fort probable que la population française sera encore un peu plus jeune que la population stable correspondant à sa fécondité et à sa mortalité et que, donc, elle sera encore très certainement appelée à vieillir davantage.

La projection "*moyenne*" faite par les Nations unies pour le Japon, indique au contraire que la proportion des 60 ans et plus pourrait être dans ce pays supérieure à ce qu'indique la population stable construite avec un TFR de 1,8 et la mortalité moyenne projetée pour la France en 2050. C'est que, dès à présent, la mortalité japonaise est plus faible que la mortalité française et que la baisse de mortalité prévue pour ce pays d'ici 2050 est encore plus forte que celle prévue pour la France.

D'après ces projections, la proportion de 60 ans et plus pourrait ainsi être, en 2050, de 35% en France (hypothèse moyenne) et de 42,5% au Japon. Le Japon est ainsi le pays où le vieillissement démographique a été le plus rapide et il restera probablement encore quelques décennies celui où la proportion de personnes âgées est la plus élevée. Cela résulte en partie de la baisse de sa fécondité mais celle-ci n'a pas plus d'influence que dans les pays européens, puisque depuis les années 1970 les trajectoires des fécondités européenne et japonaise sont presque parfaitement superposées. De plus cet effet de la baisse de la fécondité est fortement modéré dans la projection des Nations unies puisque celle-ci prévoit, dans l'hypothèse moyenne retenue ici, une remontée du TFR à 1,85 d'ici à 2050. La rapidité spectaculaire de la montée des personnes âgées au Japon est donc pour l'essentiel à imputer à la précocité et à la force du vieillissement par le haut que ce pays connaît depuis la fin des années 1950 alors qu'il n'a réellement pris de l'ampleur en Europe qu'à partir des années 1970, sans toutefois atteindre les records japonais.

Mais si le Japon se singularise ainsi par la rapidité de son vieillissement démographique, du fait de la baisse spectaculaire de la mortalité aux grands âges, le vieillissement va aussi se produire à un rythme accéléré dans la plupart des pays en développement du fait, cette fois, de la rapidité de la baisse de la fécondité qui vient de s'y produire.

<sup>13</sup> La table de mortalité 2050 (Vallin et Meslé, 2001) utilisée ici pour le calcul de la population stable est très proche de celle utilisée par l'INSEE pour la projection à mortalité moyenne.

#### 4. PERSPECTIVES: L'ACCÉLÉRATION DU PROCESSUS DANS LES PAYS DU SUD

Pour juger de ce point, nous avons la chance de disposer de la base de données des Nations unies retraçant l'histoire démographique de tous les pays du monde depuis 1950 et projetant toutes ces trajectoires jusqu'en 2050, dans le cadre de plusieurs scénarios d'hypothèses. Si, pour nombre de pays, les données ainsi rassemblées reposent sur des estimations parfois grossières, cette base, régulièrement ré-estimée tous les deux ans, donne une très précieuse vue d'ensemble sur la démographie mondiale. La ré-estimation la plus récente est fondée sur les données de 2002 (United Nations, 2003).

Comparer globalement les pays en développement aux pays développés n'a pas beaucoup de sens car, d'un pays en développement à l'autre, le démarrage et le calendrier de la transition démographique, notamment ceux de la phase où la fécondité entre en baisse, ont beaucoup varié. Dans une première approche globale, il faut donc au moins s'appuyer sur la distinction désormais faite par les Nations unies des pays les moins développés au sein de l'ensemble de pays en développement. Ces pays ne sont en effet pas seulement les plus pauvres, ils sont aussi ceux où la fécondité n'a commencé à baisser que très récemment. Appelons "*pays intermédiaires*" l'ensemble des pays en développement amputé de ce groupe de pays les moins développés.<sup>14</sup>

La figure 14 compare l'évolution depuis 1950 des proportions de personnes de 60 ans et plus dans chacun des trois grands ensembles ainsi définis (pays développés, pays intermédiaires et pays les moins développés), ainsi que leur projection jusqu'en 2050 dans le cadre de trois hypothèses de fécondité (basse, moyenne et haute). Malheureusement ces projections ne comportent qu'une seule hypothèse d'évolution de la mortalité (en dehors de l'hypothèse de mortalité constante). Mais ce n'est qu'un moindre mal car pour les décennies qui viennent, le principal facteur de vieillissement démographique des pays en développement tient à la baisse récente de la fécondité. Il faut seulement ne pas oublier que ce vieillissement serait encore plus fort et rapide avec l'intervention d'une baisse plus rapide que prévue de la mortalité aux grands âges.

Laissons de côté les pays les moins développés qui, visiblement ne commenceront vraiment à être atteints par le phénomène qu'au terme de

<sup>14</sup> Les Nations unies ne donnent pas de nom à ce groupe, se contentant de parler de l'ensemble des pays en développement d'une part et du sous-ensemble des pays les moins développés, de l'autre.

cette projection et comparons sur la figure 14 les deux autres groupes de pays. Sur toute la période allant de 1950 à 2000, la part des 60 ans et plus dans les pays intermédiaires s'est constamment maintenue très en dessous de celle des pays développés, au point qu'en 2000, avec à peine plus de 8%, elle est encore loin d'avoir rattrapé les 12% qui prévalaient en 1950 dans les pays développés. Cette proportion y a même commencé par légèrement diminuer durant cette période avant d'amorcer un début de hausse à partir du milieu des années 1970. Le vieillissement par le bas a, durant toute cette période, presque entièrement été compensé par le facteur rajeunissant de la baisse de la mortalité infantile. Mais, la hausse amorcée au cours des dernières décennies va s'accélérer de façon spectaculaire, là où elle avait été, au contraire, assez constante dans les pays développés. Dans l'hypothèse moyenne des Nations unies, dès 2020, la part des 60 ans et plus des pays intermédiaires va atteindre les 12% qui caractérisaient les pays développés en 1950, puis, en 10 ans, cette proportion passera aux 16% que les pays développés ont mis 35 ans (de 1950 à 1985) à atteindre. Enfin, dans les 20 ans restant d'ici la fin de la projection, cette proportion passerait à 22,5%, niveau que les pays développés mettraient 30 ans à atteindre (de 1985 à 2015). Afin de mieux illustrer cette rapidité du vieillissement démographique des pays en développement, une copie de la trajectoire des pays développée a été reportée vers la droite pour comparer directement leur évolution à celle des pays intermédiaires à même niveau de départ. (Figure 14, p. 415).

Encore faut-il, pour mieux apprécier la situation, préciser ce que signifient les écarts entre la projection correspondant à l'hypothèse moyenne et les projections encadrantes des hypothèses haute et basse. Encore une fois, seule l'évolution de la fécondité est en cause ici. Chacune des hypothèses conduit les pays intermédiaires et les pays développés au même niveau de TFT en 2050, soit 1,9 enfant par femme dans l'hypothèse moyenne, 1,4 dans l'hypothèse basse et 2,4 dans l'hypothèse haute.

Il est vrai que, faute de se résigner à un recul massif de leurs populations, les pays développés pourraient en venir bientôt à trouver les moyens d'une remontée de fécondité et l'on peut sans doute considérer comme très probable que même sans aller jusqu'à 2,4 celle-ci repasse d'ici 2050 un peu au dessus du seuil de remplacement des générations. Il ne serait donc pas déraisonnable de tableer sur une trajectoire située quelque part entre les hypothèses moyenne et haute. En revanche, compte tenu, non seulement de l'expérience de ces mêmes pays développés, mais aussi de celle déjà vécue par certains pays intermédiaires comme Singapour (1,5 enfants par femme

en 2000), il me paraît tout à fait improbable que la fécondité de ce groupe de pays ne descende jamais en dessous de 2,4 ni même en dessous de 1,9 d'ici 2050. Elle devrait au contraire continuer à descendre bien au-dessous du seuil de remplacement avant que les changements de société nécessaires à l'arrêt de cette baisse ou à la reprise n'interviennent. Dès lors, la comparaison la plus juste que l'on puisse faire à partir de ces projections des Nations unies est peut-être de comparer la projection à fécondité basse des pays intermédiaires à une projection pour les pays développés qui se situerait entre les scénarios à fécondités moyenne et haute.

Ainsi, il est bien probable que la proportion des 60 ans et plus rejoigne dans les pays intermédiaires la trajectoire des pays développés peu après 2050. Autrement dit, en moins de 50 ans (de 2020 à 2060 ou 2070) ils pourraient avoir à assumer un changement pour lequel les pays développés auraient disposé d'un temps d'adaptation de près de 120 ans (de 1950 à 2060 ou 2070).

Pourtant ce raisonnement global ne rend pas complètement compte de la formidable accélération du processus de vieillissement démographique que beaucoup de pays en développement auront réellement à assumer. En effet, le groupe de pays intermédiaires est lui-même entré de façon hétérogène dans la phase de baisse de la fécondité et ce simple décalage de calendrier rend le mouvement d'ensemble plus lent que le mouvement qui sera réellement observé dans chaque pays.

La figure 15 compare aux trajectoires des États-Unis, de l'Europe occidentale<sup>15</sup> et du Japon, celles de quelques pays intermédiaires choisis dans les différentes régions du monde. Les trois pays (ou ensemble de pays) développés ont été choisis pour bien encadrer la diversité qui existe aussi dans le monde développé: le Japon et les États-Unis sont aux extrêmes, le Japon en raison de la baisse très rapide de sa mortalité aux grands âges, les États-Unis en raison du maintien d'une fécondité relativement élevée. L'Europe occidentale occupe une position moyenne. Les pays en développement ont au contraire été choisis de préférence parmi ceux qui ont eu une baisse de fécondité précoce. Ceux où la baisse n'a démarré que plus tard ne connaîtront l'essentiel du phénomène qu'au-delà du terme de la projection.

Dans chacun des deux graphiques de la figure 14, pour encadrer la réalité la plus probable, deux projections sont représentées, l'une en trait plein correspond à l'hypothèse de fécondité moyenne, l'autre en pointillé

<sup>15</sup> Au sens des Nations unies, c'est-à-dire: Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, France, Luxembourg et Suisse.

correspond à l'hypothèse de fécondité haute. La trame de référence ainsi constituée permet d'apprécier l'ampleur que prendrait le phénomène dans les pays en développement retenus selon qu'ils suivraient la projection à fécondité moyenne ou la projection à fécondité basse.

Selon l'hypothèse de fécondité moyenne, dans des pays comme le Bangladesh ou l'Inde, dans lesquels, jusqu'à présent la baisse de la fécondité n'a pas été des plus rapides, le processus de vieillissement démographique, même s'il s'annonce déjà plus rapide que celui qu'ont connu les pays développés, serait loin d'être achevé en 2050 et les proportions de 60 ans et plus seraient encore, au milieu du siècle, avec respectivement 17 et 20%, inférieures à celle des États-Unis (22 à 25%) et, bien sûr, très loin derrière celle du Japon (39 à 42%). Dans l'hypothèse où le Bangladesh et l'Inde suivraient l'hypothèse basse de fécondité, leurs proportions de 60 ans et plus rejoindraient à peu près en 2050 celle des États-Unis, mais resteraient encore bien en deçà de celle de l'Europe occidentale. (Figure 15, p. 415).

En revanche, quelle que soit l'hypothèse d'évolution de leur fécondité, celle-ci serait, dès 2050, largement dépassée par des pays comme Cuba, Singapour ou la Corée (figure 15 A). Dans ces pays, la proportion de 60 ans et plus pourrait même rattraper ou dépasser celle du Japon, s'ils suivaient l'hypothèse basse de fécondité! Pourtant, Singapour et la Corée n'en sont encore aujourd'hui qu'au niveau atteint par le Japon en 1970 (Cuba en est au niveau japonais de 1980) et, surtout, il faut le rappeler, l'évolution prévue pour la mortalité japonaise aux grands âges est exceptionnellement plus rapide, dans cette projection des Nations unies, que celle retenue pour les autres pays. Si, par exemple, la Corée suivait les traces du Japon dans ce domaine, ce qui ne serait pas trop surprenant, le vieillissement démographique y serait encore plus rapide qu'on ne le prévoit ici.

Ainsi, d'ici à 2050, les pays en développement qui ont connu une transition précoce et rapide de leur fécondité vont être confrontés à une accélération de leur vieillissement démographique sans précédent dans le monde développé, parfois plus forte, même, qu'elle n'a été au Japon. Et ce phénomène ne se limite pas aux seuls cas déjà visibles dans le cadre de cette projection à 2050 des Nations unies. Tous les pays où la transition de la fécondité aura été rapide seront tôt ou tard confrontés à cette situation.

Pourtant, à court terme, la situation de ces pays est loin d'être catastrophique. Au contraire, ils vont, durant quelques décennies, passer par une phase exceptionnelle où leur structure par âge sera extrêmement favorable au développement, une *fenêtre démographique* d'opportunités économiques et sociales.

## 5. LA FENÊTRE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE

Si les perspectives d'évolution de la proportion des 60 ans et plus annoncent clairement la nécessité de se préparer, partout dans le monde, mais plus encore dans les pays en développement que dans les pays développés, à la prise en charge des problèmes liés au vieillissement démographique, celle de la part que les adultes occupent dans la population totale, ici les 20-59 ans, qui est un indicateur de la force de travail théorique qu'un pays peut mobiliser en faveur de son développement économique et social, pourrait, si l'on sait en exploiter les opportunités, en fournir les moyens. Cette part est actuellement très différente d'un pays à l'autre mais son évolution récente et les perspectives d'avenir sont également très diversifiées.

La figure 16 en donne une vue globale en comparant, comme à la figure 14, les pays développés aux pays intermédiaires et aux pays les moins développés. En 2000, les 20-59 ans formaient plus de 55% de la population totale dans les pays développés, alors que cette proportion n'était que de 51% dans les pays intermédiaires et seulement de 41% dans les pays les moins développés. Une bonne part des problèmes actuels de développement se trouve résumée dans ces chiffres puisque ceux-ci nous indiquent clairement que les pays développés continuent aujourd'hui de bénéficier de la plus grande capacité théorique de travail et nous montrent à quel point celle des pays les moins développés est inférieure.

Mais la figure 16 (p. 416) montre aussi que, dans un passé récent, la situation était encore plus désavantageuse pour les pays en développement, surtout pour les pays intermédiaires, où, en 1970, la population ne comptait que 42% d'adultes. Dans les pays les moins développés aussi, la situation a été pire qu'aujourd'hui, avec à peine 40% d'adultes dans les années 1980. Par rapport à 1950, dans tous les pays en développement, la baisse de la mortalité des enfants, parfois renforcée par une certaine hausse de la fécondité a en effet contribué à accroître la part des jeunes dans la population et à diminuer celle des adultes. Cependant, à partir des années 1970, la baisse générale et rapide de la fécondité dans les pays intermédiaires a opéré le mouvement inverse alors que dans les pays les moins développés, l'amorce de cette seconde phase de la transition démographique a été trop tardive pour avoir déjà un effet important en ce sens. Il leur faudra attendre les décennies prochaines pour bénéficier d'une augmentation substantielle de leur proportion d'adultes.

Les projections des Nations unies montrent que, quel que soit le scénario retenu, cette proportion est appelée à diminuer très prochainement



dans les pays développés. Au contraire, elle va encore augmenter fortement dans les pays intermédiaires avant qu'elle n'y baisse ensuite très vite et, dans les pays les moins développés, cette augmentation devrait se poursuivre au moins jusqu'au terme de la projection.

Notons cependant, immédiatement, que l'hypothèse faite sur la fécondité revêt ici une grande importance. Si l'on retenait l'hypothèse haute, la part des adultes culminerait, dans les pays intermédiaires, à 53% vers 2010. Autrement dit, ces pays ne bénéficieraient jamais d'une conjoncture aussi favorable que celle qui a permis aux pays développés de dépasser les 55%. Mais, je l'ai déjà dit, cette hypothèse me paraît peu crédible. Au contraire, dans l'hypothèse basse, la part des adultes culminerait dans les pays intermédiaires à 58% vers 2020-2025, un niveau jamais atteint dans les pays développés. Quant aux pays les moins développés, la projection ne va pas assez loin pour déterminer le point culminant mais elle nous indique qu'en 2050 la proportion d'adultes y serait déjà, avec 56%, supérieure au maximum jamais atteint par les pays développés.

Cependant, là encore, cette vue globale par grands ensembles mondiaux mêle des calendriers de baisse de la fécondité très différents et cache les conséquences réelles pour chaque pays de ces évolutions. Les figures 17 et 18 illustrent ce phénomène de la fenêtre démographique pour les mêmes pays que ceux qui ont été pris en exemple à propos du vieillissement démographique (figure 15). Cependant pour rendre les graphiques à peu près lisibles, la figure 17 ne reprend que des pays en développement où la baisse de la fécondité a été très précoce (Chine, Corée, Sri Lanka, Singapour, Thaïlande, Cuba) alors que la figure 18 reprend les cas de baisse de fécondité moins précoce (Inde, Bangladesh, Viêt-Nam, Tunisie). Dans les deux cas les évolutions de la proportion de population de 20-59 ans sont comparées à celles des trois exemples de pays développés utilisés à la figure 15: États-Unis, Japon et Europe occidentale. Enfin, comme à la figure 15, la référence aux pays développés porte principalement sur l'hypothèse moyenne (en traits pleins) et accessoirement sur l'hypothèse haute (pointillés) alors que pour les pays en développement, le graphique de gauche illustre le scénario à fécondité moyenne et celui de droite le scénario à fécondité basse.

Si l'on s'en tient, à l'hypothèse moyenne, Singapour apparaît comme le cas le plus extrême mais aussi le plus précoce de tous, au point que l'essentiel de l'avantage que lui donne cette fenêtre d'opportunité appartient déjà au passé. En effet, dans ce pays, la proportion de 20-59 ans a culminé dès 1995 à 62%, beaucoup plus haut que les 57% atteints en 1970 par le Japon. La proportion d'adultes a en fait atteint son maximum à Singapour

en même temps qu'en Europe occidentale (57% en 1995) et un peu avant les États-Unis (55% en 2000). Mais dans ces deux derniers cas, il s'agissait d'un second maximum, lié au *baby boom* de l'après-guerre, le premier ayant eu lieu avant 1950 à un niveau inférieur.

Cet avantage est arrivé très subitement à Singapour, puisque très peu de temps avant, en 1965, la proportion de 20-59 ans n'était que de 41%, bien inférieure aux 47, 51 et 55% observés à la même époque en Europe occidentale, aux États-Unis et au Japon, respectivement. (Figure 17, p. 416).

En fait, sous l'effet de la chute très rapide de la fécondité qui s'était produite à Singapour, en 15 ans, de 1975 à 1990, la proportion de 20-59 ans s'y est brusquement élevée de 47 à 62%! La situation démo-économique du pays s'en est trouvée radicalement changée et cela n'est certainement pas sans rapport avec le fulgurant développement économique du plus dynamique des quatre *dragons*, ainsi qu'on appelait, dans les années 1980, les "nouveaux pays industriels" d'Extrême orient (Singapour, Taïwan, Hong Kong et Corée du Sud). Mais cet avantage ne peut être que de courte durée car, tout comme la réduction de la proportion des jeunes, la montée de celle des personnes âgées est d'autant plus brutale que la baisse de la fécondité a été rapide. La fenêtre démographique ne s'ouvre que le temps que la seconde prenne le relais de la première. D'après la projection à fécondité moyenne des Nations unies, à Singapour, la part des 20-59 ans va ainsi être très brutalement laminée par la montée de celle des 60 ans et plus: en 20 ans, de 2015 à 2035 elle retombera de 60% à 45%.

À quelques années de distance, une fenêtre démographique est aussi en train de s'ouvrir dans d'autres pays comme Cuba, la Corée du Sud, la Chine, la Thaïlande ou le Sri Lanka, pris en exemple en figure 17. Dans le cadre de l'hypothèse moyenne de fécondité (figure 17, graphique de gauche), sauf en Corée, pays qui a déjà largement suivi les traces de Singapour, la proportion d'adultes culminerait, très prochainement, à un niveau sensiblement moins haut que Singapour. Cependant dans l'hypothèse, plus probable, de fécondité basse (graphique de droite), le sort de Singapour, qui est d'ores et déjà joué, ne serait certes pas très différent mais la fenêtre démographique serait beaucoup plus importante dans les autres pays. Et, naturellement, la différence est d'autant plus forte que la baisse à venir de la fécondité reste importante, comme en Thaïlande ou au Sri Lanka.

La figure 18 illustre les cas de quelques-uns des pays qui vont succéder à ceux de la figure 17, comme la Tunisie et le Viêt-Nam où la proportion d'adultes culminera vers 2020, ou comme l'Inde et le Bangladesh où ce maximum ne sera atteint que plus tard encore, vers 2040. Ces exemples mont-

rent, encore plus clairement que le précédent, que la différence entre les hypothèses moyenne et basse de fécondité est d'autant plus forte que la baisse de la fécondité est moins avancée, mais ils montrent aussi que l'ampleur du phénomène est liée à la rapidité de cette baisse. En Tunisie et au Viêt-Nam, cette baisse a été très rapide et la proportion d'adultes atteint des niveaux très élevés, comme ceux de la figure 17, surtout dans le cas de l'hypothèse basse. (Figure 18, p. 417).

Au contraire, en Inde et au Bangladesh, où la baisse de la fécondité a été moins rapide, cette proportion monte moins haut: dans l'hypothèse moyenne elle culminerait même à peine plus haut que dans les pays développés. En revanche, la fenêtre d'opportunité sera de durée nettement plus longue. En Inde, par exemple, la proportion d'adultes, qui dépassera les 50% au tout début des années 2000, assez peu de temps après la Tunisie et le Viêt-Nam, restera au-dessus de ce niveau beaucoup plus longtemps (même si le terme de la projection est trop proche pour le dire plus précisément, un simple coup d'œil à la figure 18 permet de s'en assurer).

## 6. ET APRÈS LA TRANSITION?

Cette alternance des différentes régions face aux avantages et aux inconvénients de l'évolution des structures par âge n'est que le résultat des différences de rythme et de calendrier d'accomplissement de la transition démographique. À supposer que celle-ci conduise à une nouvelle stabilité, à des niveaux beaucoup plus confortables d'espérance de vie et de fécondité, remplaçant l'équilibre ancien fort cruel, où il fallait faire beaucoup d'enfants pour assurer le remplacement des générations car la majorité d'entre eux étaient emportés avant l'âge de la reproduction, la théorie des populations stables nous assure que ces grands changements dans l'équilibre numérique entre les groupes d'âges arriveront à un terme où toutes les populations auraient la même pyramide d'âges, très régulière, avec, en gros, 24% de "jeunes" de moins de 20 ans, 46% d'"adultes" de 20-59 ans et 30% de "vieux" de 60 ans et plus. (Figure 19, p. 417).

Cependant, rien n'assure qu'une telle stabilité s'installe durablement. Tout indique au contraire que les facteurs de transformation de la pyramide des âges resteront à l'œuvre bien au-delà de ce qui serait nécessaire à la restauration d'un équilibre. Pour juger de la question au niveau mondial, on peut certes faire abstraction de l'effet des migrations mais, pour le reste, tout indique que l'espérance de vie peut continuer d'évoluer bien au-delà

des 85 ans retenus par les Nations unies comme point de convergence pour leurs projections démographiques (les Japonaises y sont déjà!) et que la fécondité peut tomber durablement bien en dessous des 2,1 enfants par femme nécessaires au remplacement des générations. Qui plus est, des évolutions récentes permettent d'imaginer qu'un des paramètres les plus stables de l'histoire démographique de l'humanité, le rapport de masculinité à la naissance, est désormais susceptible d'évoluer substantiellement.

Dans une étude conduite avec Graziella Caselli (2001b et c; 2004), nous avons exploré les conséquences en matière de structure par âge de plusieurs hypothèses, qui, pour être improbables, ne le sont pas plus que celle de la stabilité définitive et parfaite: entre autres, le passage du modèle actuel, de plus en plus battu en brèche, de la famille à 2 enfants à un modèle à un enfant, celui d'une espérance de vie maximum de 85 ans à une espérance de vie maximum de 150 ans, et un doublement du rapport de masculinité à la naissance ou, à l'inverse, sa réduction par deux. L'idée étant d'explorer ce qui pourrait se passer "*après la transition*", l'exercice a été conduit à partir d'une population mondiale ayant réalisé d'ici 2050 ce qui était encore considéré comme l'hypothèse la plus probable au milieu des années 1990: 2,1 enfants par femme et 85 ans d'espérance de vie à la naissance (United Nations, 1995).

### 6.1. *Si les femmes ne faisaient plus qu'un seul enfant*

La figure 20 montre ce que deviendrait la population mondiale si, au lieu de remonter à 2,1 dans les pays du Nord pour se stabiliser à ce niveau dans tous les pays du monde avant 2050 (hypothèse aboutissant à la figure 19), la fécondité tendait au contraire partout à poursuivre sa baisse jusqu'à tomber à 1 enfant par femme (objectif officiel de la Chine, mais aussi niveau déjà presque atteint dans certains pays d'Europe du Sud ou de l'Est). Bien entendu, il en résulterait un recul sévère de l'effectif global qui, à très long terme, conduirait à la disparition de l'humanité. Les pyramides de la figure 20 sont dessinées en effectif et non en pourcentages afin d'illustrer aussi cette conséquence d'une telle évolution. Notamment, le schéma de gauche superpose les pyramides de 2050 et de 2150 à la même échelle indiquant clairement cette attrition drastique du nombre. (Figure 20, p. 418).

Cependant, pour ne pas effacer complètement l'image de la transformation de la structure par âge le schéma de droite donne la pyramide de 2300 (toujours en effectifs absolus) à une plus grande échelle. Partant de 7,9 milliards d'habitants en 2050, la terre ne serait plus peuplée en 2150 que de 2,3 milliards d'hommes et de femmes et, en 2300 la population mondiale

serait ramenée à 60 millions. Mais dans le même temps, dès 2150, un formidable rétrécissement de la base de la pyramide des âges se serait produit, la proportion des jeunes (0-19 ans) se stabilisant à 8,5%, celle des adultes à 36% et celle des vieux à 55,5%.

## 6.2. *Si nous vivions 150 ans*

Mais que se passerait-il si dans le même temps, comme nous le promettrait déjà, dans les années 1970 un biologiste comme Roy Walford (1974), l'espérance de vie augmentait partout dans le monde jusqu'à 150 ans? Il y a différentes façons d'atteindre une telle cible, selon que la tendance actuelle à la très forte concentration des décès au sein d'une étroite tranche d'âges très avancée se maintienne ou que l'on aille vers un ré-élargissement de cette tranche d'âges permettant à un nombre non négligeable d'individus d'atteindre des âges extrêmement élevés tandis qu'un plus grand nombre continuent de mourir plus tôt. Dans le premier cas, la rectangularisation de la courbe de survie se maintient mais l'âge où la mort emporte presque tout le monde est repoussé jusque vers 150 ans. Dans le second, l'expansion des âges au décès, un grand nombre de personnes dépassent très largement 150 ans et le vieillissement par le haut de la pyramide est encore plus accusé.

Toujours dans l'hypothèse de l'enfant unique, la figure 21 compare donc les pyramides d'âge obtenues après stabilisation dans trois cas de figure: espérance de vie à la naissance de 85 ans (graphe de gauche qui reprend celui de droite de la figure 20), espérance de vie de 150 ans avec maintien de la rectangularisation de la courbe de survie (graphe central) et espérance de vie de 150 ans avec expansion des âges au décès (graphe de droite). Les deux pyramides de droite ne reposent plus que sur un fil, avec moins de 2% de jeunes de 0-19 ans, quelle que soit la forme de la courbe de survie, tandis que la part des "vieux" deviendrait écrasante, avec 91% de personnes de 60 ans et plus en cas de maintien de la rectangularité de la courbe de survie et même 95% en cas d'expansion des âges au décès. Mais pourrait-on encore parler de vieux à partir de 60 ans ou faudrait-il n'employer ce mot qu'après 100 ans par exemple, âge au-delà duquel se trouveraient encore... 74% de la population ou même 84% selon la forme de la courbe de survie! (Figure 21, p. 418).

Si le passage à 150 ans d'espérance de vie bouleverse radicalement les rapports entre générations et vide même de tout son sens la répartition que nous faisons aujourd'hui entre jeunes, adultes et vieux, il produit cependant

un effet qui, face à une réduction radicale et durable de la fécondité tel que le passage à l'enfant unique, n'est pas tout à fait sans intérêt: il freine la chute de l'effectif de la population, surtout s'il se fait en maintenant la rectangularité de la courbe de survie. Dans ce cas, au lieu de tomber à 2,3 milliards en 2150 la population mondiale compterait encore à cette date près de 6 milliards d'hommes et de femmes et, en 2300, cet effectif serait encore de 330 millions au lieu de 60. Mais cela ne fait que retarder l'échéance de la disparition, qui à terme reste tout aussi inéluctable.

### 6.3. *Et si le rapport de masculinité évoluait fortement?*

Jamais les projections de population officielles n'évoquent la moindre évolution du rapport de masculinité à la naissance. On s'en tient toujours au sacro-saint taux de 105 garçons pour cent filles. Les exemples se sont pourtant multipliés au cours des dernières décennies de populations à forte préférence pour l'un des deux sexes, généralement le sexe masculin, qui, tirant parti des techniques récentes et bon marché de diagnostic prénatal (échographie), pratiquent l'avortement sélectif pour obtenir les enfants du sexe souhaité (Calot et Caselli, 1988; Miller, 1996, Zhang *et al.*, 1983; Meslé *et al.*, 2004). Là encore, forçons le trait et explorons les conséquences d'une multiplication par deux du rapport de masculinité mais imaginons immédiatement aussi en contrepoint la situation où, sous l'impulsion d'un mouvement féministe mondial, les comportements évoluent au contraire vers un rapport de masculinité à la naissance d'un garçon pour deux filles.

Toutes choses égales par ailleurs ces deux hypothèses auraient des conséquences fortes pour la pyramide des âges, ainsi que le montrent les figures 22 et 23 qui suivent. (Figure 22 et 23, pp. 419-420).

Le déséquilibre en faveur des garçons est très défavorable à la croissance démographique. Sa première conséquence est en effet d'élever fortement le seuil auquel la fécondité assure le remplacement des générations. Les fameux 2,1 enfants par femme n'ont plus cours, quelle que soit la longueur de l'espérance de vie. Avec 2 garçons pour une fille, il faut en effet que chaque femme ait en moyenne 3 enfants pour assurer ce remplacement. Ainsi, avec 2,1 enfants par femme et 85 ans d'espérance de vie, la population n'est plus du tout stationnaire et sa pyramide des âges fortement rétrécie à la base. La population décroîtrait de 1,2% par an, moitié moins vite, certes, que dans le cas du passage à l'enfant unique (2,4%, avec un rapport de masculinité normal) mais tout aussi inexorablement. Au contraire si le rapport à la naissance était de 2 filles pour un garçon, la population devien-

draît croissante (+1,1% par an) et la base de sa pyramide d'âges se ré-élargirait (2<sup>e</sup> graphe de la figure 22). Dans le contexte actuel de baisse de la fécondité au-dessous du seuil de remplacement, ces considérations ne sont pas sans intérêt: avec une aggravation de la sur-masculinité à la naissance, les effets du passage à l'enfant unique seraient renforcés (3<sup>e</sup> graphe de la figure 22); l'émergence d'une sur-féminité en modèrerait au contraire fortement les conséquences, sans toutefois qu'un rapport de 2 filles pour un garçon suffise à les contrecarrer tout à fait.

Si l'on se place dans le cadre du passage à une espérance de vie de 150 ans, on retrouve les mêmes types de résultats, encore plus accusés (figure 23).

## CONCLUSION

Ainsi la transition démographique, expression, dans le domaine de la population, de l'un des plus formidables progrès que l'humanité ait jamais accompli, une maîtrise de la maladie et une réduction de la mortalité telles que, pour perpétuer l'espèce, il suffit désormais qu'une femme ait en moyenne deux enfants là où jadis il lui fallait en faire 5 ou 6, a eu et aura encore d'importantes conséquences sur l'évolution des structures par âge. La seconde moitié du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle aura été marquée, de ce point de vue, par une opposition entre des pays pauvres chargés d'enfants et des pays riches bénéficiant d'une proportion d'adultes très confortable, renouvelée par le *baby boom*. La première moitié du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle opposera, quant à elle, un nombre croissant de pays en développement bénéficiant, pour une courte durée, d'une fenêtre d'opportunité démographique qui, si elle était bien mise à profit, pourrait permettre une formidable accélération de leur développement économique à l'instar de ce qui s'est passé à Singapour et dans quelques autres pays d'extrême orient, à, d'une part, des pays industriels confrontés au cumul du passage de l'entrée des enfants du *baby boom* dans le troisième âge et des effets de l'accélération du vieillissement par le haut, ainsi que de ceux de la rechute de la fécondité, et, d'autre part, à des pays, aujourd'hui les moins développés, sur lesquels pèsera encore très lourdement le poids de jeunes générations très nombreuses. Mais, très vite ensuite, les pays en développement ayant bénéficié du répit offert par la fenêtre démographique seront à leur tour projetés, beaucoup plus brutalement que les pays riches d'aujourd'hui, face à une montée sans précédent d'un vieillissement démographique auxquels les pays industriels auront largement eu le temps de s'adapter et, du point de vue des structures par âge, ce sera sans

doute au tour des pays aujourd'hui les moins développés de profiter des opportunités de la fenêtre démographique.

Pour résumer très grossièrement, disons que, dans le demi-siècle en cours, les pays riches auront à faire face à un vieillissement sans précédent, auquel ils ont, cependant largement eu le temps de se préparer; que les pays intermédiaires vont au contraire profiter d'une fenêtre d'opportunité exceptionnelle qu'ils ne doivent absolument pas manquer de mettre à profit pour se préparer au vieillissement extrêmement brutal qui les attend immédiatement après et qu'enfin les pays les moins développés auront à porter pendant encore quelques décennies de double poids d'une croissance forte et d'une lourde charge de jeunes à former.

Mais ces situations différentes ne sont que le reflet des décalages dans le temps et des différences de rythme de la transition démographique. Les incertitudes et l'ampleur des problèmes à plus long terme pourraient bien être autrement plus alarmantes.

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## COMMENTAIRE SUR “LA DONNE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE”, DE JACQUES VALLIN

MICHEL SCHOOPYANS

Je voudrais avant tout féliciter M. Vallin pour son exposé remarquablement documenté. J'admire aussi la maîtrise avec laquelle il a réussi à structurer une matière aussi vaste et aussi complexe. *Vaste* parce que les populations du monde sont particulièrement contrastées. Toutes ont leur histoire, et celle-ci dépend non seulement de l'environnement physique, mais aussi des guerres, des régimes politiques, des relations commerciales et de bien d'autres facteurs historiques qu'on ne peut ignorer si l'on veut comprendre la diversité des populations présentes. Celles-ci affichent aussi des diversités qui résultent de l'influence exercée aujourd'hui sur elles par les gouvernements, les opportunités d'emplois, la répartition des revenus, la protection des droits de l'homme – pour ne citer que ces exemples. Toujours à la suite de M. Vallin, on accordera que les perspectives d'avenir sont très différentes selon les populations, ainsi que le démographe le souligne à propos, notamment, des pays en voie de développement.

Matière vaste, donc, mais aussi *complexe*, car traiter de la distribution par âge des populations humaines requiert la mise en œuvre de méthodes et l'intégration de paramètres différents, comme par exemple les taux de natalité et de mortalité, les indices synthétiques de fécondité, les fenêtres, les pyramides des âges selon les proportions ou selon les effectifs. Il faut aussi pouvoir tirer parti, pour l'avenir, des leçons de la démographie historique et estimer le crédit que l'on peut accorder aux statistiques relatives aux pays en voie de développement.

Il appartiendra à l'Académie *d'expliciter* les enseignements qui se dégagent de l'imposante monographie de M. Vallin. Travail difficile, sans doute, mais qui nous permettra d'aller plus avant dans nos échanges sur les rapports entre générations.

Permettez-moi à présent de proposer quelques réflexions, voire quelques interrogations, que suscite en moi l'étude du Professeur Vallin.

La première question qui me vient à l'esprit concerne *les pays en développement*. Afin de simplifier, je laisse ici de côté la distinction signalée par M. Vallin entre "pays intermédiaires" et "pays moins développés". Comment ces pays pourraient-ils connaître leurs réalités démographiques sans dépendre scientifiquement de pays capables de produire du savoir démographique de qualité? De l'exposé de M. Vallin il apparaît clairement que les connaissances relatives, par exemple, à la fenêtre démographique de tel pays peuvent pousser des nations, ambitieuses et dominatrices, à faire des recommandations perverses à des populations dépourvues d'instruments valables d'analyse scientifique. Bien plus de telles *informations d'initiés* peuvent être exploitées à différents niveaux. Je songe ici au cas du Brésil, où la stratification sociale s'exprime dans les inégalités scandaleuses au niveau de l'accès au savoir en général, et en particulier à la connaissance des réalités démographiques nationales.

Le problème se retrouve au niveau plus général des *relations internationales*, où sous couvert d'efficacité, d'utilité, d'aide au développement, des technocrates, forts de leurs connaissances, peuvent freiner le juste développement d'une population.

Enfin, le problème se pose aussi, si j'ose dire, *au sommet de la pyramide*. Quel moyen avons-nous – par exemple au niveau de l'IBGE (*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*) ou même de l'INED – de contrôler la loyauté et la scientificité des données fournies par le *Bureau of Census* ou par la *Division de la Population*, organe du reste respectable de l'ONU, face à laquelle même l'Eurostat faisait difficilement le poids, y compris avant ses turbulences.

Pour terminer cette première réflexion, je constate qu'il en va de la science de la population comme de toute autre discipline scientifique – la géographie, les sciences biomédicales, l'histoire, l'agronomie, etc. – elle peut être manipulée et manipulante.

Le texte de M. Vallin nous rappelle aussi les *limites de la démographie au niveau de l'anthropologie*. Pour le démographe, l'homme est un individu; il fait partie d'une cohorte. A la limite on pourrait appliquer les mêmes méthodes d'analyse et les mêmes instruments mathématiques à l'étude des populations animales et à celle des populations humaines. L'idée de projection et celles d'hypothèses haute, moyenne ou basse, si souvent évoquées dans les recherches sur la population humaine, présupposent que si, par exemple, les conditions générales actuelles, et en particulier les indices de fécondité, restent ce qu'elles sont aujourd'hui, la structure par âge de telle population se présentera sous telle forme d'ici cinquante ans. Sans doute,

du point de vue mathématique. Mais les projections démenties par les faits sont fréquentes et souvent impressionnantes. Même à l'ONU, la Division de la Population a dû reconnaître la chute plus rapide que prévu de la fécondité, à peu près partout dans le monde, ainsi que le vieillissement rapide de la population mondiale. Le FNUAP lui-même a dû sortir de ses retranchements idéologiques pour reconnaître certains faits, sans pour autant y adapter ses programmes.

La science de la population est donc d'un précieux secours, mais elle doit *accepter d'accueillir des paramètres qui échappent à sa saisie*. Dans la réalité humaine concrète, on n'a pas affaire à des monades, à des individus objectivés dans une série numérique. Les conclusions des analyses démographiques ne sauraient mettre entre parenthèses le fait que les hommes sont capables juger par eux-mêmes, qu'ils ont de la mémoire et sont sujets d'histoire, qu'ils sont libres et que donc leur comportement est largement imprévisible, qu'ils sont ouverts à certaines valeurs humaines, comme la justice et la solidarité, ou religieuses, comme la charité et le pardon.

Il est non moins évident que lorsqu'il s'agit de relations intergénérationnelles il est difficile de ne guère *prendre en compte la famille et le mariage*. Ce sont là en effet des institutions naturelles, antérieures aux diverses organisations que leur donnent les différentes cultures. Cette double réalité relationnelle est constitutive même de la génération au sens de transmission de la vie comme au sens de cohorte.

Qu'il me soit permis d'ajouter encore quelques observations plus particulières.

P. 39: Il serait utile de préciser que le fameux Indice Synthétique de Fécondité de 2.1, nécessaire au remplacement de la population, ne vaut que pour les pays jouissant des meilleures conditions de vie. Cet indice est certainement plus élevé dans les "pays moins développés", comme la Bolivie ou le Pakistan.

P. 39: Je me demande si les "deux façons de mesurer, techniquement, la *fécondité de remplacement*" ne mesurent pas, en réalité, des choses différentes. La réponse affirmative semble suggérée par M. Vallin lui-même lorsqu'il évoque la mesure longitudinale et la mesure transversale. Ne mesure-t-on pas, dans un cas, la fécondité des générations de l'année considérée et, dans l'autre cas, la fécondité d'une génération?

P. 41 note 3: La définition du "vieillissement de la population [envisagé comme] toute augmentation de la *proportion* de la population ayant un âge supérieur à un certain seuil ..." inclut-elle le vieillissement résultant de l'accroissement du *nombre* de personnes âgées bénéficiant de meilleures

conditions de vie? Le vieillissement par augmentation de la proportion n'est-il pas dû surtout à la baisse de la fécondité?

Pp. 46, 48, 51, etc. référence à l'année 1960. Pourquoi cette année est-elle charnière?

P. 46: "... l'espérance de vie a toujours été principalement due à la baisse de la mortalité infantile. Et l'effet de ce recul sur la pyramide des âges est tout à fait assimilable à celui d'une hausse de la fécondité". Mais si l'on admet cette assimilation, ne faut-il pas également assimiler les avortements à une baisse de la fécondité et les répercuter sur la pyramide des âges?

P. 48: Surgit une instance prolongeant celle exposée ci-dessus. Si l'effet de la lutte contre la mortalité infantile et juvénile est présenté comme équivalent à l'augmentation de la natalité, pourquoi ne pas *ajouter* le nombre d'avortements comme effet diminuant le bénéfice de la chute de la mortalité infantile et juvénile? Par ailleurs l'effet bénéfique de l'abaissement de la mortalité infantile et juvénile ne pourra grandir indéfiniment. Il est difficile de faire mieux que le Japon, qui affiche une mortalité infantile de 3‰ (PRB 2003).

P. 50: S'agit-il de "maîtrise de la croissance", ce qui insinue des interventions volontaristes, ou d'une adaptation naturelle des comportements de fécondité à une mortalité durablement abaissée? N'est-ce pas la mortalité qui commande?

P. 53: Il serait utile de comparer la structure par âge telle qu'elle se présente aujourd'hui aux USA et dans les nations européennes. C'est là un problème crucial.

P. 59: L'horizon 2050, souvent mentionné par l'ONU pour souligner la distinction entre pays développés et moins développés, est tout à fait arbitraire. Elle préjuge de la diversité avec laquelle les pays vont se développer ou stagner. En outre elle ne tient pas compte des écarts de richesse qui, à l'intérieur des pays concernés, opposent les classes très aisées et les pauvres. Tel est par exemple le cas du Brésil.

P. 65 s.: Ne serait-il pas opportun d'attirer l'attention sur les différences que l'on observe au niveau local, et même à l'intérieur des nations? La Wallonie diffère de la Flandre; la Sicile de la Lombardie; le Nordeste brésilien de São Paulo; le Honduras du Costa Rica, etc.

P. 72: La conclusion de M. Vallin est surprenante. Peu d'éléments autorisent à affirmer que les pays ont eu le temps de se préparer au vieillissement. La France n'était pas préparée à la surmortalité des vieillards provoquée par la canicule de 2003; on l'a assez reproché aux gouvernants. Presque partout les caisses de retraites sont en déficit. Il arrive qu'elles se

financent par des emprunts! En Italie ont eu lieu des manifestations contre la réforme des retraites. Dans aucun pays d'Europe occidentale on ne voit émerger une volonté de réformer le système des pensions de retraite.

### *Conclusion*

La remarquable communication de M. Vallin mérite quelques considérations finales, qui résumeront notre commentaire.

Nous entrons dans un monde où les actifs vont s'apercevoir rapidement du poids que représentent pour eux la masse des personnes âgées dépendantes. Dans un grand nombre de cas, mais selon des calendriers différents, cette masse sera perçue comme écrasante par les adultes. C'est ce que suggèrent plusieurs pyramides des âges en forme de toupies. Il va donc de soi que les adultes – dont certains seront chômeurs – ne supporteront pas indéfiniment le poids de ces vieillards dont le nombre et la proportion vont croissant.

De ce déséquilibre résulteront des *tensions* très fortes *entre générations*. Ces tensions seront même aggravées pour deux raisons principales. D'une part, des adultes actifs auront des enfants; ils auront donc à leur charge non seulement des dépendants âgés, mais aussi un contingent de dépendants jeunes, dont ils devront assurer l'éducation. D'autre part, ces mêmes adultes rechigneront à payer, via l'alourdissement de la pression fiscale, les pensions et les soins des vieillards, alors même que ces derniers, en raison de leur poids électoral, "bénéficieront", au détriment des adultes et des jeunes, de la démagogie des mandataires politiques.

Cette tension "intergénérationnelle" sera encore radicalisée à mesure que l'euthanasie sera présentée comme la *solution finale* aux impasses de la Sécurité Sociale.

Voilà quelques-uns des défis que notre Académie ne saurait ignorer.



## COMMENTAIRE SUR L'EXPOSÉ DE JACQUES VALLIN "LA DONNE DÉMOGRAPHIQUE"

EDMOND MALINVAUD

Les phénomènes démographiques sont lents et affectés d'inertie. Nous avons tendance à leur prêter trop peu d'attention. Or vous nous avez montré à quel point notamment les changements dans la structure par âge des populations peuvent être importants. Mon commentaire va porter sur le vieillissement qui affecte les pays de l'OCDE, mais qui affectera aussi les pays intermédiaires, et cela de façon même plus violente, ainsi que vous nous l'avez montré.

Nos concitoyens dans les pays de l'OCDE commencent à être bien sensibilisés au phénomène du vieillissement mais ils ne portent alors attention qu'à l'avenir proche: les dix, ou même vingt prochaines années pour les plus clairvoyants. Vous nous avez montré que, pour assurer les retraites et la santé de la génération née en 1970, les générations de ses enfants et ses petits enfants devront faire face en 2040 à une proportion de vieux qui aura augmenté de 50 % environ par rapport à ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui.

Vous avez en effet présenté les prévisions que l'on pouvait raisonnablement faire sur l'évolution de la proportion des adultes ayant de 20 à 59 ans, ceux qui assurent l'essentiel de la production sur laquelle vit l'ensemble de la population. De plus, vous nous avez montré comment la transition démographique affecte cette proportion et ménage des "fenêtres d'opportunité" à certaines époques. Ce sont des périodes durant lesquelles la proportion des adultes considérés et donc la production par tête sont exceptionnellement élevées. Selon vos prévisions la période nettement favorable de ces fenêtres devrait durer deux décennies. Encore aujourd'hui les pays de l'OCDE vivent dans cette période, qui devrait être le moment pour préparer l'avenir.

Or nos pays renaissent. La lucidité devrait les conduire à s'attendre aux déboires qui résulteront du phénomène si bien illustré par vos figures 16 et

17. Un thème majeur pour notre session va être d'étudier ce phénomène et les conséquences à tirer de ce renacement. Mes réflexions m'ont conduit à utiliser les données que vous nous présentez pour explorer un scénario hypothétique, que je crois intéressant de soumettre à examen aujourd'hui.

Selon ce scénario la prolongation de la vie active serait retenue comme solution pour faire face au vieillissement. Les données figurant dans votre note pour la France, qui n'est pas un cas extrême quant au vieillissement, m'ont permis de porter l'attention sur les proportions des 20-64 ans en 2021 et des 20-69 ans en 2041, proportions par rapport à l'ensemble de la population. Ces deux proportions seront l'une et l'autre à peu près égales à la proportion des 20-59 ans observée en 2001. Mon scénario est alors défini sous l'hypothèse où en moyenne de 2001 à 2041 l'âge de cessation d'activité augmenterait d'un trimestre par année, soit de 10 ans au total. Alors le taux d'activité de la population resterait grosso modo stationnaire de 2001 à 2041. Le rapport entre le pouvoir d'achat des retraités et celui des actifs pourrait lui aussi rester à peu près stationnaire.

Je ne prétends pas que ce scénario soit le plus vraisemblable. Mais réfléchir à son sujet permet, je crois, de conclure que le recul de l'âge de cessation d'activité devrait être recommandé. Donner tous mes arguments en faveur de cette solution serait trop long aujourd'hui. J'y reviendrai peut-être. Je me limite à quelques observations.

Durant la première moitié du vingt-et-unième siècle nos sociétés devraient devenir de plus en plus des sociétés de services dans lesquelles la consommation, et donc la production demandée, font de plus en plus appel au travail et dans lesquelles la santé des travailleurs est certes importante pour leur productivité mais leur force physique l'est de moins en moins. Faute d'une importante prolongation de la vie active, les personnes âgées de plus de soixante-dix ans éprouveront de plus en plus de mal à trouver des médecins, des aides-de-vie, des artisans susceptibles de travailler à leur domicile, etc. De plus, ce recul de l'âge de cessation d'activité serait-il injuste? Que seraient ces personnes âgées de 60 à 69 ans qui travailleraient en 2041? Des personnes nées entre 1972 et 1981, qui seraient en meilleure santé que aujourd'hui celles nées quarante ans plus tôt, qui auraient eu en 2004 l'âge d'avoir des enfants, et dont, pour beaucoup le comportement vis-à-vis de la natalité aurait contribué, avec celui des générations voisines, au fait que le nombre des 20-59 ans soit devenu beaucoup plus faible qu'en 2004.

# THE IMPACT OF REPLACEMENT MIGRATION ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

JERZY ZUBRZYCKI

I have written this brief without having had the benefit of reading Professor Vallin's paper on demographic changes in the generational structures of human populations. I do not pretend to cover the whole range of demographic 'givens' including, above all, the analysis of future trends in fertility and mortality and their impact on the generational balance.

Given my interest in human migration and determined as I am not to intrude on Professor Vallin's territory, I propose to highlight the problem of replacement migration as a hypothetical demographic 'given' and a possible solution to population decline and population ageing. The latter topics were recently given prominence in Michael Schooyans' Dantesque vision of impending 'demographic crash' (Schooyans, 1999) and Caselli's and Vallin's Apocalyptic essay on the global 'limitless demography' postulating the average expectation of life of 85 years in 2050 and further increases to 100 years in the twenty-first century (Caselli and Vallin, 2001).

Replacement migration refers to 'the international migration that would be needed to offset declines in the population of working age as well as to offset the overall ageing of the population' (United Nations, 2001, p. 97). In what follows I propose to consider the future demand for replacement migration in Europe and Japan and the likely sources of such population flows with special reference to their impact on intergenerational solidarity in the receiving countries.

## *Replacement Migration: Demand and Supply*

The demographic curve which features in Schooyans' analysis illustrates the extent of population decline in developed countries. In Europe,

according to the United Nations medium variant projections, the population of the 47 countries will decline from its present (2001) size of 728 million to only about 628 million. To prevent the decline, a net intake of 1.8 million a year or approximately twice the net number of migrants arriving in Europe in 1997 would be required. By 2050, out of a total population of 728 million, 127 million or close to 18 per cent would be post-2000 immigrants or their descendants (United Nations, 2001, pp. 83-4). If we apply the same seemingly unrealistic assumption to Japan, the country would need 17 million immigrants net up to the year 2050. At that time the immigrant component would total 22.5 million and comprise 17 per cent of the total population (United Nations, 2001, p. 53). Under an even less realistic scenario which assumes the aim of keeping the country's working age population constant, the proportions of immigrants would increase to 26 per cent in Europe and 34 per cent in Japan!

All of the above calculations are indicative of the volume of replacement migration vastly exceeding current levels of immigration. It needs to be pointed out however, that the impact of such migratory flows would be felt especially in countries and regions of Europe that are experiencing dramatically reduced levels of fertility: the Russian Federation, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Baltic countries (United Nations, pp. 97-8).

Overall, while the UN migration projections are highly unrealistic and do not take into account a myriad of other factors, they do underscore an ongoing concern with, and debate about, low levels of fertility in developed countries.

Currently policy makers in developed countries are grappling with the problems of population decline including the more than proportioned drop in size of the working population. From which source can labour shortages be met? Is it to be by increasing the age of retirement (Japan) or by calling on the reserves of the female workforce (Italy, Spain) and dealing with structural unemployment as in the former German Democratic Republic? Or should the long term plans include substantial changes to the present largely restrictive immigration policies to allow entry for people from developing countries?

In the second half of the twentieth century, migration as a source of labour supply was largely confined to the three traditional immigration receiving countries – United States, Canada and Australia. At the same time there was another group of countries in Europe which met shortages of labour by immigration from former colonies – France and Britain. Germany supplied the needs of the expanding economy by importing its 'guest workers' (Gastarbeiter) from Turkey and parts of the eastern Mediterranean.

In the twenty-first century the scope for labour migration is increasing at an exponential rate. There has been a massive increase in the number of people for whom international migration has become a viable option. This applies especially to the Third World countries where increases in educational levels and massively improved transport and communication systems have increased the number of people who consider migration, whether it be legal or illegal.

Here the challenge to developing countries will be how to respond to massive gaps in world income resulting in economic pressures that force migration out of poor areas within nation states and in international migration movements. We know that 83 million people are added to the world population annually, of whom 82 will live in the developing world. Much of the increase will occur in parts of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, the two regions where poverty is currently concentrated (World Bank, pp. 81-82). In the past, pressure to migrate could be and was largely frustrated by immigration controls but in this century substantial increases in the working population could well produce uncontrollable situations. Gross over-population leading to intolerable conditions, usually combined with grave environmental deterioration, life-threatening famine and drought will all produce global emergencies. The seeking of refuge will not only be a basic matter of international peace and security, it will be also a massive challenge and call for leadership at all levels of society.

More specifically, the challenge will be for policy makers to come to grips with the prospect of a progressive but inevitable change in ethnic and racial composition of the workforce since those accepted for immigration or given asylum in Europe and other developed parts of the First World will come from the Third World.

### *Replacement Migration and Intergenerational Solidarity*

Given the recent history of the growth of anti-immigration political parties in Europe and elsewhere, and the continuing debate about border controls in 'Fortress Europe', an increased inflow of other races adding to the existing populations of immigrant origin and, as in the documented case of France and Britain, creating unrest among ethnic minority youths (Jolly, Rex) is bound to increase the already existing demographic and economic divide between generations – those in the workforce (the 'Young') and those living in retirement (the 'Old'). As I have argued elsewhere, this 'could prove to be one of the defining issues of the twenty-first century' (Zubrzycki, p.

204). One could speculate about how the existing discord between 'too many pensioners' and 'too few youthful workers' (Zubrzycki, p. 205) might be transformed into the reality of a racial clash between the old 'White' and the young increasingly 'Coloured'. In addition, the underlying issue of wealth sharing and economic transfers will add to intergenerational tension (Mason and Tapinos, 2000).

A comprehensive reassessment of many established economic and social policies and programs will also need to include the current practice of selective immigration of skilled workers and its impact on the brain drain from developed countries driving unskilled workers into illegal migration as has been proved in the last decade of the twentieth century (World Bank, p. 83). Even more difficult issues that will require reassessment are current policies and programs relating to the integration of large numbers of recent migrants and their descendants. From my perspective and professional experience, these can be summarized under the rubric temporary versus multicultural settlement migration. Temporary migration – as exemplified in Germany's *Gastarbeiter* model – produced the situation of permanent disadvantage for migrants in their access to the receiving society – the phenomenon of underclass as shown in Dr Jolly's paper. By contrast the policy of migration for settlement as practiced – for example – in Australia, Canada and Sweden is designed to remove temporary disadvantage by providing a wide range of settlement services and an offer of citizenship. In such countries we find various forms of multiculturalism favouring an equal model of rights and responsibilities, the championing of ethnic and cultural heritage within a framework of obligation to the receiving society. Only with an imaginative strategy for integrating immigrants can countries ensure that they enrich the host society more than they unsettle it.

### *Conclusion*

I have argued in this paper that the decision to accept the newcomer – the regular immigrant or a defenceless refugee seeking asylum – will be affected not just by political considerations but also by the demographic realities of what should be seen as the West's culture of decline or Schooyans' *le crash démographique*. I have also stressed the urgency of population and migration pressures that will force developed countries to accept substantial numbers of people required to fill gaps in the workforce. Over time this process might aggravate existing tensions between the generations: the Old, predominantly white, will look askance at the coloured Young.

We were reminded in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* that ‘The exercise of solidarity within each society is valid when its members recognize one another as persons. Those who are more influential, because they have a greater share of goods and common services, should feel responsible for the weaker and be ready to share with them all they possess. Those who are weaker, for their part, in the same spirit of solidarity should not adopt a purely passive attitude, or one that is destructive of the social fabric, but ... should do what they can for the good of all’ (SRS, 39).

How can this injunction be translated into a pro-solidarity policy in a society whose social fabric may be threatened by the intergenerational tension brought about by an explosive combination of demographic ‘givens’? It would appear that the settlement-multicultural model of immigration is *a priori* more conducive to the maintenance of intergenerational solidarity as laid down in the Papal exhortation. If the newcomers are recognized as persons, if their ethnic background and culture are seen as an asset that can enrich the receiving society, if they have access to the society’s goods and services, then they will not adopt those passive attitudes ‘destructive of the social fabric’. At the same time people in the host society committed to human dignity will take a stand against the tendency to make immigrants the scapegoats for social problems. Surely a tough prescription for societies still smarting from the events of September 11, 2001!

Here is the challenge of the multicultural state: how to integrate migrants yet foster diversity; how to let diversity flourish, maintain tight security in containing terrorism, yet foster a sense of national identity that carries divergent groups. It is a problem being played out all over the Western world. At its essence it is about how identities will be shaped in an ever-changing global landscape.

One final point for the future agenda of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. The ideas that we take on board for close examination deal mostly with the way in which reforming societies handle the problem of social cohesion and conflict. In the context of this commentary, the issue of solidarity and its promotion through immigration programs focusing on multicultural settlement is an example of social reform that did not originate from the grass roots but was launched by politicians converted to the idea by social scientists. This raises an important point of policy: what educational approaches are required to promote multiculturalism and comparable programs of social engineering? Would the Academy take multicultural education – or simply general education – as the focus of its ongoing inquiry?

From my Australian experience I conclude that multicultural education holds the key to successful social engineering. The old dogs in the population may not be able to learn new tricks. But the youngsters can. Everything will depend on the spirit in which the coming generations are raised, not only in their formal schooling but also in the respective ethnic gatherings and communal organizations. This topic could well feature in the Academy's newly revived interest in the sociologist's 'intermediate structures'.

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# ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGES IN GENERATIONAL RELATIONS

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA<sup>1</sup>

## *Overview*

The title I was given for this paper, 'Economic, Political, and Cultural Consequences of Changes in Generational Relations', implies a causality that seems to me backwards. That is, relations between generations are not an autonomous factor – an independent variable, in social science terms – that causes economic, political, and cultural change. Rather, it is the latter that are the independent variables that cause changes in the relationship between the generations, as when a profligate present generation piles up long-term liabilities that will have to be paid by a future generation. I am therefore taking it as the objective of this paper to look at political, economic, and cultural change, and to discuss what effects it will have on generational relations and inter-generational solidarity.

This, of course, is an impossibly broad topic. There is no aspect of change in any of these broad categories that does not in some way impact generational relations, and there is no way of speaking empirically about changes that may take place in the future in these areas.

In order to prevent this from becoming a completely open-ended exercise in futurology, I would like to focus on trends in politics, economics, and culture that take place over generational time scales. It is this kind of slow-moving change that produces generational cohorts, that is, groups of people born within certain time periods whose views and behavior are similar because they have been shaped by similar experiences. This type of change

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is often continuous; past trends in behavior provide some guide as to what we might expect in the future. Some trends, like demographic change, can be described with a fairly high degree of empirical precision, and carry a momentum that permits a certain amount of prediction. Cultural and normative change also fits this pattern, since it tends to happen continuously and incrementally over generational time scales.<sup>2</sup> Other types of change, like shifts in international relations, are subject to frequent discontinuities as a result of war, revolution, and technological innovation. Since they cannot be projected forward terribly easily, they will be left out of this discussion. Technological change is similarly hard to predict: technologies go through life cycles, with large, discontinuous changes in the early phases as technologies are invented and adopted, followed by prolonged periods of more incremental change as they mature.

Another characteristic of slow-moving, continuous change is that it is usually difficult to affect using short-term policy instruments. And yet, it is important to consider ways in which societies can shape long-term change. Intergenerational solidarity will have no meaning if the conditions affecting the relationship between generations cannot be altered through human choice. In areas like the environment or social security, there clearly are steps that can be taken now that will affect the well-being of subsequent generations, though the vector of policy change is itself also a slow-moving, long-term one. We need to consider whether policy choices are available in other areas as well.

### *Long-Term Social Change, 1950-2000*

The particular areas of long-term change that I want to focus on here concern the interlinked issues of reproduction, family, civil society, and the normative framework in which all of these activities are embedded. The developed world has just gone through a massive series of changes in these areas over the last 35-40 years, changes I have earlier labeled the 'great disruption'.<sup>3</sup> It will be of great consequence to future generations whether these trends continue, accelerate, or reverse course, and it is of course of great importance to know whether and how human agency can affect future outcomes.

<sup>2</sup> Sometimes, of course, it happens rapidly, as in the case of American attitudes towards the outside world before and after events like Pearl Harbor or September 11.

<sup>3</sup> See Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (New York: Free Press, 1999).

## *The Family*

At the core of the great disruption are changes in relations between men and women and in family life. There has been a long and ideologized debate over whether there can be said to be something like a 'natural' family, and it is certainly the case that kinship structures vary dramatically across cultures and over time. There is some recent work coming out of anthropology and evolutionary biology suggesting that the nuclear family has been far more universal in the human species than formerly believed,<sup>4</sup> and that it was a predominant form of kinship in Western Europe for a very long time.<sup>5</sup>

In any event, changes in family structure across the developed world since the early 1960s has been striking. Figures I-IV (pp. 421-422) in the appendix show trends across a series of OECD countries regarding divorce, births to single mothers, total fertility, and female labor force participation that illustrate the magnitude and breadth of what has happened. Beginning some time in the 1960s, men and women began to divorce each other much more frequently; children were increasingly raised either by single mothers, by unwed parents, or in family situations in which someone other than the biological parents acted as caregivers; the size of families dramatically decreased; the amount of time that people spent in family situations (either in their parents' household or in their own) as a proportion of total lifetimes decreased (particularly for women); and women moved in huge numbers into the paid workforce.

One of the striking changes that has resulted from the cumulative effect of these changes is the number of people living alone in advanced societies. Table 1 provides figures for the number of people living alone as a percentage of all households for a variety of developed countries during the 1990s.

<sup>4</sup> Nuclear families appear to have been the predominant form of kinship in hunter-gatherer societies; large, elaborate kinship structures like tribes and lineages arose primarily after the discovery of agriculture. See Stevan Harrell, *Human Families* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), pp. 26-50; and Adam Kuper, *The Chosen Primate: Human Nature and Cultural Diversity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 174.

<sup>5</sup> It was long assumed that the nuclear family was the byproduct of industrialization. The 'new family history' associated with Peter Laslett has demonstrated that nuclear families were dominant in Europe well prior to industrialization. Rather than industrialization changing family structure, it may be the case that these changes in family structure were one of the facilitating conditions for European modernization. Peter Laslett and Richard Wall, *Household and Family in Past Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); and Peter Laslett and Richard Wall, *Family Forms in Historic Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Table 1: PEOPLE LIVING ALONE AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS<sup>6</sup>

Country	Households
Austria	29.2
Denmark	50.3
Ireland	21.5
Netherlands	31.8
Norway	45.6
Switzerland	32.4
United Kingdom	12.0
United States	25.1

These changes occurred across virtually all developed countries, though with considerable cross-country variance. Divorce rates in Catholic countries as well as Japan and Korea, and rates of out-of-wedlock births, were lower than in the United States, Britain, and most of Scandinavia. Female labor force participation was highest in Scandinavia, followed by the US and Britain, but remained relatively low in Germany and other parts of continental Europe, as well as Japan (which is an outlier in almost all of these measures). Births to unwed mothers has a very different meaning in Europe than it does in North America, since the rate of cohabitation is much higher there; many such children are actually living in households where both biological parents are present, while in the US they are being raised by single mothers or in households with surrogate parents. Nonetheless, what is striking from these data is how broad and rapid these changes in a very old institution, the family, were.

### *Social Relationships Outside the Family*

If we consider other types of social relationships outside of the family, we see a similar degree of change, though here the trends are more complex and in some cases contradictory. One clear negative indicator of social

<sup>6</sup> Year of figures: Austria 1993; Denmark 1997; Ireland 1996; Netherlands 1996; Norway 1997; Switzerland 1990; UK 1995; and US 1997.

cohesion and trust are crime rates, and here we see that they increased over roughly the same group of developed countries over the 1965-2000 time period, as indicated in Figures V-VI (p. 423) in the appendix. It has long been recognized that American crime rates are significantly higher than those of other developed countries, and that there are a higher proportion of violent crimes in America than elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> This remains mostly true. But virtually all European countries experienced a significant increase in crime, both violent and property, in roughly the same time period as the United States. Indeed, in some categories of property crime, rates in Europe now exceed those of the United States.

It is much more difficult to measure civic association outside the family, though many efforts have been made to do so since Robert Putnam's pioneering work.<sup>8</sup> Even for a data-rich country like the United States, the trends are highly complex. While Putnam has asserted that there has been a secular decline in social capital in the US since the 1950s,<sup>9</sup> this conclusion has been disputed by a number of authors.<sup>10</sup> Lester Salamon in fact argues that the very period Putnam describes as one of decline in social capital has seen an 'associational revolution'<sup>11</sup> (It is one thing when social scientists disagree on the exact value of a coefficient, and another when they cannot agree whether it is a positive or negative number!).

Putnam draws his conclusions from declining membership in a variety of organizations, as well as times series survey data concerning organizational membership and levels of trust in various social institutions like government at various levels, corporations, the military, labor unions, and fellow citizens. Putnam's case is strongest that trust as measured by survey data has seen a large secular decline over the past forty years (though with some recovery in the 1990s). It is much harder to make the case that peo-

<sup>7</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: Norton, 1995).

<sup>8</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>9</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

<sup>10</sup> See inter alia Everett C. Ladd, *Silent Revolution: The Reinvention of Civic America* (New York: Free Press, 1999); Marcella R. Ray, *The Changing and Unchanging Face of US Civil Society* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2002).

<sup>11</sup> See Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, *The Emerging Sector: An Overview* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Inst. for Policy Stud., 1994); and Lester M. Salamon, 'The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector', *Foreign Affairs* 73(4), 1994: pp. 109-122.

ple are correspondingly less socially interconnected in terms of group memberships. The problem, as a number of observers have pointed out, is one of absent evidence, which does not constitute evidence of absence. That is, newer and more poorly institutionalized groups are much less likely to keep good information on their own membership, or to be the subject of surveys carried out by third parties. In the United States, Europe, and Asia, the Internet has emerged in the past decade as one of the central loci of social interaction, and yet there is virtually no good data as to quantity and quality of social connectedness it facilitates.

When one turns to other countries, the data problem is even more severe. There are certain cross-country value surveys like the University of Michigan's World Values Survey that ask questions related to trust and membership in voluntary associations. The data here are also highly contradictory: levels of trust, both in major institutions and in fellow citizens, are down in many countries over the 1981-1996 period, but are up in others. Some forms of organizations like labor unions have seen decreasing membership, while others have had increasing members. Information on new forms of connectedness is as lacking for Europe and northeast Asia as it is for the United States.

### *Causality*

The changes described above – between the sexes, in the family, and in the way that individuals related to the broader society (whether negatively, as measured by crime rates, or positively, as measured by civic association) – were massive and occurred in a relatively restricted period of time. These trends are also clearly related to one another: female labor force participation affects family stability; family structure affects crime; relationships outside of the family both complement and displace those within it.

When aggregated up to the level of entire societies, the complexity of these causal relationships is so great that social scientists are usually reluctant to draw broad conclusions. It is not possible to control for all of the variables that affect these outcomes, or understand all of the complex causal paths by which they are related to one another. It is much safer empirically to assert micro-level relationships, say between ethnic diversity and crime in a particular neighborhood.

The problem with this approach is that it risks missing the forest for the trees. That is, there were large changes in certain social variables that occurred across a wide variety of countries over a relatively short period of

time. Cultural variables, and particularly ones concerning the most intimate aspects of sexuality and family life, do not as a general rule change rapidly, and yet they did in the period from 1960-1990. This suggests that some deeper causes were operating despite all of the cross-country variation.

In the paragraphs below, I want to lay out my interpretation of the causal connections between these phenomena. James Q. Wilson, in a review of *The Great Disruption*, offered an alternative interpretation of these developments, and said that I could not prove my view any more than he could prove his. He is of course correct in saying this, if by proof we mean a statistical regression which shows correlations between these phenomena to a very high confidence level. This does not mean, however, that it is pointless to try to think through the sources of social and cultural change, since our interpretation of the past will very much affect what we think is possible with regard to policy affecting future outcomes.

Let us begin with some of the interior connections between sex, male-female relations, and the family. We know that several major aspects of behavior began to change rapidly beginning some time in the mid-1960s: sex became increasingly detached from reproduction, women began entering the paid labor force in large numbers, divorce rates and later out-of-wedlock births began to climb, and feminism emerged as a large and powerful political and cultural force in virtually all Western developed countries. Everyone who lived through that period knows that behavioral change was accompanied by large ideational changes in the way that people thought about sexuality.

The conventional interpretation of these events is that culture was the independent variable and that the behavioral phenomena were dependent. Many would say that the cultural changes that occurred in this period were the working out of certain inherent tensions in the entire Western post-Enlightenment secular tradition that placed great emphasis on the individual and individualism at the expense of various forms of communal authority. Individualism is required by modern capitalism and the principle of the economic autonomy of individuals had spread widely by the first half of the twentieth century. It was only inevitable, the argument goes, that these same principles of individual choice should then be applied to the realms of sex and family.<sup>12</sup> The authority of institutionalized religion, in particular,

<sup>12</sup> For a version of this argument, see Alan Wolfe, *Moral Freedom: The Search for Virtue in a World of Choice* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).

had been under challenge since at least the Protestant Reformation, and the growing secularism of modern societies that accelerated in the 1960s was simply a continuation of this trend.

It is obvious that as a long-term description of ideational or cultural change, this account is incontrovertible. But as an explanation for why these changes occurred in the second half of the 20th century, they leave much to be desired. There was, for example, both a mini-sexual revolution and a feminist movement born in the wake of the first World War in Europe and North America. Why did they not lead to the sorts of massive behavioral change that occurred from the late 1960s onward? Why were cultural values so susceptible to change after the 1960s? Culture does on occasion shift spontaneously, but there was no new prophet or religious vision that suddenly emerged in the 1960s. Hugh Hefner was hardly a source of charismatic authority for this generation.

So while the broader pattern of post-Enlightenment cultural development in the West exists as a background condition for change, we must look to more proximate causes to explain why that change took place when it did. I would point to two specific developments that can be dated to this period and that did have a direct impact on sexual behavior and family life. The first was the introduction of the birth control pill in the early 1960s, that permitted the separation of sex and reproduction; the second was the emergence of a post-industrial workplace in which women had vastly greater opportunities for paid employment outside the home.

The birth control pill was a technological innovation that produced an enormous range of unintended consequences. At its introduction, it was seen as an aspect of women's liberation, since it would permit women to enjoy sex as men did free from the responsibilities brought on by pregnancy. It is clear in retrospect, however, that it also acted as an agent of male liberation as well, by freeing men from the norm of responsibility for the children that they fathered. Within less than a decade, the burden of responsibility for raising an unexpected child shifted from the man to the woman,<sup>13</sup> leaving a huge number of women in the following generation to raise children on their own without the benefit of the child's biological father.

The second major exogenous change that drove cultural change was the evolution of a post-industrial workplace, in which mental labor increasing-

<sup>13</sup> Janet L. Yellen and George A. Akerlof, 'An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 111(2), 1996: pp. 277-317.



ly displaced physical labor, and information substituted for material product. This change did not occur abruptly, as in the case of the introduction of the pill, but by the 1960s the service sector had come to constitute a sufficiently large proportion of American employment that Daniel Bell could take note of it in his 1968 work *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*.<sup>14</sup> The 1960s in the US marked the high point of a work force dominated by male heads of households, often protected by union contracts. Labor markets began to shift markedly after that, as female labor force participation began to rise. Male median incomes in real terms peaked in 1973, never to recover in the years after that point. The ratio of female to male real incomes began to rise steadily after that point, first in Scandinavia, the US, and Britain, followed by central Europe, then by Catholic Europe, with Japan lagging all industrialized democracies.<sup>15</sup>

These two developments – birth control and female labor force participation – had the dramatic impact on the family predicted by economic models of marriage and divorce.<sup>16</sup> Female access to resources gave women an alternative to dependence on a husband's income, while at the same time releasing men from the moral obligation to support their wives and the children that they bore. Culture was, of course, an independent variable here as well: the feminist movement represented the aspirations of millions of women who wanted their own careers and independence, and who were willing to accept divorce as the price for achieving these goals. Changes in the labor market did not create these aspirations, but made them much easier to realize.

The causal relationships between these phenomena and increasing crime and social distrust are very complex. It is very common for American conservatives to link the breakdown of the nuclear family to crime, as well as to other social pathologies like poor educational achievement, drug use, teenage pregnancy, and the like. It is certainly true that these phenomena

<sup>14</sup> Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society; a Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

<sup>15</sup> These differences were only partly cultural. Some countries retained formal barriers to female employment in certain occupations longer than others; and in some cases, welfare state protections aimed to preserve the incomes of male heads of households. In the US, by contrast, welfare protections had since the Civil War tended to target women's incomes. See Theda Skocpol.

<sup>16</sup> The standard economic theory is given by Gary Becker in *A Treatise on the Family* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

are highly intercorrelated for certain populations like inner-city African-Americans.<sup>17</sup> But multivariate analysis tends to show that family structure disappears as a causal factor for crime or educational achievement when one controls for socio-economic status. (This is a bit misleading insofar as family breakdown also correlates with lower SES, and thus can return as an explanatory variable). Moreover, if the breakdown of the family occurring after the mid-1960s was the cause of crime, one would expect the rise in crime rates to follow with a lag of 10-15 years as the children reared in broken homes came of age. One finds, instead, that crime rates began rising concurrently with changes in sexual relationships and family structure, suggesting that they had a common underlying cause.

Moreover, Europe differs markedly from the United States in the crime-family nexus. Certainly there are slums in Europe where family breakdown, crime, drug use, and poverty coexist. But there is also substantially less residential mobility in Europe than in the United States, and less labor market turnover. The stability of neighborhoods has an important impact on the socialization of children; the family is not the only institution available to provide 'eyes on the street' to control the behavior of young people.

There are other possible explanations for the rise of crime rates after the 1960s. One simply has to do with the postwar baby boom: since most crime is committed by young males between the ages of 15-25, one would expect crime rates to rise when the baby-boom cohort reached its teenage years, and then to taper off when this cohort arrived at middle age.

A second factor has to do with what is euphemistically called social heterogeneity: in many societies, crime is highly concentrated in certain racial or ethnic groups, like African-Americans in the US or the various mostly immigrant communities in Europe. In the United States, the 1960s saw the end of official segregation in the South and the coming of age of black children whose parents had taken part in the great postwar migration to the north after World War II. In Europe, this period also saw increases in immigration following decolonization in the 1950s, and the growth of large immigrant slums like the ones that surround many French cities. It is important to face the fact that crime and ethnicity or race are correlated (more on this below); on the other hand, it is also important to note that crime rates increased among all groups, native-born and foreign, black and white, during this period.

<sup>17</sup> See William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

It is even more difficult to establish clear causal relationships between the trends in civil society noted above and the other dimensions of social change in change in the family. To repeat, the underlying trends themselves are ambiguous: while in the United States levels of trust are clearly down over the past 40 years, organizational memberships may have been simultaneously increasing. There is only a weak correlation between family breakdown and levels of trust, despite what might seem to be a commonsensical reason to expect the two phenomena to be related. On the other hand, there are statistically meaningful correlations between trust and income, education, immigrant status, race, and whether one has been the victim of a crime.<sup>18</sup>

It is thus impossible to draw any general conclusions about trends in civil society for developed countries broadly, and difficult to simply confirm Putnam's claim concerning trends in social capital and voluntary association in the United States. I have labeled my own interpretation of what has been happening to American society as one not of secular decline, but rather of moral miniaturization. That is, there are considerable data that indicate that Americans actually belong to more organizations and associations and thus take on more identities than their parents or grandparents, but that the *quality* of these relationships has become attenuated and the circles of people to whom one is related socially have grown smaller. In other words, an urban, middle-class generation X-er may belong to several professional groups, civic leagues, clubs, alumni associations, and multiple internet chat rooms, but his or her moral connectedness to any other person in any of these overlapping circles is weaker than the social connections made by his or her grandparents a couple of generations ago.

Whether this pattern is also evident in other developed countries, where patterns of geographical mobility and technological adoption are different, is not clear. But it stands to reason that similar social processes are unfolding in many societies. Communications channels, for example, have multiplied everywhere with the advance of technology. 100-channel cable TV would presumably produce much less by way of shared experience than a world in which everyone had only two or three channels to watch; while the Internet frees us from the tyranny of distance, it also frees us from the moral connectedness of geographically limited, face-to-face communities.

<sup>18</sup> Tom W. Smith, 'Factors Relating to Misanthropy in Contemporary American Society', *Social Science Research* 26, 1997: pp. 170-196.

*Social Change: Secular or Cyclical*

I want at this point to transition from a discussion of what has happened over the past couple of generations to what might happen in the coming ones. One obvious place to start is whether these long, multi-generation length social trends are secular or cyclical. That is, are we witnessing long-term moral decline as a consequence of our passing into a secular humanist society that has lost the moral bearings provided by religious faith? Will family breakdown and crime rates continue their inexorable rise, until society itself ceases to exist? Or are we seeing instead a long cycle in which social norms are disrupted by social or political change, only to be reformed or reformulated on a different basis over time?

I believe that the social trends I have labeled the great disruption are cyclical, that there is a natural basis for morality, that morality can be guided by religion, but that religion is not a necessary condition for moral behavior, and that we can expect some reversal in the negative social trends in the coming generation.

On the other hand, what drives normative change by this account is technological change, and there is no reason to think that technological change will cease, or that there will not be future massive disruptions of social relationships that will pose severe challenges to society. I want to speculate on some of the important social trends, different from those that I have just described, that I expect to see emerge in the next generation.

My reasons for believing that the social trends I have just described are cyclical rather than secular in nature is simply that they have happened before, and that societies have succeeded in adjusting to a changed environment and have renormed themselves. This has happened not just once, but many times in the past, and I do not see any reason why it should not be expected to happen again in the future.

There was a clear precedent for the kinds of changes that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, which was the massive disruption of social norms that accompanied industrialization in Britain and the United States. Beginning roughly in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century, crime rates, rates of illegitimacy, and social pathologies like alcoholism all began to climb.<sup>19</sup> This was clearly linked to the demise of agricultural society and the rapid emergence of urban-industrial life. The

<sup>19</sup> James L. Collier, *The Rise of Selfishness in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

early mill towns of Manchester or Lowell separated young men from their families and housed them in dormitories, where the normative structure of village life no longer applied. Rates of alcoholism in the United States during the late 1820s was astonishing and comparable to the plague of drug addiction that emerged in the 1970s.<sup>20</sup>

Religion played a big role in the renorming process in Britain and the United States during the late nineteenth century, and some have argued that its absence today makes impossible anything like the Victorian revival. The importance of religion to the historical revival process in these two countries was certainly great, but the assertion that the social virtues cannot exist apart from a religious framework seems to me to be doubtful. There are a number of reasons for believing this. First, there are a number of societies around the world that are highly orderly and normative, without these norms having a strong religious foundation. Many of these societies are in East Asia, and include China and Japan.<sup>21</sup> Buddhism, Taoism, Shinto, and other religions of course exist, but they do not play anything like the role in these societies that Christianity, Islam, and Judaism play in lands where monotheistic religion has prevailed. Indeed, the central ethical code historically in China has not been a religion at all, but rather an ethical doctrine, Confucianism, that requires no belief in a transcendent God or gods.

Second, the empirical correlation between religion and social order is not a strong one. The societies of Western Europe have secularized dramatically over the past two generations, while religion remains much more vibrant in the United States. And yet while all of these societies have experienced increasing rates of social dysfunction, those of the more religious US have risen much faster. Within the United States, there is no strong correlation between either crime or family breakdown rates, and rates of religious belief. The rural South, for example, has always had significantly higher rates of violent crime than the rural north, despite the higher rates of secularism in the latter.

### *Cultural Diversity and Social Order*

All of this suggests that religion is not the *sine qua non* of social order. All other things being equal, we might expect some degree of cyclical

<sup>20</sup> See William J. Rorabaugh, *The Alcoholic Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

<sup>21</sup> This argument has been made by James Q. Wilson.

rebound as norms, laws, and other institutions of order begin to catch up to the social changes that have been brought about by technological and economic change. There is some evidence that this began happening, in the United States at least, during the 1990s. There is a lot of evidence that norm-following behavior is genetically programmed into our species.<sup>22</sup> The specific content is of course not universal, which is why there is cultural variation across human societies. But normlessness or *anomie* is a highly atypical – indeed, pathological – situation in human societies. There is no particular reason to think that we are about to enter a period of prolonged anomie at the beginning of the twenty-first century, any more than there was when Durkheim wrote about anomie as a byproduct of the transition from agricultural to industrial society.

On the other hand, there are other reasons apart from the role of religion in society that may establish higher or lower long-term levels of social order or social dysfunction. Up to this point, I have been describing only one dimension of cultural change, that brought on by technological innovation and the latter's economic consequences. But there are clearly other dimensions to cultural change, the most important one being the degree of cultural diversity that exists within a given society. Religion, for example, plays a role in bonding communities only when there is consensus on religious first principles; religious diversity has historically tended to promote communal conflict rather than stability.

Multiculturalism – that is, the co-existence of multiple ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial minorities within the same society – characterizes a great many parts of the world, including the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, central and Eastern Europe, southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. Western Europe and its north American offshoot, as well as China and northeast Asia, have historically been much more ethnically and religiously homogeneous, though Western Europe has experienced violent religious sectarianism in the past. One of the very consequential multi-generational changes that is taking place is increasing cultural diversity in these formerly homogeneous parts of the world.

<sup>22</sup> For an overview of some of the new literature from the life sciences on this issue, see Matt Ridley, *The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Viking, 1987).

Human beings existed in small, isolated groups for much of their history: in hunter-gatherer and agricultural societies, an individual often had contact only with other members of his or her kin group or village. These societies were usually segmentary, meaning that when these small communities bumped into one another, they were likely to encounter people similar to themselves. Cultural diversity came about historically primarily as a result of migration and conquest.

In modern times, technology has increased the de facto level of diversity in a number of ways. Improved means of transportation increase the speed with which people can migrate, and the distances over which they can move. Communications technology greatly increases the level of perceived diversity in a society: television and radio exposes a society to ways of life very different from its own.

Moreover, the economic world made possible by technology increases the incentives for diversity through economies of scale. As Adam Smith pointed out, the size of the market governs the division of labor; as commerce becomes possible between larger and larger geographical areas, they become newly interdependent and hence locked in some form of cultural contact. Larger political communities often confer economic advantages,<sup>23</sup> and almost always confer military ones;<sup>24</sup> hence there has been a tendency over time towards consolidation into larger and larger political units whose constituents are inevitably more diverse. Thus people today increasingly live in large, interdependent urban communities comprised of thousands or millions of individuals, which are subordinated to other political units numbering in the tens or hundreds of millions. Their fates are bound up with those of people very different from themselves: a worker in Detroit can lose his job because of a newly opened factory in Korea, something that would have been inconceivable a few hundred years earlier. And they must to an increasing extent cooperate politically with people culturally very different from themselves.

As a result of immigration from developing countries, many European societies now have significant religious and ethnic minorities. 8.9 percent

<sup>23</sup> They do not confer an advantage only if one assumes a world of free factor mobility, which has not been the typical situation throughout most of human history. Even so, the ability of larger units to set standards and gain advantage in economic negotiations remain important benefits of scale.

<sup>24</sup> The classic case for this was made in Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1975).

of Germany's population, or 7.3 million people, are considered foreigners, the great bulk coming from Turkey and other non-EU countries; in Austria the percentage of foreigners has increased from 4.2 to 8.8 from 1989 to 2003; in Switzerland, the figure is 20 (up from 16 in 1970).<sup>25</sup> Since the end of the Cold War, cultural diversity has been fed by instability on Europe's periphery, not just in the Middle East but in the former communist world and the Balkans.

Of these foreign born populations, those from Muslim countries arguably present the greatest challenge in terms of cultural diversity, since religious identity for many Muslims remains strong and distinctive when compared to immigrants from, for example, Latin America, East Asia, or Africa.<sup>26</sup> It is difficult to come by accurate statistics on Muslim populations in Europe, since official census data often excludes questions of religious affiliation, and since there is a great deal of illegal immigration. Table 2 presents one rough estimate, which is probably on the low side.

Table 2: MUSLIM POPULATIONS IN EUROPE<sup>27</sup>

Country number	(millions)	% of pop.
France	4.5	7.5
Germany	3	3.6
Britain	2.5	2.5
Italy	1	1.7
Netherlands	1	6.2
Spain	0.5	1.2
EU total	13	3.2

<sup>25</sup> Numbers drawn from the *Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports* and *CIA World Factbook*.

<sup>26</sup> In addition, there are cultural practices in Muslim countries like cousin marriage not related to Islam that lower the rate of outmarriage and hence the rate of cultural assimilation.

<sup>27</sup> Source: *Economist*, March 6, 2004.



The period since September 11 has provided troubling evidence that Muslims are being poorly integrated into European societies. Virtually all of the organizers of the September 11 attacks were radicalized in Western Europe, not in Afghanistan or the Middle East. Most came from middle class backgrounds; it was not poverty or lack of opportunity, but something about their social status in Europe, that produced this degree of alienation.

The United States has also undergone a similar transformation into a highly multicultural society. The country was born as a relatively homogeneous, biracial society: as Jay remarked in *Federalist 2*, 'Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people – a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs ...'. Americans rightly celebrate the centrality of their democratic political institutions to their national identity and success as a nation. They tend to underplay the cultural underpinnings that facilitated the working of those institutions, particularly in the Republic's early years. Similar formal institutions with different cultural preconditions prevailed in nineteenth century Latin America, and led to much less happy results. And indeed, the one source of racial diversity in early America – its African-American population – nearly wrecked the American democratic experiment.

The cultural homogeneity of the majority white society was diluted over time, first by immigrants from central Europe, Ireland, and Scandinavia, then from southern and Eastern Europe, and in the post-World War II period from Latin America and other parts of the developing world. The United States, like other Anglophone countries of new settlement, has been relatively successful in assimilating immigrants, a fact that makes Americans sometimes oblivious of the degree to which it has changed culturally over time. It was routine, for example, for presidents to describe the US as a 'Christian country' up through World War II; to do so now would mark a politician as a bigot and beyond the pale of acceptable political discourse.

There are a number of reasons for thinking that cultural diversity will continue to increase in developed countries over the next couple of generations. There are other specialists at this conference who will address demographic trends, and how these trends will affect social security, health care, and other aspects of future welfare. I would like to concentrate on how they are likely to impact culture, because in my view much of the developed world is heading for a crisis in the next generation precisely because of this intersection of demographics and culture.

Many observers have already remarked on how low rates of fertility among native-born populations will lead to dramatically falling populations in many countries during the twenty-first century.<sup>28</sup> The working-age population has already been shrinking in absolute numbers in Japan and will do so throughout Europe in the coming years. In economic history there are relatively few precedents for prolonged population decline, except as a result of traumatic disruptions brought on by war or disease. If increases in labor productivity fail to offset population losses, these societies will face continuing declines in absolute GDP. It is in theory possible to imagine that a society could foresee this change and accommodate it through higher savings, lower benefits, longer working lives, and the like. But such a theoretically possible society does not seem to exist anywhere in reality; there is huge resistance in Europe, North America, and Japan to changes in existing social security entitlements. This suggests that the path of least resistance to maintaining both current and long-term standards of living will continue to be the importation of workers from culturally different societies.

### *Political Consequences of Cultural Diversity*

Liberal societies have become accustomed to celebrating cultural diversity over the past generation. They have important political reasons for doing so that go to the heart of their identities as liberal societies, and there are in fact real advantages that diverse societies have over homogeneous ones. On the other hand, certain forms of cultural diversity can be a liability, and if societies at the limit become too diverse, they cease being a single community, and can break apart or descend into violent conflict. We need thus to consider the balance sheet with regard to diversity, and consider how increasing diversity will impact Western societies in the coming years.

Liberal societies are, of course, committed to the principles of tolerance and pluralism, in which culturally different people agree to keep disagreements over final goods out of political contestation. Modern liberalism sprang from the violent religious conflicts that occurred after the Reformation, conflicts that convinced thinkers like Hobbes and Montesquieu of the need to shift politics to the 'low but solid ground'<sup>29</sup> of

<sup>28</sup> Nick Eberstadt, 'World Population Implosion?', *Public Interest* no. 129, 1997: pp. 3-22.

<sup>29</sup> This phrase comes from Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

mutual survival. Thus was born the principle of secular government and the enshrining of tolerance as the central liberal virtue. Liberal societies have of course more often honored these principles in the breach, and it is the legacy of de facto intolerance that led to the positive promotion of diversity in recent years.

Cultural diversity can confer some real economic advantages. Homogeneous societies can be closed to outside influences, and unable to adapt to changing conditions. Cultural diversity, by contrast, can function like genetic diversity in a population, in which different cultural approaches compete and more adaptive ones survive. It is certainly the case that the United States' economy has benefited strongly from immigration; some 40 percent of the engineers, managers, and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley were born outside of the United States, and the ethnic networks thus created have served as important conduits for ideas, capital, and innovation.<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, there are certain critical gaps or contradictions in liberal political theory when confronting the problem of cultural diversity, contradictions that will come to the fore as the actual level of diversity increases.<sup>31</sup> The first has to do with the issue of whether rights are held by individuals or by communities. The Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition generally holds that rights-holders are individuals. But in the real world, individuals belong to communities of all sorts that assert communal rights against the individuals comprising them, on the one hand, and against the state on the other. The assertion of communal rights has always been controversial in liberal societies, but there is not a single case in which they are simply ignored in favor of the rights of individuals. Germany and Holland, for example, recognize the Protestant and Catholic Churches as corporate entities, and the German state collects religious taxes on their behalf. Canada has implemented a policy of bilingualism on a federal level, even though it does not recognize the linguistic rights of the Inuit or other indigenous groups. Even in the Lockean-liberal United States, the government has at times permitted small communities like the Amish to exempt themselves from public duties like military service or school attendance and has legal-

<sup>30</sup> On the role of ethnic Chinese and Indians in Silicon Valley, see Annalee Saxenian, *Silicon Valley's New Immigrant Entrepreneurs* (San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California, 1999).

<sup>31</sup> On this question, see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

ly recognized, for affirmative action purposes, various racial and ethnic groups as objects of government preferences.<sup>32</sup>

The second important gap in liberal theory concerns exactly what degree of cultural diversity a liberal society can tolerate and still remain fundamentally pluralistic. The problem is that many cultural beliefs and practices are not themselves liberal and tolerant. Clearly, liberal societies are not obliged to tolerate people opposed in principle to a liberal state: thus a Muslim fundamentalist who wanted to abolish a secular constitution and replace it with Sharia law could be legitimately excluded. But supposing one group's cultural identity in some way limits the cultural autonomy of another group, as in the choice of Sabbath days and public holidays? Many liberal states feel themselves to be the heirs of important cultural traditions that they do not want to lose or see diluted: thus Israel is not just another liberal democracy, but a Jewish state as well whose Arab Muslim citizens will never feel completely at home; Latvia and Estonia have sought to preserve their ethnic identities in the face of earlier forced Russification. Italians have faced this issue recently in arguments over the display of crucifixes in schools and other public places: is this an unwarranted intrusion of religion into public life, or simply an acknowledgment of Italy's Christian cultural heritage?

The truth of the matter is that there is hardly a liberal democracy that does not have a cultural identity separate from its formal existence as a liberal state. This is true no less for the United States, despite the relatively open and universal nature of its citizenship.<sup>33</sup> The country's Anglo-Saxon-Puritan cultural heritage<sup>34</sup> gives it certain functional advantages like the common use of the English language.<sup>35</sup> But there were other cultural habits passed on through this inheritance that made the development of American democracy quite different than political development in, say, Latin America. This cultural identity was diluted as a result of successive waves

<sup>32</sup> Even here, American law has been reluctant to recognize the validity of group rights claims and tends to argue in favor of, for example, the educational value of diversity.

<sup>33</sup> On this issue, see Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We: Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

<sup>34</sup> This inheritance was, of course, quite complex and differed according to region. For an excellent analysis that looks at the British origins of American culture in a much more fine-grained way, see David H. Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

<sup>35</sup> By and large, proponents of bilingualism in the United States do not insist on linguistic rights per se, but argue that bilingualism is a faster route to acquiring English.

of immigration, but was never tied to ethnicity or religion and therefore has survived and adapted over time.<sup>36</sup>

Diversity already played a role in the development of the great disruption of 1965-1995. In 1965, the United States was a largely segregated society with levels of immigration that had been at historically low levels. The following period saw not just the end of legal segregation but the integration of African-Americans across all walks of American life.<sup>37</sup> This coincided with changes, starting in 1965, in the restrictive 1924 immigration law that led to massive increases in legal and illegal immigration, coming this time not from Europe but from Latin America and other parts of the developing world. The clubbiness of pre-1965 America gave way to a society that was not just more diverse, but also much more fair and equal as a host of informal racial, ethnic, and gender barriers began to fall. But the breaking open of these older more stratified communities contributed to the social dysfunctions described above. This is the nature of social capital: communities that are tightly bonded often time achieve their collective action at the expense of openness and fairness.

In the United States, Europe, and Japan, there is a correlation between crime rates and ethnic or racial minorities. This empirical fact is often taken as a racial/ethnic slur, but should not be. One of the critical factors determining crime rates is the normative structure or social capital of the local community. People who are perfectly law-abiding and orderly in their own society often become less so when transplanted to another country with different norms and networks. Communities can enforce normative structures only if they are relatively homogeneous, stable, and bounded, conditions that seldom apply to racial or ethnic minorities in rapidly changing societies. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was a strong association between crime and race during the great disruption in the United States, or between immigration and crime in contemporary Europe.

The correlation between race/immigrant status/ethnicity and crime or other social dysfunctions is what then helps to propel political backlash

<sup>36</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset argues, for example, that Protestant moralism survives in contemporary American feminist and anti-war movements, despite the fact that these have become largely secular. See Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

<sup>37</sup> For empirical documentation of these changes, see Abigail Thernstrom and Stephan Thernstrom, *America In Black And White: One Nation, Indivisible* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).

movements. The Republican ascendancy after the 1970s in the United States was in large measure a reaction to the dramatic social changes that had been unleashed during that period, in which fear of crime and growing social disorder played a very large role. In Europe, backlash movements like Le Pen's Front National in France, the Vlams Blok in Belgium, the Volkspartei in Switzerland, the Lega Lombarda in Italy or the short-lived Republikaner party in Germany have backed intolerant agendas, with far more sinister implications given the continent's twentieth-century experience with fascism.

### *Policies to Promote Intergenerational Solidarity*

It would seem obvious that cultural diversity, and the way that different societies respond to it, will be among the most important factors affecting long-term cultural change over the coming generations, and that any consideration of intergenerational solidarity must consider how to deal with the long-term problem of diversity. Liberal societies must devise ways of remaining tolerant and open, while at the same time retaining some degree of cultural cohesion. A variety of plausible demographic projections for countries like France and the Netherlands show them having majority non-Christian populations within two generations. It is hard to imagine this unfolding, however, without provoking a major political backlash from the now-dominant native-born cultural group.

There are a number of ways of dealing with this problem. The first is to strictly control immigration as Japan and Korea have done, or as in Australia to open the gates only to selected groups that are likely to assimilate easily and bring with them needed skills. Spain has tried to deal with population shortfalls by trying to shift the source of new immigrants from Muslim countries to Latin America. As noted above, restrictive strategies will become increasingly difficult to implement as the rate of native-born population decline accelerates. Enforcement of strict immigration rules is easier for countries surrounded by water than for nations like the US or those of the EU which have long land borders. Rules requiring freedom of movement among EU member states and the enlargement of the community from 15 to 25 members will increase flows of diverse peoples. For countries like France and the Netherlands that already have large immigrant populations, the closing of borders will not solve their problem because the higher birthrates of immigrant minorities will continue to increase their share of the total population.

For those countries which do not seek to close off immigration, there will be essentially two different policy models for dealing with cultural diversity. The first is what might be called the German corporatist approach, and the latter is the Franco-American policy of assimilation.

The corporatist approach assumes that cultural differences are abiding, and seeks to create rules for mutual coexistence through the recognition of the communal rights of the society's diverse cultural communities. Germans were fond of saying that theirs was not a 'country of immigration', and by and large did not pretend that one could be both a Turk and a German at the same time. Multiculturalism in this context meant not integration but the mutual coexistence of different ethno-religious communities on an equal footing. The German state, as noted above, recognizes the communal rights of the Catholic and Protestant churches, and in effect created reform Judaism in the late nineteenth century to provide Jews with an institutional basis for legal representation. For a society organized along these lines, the chief issue will be which communal groups to recognize, and how to select that group's official representative.

The assimilationist approach, by contrast, refuses to recognize communal rights and seeks to treat its citizens purely as individuals. Citizenship is universal, based on political criteria de-linked from ethnicity, race, or religion. Most successful assimilationist policies have gone further than this and actively used social policy to erase de facto cultural distinctions between groups by enforcing monolingualism or by subjecting all citizens to a common education through the public school system.

These poles are ideal types only. Postwar Germany based citizenship on ethnicity, but began to move towards the assimilationist model in 2000 when its citizenship law was changed to make it easier for non-ethnic Germans to receive citizenship. The French republican tradition was aggressively integrationist, refusing to recognize communal rights, enforcing secularism in the public square, and using the educational system to produce a uniform acceptance of a common French linguistic culture. But the French have at various times also pursued a corporatist strategy. Napoleon organized a *Consistoire des Juifs* to deal with the French Jewish community, and more recently the French government has sought to create an official body representing 'moderate' opinion among French Muslims. Finally, the United States has in the past generation moved away from an assimilationist model through the introduction of multiculturalism and bilingualism in its school system.

Both of these approaches have strengths and weaknesses. The corporatist model is almost inevitable for any country with historically and geographically rooted ethnolinguistic minorities (e.g., French-Canadians, the Hungarian minority in Romania, etc.). It is realistic in the sense of recognizing the permanence of cultural identities. But it also embeds these identities firmly into law, and moves cultural conflict squarely into the political arena. Politicized intercommunal disputes can exacerbate divisions rather than moderating them. Switzerland shows that different ethnolinguistic groups can coexist for a long time in a peaceful democracy. But there are plenty of examples of such coexistence breaking down (e.g., Lebanon, the Balkans), particularly in the face of different rates of demographic change.

The assimilationist model, where it can be applied, will in the end produce a more culturally coherent society and thus is a desirable approach. But it works only under certain specific circumstances,<sup>38</sup> and can be abused or improperly applied. Coercive assimilation often provokes a backlash. The Russian empire and the former Soviet Union pursued forced Russification over two centuries; in the end, with the collapse of the USSR, many of the ethnolinguistic groups believed to have been assimilated within the empire reemerged stronger than ever. When secularism turns into militant anti-clericalism, as it has in Kemalist Turkey, the result is often a religious backlash. The recent French ban on Muslim girls wearing headscarves in public schools may lead to a similarly counterproductive result, driving observant Muslims out of the public school system and into private religious schools.

It is hard to understate the importance of managing the problem of cultural diversity to the future health of Western societies. After September 11, some have suggested that we are facing a 'clash of civilizations' on an international level, pitting the West against the Muslim world. The international problem at least has a fairly clearcut solution in the form of a war on terrorism. It is the internal civilizational clash within each contemporary liberal democracy that will be much more difficult to deal with forthrightly because liberal theory does not give us a clear answer as to a normatively desirable outcome.

The issues of immigration and cultural diversity are very comparable to other issues addressed at this conference like environment and social security in the way that they affect intergenerational solidarity. Cultural change

<sup>38</sup> Ultimately, the only long-term way of guaranteeing assimilation is through intermarriage, where the different cultural groups literally blend and disappear.



resulting from cultural diversity is something that will unfold slowly over a long period of time. It is a phenomenon that is only partly under the control of public policy. If that small degree of policy control is to produce meaningful results over the space of the next several decades, policy decisions need to be made and implemented in the short term.

The kinds of economic and technological changes that produced the great disruption of the last four decades of the twentieth century created enormous social and policy challenges for the societies affected by it. The adjustment process is still ongoing, as individuals, families, neighborhoods, and societies seek to reestablish social connectedness. The task of renorming post-industrial societies is enormously complicated by increasing cultural diversity, which makes cultural consensus and spontaneous order much harder to achieve. This suggests that the disruption will not so much heal as mutate into different forms in the coming years.

## COMMENTS TO: FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, 'ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGES IN GENERATIONAL RELATIONS'

JUAN J. LLACH

Throughout his rich and prolific intellectual production,<sup>1</sup> Francis Fukuyama has been dealing with critical problems of our civilization, addressing them with deep insight and soundness and giving polemical answers to the questions so posed. This paper is not an exception. Its general approach is to analyze some economic, political, and cultural changes from the point of view of their effect on intergenerational relations and solidarity. In spite of the complexity of these changes, the paper is policy oriented. Francis Fukuyama thinks, and I agree with him, that it is important to consider ways in which societies can shape long-term change and that intergenerational solidarity will have no meaning if the conditions affecting the relationship between generations cannot be altered through human choice.

To analyze these questions, Fukuyama chooses a very relevant topic, the Great Disruption<sup>2</sup> that began around 1950. It encompasses interlinked aspects of human reproduction, the family, civil society, and the normative framework in which all of them are embedded. At its core are two different types of phenomena. The first is the deep transformation in relations between men and women and in family life. The second type includes different kinds of changes that are still taking place outside the family under the common umbrella of crises of social cohesion, such as the increase in

<sup>1</sup> In only twelve years, Francis Fukuyama has written five books: *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), *The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (1995), *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (1999), *Our Post Human Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* (2002), and *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (2004).

<sup>2</sup> This was the central topic of his 1999 book.

crime rates or, more conjecturally, the deterioration of trust, associationism and other forms of social capital. According to Fukuyama, these changes are, to a certain extent, related to each other. For instance, female labor force participation affects family stability; family structure affects crime; and relationships outside the family both complement and displace those within it. However, as the author recognizes, the causal relationships between family crisis, on the one hand, and the declining of social capital or the increase in crime, on the other, are far from being clear. Although some inconclusive evidence shows us that social heterogeneity is associated with an increase in crime, the causal nexus is not firmly established either.

From the author's point of view, even when cultural variables have played an important role – as it can be seen, for instance, in the feminist movement – the main forces in the development of the Great Disruption have been technological.<sup>3</sup> Fukuyama thinks that these changes are more probably cyclical than secular on two grounds. First, he believes (quoting Hayek) that there is a natural basis for morality, either guided by religion or other forces like the genetically programmed norm-following behavior that leaves anomie as a highly atypical and pathological situation in human societies. Secondly, Fukuyama thinks that what drives normative change is technological change, and that there is no reason to think that technological change will cease. Finally, phenomena like the Great Disruption have happened before – as during the first waves of industrialization – and societies have succeeded in adjusting to them. Although it is not the central point of my comments, I would like to add here that the history of the 20th century shows us very clearly that we can have very long periods of anomie, with tremendous consequences on human life.

The author finds that one of the most consequential multi-generational changes that are taking place nowadays, associated to the Great Disruption, is a growing cultural diversity in formerly homogeneous parts of the world. Once again, technological forces are the ones that are pushing for this change. Lower transport costs, in the first place, allow more rapid and distant international migrations. New communication technologies, in the second place, have raised the perceived diversity in a society. Finally, there are different forces enhancing the incentives for diversity through economies of scale, giv-

<sup>3</sup> The first was the introduction of the birth control pill in the early 1960s that permitted the separation of sex and reproduction. The second was the emergence of a post-industrial workplace in which women had vastly greater opportunities for paid employment outside the home.

ing place to the consolidation of larger political units, whose constituents are inevitably more diverse and, at the same place, bound up with those of people very different from themselves. A bit surprisingly, the main trait of the present wave of globalization, i.e., the increase in trade and capital movements, is not mentioned and this will be one of the points of my comments.

From a vast complex of social forces, the author prefers to concentrate on migrations and their impact on cultural diversity. First, because the challenges of multiculturalism – and particularly the coexistence with people from Muslim countries – are at the core of the solidarity between our generation and the forthcoming ones. Secondly, because the author thinks that the developed countries (DCs) are heading for a crisis in the next generation precisely because of an interaction of demographics and culture. They will confront declining populations, with negative consequences for economic growth and social security entitlements that, from his point of view, will face the only acceptable solution of increased immigration. Additionally, increased cultural diversity can have negative political consequences. Even when cultural diversity and homogeneity have both negative and positive sides, an extended and biased perception of its disadvantages can propel political backlash movements. Finally, the task of renorming post-industrial societies to overcome the Great Disruption is enormously complicated by increasing cultural diversity, which makes consensus and spontaneous order much harder to achieve.

The final part of Fukuyama's paper deals with policies to promote inter-generational solidarity. However, only policies referred to immigration are mentioned. Different alternatives are considered, like strict or selective controls, the corporatist approach and the assimilationist approach. However, Fukuyama thinks that the only long-term way of guaranteeing assimilation is through intermarriage.

### *Consequences of Omitting the Analysis of Events in the Developing World*

The whole analysis of the paper, including almost all its empirical references, is focused on DCs. This is not surprising for whoever has read *The End of History and the Last Man* in which, even taking into account all its nuances, the forthcoming history of not developed countries (NDCs)<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> I use the expression 'not developed countries' (NDCs) just to simplify the text. It is neither better nor worse than all the alternative names. 'Developing countries', for instance, supposes that all of them are in such a situation, which is not right.

appears to follow essentially the same stages previously fulfilled by DCs. But the case could be that the forthcoming history of DCs would, in the end, be dependent on the events in NDCs, and vice-versa. As a consequence of this omission, we do not have the opportunity to enjoy the penetrating mind of Francis Fukuyama applied to the understanding of some of NDCs' problems. I cannot replace him, but anyway the axis of my comments will be the potential consequences of including different historical paths of NDCs on some of the intergenerational issues dealt with by the author.

The omission of the situation outside the developed world is misleading at least for two reasons. In the first place, because multiculturalism is directly associated with massive immigration coming precisely from the developing world. Secondly, because it seems evident that in the developing world, the causes of the problems of the Great Disruption are different from those observed in the developed world, and the same could happen with the policies to address them.

Let me go first, very briefly, to the second point. For any person who lives in a NDC it is evident that the crisis of the family, the increase in crime and the deterioration of social capital, i.e., all the main consequences of the Great Disruption, are at least partially explained by poverty, unemployment, an incredibly uneven income distribution, slow growth and environment deterioration. Political and macroeconomic instability, on the other hand, have a negative impact on the respect for rules and, as a consequence, on trust. Can all this be explained or understood just because NDCs are living the typical social consequences of industrialization that DCs have lived long ago? We do not know, or at least, I do not know. But let me speculate a bit on this. First, I think that these questions are still relevant even in the developed world. For instance, the author did not mention one of the possible explanations of the higher crime rates in USA compared to Europe or Japan, which are the higher incidence of poverty and a less even income distribution. Had Fukuyama given a look at the developing world, this explanation would have perhaps appeared more evident even for DCs. Secondly, we should not forget that some of the negative social consequences of industrialization in Europe played an important role in the birth of different forms of totalitarianism and, in the end, to what has been called the European Civil War (1914-1989). This happened in spite of the fact that, previously and contemporarily, a massive migration from Europe into America and Africa had helped in some way to alleviate the Malthusian conflict

between population and subsistence that was taking place. Apparently, NDCs have neither of those alternatives at hand (fortunately, regarding the first one). But precisely for this reason, it is not clear what will be the historical development and the final solution of the Great Disruption in the developing world. The fact is that, in this case, social factors clearly appear more relevant than technological ones. Finally, it is not necessary to adhere to the old-fashioned dependence theory to understand that economic development in NDCs nowadays faces different obstacles from the ones confronted at their turn in DCs.

### *The Case of Massive International Migrations*

Fukuyama clearly states that, given the conflict between culture and demography, the path of least resistance to maintaining both current and long-term standards of living in DCs will continue to be the importation of workers from culturally different societies. As a consequence, the question of how to deal with multiculturalism and immigration becomes one of the most important to answer in order to build policies to promote intergenerational solidarity. There are three problems with this approach.

In the first place, the sole technological explanation of increased international migrations in recent times is not satisfactory. Technologies to emigrate have been at hand since a century and a half ago. Secondly, it is very well established among demographers and economists that, most of the time, migration is explained both by expulsion and attraction factors. So, it is not enough to state that international migration to DCs will continue growing because of their need to solve the social security issues arising from demography. We also need to take into account what is going to happen with the economic growth and employment prospects in NDCs. This leads us to the third point, and it is that we know from economics that factor movements, like international migration or capital flows, are to a certain extent substitutes for goods movements.

For all these reasons, both the analytical and policy alternatives considered by Fukuyama are, from my point of view, unnecessarily narrow. He just enumerates different alternatives of regulating immigration. I think it would be better, instead, to open our minds to the following four alternatives.

TABLE 1. FOUR ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON SOCIAL SECURITY

Migration intensities from NDCs to DCs		Growth rates of NDCs	
		High	Low
Commercial Policy of DCs	Closed	Medium/high migrations Social security improves	High migrations and cultural diversity Social security mixed
	Open	Low migrations Maximum growth Social security: strong improvement	Medium migrations, 2 Social security mixed

*Links Between International and Intergenerational Solidarities*

Both developed and developing or not developed countries fortunately have more tools at hand in order to build the Great Reconstruction that Francis Fukuyama has expounded in other works. And also, with a broader scope, in order to build the new international economic order that the Social Doctrine of the Church has been requesting since Pope John XXIII wrote *Mater et Magistra*. The same consideration holds referring to the central goal of Fukuyama’s contribution to this session, i.e., ways in which societies can shape intergenerational solidarity beyond the realms of environment or social security.

The higher the future growth of NDCs, the lower will be the undesired migration pressures in DCs. The fairer the international economic order, both regarding trade and finances, on the other hand, the higher will be the growth of NDCs. The optimum case for NDCs in Table 1 is the SW quadrant, with high economic growth and open trade. But this quadrant is the

best for DCs too, since it would minimize international migration pressures and, because of the high growth, will improve the social security as well. So it seems that there is a pretty clear-cut option. DCs can choose either to build regional fortresses to separate them from the world, or to build international bridges. In the case of NDCs the option is not very different, only that in a context of lower growth and less trade the fortresses they will need to build would be internal, as the one they are discussing now in Rio de Janeiro to separate the *favelas* from the rest of the city.

Some of the connections of international and intergenerational solidarity are particularly clear. The case of agricultural protectionism is perhaps the most evident. OECD countries spent US\$ 318 billion to protect agribusiness in 2003. Considering just the cost of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), we see that it has jumped from €25 billion in 1990 to almost €45 billion nowadays. These are enormous amounts of money, and they could help a lot to alleviate the very serious situation of social security systems in most of those same countries, almost all of them factually bankrupt. To give a more specific, concrete example, let me quote a recent study by Oxfam.<sup>5</sup> It shows that the cost of producing sugar in the EU is six times higher than in Brazil and that the implicit subsidy is more than €2 billion. Subsidizing sugar producers is not just economically stupid; it is morally indefensible, too. For Europe's subsidies are not merely a quaint way to keep a few farmers in business. They cause so much sugar to be produced that the stuff is exported to poor countries, hurting farmers who might otherwise earn a living by growing it themselves – and perhaps even exporting it to Europe. At most, only 1.5m tm of sugar a year is bought in Europe from preferred trading relationships with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Worse, the sugar provisions of the CAP set poor countries against each other. European subsidies mean that its excess sugar ends up in places such as Algeria, Ghana, Congo and Indonesia, displacing sugar produced in countries such as South Africa and India.<sup>6</sup> The biggest winners, says Oxfam, are large European sugar refiners.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Published in [www.economist.com/research/articles](http://www.economist.com/research/articles).

<sup>6</sup> Brazil and Thailand are the hardest hit, Oxfam reckons. According to its analysis, Brazil loses around \$500 million a year and Thailand about \$151 million, even though these two countries are the most efficient sugar producers in the world. Even less efficient, and poorer, African countries lose out. Mozambique will lose \$38 million in 2004 – as much as it spends on agriculture and rural development. The costs to Ethiopia equal the sums it spends on HIV/AIDS programs.

<sup>7</sup> France's Beghin Say, it claims, benefits by €236 million a year, Germany's Sudzucker by €201 million, and Britain's Tate & Lyle by €158 million.



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Another clear connection comes from growth of NDCs. Traditionally, it was not very relevant as a determinant of DCs' growth. But this is changing rapidly, particularly because of the increasing size of Asia in the world economy. So it will be more and more certain that the economic growth of NDCs will influence the events in DCs.

Almost at the end of his paper, Francis Fukuyama says 'after September 11, some have suggested that we are facing a "clash of civilizations" on an international level, pitting the West against the Muslim world. The international problem at least has a fairly clear-cut solution'. I really do not know what this clear-cut solution is. If it means building more and more war fortresses or, directly, making war, I would say it could be a clear-cut – although the evolution of the war in Iraq casts some doubts – but very doubtful solution. The alternative of building a new international economic order will not only be more human and fair, but also cheaper and more efficient. I do not think that even in such a context international migrations will cease, but they will become less intense and manageable, with very positive consequences on the assimilation of cultural diversity.

Based on all these considerations I think the building of a new international economic order along the proposals of the Social Doctrine of the Church and diverse multilateral organizations is beyond any doubt the most important policy we should develop and enforce to promote not only peace and development, but intergenerational solidarity as well.

## FAMILY CONCERNS AND INTER-GENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

MARGARET S. ARCHER

This paper will explore three issues. What is the importance today of the family to people in Britain? What is it about these people that makes the family important to them? What are the implications of attaching importance to the family for inter-generational solidarity? It will do so with reference to two on-going investigations about the emergence of different modes of personal reflexivity, which are intertwined with these issues – one of the general population and the other of students entering University. In answering the first question, it will be assumed that people are ‘strong evaluators’ (Taylor 1985: 65-8) in their own lives rather than just maximising their utilities. In dealing with the second question, it is accepted that situations are objectively shaped for agents, but that their causal efficacy is mediated through their subjective evaluation by agents, rather than them constituting irresistible pushes and pulls upon people. In addressing the third question, it is presumed that we are dealing with active agents whose self-monitoring contributes to making things happen, rather than passive agents to whom things just happen. This underlying model of the human person who is also a social agent (Archer 2000) is at variance with much of the sociological tradition in family analysis.

### *Preliminary Considerations*

‘Generations’ can be defined very differently, depending upon the purpose in hand. At one extreme the definition is subjective in nature; at the other it is objective. The first type is illustrated by Edmunds and Turner for whom a ‘generation’ can be defined as a cohort that for some special reason such as a major event (war, pestilence, civil conflict or natural catastrophe such as an earthquake) develops a collective con-

sciousness that permits that generation to intervene significantly in social change (2002: ix).

Thus they refer to the 'post-war generation' (shaped by the Cold War), the 'anti-globalization generation' (the response of the Islamic diaspora to globalization), the 'September generation' (created by the events of 9/11) and even the 'missing generation' (defined by its absence before the fall of Communism). These are necessarily subjective groupings because they depend upon 'collective consciousness', that is the fact that 'an age cohort comes to have social significance by virtue of constituting itself as cultural identity' (2002: 7). The referent is to people's subjectivity, the presumption made is that 'generation units' (see Mannheim [1952] 1997) share something of the same mind-set and also that it is possible to distinguish several 'generations' that are co-terminous in time but largely separated in space (such as the 'September generation' and the 'anti-globalization' generation').

In itself, this type of definition is unobjectionable, so long as these assumptions are warranted. Whether or not they can be is an empirical matter, which the authors accept (2002: 16), as is the assertion that such collectively shared subjectivity permits a 'generation to intervene significantly in social change'. In any case, I do not intend to conceptualise generations in this way, nor in terms of the polar opposite type of objective definition.

At the other extreme, 'generations' are objectively because chronologically defined, their referents being to some actuarially (constant or variable) time span. Such conceptions permit statements of the kind that 'less than one hundred generations have passed since the Romans invaded Britain', which may be of utility if the aim is to study, for example, the persistence or elimination of certain genetic characteristics or the diffusion and syncretism of cultural beliefs, artefacts or practices.

Like all others, my own conceptualisation is governed by the problem in hand and the constraints of the research design adopted. It lies between the objective and the subjective. Objectively, 'generations' represent positions within a continuum of descent. They are the 'parental' (or 'grandparental') 'generations' of the subjects investigated – or the 'generations' of their children (or grandchildren). Because such 'generations' are (objectively) relational to the subject, this means that they are roughly similar in their chronology for the Student sample because of the predominance of 18 to 19 year olds among first year entrants to University. This is not the case for the General sample, which was stratified into four age groups: the 16 year old girl and 80 year old woman can refer to grandparents who may be more than 60 years apart in age and belong to 'culturally different' cohorts with different life-chances etc.

The subjective component consisted in allowing respondents themselves to define who constituted members of their families. Such definitions were very varied; these variations exceeded the distinction between the nuclear and the extended family (for example, there were horizontal differences in whether or not 'cousins' were included); and such variations were to prove highly significant and non-random. They were so in relation to manifestations of 'inter-generational solidarity'. Again, it is important to be clear about the kinds of activities which are taken here to be indicative of such solidarity – or its absence.

'Inter-generational solidarity' can be conceptualised in different ways, at different levels and refer to completely different types of agents and actions. Thus at the most macro-level, 'solidarity' (or its opposite) could refer to the consideration or indifference (perhaps unknowingly) that a given generation displays towards the future of the human race, in terms, for example, of the environmental conservation or depredation transmitted to future generations. At the regional and/or national levels, 'solidarity' could well refer to the equity with which finite public resources are distributed between the extant chronological generations. Recently there have been growing concerns about the Western tendency for the older (and still older) generations being the highest users of public services and recipients of public benefits (Esping-Anderson 1998). This is held to be fuelling inter-generational conflict with the younger active population (Vincent 1999: 103; Chauvel 1998), whose new entrants are now told to fund their own private pension schemes. At the meso-level, attention might focus upon a particular social institution or organised activity, with the question being how far participation is indifferent to age and thus promotive of 'solidarity' (as with football matches or Church attendance). At the micro-level, attention would shift to inter-personal relations and to the multifarious ways in which a given generation may or may not be supportive of older or younger ones.

No one level of analysis has precedence over another in terms of its causal influence. That again is an empirical question; moreover, because of the properties and powers pertaining to them, all levels are operative simultaneously. Again, the same agents can be actively involved in each of these levels at the same time. In consequence, a complete account of inter-generational solidarity would have to embrace all of these levels and the relations between them.

My aim in this paper is much more modest. It focuses upon the micro-level of interpersonal relations, identifies those kinds of voluntary actions which promote or demote inter-generational solidarity amongst family

members (which is where the self-definition of 'the family' by subjects becomes important) and therefore at most contributes to an account of *the aggregate effects of individual actions*. On the whole, and with exceptions to which I will return, these (potentially powerful) aggregate effects are not 'everything' but have tended to be treated as closer to 'nothing' in the post-1945 sociological tradition. This is part of the general and imperialistic tendency to regard all action as 'social action' (Campbell 1996). In consequence, the personal promptings and restraints to action are subtracted from the individual and credited in one way or another to the social. Individuals are the executive agency of society – as *träger*, over-socialised beings or mouthpieces of hegemonic discourses. In all of this, the properties and powers of individual people shrink progressively as the capacity to conceive of and conduct courses of action is increasingly withheld from them (see, for example, Harré and Gillett 1994). On such an over-social account, the level of inter-personal activities that I am examining would be epiphenomenal to the issue of inter-generational solidarity. Reduced to the mere echo of higher-level structural or cultural influences, such individual doings could make no independent aggregative contribution because they lack the autonomy to do so. All of this spells a drift to a diffuse form of social determinism under the banner of social constructionism.

#### PART 1. TRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL CONDITIONING AND OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION IN RELATION TO THE FAMILY

##### *Social Hydraulics and Family Forms*

Yet, determinism does not work in relation to this problem and it is impossible to point to any area where it does work – which is why there are few if any self-proclaimed sociological determinists around. Instead, what is vaunted is strong social conditioning. Even there, the human material has to be granted to be of such a kind that it is amenable to being conditioned (Sayer 1992: 121) – it has to be granted this property if no other. Equally importantly, a social conditional influence has to condition *something* and in this case the something has to be some form of intentionality to treat various family members in various ways – however diffuse and inchoate such intentions or inclinations may be. Since conditional influences are often quite properly conceptualised as constraints and enablements, then a constraint logically has to constrain something, just as an

enablement must enable something. These are transitive verbs and there is no such thing as a constraint or an enablement *tout court*. In other words, no conditional influence operates as a hydraulic pressure which simply pushes and pulls human agents around, the latter fundamentally being conceived of as 'indeterminate material'. All social influences have to be mediated by and through people – who have the personal powers to respond to them in very different ways, according to who they are, where they are placed and, specifically what personal projects they entertain.

Indeed to attempt to nullify such personal powers and to privilege the power of social forms always produces defective explanations. At most, in the domain of family relations, this yields correlations (between, for example, socio-occupational status and inter-generational cohabitation, geographical contiguity or quotidian contact). At best, these tell us what 'most of the people do most of the time' and quite often sociologists settle for second best – merely that a statistically significant portion of the population do 'x' rather than 'y'. But the correlation coefficient is only an empirical generalisation (a methodological expression of Hume's 'constant conjunctions') (Bhaskar 1989). What no correlation can tell us is *why* people do what they do in fact do (be this following the trend which generates a high coefficient or deviating from it); and correlations are always less than perfect.

Efficient causality depends upon the motives, intentions and courses of action which are conceived of and implemented by agents themselves, whether or not they are mediating structural or cultural factors when deciding precisely what to do. Instead of investigating what does move different agents, too frequently investigators have covertly inserted their own assumptions about what motivates them: people are presumed to act in their own best interests, to pursue objective advantages, to accede plastically to social inducements or discouragements. This approach is resisted here because it turns all agents into instrumental rationalists in their familial relations. It disallows that the value rationality (the *Wertrational*) of many people means that family solidarity is an end in itself to them and not an instrumentally rational (*Zwekrational*) way of becoming 'better off' in terms of some hypothetical 'utiles'. In short, the family can be something we care about for its own sake, for the internal rather than the external good(s) it supplies (McIntyre 1987: 181-203), as I hope to demonstrate in Part 2.

However, to resist the social hydraulics that are secreted by the quest for empirical generalisations is to swim against the historical tide in the sociology of the family. Perhaps the oldest and best entrenched of such generalisations, still celebrated in introductory textbooks, is the correlation

between the rise of industrialisation and the advent of the nuclear family. A brief inspection of the stages of this argument about the demise of the extended family serves to lay bare its reliance upon the imputation of instrumental rationality.

The first stage of the argument goes as follows. In various ways the process of industrialisation engendered considerable population movement, particularly from rural to urban areas, thus disrupting the old stability of family location, which had spelt the geographical contiguity of generations and encouraged practices of solidarity amongst them (from cradle to grave in terms of the transmission of knowledge, role induction and informal apprenticeship, the valuation of long-acquired expertise and the extension of mutual care over the generations). Not only was it the young, active and able-bodied who first flocked towards urban, industrial employment but industrialisation itself placed a premium on *The Migratory Elite* (Musgrove 1963). Those who were willing to make successive geographical moves towards new occupational openings also reaped the benefits of social mobility. And those most able to do were those literally carrying the lightest family baggage – by leaving the oldest generation behind. As these two-generational units became increasingly well-off, the more readily could they substitute out-sourcing for services previously supplied by extended family members (replacing them by maids, child nurses, nannies, grooms and gardeners). They also found themselves in a position to make financial provisions for their parents, relieving the threat of both the Workhouse and the Pauper's burial. Thus callousness did not have to taint the instrumental rationality through obedience to which the middle class nuclear family was born.

The second stage of the argument concerns the working class, whose poverty sustained their reliance upon services rendered by the extended family throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Negatively this pattern was reinforced by the absence of any form of extra-familial care for the old – beyond the dreaded Workhouse where aged couples were usually separated into male and female dormitories. What then served to universalise the nuclear family amongst those (the majority) who remained beneficiaries of the extended family form?

The argument continues that as democratic politics increasingly became bourgeois politics, the heirs and successors of the old 'migratory elite' progressively institutionalised the extra-familial provision of services for the family. As this process intensified throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, public provisions gradually replaced both servants and the services of the extended family: by the development of universal school-

ing and formal vocational training, of orphanages, asylums and hospitals, and eventually of pensions, sickness benefits and public geriatric care. In short, the nuclear family became the norm because the family itself had reduced tasks to perform. This was the thesis concisely stated by William F. Ogburn that the modern family was 'losing its functions' (1934).

This thesis formed the keystone of the post-war sociological consensus on the family. As William Goode, the sixties doyen on family research (Goode 1963), summarised the situation:

Family research in the post-World War II period has documented one gross empirical regularity ... that in all parts of the world and for the first time in world history all social systems are moving fast or slowly toward some form of the conjugal family system and also toward industrialization. In agreement with the intuition of social analysts for over a century is the finding that with industrialization the traditional family systems – usually, extended or joint family systems ... are breaking down (Goode 1964: 108).

Although Goode himself contested both the uni-factoral premise that industrialisation was alone responsible and also resisted empirical generalisations about the co-incidence of industrial and family change being elevated to the status of a 'theory', empiricism nonetheless ruled. What empiricists missed and persisted in neglecting into the next millennium is Goode's following and acute observation:

No nuclear family *system* exists, if by that we mean a system in which most families maintain few or no relations with their more extended kin. All contemporary studies in the most industrialized countries – Great Britain and the U.S. – show that in fact each family unit maintains contact with a wide range of relatives, and that the largest single category of 'recreation' is 'visiting with relatives' (1964: 51).

Instead, official statistics and calculations, like those of Marvin Sussman for the U.S. (1974: 38), showing 75% of the population living in nuclear or conjugal families, with (once married) single-parent families in second place at 15%, and experimental forms lying third at 6% together served to underline the demise of the extended family (2%) and of households made up of kin networks (again 2%). Theory mirrored the empiricist consensus. This was strongly signalled in the fifties as Parsons unequivocally assigned the family to 'system maintenance' functions rather than those of 'task performance'. Equally importantly, his *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process* (Parsons 1955) highlighted the new focus of concern with the psychodynamics of family relations *inside* the nuclear unit.



The final stage in the argument, fuelled jointly by latter day feminism and the much vaunted 'individualism' induced by the imperatives of flexibility in the new labour market (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002), presents a scenario in which people are progressively unfitted for stable long-term relationships. In turn, whilst this endorses the previous demise of solidarity with the 'third generation', it now views 'two generational' solidarity as threatened. Significantly, the factors held responsible are largely an intensification of those earlier said to be accountable for stripping the family of its functions. For example,

individualization means that people are linked into the institutions of the labour market and welfare state, educational system, legal system, state bureaucracy, and so on, which have emerged together with modern society. These institutions produce various regulations – demands, instructions, entitlements – that are typically addressed to individuals rather than the family as a whole. And the crucial feature of these new regulations is that they enjoin the individual to lead a life of his or her own beyond any ties to the family or other groups – or sometimes even to shake off such ties (Beck-Gernsheim 2002).

The only new ingredient is the reinforcement supplied by the women's movement, representing the family as the lynch-pin of engendered exploitation and patriarchal repression.

Together these factors are considered by such authors to raise the following questions. Firstly, why have children at all? After all, despite young women's protestations that they desire them, less do have them. Thus, in Britain, 'according to official government forecasts at least 20 per cent of women born in the 1960s will not have children, rising to nearly one quarter of those who were born in the 1970s' (Franks 1999: 197-8). And the German trend has reached almost one third amongst the same cohort. Secondly, why have children so early and in such numbers? After all, one child can assuage the maternal urge; one perfect child, thanks to medical screening and genetic engineering obviates any need for risk-spreading over several; and intensive investment in one perfect child optimises his or her social life-chances. Thirdly, why not have a child without a family? Today the life-long, heterosexual and domiciliary based unit of birth parents and their child(ren) is only one of a proliferating list of experimental options on offer – including (sometimes profitable) surrogate motherhood. Such is the problematisation of the 'post-familial family'.

Nevertheless, people (very various) *increasingly* go to extraordinary lengths in order to reproduce (the other face of bio-medical possibilities),

young people, especially in Mediterranean countries, tend to live much longer with their parents whilst completing education (Hakim 2003), and in Eastern Europe the endless 'make do' and inter-generational mix in the sharing and re-sharing of apartments, movement of money between bank accounts to cover down-payments, and the 'pass the parcel' of child-care and granny-care are not diminishing. In short, even the facts of European life cast the above scenario in the light of selective perception.

Its script writers are not unaware nor without a response. Late modernity promotes not only individualisation but also a lonely longing for inter-personal ties. Thus, the endurance of the family (be it re-partnered and amalgamated) was already presented in the 1970s as a 'haven in a heartless world' (Lasch 1977). Even Beck-Gernsheim's 'post-familial family'

will be the expansion of the nuclear family and its extension over time; it will be the alliance between individuals that it represents; and it will be glorified largely because it represents an image of refuge in the chilly environment of our affluent, impersonal, uncertain society, which has been stripped of its traditions and exposed to all kinds of risk (2002: 8).

But there is a condition attached to this endurance of the nuclear family and it is the same one attaching to the growing need for care amongst the oldest generation, because of its longevity. The provision of care across any generation has been an almost exclusively female preserve – and continues to be so. Yet, with women's increasing employment in the public domain, their labour capacity is now a scarce resource in relation to inter-generational caring. The proviso, therefore, is a redistribution of domestic labour away from women and towards men: 'the future contract between the generations will depend on the success of a new contract between the sexes' (Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 85).

### *Instrumental Rationality and Family Relationships*

Those are the terms for granting a provisional future to the family in the West. Conversely, and in direct succession from the assumption of instrumental rationality which underlay the traditional sociological analyses of changes in family forms, is the contribution of Gary Becker (1991). His *Treatise on the Family* proffers a means of eliminating the above proviso about the necessary redistribution of domestic labour; an answer to why people will continue to have children, though in smaller numbers, and the source of an enduring bond between the second and third generation. Such

guarantees are supplied by instrumental rationality itself. If we focus steadily upon the investment patterns and pay-offs of rational men and women, then cause for concern largely evaporates. That is, of course, if Becker can convince us that family relations are indeed approached like other commodities in a person's overall investment portfolio.

Becker himself begins by disposing of the proviso that the frail bonds of inter-generational solidarity depend for reinforcement upon a more equitable distribution of domestic labour:

even if a husband and wife are intrinsically identical, they gain from a division of labour between market and household activities, with one of them specializing in more in market activities and the other specializing more in household activities. The gain comes from increasing returns to investments in sector-specific human capital that raise productivity in either the market or the non-market sectors. Therefore, even small differences between men and women – presumably related at least partially to the advantages of women in the birth and rearing of children – would cause a division of labor by gender, with wives more specialized to household activities and husbands more specialized to other work (Becker 1993: 3-4).

This may be the case in terms of objective financial pay-offs, but what justifies Becker in assuming that this is the 'currency' used by couples, an 'external' good, a means to being materially better-off, rather than the alternative currencies of intrinsic satisfaction, stimulation and self-fulfilment? Indeed, he concedes as much for the quotation continues:

The degree of specialization in a marriage would be less extreme if one of the sectors, perhaps housework, were considered more boring and less worthwhile.

In other words, 'personal boredom' and well as 'material gain' has to be factored-in, but what hidden-hand ensures that this translates directly into a more equitable sharing of the 'boring', what is the common currency that enables 'boredom' to be offset against 'gain', and why should this satisficing adjustment in domestic activities prevail within a relationship of unequal conjugal power?

The same problem attaches to Becker's account of altruism within the family; over many generations this is biologically selected for because of its survival advantages for young and old alike, yet, in any one generation, it has to be worked at. Why should people live and work in this way? Again because they will all become 'better-off'. Thus family life is a matter of cost-benefit analysis. Becker advocates an 'investment in guilt', by which parents

financially promote the acquisition of 'merit goods' in their offspring with the intention of inducing sufficient guilt in their children that they themselves are cared for in return in their later years. (Archer and Tritter 2000: 41f.) Yet, this assumes that parents are actuated by investment considerations, rather than caring for their children's well-being as an end in itself. It also presumes that guilt will actuate these children later on to assume responsibility for their elderly parents needs. In all of this, emotions like love and caring within the family have been disallowed as ends in themselves. Instead, they have been subordinated to cost-benefit calculations which will eventually be cashed-in to everyone's (material) advantage.

But in terms of such instrumental rationality why do the benefiting offspring not just cut and run with their 'merit goods', rather than engaging in a reciprocity with the third generation? Becker himself

recognises that frequent contact among family members often raises the degree of altruism. That is to say, altruism may well have some of the properties of an addictive taste that is fostered by consumption of the good involved. We believe that addictive aspects of altruism better explain the apparently larger bequests by parents to children who visit them more frequently than does the view that parents use bequests to 'buy' visits (Becker 1993: 365).

So, a new variable, 'frequency of contact' has been introduced to explain reciprocal solidarity. However, to explain this frequency itself, we are presented with two stark alternatives: either these contacts are matters of irrational addiction (Elster 1999) – the preferred explanation – or they are again commodified purchases. Here it is rather easy to see why Becker rejects the second alternative because why should granny and grandpa 'buy' a visit, unless they value it for itself, since the only further benefit to which it could lead is 'further visits', which raise the same problem.

Of course, if addiction is truly irrational it is withdrawn from the ambit of Rational Choice Theory; we cannot even ask the question why grandparents become addicts to visits from their families rather than becoming geriatric gamblers or hitting the bottle. Instead, Becker wants to make such grandparental altruism (bequests) explicable as the dependent variable. Upon what does it depend – upon the 'frequency of visits' itself, which now become the *explanans*: 'the degree of altruism is not fixed but often responds to the frequency and intensity of contacts with beneficiaries' (Becker 1993: 375).

This leads us back to Goode's observation (see p. 8) about the *recreational* importance of visits to relatives because leisure activities are usually

regarded as voluntary – being matters neither of irrational addition nor calculative instrumentalism. It also links forward to one aspect of my own ongoing research project where the quantity and quality of intra-familial contact is found to be one of the main causes of *who* we become as people and of what we then *do* because of what we most care about – and the moral commitments these concerns reflect, considered as being ends in themselves.

## PART 2. INTER-GENERATIONAL RELATIONS AND OUR ULTIMATE CONCERNS

Let us begin from a different starting point, namely that *who* people are derives from their ultimate concerns which are expressive of their identities and therefore are *not* a means to some further end. Ends like these to which we are morally committed are those things that we care about most. When our ultimate concerns are matters of family relations, these are not for any agent the ‘means to his flourishing but its constituents’ (Hollis 1989: 174). Here, there is no sense in asking why it pays someone to give their child a birthday present or to help their parents out; for these actions are expressive of their relationship, not matters of investment and *quid pro quo*. Moral commitment of this kind is neither calculative nor socialised, yet it is both reasoned and social, for our relations to these significant others are the expression of who we are and where we belong.

An ‘agent’s ultimate reference group cannot be himself alone. He needs some group to identify with in relationships whose flourishing is a measure of his flourishing’ (Hollis 1989: 174). By necessity this has to be authentic because when another’s interests are part of one’s own, short-cuts which simply give the appearance of belonging and of caring are self-defeating to a person whose real need is really to belong. What this implies is that Weber’s *Wertrationalität* remains part of our lifeworld, which cannot be reduced to a bargain-hunter’s bazaar. As Frankfurt puts it, a

person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He *identifies* himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced (1988: 83).

When explaining what such agents decide to do, then it is their commitments which supply their own ‘weights and measures’. Without a knowledge of what is moving them we simply do not know what *counts* to them as a cost or a benefit or how strongly it counts.

Now the rational choice theorist would presumably object here that committed people are still acting with instrumental rationality, it is simply that we have dug a bit deeper into their preferences. This would be mistaken because with a commitment, means and ends are not separate: the things we care about profoundly affect *how* we honour our commitments. Commitments are a way of life 'in the round' which affect means as well as ends. We will not understand the precise means selected unless we comprehend the *relationship* which a person sees between their goals and means, and this is something which can only be understood in expressive and not calculative terms. When we care for our children by giving time to play with them, this is expressive of our relationship with them, it is not a means of gaining their affection, nor is it conformity to the norms of good parenting, which are just as well satisfied by leaving them at a play-group. Instead, and especially with respect to those we love and with respect to our ideals, we are liable to be bound by necessities which have less to do with our adherence to the principles of morality than with integrity and consistency of a more personal kind. These necessities constrain us from betraying the things we care about most and with which, accordingly, we are most closely identified. In a sense which a strictly ethical analysis cannot make clear, what they keep us from violating are not our duties and obligations but ourselves (Frankfurt 1988: 91).

There is no doubt that the family matters to the British population and even some evidence from my current research project that it is the 'ultimate concern' of the general population investigated. The data gathered about the family were not the central point of interest, since the project is concerned with the development of human reflexivity. Nevertheless, from the pilot investigation it appeared that family relations played a significant role in the type of reflexivity developed. Therefore data were collected which can be used to assess the role of the family in people's 'main concerns in life'. The project involves two samples. Firstly, there is a sample of the general population resident in Coventry (n=128), stratified by gender and into four age groups and four occupational categories. Secondly, there is the population of all students entering the University of Warwick to study Sociology (as Single or Joint Honours students or those taking it as an external option: n=130). They were examined during their first week as undergraduates in 2003 and form part of a longitudinal study over three years. In both studies it is the long qualitative interviews (approximately 1 in 3), now underway, which lie at the heart of the project, but the quantitative findings seemed interesting enough in themselves to present here.

Specifically, both sets of respondents were asked on the questionnaire, 'In general, what are the three most important areas of your life now – those that you care about deeply'. They were given three numbered spaces for responses, asked to list the most important first, but responses were open-ended and therefore provided in the subjects' own words. In quantitative terms, this seems a reasonable way of measuring people's 'ultimate concerns', although we must beware of assuming that use of the same word, such as 'family' means the same thing to different subjects – a matter to which I will return because of the availability of certain internal checks upon this.

To begin with the general population, the overwhelming and perhaps surprising finding was the importance of the 'family',<sup>1</sup> with only ten respondents failing to list it amongst their three main concerns in life. Even more striking is the fact that if the first listed concern can legitimately be taken as representing respondents ultimate concern, then over three-quarters (78%)<sup>2</sup> of this sample designated it as such.<sup>3</sup> This showed no substantive difference for gender; the percentage for males being 77% and for females 79%. For those currently married or in a partnership of at least two years duration, the proportion putting the 'family' first rose to 83% (Again gender differences were small, with males at 85% and females at 81%). For those with children, regardless of their marital or partnership status, it rose again to 84% (Once more this finding is not a heavily engendered one, standing at 81% for men and 87% for women).

What such strong findings tell us is that the 'family' matters, that it matters more than anything else to 78% of the sample and is amongst the main concerns of 92% of the sample – which attempted to be representative of gender, age and socio-economic group. What these findings do not tell us is *who* is being referred to as 'family' and therefore *who matters*; nor can they reveal anything about inter-generational solidarity. We will have to work slowly into this, using biographical data collected on each subject and the qualitative evidence collected from interviews in the original and Pilot investigations.

To begin with, it is clear that different respondents do indeed mean different things by the 'family' and that the general population used it to

<sup>1</sup> Here the open-ended responses given by subjects were grouped into the following categories and then aggregated: 'family' (81.2%), 'partner/relationship (singular)' (1.6%), and 'family and friends' (9.4%), together totalling 92.2%.

<sup>2</sup> Henceforth all percentages are rounded up or down to the nearest whole number.

<sup>3</sup> As defined in footnote 1.

include 'partnerships of at least two years duration' (incorporating two avowedly gay partnerships); re-partnering (which may or may not have involved marriage); having children (whether the subject was of widowed, divorced, separated or single-parent status); the amalgamated family, with step-children, sometimes from both sides; and having living parents and relatives, when respondents were never married, not in a partnership and childless. In other words, to say that the 'family' is of tremendous importance to the general population does not mean that the referent is to the traditional family.

In fact, the referent is probably closer to 'those I care about a great deal in my personal relationships'. This can be checked indirectly by reference to a question asked of all subjects and to which they could respond in one of seven categories from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. The question was 'So long as I know those I care about are OK, nothing else really matters to me at all'. Obviously this is a much stronger statement because it is exclusive of other concerns, whereas subjects listing (their definition of) the 'family' as their ultimate concern, had two more opportunities to list other concerns. Nevertheless, over half were in agreement (58%) with the above question, 13% opted for the median (or uncertain category) and 29% disagreed with the statement. Clearly, close personal relationships are of great importance if they are of exclusive importance to half of this population. Further substantiation of this proposition comes from answers to the following question: 'Most of my satisfaction comes from belonging to a close-knit family, friendship or work group'. This is a weaker statement, because it talks about 'most' rather than 'all' and also broadens out personal relationships to include friends and fellow workers. Over three-quarters of subjects were in agreement and only 13% in disagreement. So far, the data have only enabled it to be shown that the 'family' matters, under their own descriptions, as the ultimate concern of members of the general population and that this is probably related to the significance attached to close interpersonal relations. As such, it is compatible with the 'haven in a harsh world' interpretation of the durability of the family – often under new and increasingly unconventional forms.

However, as yet, these findings reveal nothing about inter-generational solidarity. In order for them to do so, in conjunction with the student survey, I will have to make use of my preliminary study (Archer 2003) and of the Pilot investigation of 32 subjects. This qualitative material, based upon in-depth interviews, which often lasted more than three hours, goes to the core of the project and can provide a hinge between the two on-going studies.



It does so because it establishes the crucial and *mutually reinforcing* connection *between contacts and concerns* with and over the three generations. Firstly, the following factors, in combination, appeared to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for promoting inter-generational solidarity, that is the frequency, intensity and importance attaching to relations between the three generations. (i) Geo-localism: stability of residence fostering an uninterrupted friendship network for the youngest generation. (ii) Progression through compulsory schooling with the same neighbourhood age cohort, uninterrupted by changes of school or attending boarding school. (iii) Continuity of the natal family, undisturbed by death, marital breakdown, re-partnering or the amalgamation of step-siblings. (iv) A transition from school to work assisted by family members and/or accompanied by school friends. These are the quantitative aspects of what I term 'contextual continuity', but they are only the bare bones and need to be associated with warm and congenial relations.

Secondly, the necessary conditions are supplied by the response of the youngest generational subject. He or she needs to be able to identify an occupation, maintain and develop a peer-network, and to initiate his or her first significant (sexual) relationship within the bounds of this natal context. In other words, individuals have to discover that they can form their own *personal modus vivendi* within the same context – and far from all such young people find that they can satisfyingly invest themselves there. For those who can, the family context becomes their own and represents a common social anchorage, sharing the same topography, generating a communality of referents, fostering a pool of shared experiences and under-writing the utility of consultation, assistance and advice between generations.

Take thirty-seven year old Angie, a secretary whose biography shares all the above features; brought up in what she describes as a 'loving environment', meeting her closest friend at the age of two, replicating the precise occupational position of her mother; Aunt and many family friends and extending her friendship network through Secretarial college and her two main jobs to date. Angie displays considerable satisfaction with her *modus vivendi*. What is significant about it for present purposes is the intense amount of interpersonal contact involved. The environment in which she grew up continues to be her environment. It reaches forward and backward, *reinforcing its continuity by the frequency and intensity of interpersonal contact*.

I see my Mum about twice a week I suppose, and I see my Auntie about once a month, and then cousins ... I see my uncles probably once a month. It just depends what's going on. I don't tend to speak

to them on the phone – my relatives – as much as my friends, but I speak to my Mum, not every day, but certainly every other day I'm on the phone.

Other subjects, both of whose parents and grandparents are alive, incorporate them into their pattern of regular contacts, with older subjects often finding small jobs for their parents. For younger subjects, dense familial contact is smoothly interwoven into a busy social agenda with friends, boyfriends and girlfriends. An important feature of this density and intensity of contact is that it insulates against external 'intrusions' and supplies a continuous contextual running commentary upon the conduct of these subjects own lives. In brief, the various generations, members of the extended family, friends and colleagues share the same lifeworld and contribute to its current protection and projection over time.

Contrast the above pattern with fifty-seven year old Eliot, who runs his antiquarian book business from home as a sole trader. His biography is almost the reverse. His father died when he was very young and his mother remarried, presenting him with two step-brothers. This also entailed three geographical moves around the country, and Eliot's changing schools and boarding from the age of eleven. His earliest friends date from University. Eliot eventually married an equally migratory University lecturer and their two sons were born in a house chosen for occupational convenience and far away from both natal families. To accommodate to the occupational demands of this dual-career couple, weekly boarding was chosen for the children's secondary education. Significantly, it is his work rather than his family which Eliot nominates as his 'ultimate concern', although home-life occupies second place for him. As he talks about the latter, it is clear that he himself is an individualist, that he expects his wife to have her own autonomous concerns and his children to grow up to be independent adults, going their own ways.

The relationships that I have in my own house matter, but not in the way that most other people would assume they matter. But they do rest on respect for other people's priorities within the home ... I think I have to say that either I have a very understanding wife or a wife whose behaviour is as akin to mine as I'm likely ever to find on earth ... As a bookseller ... I normally come around to thinking, no, it isn't that into which I would have happily sent my sons. I wouldn't like to have committed them to following in my footsteps.

Relationships are governed by an 'ethic of responsibility', hammered out between the individuals in question because there are no 'contextual

rules' for them to follow and no 'contextual commentary' to which their definitions are offered-up for communal approval. The importance of the contrast with Angie is that for Eliot and his wife, inter-generational solidarity is largely confined to 'visiting'. As far as the oldest generation is concerned, the 'ethics of responsibility' require that good quality care is ensured for their failing parents, but by out-sourcing, and that personal relations are maintained by regular though rather infrequent 'visits'. Equally irregularly, the boys, one of whom now lives abroad, return home for their own 'visits'. When the elder son started his own business after graduation, the 'ethic of responsibility' required that both Eliot and his wife independently offered him financial assistance, but as someone 'rightfully in charge of his own affairs', these offers were properly declined. What is important for defining the contours of inter-personal relations within this family is that *concerns and contacts are no longer mutually reinforcing*.

In turn, what this indicates is that the biggest threat to inter-generational solidarity, considered at the micro-level, is *a rupture in the dialectics of concerns and contact*. Where there is an absence of 'contextual continuity' in which the individual can become embedded in the first place or a lack of concerns which can be endorsed within this context, these factors together promote the 'responsible family' rather than the 'solidary' geo-local family.

In Britain over the last ten years, the single biggest force disrupting natal contextualisation and rupturing the mutual reinforcement of 'concerns and contact' for young adults is the expansion of University education. Currently the Government's target is that 50% of school leavers should enter University and well over a third are already doing so. Since those taking up these provisions are young people who have failed to locate an occupational outlet within their natal context in which they can invest themselves and because attendance for the majority entails moving away from their home towns, then both the development of concerns and the maintenance of close contact become matters determined outside the natal context.

This is where a connection can now be made with the longitudinal student study. These, it will be recalled, are young people, the vast majority of whom are in their first week of living away from home. Of the population in question, only 11% of these students lived in towns, suburbs and villages surrounding the University. All the students have not only been selected for entrance, they are also self-selected. None of them were content to remain and train within their natal context. Certainly they are disproportionately middle class, (72.3% having fathers in, or who used to be in, managerial and professional occupations and 52% of those whose

mothers work also have or had the same occupational status). But nearly all of these have opted for a high-status University rather than for one near home, which would have been possible for the majority. Interviews confirm that the standing of the University was a prime consideration – outweighing proximity to parents, even for those few who had considered this factor to be of importance.

It will be recalled that 78% of the Coventry population listed the ‘family’ (as defined in Footnote 1) as their first concern in life, with this proportion rising for both those currently in a relationship and also for those with children, regardless of their having a relationship or not. Of course, the Coventry population is different, being made up of those aged from 16 to 80 plus. However, amongst the Coventry residents, the youngest age group of the 16-24 year olds was not substantially different from the older respondents, since 69% of them listed the ‘family’ first (versus 71% for those aged 25 plus), if they are allowed to include their ‘partners’ (as were older subjects, if they used this term).<sup>4</sup>

When the student population is compared with the Coventry 16-24 year olds, large differences immediately surface for their first concerns. Whilst 53% of the Coventry youth strictly listed the ‘family’ first, only 30% of the students did so. If we now add in listing a partner as the first concern, then the student total rises to 43% compared with 69% for Coventry youth. Interestingly, no differences in social class were found for the latter, when the two upper and two lower occupational categories were compared. Of course, it is true that many of these student ‘relationships’, which seem so important to them at the time, will probably prove ephemeral, but this is also likely to be the case for some of their Coventry peers.

Nevertheless, it is also important to take into consideration that the average age of students was 19.7 years, compared with 21.5 for Coventry youth. This may seem a small gap but then again, these are precisely the years during which partnerships stabilise and engagements are contracted. This may well be important because 44% of the Coventry young people stated that they were in a relationship of at least two years duration which vastly outnumbered students in the same position. The significance of this derives from the fact that being in a stable relationship was associated with a rise in the importance attached to the ‘family’ by the Coventry population in general.

<sup>4</sup> Note that this is a more restrictive definition because it excludes ‘friends and family’ in order to concentrate upon family members.

So far, our findings show that when first or ultimate concerns are examined, the 'family' (as defined above) is the dominant concern of Coventry young people, but not of students. What then if we take all their three listed concerns together, remembering that in one's first week at University the demands of work and apprehensions about fitting in will be particularly salient? This seems undoubtedly to be the case. Students' top overall concern was about University work (23%), rising to 28% if 'University social life' is added in and to 34% if 'University in general' is included. The contrast here is perhaps with Coventry young people's second concern with 'work/career' which accounted for 19% of their valid listings. Most importantly, for the Coventry youth, the 'family' retains its pride of place, accounting for 30% of their choices, which is only slightly lower than the 33% accorded to it by the Coventry population in general. Again, those in the Coventry 16-24 age cohort are much more like the older residents of the city than they are like the students.

### *Conclusion*

Despite drawbacks in the comparability of the data, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the family, under their own descriptions, matters more for young people in the general population (some of whom are themselves graduates) than it does for our University entrants. This is entirely in line with the hypothesis deriving from my earlier study (Archer 2003) that *contextual discontinuity*, represented here by the 'great break' that University constitutes for the majority of students, entails a major and often irreparable caesura with the 'solidary' and geo-local family.

Certainly, the importance attached to the family, under their own definitions, seems likely to rise for our students over time and indeed in the short-run. It is highly probable that it will do so, firstly, as many form durable partnerships over the next three years (and all of those interviewed hoped for this). Secondly, the importance attaching to the family will in all likelihood increase again as they have children, something that nearly all of the students interviewed were very clear that they wanted, although they deferred this until approximately ten years further on. (It should be noted that this second increase should also be registered among the Coventry sample of young people, all of whom were childless at the time of interview).

However, because of the 'great break', which has already cut through the students' dense enmeshment in their familial context and because of their uniformly stated desires for satisfying careers, whose locations will

in all likelihood cement their departure from their natal context, they will not tend to form 'solidary' geo-local families even amongst those who came from them. Instead, the 'responsible family' is more likely to be the form that the majority develop. At its core will lie a dual-career partnership, for even though most of the women undergraduates envisaged some interruption of work whilst their children were very young, all intended to resume working. As far as their parents are concerned, it seems unlikely that many of them will find homes with their graduate children in their old age, but attention to and investment in high-quality care will be an ethical responsibility assumed on their behalf. As far as the youngest generation is concerned, the expectation would be that autonomous parents will also be punctilious about the quality of child-care and education selected, but that they would expect their children to 'go their own way' and would view it as a dereliction of their responsibilities not to see their own offspring through University or advanced training – thus fostering the reproduction of this form of family.

What our British students seem set to do is to reproduce the 'family' as a 'responsible partnership' rather than in its more traditional 'solidary' form. If the 'ethics of responsibility' seem to some to represent a diminution in inter-generational concern, this is probably indeed the case at the level of inter-personal relationships. However, I would invite such interpreters to return to consider the various levels at which contributions to inter-generational solidarity can be made, as discussed at the start of this paper, because of a further finding from the British undergraduates. On interview, very few are materialistic, what they seek from work is a comfortable income, not the means for an expensive lifestyle, and what they want above all from their future careers is the moral ability to make a small difference for good. If some would find greater self-fulfilment and social usefulness in working for 'Age Concern', caring for the homeless or in health administration rather than taking personal care of their own parents, and if some would find it in teaching, work with young offenders or with development agencies, then their contribution to inter-generational solidarity will have jumped a level, rather than having disappeared. Only at the end of the longitudinal student study will it be possible to assess how far these early aspirations have become a reality in terms of the careers finally adopted. Meanwhile, in relation to the rest of Europe, one of the biggest differences in the proximate future of different family forms appears to hinge on the proportion of those going to University for whom this entails moving away from home.

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## COMMENTS ON 'FAMILY CONCERNS AND INTER-GENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY'

MARCELO SÁNCHEZ SORONDO

I am very honoured and grateful to President Glendon and Prof. Archer for their invitation to comment on Prof. Archer's important paper on *Family Concerns and Inter-Generational Solidarity*. However, I suspect that this invitation was extended out of kindness and feel that it rather overestimates my capabilities, especially in sociology.

This paper has many merits, above all the choice of the generational approach to understanding complex human phenomena. The notion of 'generation' is very well described. This non-static approach shows us that today several generations coexist and that the relations that are established among them, according to the different conditions of each age group, go to make up the dynamic realities of solidarity or indifference, which at every moment constitute the reality of our lives as humans. As modern thought has emphasised (Dilthey, Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, Jonas), human life develops through time. The notion of a 'generation', converted into a method of sociological investigation, rightly consists, in a certain sense, in projecting the structure of human life onto the present, the past and the future. The advantage of this approach is that it can allow us to discover the most authentic realities of human life in every field. Perhaps we can say that the generational approach enables us to see these realities of human life not from the outside but from within, with reference to their dynamics and actualities.

The phenomenon of globalisation has increasingly led us all to feel that we are contemporaries. We live at the same time and in the same habitat, even though we act to shape it in different ways. Although we are all contemporaries, not all of us are coetaneous. Within the same chronological time span at least three different life timeframes coexist which are coetaneous and which we term 'generations'. More subjectively, a generation is a

group of people who are coetaneous in a circle whose members coexist together and are capable of intervening in a significant way upon society. From this point of view, the concept of 'generation' does not entail more than two essential features: belonging to the same age band and having social contacts that can influence society, as is expressed in the statement that such collectively shared subjectivity permits a 'generation to intervene significantly in social change'. Another notion of 'generation', and a more objective one, is that linked to genealogy, or rather to the biological series of children, parents and grandparents. The Gospel according to St Matthew begins: 'Roll of the genealogy of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham: Abraham fathered Isaac, Isaac fathered Jacob, Jacob fathered Judah and his brothers, etc'. In seeking to identify the social determinants of solidarity, Prof. Archer uses a notion of generation that draws upon the objective and the subjective. At an objective level, 'generations' represent positions within a continuum of descent (p. 123). The subjective component consists in allowing respondents themselves to define who constitutes members of their families (p. 123). 'Inter-generational solidarity' can be conceptualised in different ways and at different levels and can refer to completely different types of agents and actions. At the micro-level, which Prof. Archer focuses on, 'attention would shift to inter-personal relations and to the multifarious ways in which a given generation may or may not be supportive of older or younger ones' (p. 124).

Following these criteria, the study of social determinants among generations is also very well done. In general, I would say that the paper is very convincing when it deals with 'Traditional Conceptions of Social Conditioning and of Personal Motivation in Relation to the Family', and above all when it criticises the deterministic trend in sociology which does not take into account what Prof. Archer very appropriately calls the 'ultimate concerns' of people, 'which are expressive of their identities and therefore are *not* a means to some further end' (p. 133). Prof. Archer explains that:

Commitments are a way of life 'in the round' which affect means as well as ends. We will not understand the precise means selected unless we comprehend the *relationship* which a person sees between their goals and means, and this is something which can only be understood in expressive and not calculative terms (p. 134).

Here we can add further 'ultimate concerns' (employing the terminology of Paul Tillich), which also arise in the centre of the heart of man and which refer to truly ultimate horizons: where we come from, where we are going, and the ultimate meaning of life and of solidarity. Here we are at the

summit of the life of the spirit, within the religious spectrum of man, from which spring continuous questions in relation to which that form of sociology that only searches for 'instrumental rationality' (so well described by Prof. Archer) can say very little or nothing. From this high horizon of the ultimate religious concerns, the human agent can inspire and shine forth all the expressions of life and culture. However, since their origin is different from culture they cannot take the place of culture or social structures. Indeed, one should not underestimate the role that religion plays in culture and in the social effects of the human agent. Religion plays a role, in the main, as a unifying element, as a soul, by offering a framework or scale of values. There are cultures which clearly have a religious basis, such as those of the areas of Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Shinto, and the religions of Africa. Some cultures exclude or marginalise the religious component, such as neo-positivism, Marxism, or Confucianism or other lineages of the Chinese inheritance, but here religion returns surreptitiously in the form of elements or visions that are almost religious in character, such as progress or perfect justice in secular or socialist societies or the social harmony of the Confucian tradition.

In the Christian experience faith has deeply shaped culture. For example, as Francis Fukuyama observed, 'religion played a big role in the renorming process in Britain and the United States during the late nineteenth century'. Given that the Christian message is not bound 'exclusively and indissolubly to any race or nation, any particular way of life or any customary way of life recent or ancient',<sup>1</sup> it has the capacity to enter and to become an internal form of all those cultures that do not exclude it *a priori*. The social order and interpersonal relationships, which have as their basic unit the family, are through it elevated to sacraments of the communication of salvific grace, without changing their own ends of love, solidarity and procreation, which, indeed, are thereby strengthened.

With regard to these 'ultimate concerns', rather than ignoring them or avoiding them within controversies in line with the idea of tolerance that concluded the wars of religion in the Christian West (in the sense of a *modus vivendi* along the lines of Hobbes: 'if we do not want to kill each other then let us tolerate each other'), John Rawls proposed, in his final major work, *The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus*.<sup>2</sup> He argues that it is now necessary to

<sup>1</sup> *Gaudium et Spes*, § 58 c.

<sup>2</sup> 'The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,' *Oxford Journal for Legal Studies* (Spring 1987), 7(1):1-25.

engage in a further step forward, that is to say to recognise that the rival 'metaphysical' ideas that have lain behind and still animate the strong beliefs of citizens of the Western democracies can underpin a minimum corpus of beliefs that can help in a positive sense to create a 'reflective equilibrium'. He is referring here to certain 'comprehensive' theories, of a moral, philosophical or religious kind, which can, despite their mutual opposition, work together through their overlapping to achieve the joint establishment of the specific values of a democracy that can survive in a historical and sociological context characterised by the 'fact of pluralism'. We touch here upon a central point of some extreme forms of liberalism, namely the tendency to exaggerate the fracture effected by modernity and to uphold secularisation not only as fact but as a value, to the point of excluding from the field of discussion – either tacitly or openly – anyone who does not accept *a priori* the Nietzschean profession of the 'death of God'. Such is not the case, for example, in that tradition of classical German thought which, together with Hegel and in opposition to Nietzsche, sees the message of Christ as the only true bearer of freedom in history.<sup>3</sup>

When reading the second part of the paper by Prof. Archer a non-specialist in sociology (and one who has the occupational deformation of a philosophical background) might be led to reflect on how much opposition there is between the principle of responsibility and the principle of solidarity in her discussion of the effects of university education on young people. Of course, if by inter-generational solidarity at the micro-level we mean that actions linked to personal contact with family members constitute the primary form of solidarity, this statement is fully convincing. However, one might raise the question of whether this might not understate an important dimension, namely that there can be frequent inter-generational contacts that are not necessarily characterised by solidarity.

<sup>3</sup>'No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite, ambiguous, and open to the greatest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty... Whole continents, Africa and the East, have never had this Idea, and are without it still. The Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, did not have it. On the contrary, they saw that it is only by birth (as, for example, an Athenian or Spartan citizen), or by strength of character, education, or philosophy (the sage is free even as a slave and in chains) that the human being is actually free. It was through Christianity that this Idea came into the world. According to Christianity, the individual *as such* has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love, destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself, and have God's mind dwelling in him: i.e. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom'. (Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, § 482).

Every day we see that people who live together end up by fighting each other or co-existing only with difficulty. On the other hand, we can also envisage inter-generational relationships that contribute to solidarity but do not revolve round daily contact.

In my opinion, if we think of inter-generational solidarity as a form of friendship, we can quote Aristotle, who says, precisely with reference to the ethical plane, that friendship is not of one kind only. Indeed, this is an essential equivocal notion that one can clarify only by asking about the sort of things that give rise to it – its 'objects,' its *phileta*. Thus, we must (following Aristotle) distinguish three types of friendship: that which involves 'good', that which involves 'utility', and that which involves 'pleasure'.<sup>4</sup> From the point of view of the famous question of 'self-love' the distinction between these three 'objects' is essential. The fact that good is an 'object' of self-love is the reason why *philautia* – which makes each person his or her own friend – is seen by Aristotle as a virtue. What is important here is the orientation towards good. Naturally, friendship as solidarity presents itself from the outset as a mutual relationship. Reciprocity forms by definition a part of friendship and this reciprocity extends all the way to the commonality of 'living together' (*suzen*), and thus includes interpersonal contacts. According to this idea of mutuality, each subject loves another subject *as he is*.<sup>5</sup> This is not the case in friendship based on utility, where a subject loves another for the sake of some expected advantage, and even less is it the case in friendship based on pleasure. We thus see reciprocity already established on the ethical plane (in true friendship there is the object of good). Indeed, when violence arises, for example, there must be respect both for the other subject and for myself. Thus it is that this 'as he is' avoids any selfish approach because it is the foundation of mutuality. This, in turn, cannot be conceived of without reference to good in love for oneself and for one's friend, in friendship and in solidarity. Thus the referring to oneself is not abolished but is, as it were, extended, by mutuality and by solidarity, by the effect of the predicate 'good', which is applied to agents as well as to actions.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> 'It seems that not everything is loved, but only what is lovable [*phileton*], and that this is either what is good [*agaton*], or pleasant, or useful' (*Ethic. Nic.*, VIII, 3, 1155 b 18 f.).

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, VIII, 3, 1156 a 18 f.

<sup>6</sup> 'Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves [*kath'hautous*]', (*Ib.*, VIII, 3, 1156 b 7-9); and later: 'And in loving a friend men love what is good for themselves [*hautois*]; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend' (*Ib.*, VIII, 5, 1157 b 33 f.).

If, therefore, we see solidarity as an expression of friendship, what matters is the ethical relationship with good: being together in good for reciprocal good. I thus raise the question of the qualitative character of interpersonal relationships. In this sense, inter-generational solidarity between family relatives, or their modern version, must be informed by an orientation towards good. Solidarity of this kind cannot be based solely on utility or pleasure.

What can we say about those undergraduates referred to by Prof. Archer in her empirical study on Coventry? According to this study, they prefer to go to a university of standing rather than remain near to their parents. In addition, the students in Coventry give far less value to the family than their counterparts of the same age in the same city. Prof. Archer concludes that 'the family ... matters more for young people in the general population ... than it does for our University entrants' (p. 141) and argues that this is in line with a previous study of hers which reveals that university for the majority of students 'entails a major and often irreparable caesura with the 'solidary' and geo-local family' (p. 141). Prof. Archer goes on to observe that in the future these university graduates will tend more towards organising care by others for their parents rather than being personally close to them in a 'solidary' geo-local sense – such will be the form of inter-generational solidarity that they will express.

This, of course, involves a very profound point about solidarity: whether inter-generational relationships move simply from 'me' to 'you' in the sense of from father to son and so on, what we might call 'genealogical' or 'biological' generations, or whether such relationships also move from 'me' to others with whom I do not have a direct personal link. Of course, one cannot confine inter-generational relationships to the family or a circle of friends and acquaintances: they must extend to all those that I do not know face to face. They include both people who are my contemporaries and those of my age band, and the people who are still to come. Hence, solidarity also expresses itself through just institutions. So, a student who wants to study to improve society and sacrifices his or her immediate relationships of solidarity can also construct inter-generational solidarity, not in the sense of mere genealogical solidarity but in the wider sense of solidarity towards others in existing society and the society to come. This is the point that Hans Jonas discusses when he refers to the new categorical imperative of the ethics of responsibility towards future generations.<sup>7</sup> He

<sup>7</sup> Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility* (1979), The University of Chicago Press, (Chicago, 1994).

rightly interpolates in some way the human tie of filiation among each agent and its distant effects. Therefore, there is the need for a new imperative that forces us to act in such a way as to ensure that there will still be a genuine human life after us.<sup>8</sup> Unlike the Kantian imperative, which implies some contemporaneousness between the agent and he who stands before him, Jonas's imperative considers duration over time. However, we can ask what the idea of solidarity becomes when it is spread over space and the duration of time. This is where we reach the core of the idea of capability, that is, the power-to-do, what Prof. Archer terms 'agency'. Unfortunately, the philosophical lexicon is not very rich in this area. Aristotle, who was the first to describe 'choice' (*proairesis*) and 'deliberation' (*boulesis*) in detail does not have a specific concept of human action that distinguishes the immediate power of doing from causality extended over space and time. He says that actions that 'depend on us'<sup>9</sup> are, for their agent, what children are for their parents,<sup>10</sup> or as instruments, limbs, or slaves are for their owners. Starting from Locke, the moderns added a new metaphor, as we can see in Strawson's theory of 'ascription', where he states that the physical and psychic predicates of the person 'belong to that person completely, that person owns them, they are that person's'. This 'being mine' of the power to act seems to designate a 'primitive fact'.<sup>11</sup> This gives rise to phenomena such as 'initiative' and 'intervention', where the 'immixtion' or interference of the agent of the action in the course of events and facts can be seen. Thus, this interference (or agency) does, actually, cause changes in the world. The fact that we can represent this initiative or intervention of the human agent on things in the course of events and facts as a connection among various kinds of causality must be acknowledged. We must recognise the structure of the action as initiative, that is to say, as the beginning of a series of effects in the course of events and facts that passes between generations, intervening significantly in social change. We have the empirical evidence that we are able to do something every time that we ensure that an action in our power coincides with the opportunity to intervene offered by any course of action that can be extended to future generations.

<sup>8</sup> 'Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life'. (*Ib.*, cit. p. 55).

<sup>9</sup> *Ta eph'hemin* (*Ethic. Nic.*, III, 5 1112 a 30-34).

<sup>10</sup> 'Or else we must contradict what we just now asserted, and say that man is not the originator and begetter of his actions as he is of his children'. (*Ib.*, III, 7, 1113 b 16 f.).

<sup>11</sup> P. Strawson, *Individuals*, Methuen and Co. (London 1959), pp. 125-180.

If Coventry undergraduates through their university studies should find something essential for the good of mankind or at least avoid causing irreparable damage to the integrity of human beings and their habitat, i.e. the environment, one could well say that they will have contributed to achieving (or not achieving) inter-generational solidarity in a 'historical' sense and indirectly to inter-generational solidarity in a family sense.



**SECOND SESSION**

**SOCIAL POLICY, FAMILY POLICY,  
AND INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS**

# SOCIAL POLICY, FAMILY POLICY AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY: A NEW DESIGN

PIERPAOLO DONATI

## *Summary*

Over recent years, social policy has attempted to deal with the question of solidarity among different generations principally through the intervention of the State and the market. The family has been dealt with in a somewhat schizophrenic manner: on the one hand, it has been privatised and its role as a social institution has been marginalized; on the other hand, however, it has been employed as a public instrument in an attempt to remedy the failure of the State and the market. The hypothesis I would like to submit is that social policy has had a distorted effect on those very relations of solidarity it is designed to support. The present result is an increasingly harsh struggle between generations over control of the rights to public resources.

What I am suggesting is that intergenerational solidarity needs to be redefined as a 'cooperative game' involving all players within the framework of a *societal* approach to social policy: an approach entitled *complex subsidiarity* based on three cornerstones: 1) the differentiation of those social spheres dealing with the problem of intergenerational solidarity; 2) the allocation of diverse duties and resources to each sphere; 3) the regulation of relationships between the said spheres on the basis of the principle of reciprocal subsidiarity.

The main aim of this approach is the promotion of *new institutions* of 'subsidiarity through reciprocity' within each of these spheres. In this way, it becomes possible to pursue a family-friendly form of social policy, consisting in guaranteeing that all public, private and mixed (public-private) institutions face up to the problem of creating and distributing resources among generations in such a way as not to harm the family as a mediator of intergenerational solidarity.

## 1. *The Crisis of Solidarity Among Generations: The Issue and the Theses*

1.1. The question of the crisis of solidarity in relations between generations has become an increasingly acute social problem in recent years, one with profound long-term implications. In a growing number of countries, mention is frequently made of generational conflict (*generational clash*, *Generationenkrieg*).<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, we have yet to really grasp the full meaning of this crisis and to understand what it is to be done about it.<sup>2</sup>

This question currently affects the developed world: however, given that generational conflict is intrinsic to the processes of modernisation and globalisation, the problem is bound to affect all countries in the long run, albeit in different ways and at different times.

What does the problem consist in exactly? The solidarity crisis may be initially defined as the lack of social rules, either written or unwritten, envisaged or otherwise, whereby one generation is called upon to support the others. These rules have been replaced by a conflict of interests, and the consequence of this is the increasingly strong, dramatic competition between generations for control of access to available resources.

In the past, parents helped their children grow up, and then when the children reached adulthood they in turn helped their now elderly parents through their old age. The welfare state has since intervened, providing young people with support and with equal opportunities when their parents are no longer alive or are unable to provide the necessary support themselves: likewise, it supports the elderly thus freeing the younger generations from the burden of having to do so. This external intervention has become increasingly important, and in the more advanced welfare state systems, the expectations of both the young and the elderly in terms of economic well-being now depend more on state benefits (through the tax system and a complex system of entitlements) than on support from the other generations.

<sup>1</sup> I am not going to justify this affirmation with lengthy quotes from recent studies, but would simply suggest that the reader look at the bibliography in question, and in particular at Malinvaud (2002), Piancastelli and Donati (2003), and Bertocchi (2004).

<sup>2</sup> I would like to cite one particular example. The European Commission Report entitled *Towards a Europe for All Ages. Promoting Prosperity and Intergenerational Solidarity* (EC Commission 1999), focuses only on the elderly and the various programmes designed to improve their living conditions, while completely ignoring the system of relations with other generations.

The emergence of the welfare state is, of course, a positive development in that it has guaranteed a greater degree of fairness in the distribution of income to the more disadvantaged sectors of the population: however, the way in which the welfare state has intervened has led to a number of distortions, of which the following are but two examples.

*First distortion:* the logic of pressure and agreement inherent in the welfare state has meant that in many countries, the redistribution of wealth among generations performed by the State tends to favour the elderly, to the detriment of children and the younger generations. The resources that ought to be accumulated for future generations are being spent on today's elderly, and there is a growing awareness that today's youth, as they become adults and subsequently elderly themselves, will have fewer available welfare resources compared with previous generations.

*Second distortion:* the 'middle' generation (today's adults) are subjected to increasing social pressure, forced as they are to take care of both their young children, their elderly parents, and – given the gradual increase in life expectancy – of their grandparents as well. Therefore these intermediate generations are said to be 'squeezed', as the welfare state burdens the families of adult parents with the entire cost of its social policies.

Moreover, whereas the welfare state is considered the guarantor of intergenerational solidarity from the point of view of legislative expectation, in practice the welfare state's action is limited (as proven by the persistence of poverty) and has become increasingly critical in terms of economic feasibility. In any case, the welfare state has not replaced the intergenerational transfers that occur within the family-parent system. Private transfers continue, and are of considerable importance even in the more developed welfare state systems (Kohli, 1999).

The question that has to be asked is: should the welfare state continue with, and eventually increase, its intervention in the regulation of exchanges between generations, or should another approach be adopted?

1.2. There are various potential solutions to the above-mentioned problem. An initial solution lies in the reform of the welfare state itself, designed to make it better suited to achieving equal opportunities both within each generation and among the various different generations. This approach is based on the belief that solidarity can only be achieved if priority is given to the use of political power over all other means (I am going to call this the *lab* approach). A second solution is based on the belief that the crisis of the welfare state is irreversible, and as such a market-based approach needs to

be adopted, whereby each generation is called upon to worry about its own future (I shall call this the *lib* approach). A third solution, on the other hand, is based on the belief that solidarity among different generations is a complex question of rules of exchange between the diverse levels of society (the State, the market, the third sector and families), and as such it proposes to redesign social policies on the basis of the subsidiarity principle (I shall call this the *subsidiarity* approach).

1.3. In the present paper I wish to take a closer look at the underlying reasons for choosing this third option. In order to do so, I shall start by observing that currently existing models of social policy are generally characterised by one of two opposing approaches: the first approach entrusts the problems of intergenerational solidarity to the mechanisms of the free market; the second approach deals with such problems through the use of the State's political power, with policy consisting of prescriptive programmes. In both cases, the outcome has been unsatisfactory, negative, and in some cases, even contorted. Moreover, proposals of a mix of the free market and State regulation (*lib/lab*) fail to remedy this situation.

My hypothesis here is that it is possible to find alternative solutions provided we conceive of social policy within the framework of a partnership-type conception of welfare institutions, based on the principle of subsidiarity, that manages to valorise the agency of the social subjectivity of the family and the network of associations surrounding the family, through a complex series of citizenship's rights-duties granted to the family and to those civil associations that promote intergenerational solidarity.

This hypothesis is based on the following points:

(i) *Each social policy requires a suitable definition of the term 'generation'.* Social policies tend to contain different understandings of exactly what 'generations' consist in. The majority of present-day social policies employ an abstract, impersonal concept of generation, one that is no more than a simple statistical aggregate of individuals, and this leads to the obliteration of generational *relations*. Generations are thus reduced to mere entities of production and consumption. It should be pointed out that the ideas the State and the market have of generations are only of use for certain operations within the field of political economics (such as those concerning the distribution of certain types of resources), but not for formulating social policies designed to encourage solidarity among generations. In order to achieve such solidarity,

social policies need to contain a definition of the term 'generation' that explicates and valorises the relational nature of solidarity (section 2);

(ii) *We need to go beyond the existing, obsolete models of welfare.* Traditional social policy models are quickly becoming obsolete. The three most common ideal-type models (which I shall call, respectively, the *lib* model, the *paternalistic or vertical subsidiarity state* model, and the *lab* model) all have serious limitations. Their evolution tends to lead towards a scenario characterised by what, for the sake of brevity, I shall call '*lib/lab* solutions', i.e. a mix of State intervention and the free-market approach. An analysis of these solutions leads us to think that they themselves are incapable of meeting the considerable challenges to intergenerational solidarity the future holds. Thus I am going to counter this scenario with an alternative one: one characterised by *societal or complex subsidiarity*. Such solutions are new in that they are based upon relational policies (see Donati, 2003a), and they are slowly emerging in experimental forms in a number of different countries. A comparison of the two approaches (*lib/lab* on the one hand and *subsidiarity* on the other) will help to clarify their differences (section 3);

(iii) *A complex notion of intergenerational solidarity that takes account of the role of the family.* I also believe that the failure of social policy is due, first and foremost, to the way in which social policy actors have conceived the roles played by the family and family-based associations. Traditional social policies have acted upon primary and associative networks in ways that have weakened and 'eroded' the family as society's primary form of social capital. If we wish to regenerate the fabric of solidarity among generations, we need to ensure that social policy be based upon a complex notion of solidarity corresponding to certain specific dimensions, criteria and institutions.

To put it briefly, intergenerational solidarity is based on the synergy between four different, fundamentally important spheres, together with their respective criteria of social justice: the State (solidarity in the form of the redistribution of wealth: redistributive justice); the market (solidarity in the form of equal opportunities: commutative equity); the family (primary solidarity in the form of acknowledgment: justice as sharing); the world of civil associations (secondary solidarity as a principle of reciprocity among generations as adopted by private social associations and non-profit organisations: justice as mutual aid and extended reciprocity) (section 4).

In the concluding section, I shall try to illustrate some concrete proposals concerning the nature of those institutions, based on solidarity and subsidiarity, that could be set up in order to deal with the growing lack of intergenerational solidarity in those areas characterised by the failure of both the State and the market (section 5).

## *2. Which Generations and What Kind of Solidarity Are We Talking About Here? Certain Common Misunderstandings*

2.1. Why has intergenerational solidarity become a problem, and why, in particular, has it become a problem within the social policy field?

There are a number of empirical reasons for the above, and various explanations have been furnished for the decline in intergenerational relations. On the one hand, the causes are to be found in the processes of modernisation and globalisation that weaken social ties and empty them of their intrinsic value; on the other hand, they consist in the fact that the welfare state itself has made generations increasingly anonymous, fragmented and impersonal, since it has reinforced (rather than countered) the commercialisation of the market.

Intergenerational solidarity became a problem the moment society stopped seeing generations as historical, social and cultural entities, and began perceiving them simply as statistical aggregates to be used in order to calculate private consumption and welfare expenditure. Imbalances, separations and conflicts between generations have been a constant of modernity: nevertheless, the present crisis arose at the peak of expansion of the welfare state (from the 1980s onwards), at the same time as the so-called second demographic transition characterising western countries (Donati, 1991).

The concept of generation has gradually come to mean something of a rather generic nature. International debate increasingly focuses on what it sees as the equality of generations, but both terms (equality and generations) are becoming increasingly vague (Barry, 2000; Donati, 2002).

The idea of 'leaving a better world for future generations' ('tomorrow's humanity') is of course a valid and essentially important one: however, when 'generation' is conceived of in terms of a general population living on Earth at Time T1 and at Time T2, this could annul the meaning of what it is that gives rise to the generations.<sup>3</sup> In fact, our problem concerns generations per-

<sup>3</sup> See the *UN Declaration on the responsibilities of the present generations towards future generations* (Unesco, Paris, 12 November 1997). This declaration perceives gener-

ceived as groups with blood ties, linked by a series of concrete relationships involving short, medium and long-term responsibilities. The replacing of such relations with a vague concept of solidarity between present and future humanity is an abstract operation. Generations either constitute a relational concept (they consist of persons tied by relationships of descent) or they do not exist at all. Social policy, however, fails to grasp this relational quality, and in fact tends to limit such relations to that between parents and their under-age children within the framework of the limited, privatised family sphere.

The fact remains that the concepts of generation and intergenerational solidarity are expressed in purely physical and economical terms. Society itself is thus reduced to an abstract collection of individuals who are not linked by any real social relations, but only by the commonly-shared problem of economic and physical survival.

If we wish to construe a social policy of intergenerational solidarity, then we need to start by deciding which definition of generation is to be used within the social policy sphere.

2.2. The word 'generation' can be defined in at least four very different ways (Donati, 1997):

- in the *statistical* sense of the word, a generation is seen as a *demographic cohort* of those individuals born in the same year or within a certain statistical interval of  $n$  years;
  - in the *historical* sense of the word, a generation is an *age group* which although it may coincide with a demographic cohort, is perceived as a social group due to the fact that its members are united by a certain historical experience or by a given lifestyle;
- among specialists, a commonly-held perception of generation is the one derived from the writings of K. Mannheim: it is seen in the *socio-political and socio-cultural* sense as a 'generational unit' defined as an age sub-group producing and leading social and cultural movements in that it shares a common ideological identity; this definition is widely used in the sociological field, and it tends to associate a given generation with a given ideological movement, as a result of which the term 'generation' loses its blood-tie associations;

ations as anonymous, impersonal, soulless masses. Instead of generation we could use the term 'posterity', 'the inhabitants of the Earth in 50, 100 or 200 years' time', or some other such term. Such an abstract, indeterminate concept of generation is of no use in the social policy field.



– in the *sociological* sense of the word, a generation is a *social entity* corresponding to that group of individuals who share a given position with regard to family ties, that is, in accordance with biological and cultural inheritance, those relations that are socially mediated by the family and relatives.

Generally speaking, social policy has made use of, and continues to make use of, the first of the above four definitions, that is, the statistical definition of the demographic cohort. Thus the historical, social and cultural aspects of what a generation means in relation to other generations have been effectively removed. The perception of society as a morphogenetic process deriving from relations between different generations has been all but lost. Social policies have ended up perceiving society as an aggregate of individuals struggling against each other, rather than a fabric of relationships, albeit to a certain extent ambivalent and conflictual, in need of solidarity.

2.3. It is easy to see that social policy models vary according to the definition of generation that one adopts. Briefly speaking, there are three major models dealing with the question of intergenerational solidarity (summarised in fig. 1).

#### I. *The First Model is that of Sustainability*

Solidarity between one generation and the next is hereby understood to consist in the fact that one generation ought not to harm the opportunities the subsequent generations are going to have to make use of the available resources. The concept of generation employed here is that of a given, living population at any one moment in time. This model invokes solidarity among generations as a general bioethical criterion valid for any actor (Dobson, 2000). However, social policies refer in particular to market players and State functionaries. Strategy is based on criteria of economic utility and legislative sanction. Incentives are offered to those who successfully adopt such criteria, while those who fail to do so are penalised.

It is clearly vitally important to acknowledge the importance of solidarity among generations as a criterion of public ethics, one that establishes a form of social responsibility towards future generations. It educates people in the art of 'ethical consumption'. Nevertheless, while this model can be applied with relative ease when natural resources (first and foremost the natural environment) are at stake, it is much more difficult to employ in the social policy field. The reason for this is that social policy resources do not constitute a stock comparable to that of natural resources.

## II. *The Second Model is that of Welfare Entitlements*

Intergenerational solidarity is conceived as equal opportunity of access to those welfare rights granted to each demographic cohort by the political-administrative system. The concept of generation employed here is simply a demographic-statistical variety (young people, adults, the elderly). Solidarity among different generations is basically seen as a political problem of a distributive nature, perceived in statistical terms. It pertains to government policies in the strict sense of the word, and as such is a rather limited concept.

## III. *The Third Model I Shall Call the Relational Model*

Intergenerational solidarity is defined as a complex of rules which define the relational rights and duties pertaining to people who have in common similar relations of family descent (i.e. belonging to groups, and the relations between such groups, characterised by given blood ties). The concept of generation is a sociological one: it refers to an age group in that the individual members have similar family relations (giving birth to, given birth by) mediated by society (that is, they are seen as children, parents, grandparents, great-grandparents etc.). This model covers all actors, both public and private, although it is particularly keyed to those from civil society. In this

THREE MODELS OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND EQUITY		
MODELS of social policy	Definition of intergenerational solidarity/equity	Concept of generation
(I) the <i>sustainability</i> model	Equal opportunity of access to natural and environmental goods and to the collective resources of social welfare	The population in general or a part thereof
(II) the <i>entitlements</i> model	Equal opportunity of access to social welfare rights	Generation conceived of as a statistical cohort (those individuals born within a given time interval: children-young people-adults-the elderly).
(III) the <i>relational</i> model	The relational rights and duties of certain groups connected by descent and <i>between</i> these groups (on the basis of the principle of reciprocity)	Age groups that have in common similar relations of family descent (giving birth to/given birth by) mediated by the society (children-parents-grandparents-great-grandparents)

Fig. 1. Source: Donati, 2002.

case, solidarity among different generations is defined in more generalised terms than in previous cases, as it regards all types of good (i.e. not only natural resources and citizenship entitlements, but also the human and social capital associated with the transmission of a given cultural heritage).

Thus the way we define policies of intergenerational solidarity depends largely on our understanding of the term generation, of the relations between generations, and of the most appropriate ways of dealing with these relations.

### *3. The Ways Social Policy Deals with the Problem of Intergenerational Solidarity: Old and New Models*

3.1. For over a century, 'social policy' was synonymous with welfare state. It was believed that solidarity between the generations was written in the social pact upon which the welfare state, perceived as the 'public family', was founded. The distribution of public resources involved the application of criteria similar to those perceived to have been adopted by a nation's families. Today this pact is being challenged both in the public sphere and in the everyday lives of families.

What lies behind this change in society? It would seem that we are witnessing an historical process whereby the collectivising impulse that modern society has searched through the Nation-State has significantly diminished. The collectivising impulse of the past has been replaced by the mechanisms of the free market, which is now only required to observe a limited number of criteria of equity with regard to which the State reserves the right to intervene (equal opportunities, principles of sexual, racial and religious non-discrimination, etc.).

The withering away of traditional forms of solidarity has led to the emergence of a rather worrying historical scenario. What exactly lies behind such transformations? An inexorable decline in solidarity between generations, or, on the contrary, the opportunity for new forms of solidarity to emerge?

It would not be exactly correct to say that there emerges a paucity of solidarity in all fields: what we are witness to, rather, is a process of differentiation, whereby solidarity diminishes in certain areas but increases in others. New rules of play are emerging in each area of action. The point is that in many social policy sectors, the concept of generation is usually presented as a vague criterion employed in the definition of the strategies and concrete measures to be adopted.

3.2. The standard social policy of welfare systems linked to the entitlements and sustainability models, takes age as a distributive criterion, but does not possess a cultural framework whereby individuals of different ages are linked in a relational manner. Generations are thus perceived as competing groups of individuals.

The underlying reason for this situation, I believe, consists in the fact that social policies, even when directly or indirectly concerned with intergenerational solidarity, tend to be based on the idea that society is fundamentally no more than a stage for economic and political competition for the available resources. The relational model offers something more than this: let us now try to understand how relational policies can be perceived without having to rely on the above-mentioned existing models.

3.3. Let us consider the ideal-type models of social policy that have until now tried to guarantee intergenerational solidarity. I am going to analyse their differences and, above all, their limits (with regard to the individual characteristics of such models, see fig. 2).<sup>4</sup> Unlike other writers,<sup>5</sup> I am going to distinguish between three different models.

#### (1) *Liberal Systems*

Such systems leave solidarity between generations to the private sphere, and only intervene in cases of extreme necessity after the event (*liberal* policies). They have low levels of social cost and of regulation of generational relations.

<sup>4</sup> I propose to use ideal-types similar to those normally used in debates on welfare capitalism. The reason I call these types 'ideal-types' is that empirical types, as Arts and Gelissen have recently observed (2002), are rather complex hybrids. As it is well-known, Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes between three worlds of welfare capitalism (liberal, conservative-corporatist, social-democratic), to which he adds a fourth ('Mediterranean model') characterized by the fact of being a more 'family-based' form. But this typology remains rather problematic, and ultimately prove distorting or useless. For the sake of simplicity, I therefore believe it is a good idea to employ only an ideal-typical typology, since empirical types prove difficult to classify.

<sup>5</sup> In the USA, some scholars believe that two principal trends can be distinguished: on the one hand, there are those supporters of 'generational equity' as the duty and responsibility of the private sphere (the *conservatives*), and on the other, there are those who believe in the need for the State to promote interdependence between generations (the *liberals*) (Williamson, MacNamara and Howling, 2003).

The basic principle that governs *the civil rights of intergenerational solidarity is that of private property* and of the institution connected to this, that is, the family defined in contractual terms (this is the framework within which the concept of 'generational equity' is placed according to Williamson, MacNamara and Howling, 2003).

The strategies and concrete measures adopted mainly focus on private insurance (health, social security and personal social services): the State is perceived as playing a secondary role, while the third sector is seen as playing a purely charitable role (compassionate capitalism).

The distorted effects of this approach, this ideology of capitalist individualism, can be seen in the fragmentation of the social fabric, in a high degree of illegitimate inequality and of injustice in the distribution of wealth. Intergenerational relations are individualised by legislation and are characterised by a *natural drift*.

## (2) *Traditional Corporative Systems*

This type of regime links the welfare treatment of different generations to the positions held by individuals in the labour market, on the one hand, and within the family on the other. State measures are mainly addressed to the provision of income maintenance benefits related to occupational status. This means that the sphere of solidarity remains quite narrow and corporatist. These regimes are dominant in Continental European countries – such as France, Germany and, to a certain degree, Italy.

Within such systems, the generational problem is defined by the fact that the two large categories in question, namely *children* and *the elderly*, lie outside of the sphere of the employment contract,<sup>6</sup> and thus depend upon the family and/or the State. As a result, the problem of solidarity between different generations is seen as a trade off – not always of the cooperative variety, but often of a conflictual variety – between the family and the State. Subsidiarity is mainly of the vertical variety. In some cases, such as that of Italy, subsidiarity maybe reversed, and it is the family that subsidises the State, rather than vice-versa.

The structural weakness of this model lies in the fact that, unlike the *lib* and *lab* models, such systems design the welfare system on the basis of the 'model' family (standard or regular according to the socio-cultural standards

<sup>6</sup> With regard to wages as a link between monetary flows and welfare: see Maier and Harvey (2003).

of the time). When such a model loses its leading position either in real terms or in terms of public support (as is the case of the one-breadwinner family based on a stable couple and a given number of children), then certain problems arise, and social policy has to be redesigned as a result.

### (3) *Lab Systems*

These systems distribute welfare benefits as individual citizenship entitlements to the various age categories, accompanied by certain controls and obligations aimed at guaranteeing higher levels of social equality (*lab* policies). They are characterised by a high social cost and a considerable degree of regulation of intergenerational relations.

In this way, intergenerational solidarity is basically treated as a political question: the State is obliged to intervene beforehand in all ordinary situations, rather than just after the event when situations of poverty arise.

The strategies and concrete measures adopted are based on what Esping-Andersen (2002) calls the *decommodification* of everyday needs and services. However, this term remains rather ambiguous given that the same author proposes that welfare benefits granted to families be taxed (Esping-Andersen, 2002, p. 17).

This model is based on the intrinsic, structural mistrust in the capacity of the family to perform an equitable, independent function (Anderberg and Balestrino, 2003). The result of this is that such systems tend to reduce, rather than increase, the *empowerment* of the family.

The distortive effects are reflected in the fact that intergenerational relations fluctuate as a result of their regulation, in a similar way to those in the *lib* model; the difference between the two models being that in the case of the *lib* model, this fluctuation is driven by market forces, whereas in the *lab* model, it is induced by state regulation.

The three models described in the following page are all going through a critical period for a variety of different reasons: however, in my view the key issue here is that all of them (fig. 2) accept that the problem of solidarity between generations has to be perceived as a public issue rather than just a private one. Nevertheless, the 'public' rules that have been adopted vary from one case to the next. Since in the case of each of the three models, the choice of the main criterion tends to exclude all others, each model is in itself of a critical nature. The so-called '*conservative*' policies (this is what they are called in the USA, whereas in Europe they are named '*liberal*') tend to privatise intergenerational solidarity duties, whereas the *liberal* (in Europe, named '*social-democratic*') policies tend to defend the welfare

<b>IDEAL-TYPE MODELS OF WELFARE POLICIES SUPPORTING INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY</b>			
Type of system: Category of analysis	<b>(1) Compassionate capitalist systems (lib)</b> <i>(market-driven social policies)</i>	<b>(2) Corporative-style systems</b> <i>(occupational category-driven social policies)</i>	<b>(3) Social-democratic systems (lab)</b> <i>(state-driven social policies)</i>
<i>Example countries</i>	<b>USA (and many English-speaking countries in general)</b>	<b>Continental European Countries (mainly Germany and Italy, partially France)</b>	<b>Scandinavian and similar countries</b>
<i>Role of the State</i>	Minimal (in order to maximise private freedom)	Considerable (in order to guarantee the collective protection of the various social categories)	Maximum (in order to maximise social equality)
<i>Public spending (and the respective fiscal pressure)</i>	As low as possible (in order to encourage private insurance schemes)	High (in order to maintain levels of redistribution of wealth high)	As high as possible (in order to maximise public redistribution of wealth)
<i>Objectives</i>	Leave intergenerational solidarity to direct exchanges within the family and among relatives and to market mechanisms (in order to keep public intervention to a minimum)	Social welfare treatment for all and the guaranteed protection of those social categories (of workers) capable of making a contribution	The statutory redistribution of wealth in favour of the less fortunate age groups by means of political power (the direct and indirect transfer to the less fortunate age groups and to the more marginalized areas of life)
<i>Concrete measures (rights to resources)</i>	– Freedom as the choice of the owner or consumer – Eliminate taxation from exchanges within the family circle – Assistance limited to the poor (those below the poverty line) who merit it	– Conditional, selective freedom of access to benefits – Strong contributory system – Control of the poverty thresholds (above and below)	– Control over inequalities by means of vertical redistribution – Universal, uniform treatment – Taxation of exchanges within the family circle – Taxation of family benefits if necessary
<i>Basic principle governing intergenerational solidarity</i>	Private property-based rights	Social (occupational) category-based rights	Individual citizenship-based rights
<i>The understanding and implementation of the principle of subsidiarity</i>	<b>Subsidiarity as a residual intervention (as a form of <i>ex post</i> help in extreme cases of need)</b>	<b>Subsidiarity as a stratified and organic principle of conservative social cohesion</b>	<b>Subsidiarity as a safety net for the entire length of a person's life (welfarism)</b>

Fig. 2.

state. Both approaches appear increasingly incapable of dealing with the public issue of intergenerational solidarity, as they both fail to evaluate their effects on the family life-worlds. The traditional, corporative-style model, which is the one that is most aware of its repercussions on family relations, and thus the one most prepared to regulate intergenerational solidarity by means of the family, finds itself in difficulty when faced with the principle of equal opportunities (between the sexes and among generations). In fact, since it is based on the principles of the recognition and valorisation of social ties (its reference unit is the family group-institution, also in statistical terms), it has problems in achieving equity when the latter is seen as equal to individual opportunities.

3.4. Those models inherited from the past are affected by deep-rooted changes as a result both of their internal deficiencies, and of the external pressures they are subjected to (globalisation). The alternatives seem to point in two directions. On the one hand, they tend towards a mixture of various different criteria, and in general towards welfare systems of the reformist variety (for which reason I refer to them as *lib/lab*). On the other hand, since such mixed approaches are also blighted by continual failure, social policy needs to be thoroughly redesigned. Hence the decisive role to be played by the alternatives I call 'configurations of complex subsidiarity'. Let us now take a brief look at both of the said scenarios (fig. 3).

#### (I) *The Reformist Scenarios (Lib/Lab Mix Proposals)*

Such scenarios, combining both *lib* and *lab* approaches, result in the so-called *welfare mix*. The corporate model policies, envisaging support for intergenerational solidarity in the form of separate economic treatment for different social categories, are all but abandoned. In any case, the idea of intergenerational solidarity based on the family as a whole is abandoned, as are the concepts of *basic family income* and *family wage* (Montanari, 2000). The tax system no longer envisages taxation designed to support intergenerational solidarity through the institution of the family, since its objective is now that of taxing individuals and their lifetime opportunities (for a review of European tax systems, see: Dingeldey, 2001). Therefore, this approach carefully avoids any definition of the family, apart from when safeguarding relations between parents and children (the matrimonial bond is privatised, while the individual tie between an individual parent and his/her child is subjected to increasing obligations). The world of rights



(and by implication, that of the family and of generational relations) is basically an individualistic one (see the EU's *Charter of Fundamental Rights*, which does not safeguard the family as a social institution, but only as an individual right) (I have written extensively on this question elsewhere).

The strategies adopted are based on the principles of privatisation and decentralisation mixed together with elements of community care. Concrete measures are seen as an attempt to establish more widely integrated and socially controlled systems of benefits and services (Bahle, 2003).

The major distortive effects are: firstly, the battle among the generations over entitlement to resources in a markedly antagonistic context; secondly, the fact that policies of inclusion lead to further exclusions. It should be said that these effects are largely due to the fact that treatment of the various generations is no longer based on social status, but rather on a criterion of a contractual nature (Handler, 2003).

Those who talk of subsidiarity within this framework see it essentially as an instrument of reform within the context of the State/market complex. Civil society may be involved, not as an autonomous subject, but rather as a subject delegated to perform certain functions of a political-administrative nature.

If we focus, as Maier and Harvey (2003, p. 19) have done, on the methods of obtaining resources, on the ways of distributing benefits and on the links between the two, the *lib/lab* idea is that of countering the diverse forms of 'socialisation' of social resources called for by the *lab* models (in particular, through taxation of individuals and families), and of seeing how these resources can be utilised and can change over time. For example, the statutory monetary transfers from one generation of employees to another generation of former employees can be achieved by means of both income tax systems and of social welfare funds involving both employers and employees. Both forms of socialisation imply the transfer of purchasing power from the group that is subjected to the withdrawal to the social groups that benefit from it and thus are able to purchase goods. Maier and Harvey point out that this is not just an act of decommmodification, or of socialisation whereby resources are subtracted from the market economy. On the contrary, it involves the creation of societally instituted forms of resource flows to which a great variety of different rights exist.

This model constitutes, above all, a critique of the excessive socialisation inherent in the lab approach, and as such represents a social-democratic model integrated with elements of liberalism.

## (II) *The 'Complex Subsidiarity' Scenarios*

Such scenarios are characterised by the abandonment of the lib/lab philosophy as the underlying principle of social policy. This lib/lab compromise is replaced by a complex subsidiarity principle (both vertical and horizontal, circular and mixed).

The 'subsidiarity through reciprocity' approach is recognisable from the fact that it creates new associative institutions designed to tackle the everyday problem of intergenerational solidarity. This is not welfarism, since the objective here is that of empowering those social spheres that mediate between one generation and the next. Such spheres involve, at one and the same time, the production, distribution and consumption of those goods and services that are normally considered to be the object of social policy (welfare goods). A particularly important role is played by *relational goods and services*. These forms of subsidiarity can be said to constitute a 'societal model' in that they are designed to produce societal organisations in which intergenerational solidarity is considered their prime objective (Donati, 2003a). This model can be found in geopolitical settings where support is given to mutual aid, cooperation and social benefit investment among generations through programmes managed by *ad hoc* non-governmental, non-profit organisations.

The societal model's strategies and concrete measures focus on the creation of ad hoc institutions that in general are *non-profit* and *multi-stakeholder* (when the major stakeholders are the generations themselves). The key aims are: to render those social powers, that are responsible for the management of intergenerational resource flows, accountable for their actions; to help families operate towards establishing solidarity among generations (support and promotion of the family as a social subject of redistribution), as well as those associations dealing with intergenerational problems.

Subsidiarity is changing radically: what Maier and Harvey call 'socially instituted forms of resource flows' are today configured as new forms of socialisation created by the third sector, possibly in collaboration with organizations belonging to other sectors. The question is: who are these actors? They stem from civil society, and include examples such as: the ethical banks, specific community foundations supporting intergenerational solidarity, organizations of mutual aid, social cooperatives and social enterprises (in Italian 'imprese sociali') run for those families that on their own are not capable of dealing with problems of reciprocal aid in various areas of daily life. In these cases, what we are witness to is a process of *decom-*

<b>TWO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS OF WELFARE POLICIES</b>		
<b>SUPPORTING INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY</b>		
Type of scenario: Category of analysis:	<b>(I) Reformist scenarios</b> <i>(complex market ↔ state-driven social policies)</i> <b>(lib/lab mix)</b>	<b>(II) Scenarios of 'complex subsidiarity through reciprocity'</b> <b>(societal model)</b>
<i>Example countries</i>	Generally speaking, the so-called 'European social model'	Emerging experiments in certain countries or regions (on a limited scale)
<i>Role of the State</i>	Regulator of an optimum balance between equal opportunities and individual freedom	Relational guide (governance) of intermediary social formations in their reciprocal solidarity
<i>Public spending (and the respective fiscal pressure)</i>	Rationalise public spending using criteria of selectivity and set targets	Qualify public spending according to the solidarity it produces within the various social spheres
<i>Objectives</i>	Compulsory individualism (governing equal opportunities in the market and in generalized exchanges)	Render those social powers, that are responsible for the management of intergenerational resource flows, accountable for their actions (and in particular, help families to contribute towards intergenerational solidarity)
<i>Concrete measures (rights to resources)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enforcement of individual equal opportunities</li> <li>- Selective benefits</li> <li>- Primarily vertical, partially horizontal redistribution measures</li> <li>- Active fight against the poverty of women and children</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 'Third-party' societal institutions (neither state-run nor private) governed according to the principle of intergenerational reciprocity</li> <li>- Non profit enterprises in which the stakeholders are the generations themselves</li> <li>- Forms of mutual aid among families for several (more than 3) generations</li> </ul>
<i>Basic principle governing intergenerational solidarity</i>	<i>Minimum safety net for all</i> + <i>Employment-based rights</i>	<i>Minimum safety net for all</i> + <i>Rights based on associational memberships</i>
<i>The understanding and implementation of the principle of subsidiarity</i>	<b>Subsidiarity as an employment incentive (workfare and associated benefits)</b>	<b>Subsidiarity as a relationship of reciprocal valorisation (societal governance of intergenerational exchange relations, e.g. family insurances schemes)</b>

Fig. 3.

*modification*, not through political channels but through *civil ones*. This is the model of those systems that I have chosen to call subsidiary in a new and complex way.

The alternative, represented by those societal systems based on complex subsidiarity, does not replace either the State or the free market, but prevents these actors from going beyond their own specific functions. Such a model must perform the following operations:

(i) it must formulate differentiated spheres, that is, it must distinguish between the intergenerational exchange criteria adopted in the various different social spheres (in the family-relatives sphere, in the State, in the market, in civil society's associative sphere).<sup>7</sup>

(ii) it must develop *ad hoc* institutions when solidarity comes into play. Since intergenerational solidarity is only dealt with in a partial, reductive manner by the State and by the market, and since the family is an increasingly weak institution, it must develop new institutions of 'subsidiarity through reciprocity' capable of dealing with intergenerational solidarity as primary and secondary social capital within the sphere of civil society (Donati, 2003b).

(iii) it must link the various spheres to each other, and in particular it must enable institutions of civil solidarity to influence the State and the market, putting the terms of relations of reciprocal subsidiarity to them (Willke, 2003).

My argument is that the defects in the *lib*, *lab* and *lib/lab* models derive from the fact that these models fail to base solidarity on a complex principle of subsidiarity, and therefore solidarity becomes mere welfarism and workfare disguised as concern for social cohesion.

The complex subsidiarity model (fig. 3, column II) is seen by many scholars simply as a corrective to the other models. However, in my view it underlies a societal structure which, from many points of view, is radically different. It perceives employment contracts, property, welfare systems (pensions, health care, welfare care) very differently: they are no longer seen as a compromise between public and private interests, but as an expression of identity and independence whose legitimisation lies in the well-being of the community. It sees the welfare rights of generations as relational rather than individualistic (Wolgast, 1987): and as regards citi-

<sup>7</sup> I am referring here to the architecture of subsidiarity developed by Den-Hartogh (1999) from M. Walzer's theory of justice.

zanship rights, the rights of individuals are accompanied by the citizenship rights of intermediate social structures such as the family and those associations operating in favour of intergenerational solidarity.

In other words, the question of intergenerational solidarity is no longer reduced to a question of expenditure (as proposed in the past by many scholars),<sup>8</sup> but is perceived as a form of relationship based on sharing. The principle of subsidiarity means that the share granted to each generation does not depend on the generosity of politicians or the efficiency of market mechanisms, but on the institution of rules of exchange that encourage something *more than mere zero-sum games* in relations between different generations (Donati, 2002).

The mistake of the lib-lab systems is that of thinking such a solution can be achieved through a compromise between the State and the market. The relational (societal) approach, on the contrary, is founded on the belief that such a solution can only be achieved by instituting the principle of reciprocal subsidiarity among generations in all social fields.

In brief, the idea I would like to propose here is that forms of complex subsidiarity can be developed in those situations characterised by the considerable degree of freedom enjoyed by the subsidiary actors (fig. 4).

WELFARE SYSTEMS ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE OF REDISTRIBUTION (THE STRENGTH OF COLLECTIVE SOLIDARITY TIES) AMONG GENERATIONS IN WELFARE SYSTEMS, AND ACCORDING TO THE STRENGTH OF THE SUBSIDIARITY CRITERION IN SOCIAL POLICY			
		<i>Subsidiarity</i>	
		Low	High
<i>Redistribution</i> (ties of intergenerational solidarity in the various social welfare systems)	Low	<b>Liberal</b> market-based systems (ex post and residual subsidiarity)	<b>Corporate</b> systems (according to social category defined in terms of employment)
	High	<b>Social-democratic</b> systems characterised by a high degree of state regulation (subsidiarity as relief from individual responsibilities)	<b>Complex subsidiarity</b> systems (vertical and horizontal subsidiarity between generations)

Fig. 4.

<sup>8</sup> For example, Esping-Andersen (2002) reduces the question of intergenerational solidarity to the fact that, in his view, more can be given to children and young people in general with little social spending. In this way, solidarity is seen as a political decision about how to spend market resources. However, we all know that the problem of solidarity is not one of the entity of expenditure, but of the way in which social spending is perceived and performed: that is, if spending is to be seen as a mere question of redistributing resources to the poor, or rather as a form of relational sharing among diverse subjects.

The philosophy underlying this model is that of maintaining welfare spending at a high level (albeit within the limits of sustainability), while at the same time regulating generational relations in such a way as to avoid the mistake of those welfare systems that confuse problems of intergenerational solidarity with poverty. In this way, we can avoid the vicious circle of high social welfare expenditure producing a high degree of fragmentation in intergenerational relations. The aims of the battle against poverty and of social cohesion may be better achieved by limiting the measures based upon the customary trade-off between the State and the market, and by promoting a complex subsidiary regime guaranteeing civil society freedom and responsibility, and thus strengthening the same civil society's role as the subject of its own institutions of intergenerational solidarity.

#### 4. *The Role of the Family in Exchanges Between the Generations*

4.1. The discussion so far has underlined the fact that different current welfare systems and policies perceive the role of the family as mediator in intergenerational relations in very different ways. The *lib* model sees the mediatory role of the family as a primarily private, contractual question. The corporative model, on the other hand, assumes that there is a regulatory model of the family capable of instituting 'normal' (regulated) exchanges between generations. Finally, the *lab* model perceives the family's mediatory role as merely residual, since intergenerational solidarity must be based on the social rights of individual citizenship.

We now need to evaluate these various assumptions and their respective outcomes. I do not intend to do so in an ideological vein, but rather in an empirical manner. Thus we can start by saying that: the *lib* model ignores the fact that the family is an institution with public responsibilities, and as such it fails to see how so many public problems arise from the fact that society does not provide sufficient support to the family's social role; the corporative model, in turn, ignores the fact that the 'normal' model of the family has radically changed, and no longer corresponds, either in socio-demographic or cultural terms, to the old type of welfare system; the *lab* model, on the other hand, ignores the faults and failures of the welfare state in guaranteeing intergenerational solidarity as a right of individual citizenship, given that in many different areas of daily life, families have to compensate for the failings of the welfare state.

All of this points to the fact that present social policies have perverse effects, both intentional and unintentional, on intergenerational solidarity, since they fail to place sufficient importance on the family, when in fact the

family has been, and continues to be, the primary mover of intergenerational solidarity. What we need to do is to see whether there are any criteria (and if so, which criteria?) with which to evaluate if and when social policy valorises the family as mover of intergenerational solidarity. In my view, said criteria do exist, and are as follows: (a) the degree to which social policy considers, if at all, the family/non-family distinction; (b) whether social policy is capable of assessing the impact on family solidarity had by those measures adopted in order to balance relations between generations (Donati, 2003a).

All social policy models imply a certain idea of the family, and whether they intend to do so or not, they also encourage certain family relations and structures rather than others.

Even the United Nations has looked at this particular issue. In its Resolution no. 44/82 of December 1989, announcing 1994 as the International Year of the Family, the subject of which was to be 'The Family: resources and responsibilities in a changing world', the UN declared that: '*many social problems are getting worse, and the efforts made to resolve them are hindered by the inability of families to "function" as vital components of society*'. The situation needs a wider outlook and a greater effort, one focused on the questions and on the solving of the problems by governments and non-governmental organisations, with the support of international organisations'. Things have not improved, however, since this resolution was drawn up. There has been, admittedly, a growing awareness of the fact that each day it becomes increasingly urgent to act in order that greater intergenerational solidarity be established. Nevertheless, the family continues to appear more of a hindrance than an aid to the promotion of equity and solidarity between generations. Hence the question: can a change in this state of affairs be achieved?

4.2. The answer to this question depends on the choices made. If we consider the various social policy options in terms of the way they treat the family, three main arrangements within modern society emerge (fig. 5):

- (i) the privatistic arrangement (see fig. 5 for the analytical details);
- (ii) the interventionist arrangement (see fig. 5 for the analytical details);
- (iii) the subsidiary or societal arrangement (see fig. 5 for the analytical details, I give up commenting here).

I believe that the third of these arrangements is the one that most appropriately valorises the family as mediator between different generations; that is, as promoter of their reciprocal solidarity. Unlike the first two, this third arrangement recognises and promotes the family as a form of primary social capital (Donati, 2003b), and valorises the informal networks of intergenerational exchange (Sgritta, 2002).

<b>THREE SOCIAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE FAMILY AND THIRD-SECTOR ASSOCIATIONS IN INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY</b>			
Types of configurations:	Expectations regarding family dynamics and third-sector organisations	Directions taken by action in support of intergenerational solidarity	Sociologically predictable results regarding intergenerational solidarity
<b>(I) Privatistic arrangement</b> (prevalent in the USA): generations perceived purely as an expression of family descent and a form of contractual tie	The family as a private contractual arrangement between individuals (in the case of the couple and in parent-children relations)	Intergenerational solidarity is a private affair	The family's difficulty in sustaining its relations with the children, and the fragmentation of generations
	Family reciprocity as a private affair	Limited public intervention	The erosion and weakening of intergenerational reciprocity
	Third-sector associations (e.g. family associations) as charitable institutions	Support for family associations as a form of help in cases of family need	Marginal role of associative services provided to families as generational networks
<b>(II) Interventionist arrangement (lib/lab)</b> (prevalent in European social-democratic nations): generations perceived as statistical cohorts that need to be guaranteed equal opportunities	Individualisation of individuals and increasing weakness of the family	Reinforcing of the parent-child relationship in the absence of a couple (e.g. mothers alone)	Increasingly fewer gifts, and an increasing number of forced maintenance obligations
	Fragmentation and breaks in the circuits of reciprocity	More rights for children and the weaker members in the family	Growth in 'generational poverty'
	Growth in the no. of families-of-choice and a rejection of 'compulsory altruism'	Abolition of incentives to solidarity among family members	Widespread individualism regarding entitlements
	The third-sector associations (family associations for example) as representatives of consumers	Reinforcement of their function of advocating social rights	Civil society's family associationalism as a form of lobby
<b>(III) Subsidiary or societal arrangement</b> (emerging in those European nations with a tradition of a corporative welfare state, according to a potential model of 'subsidiarity through reciprocity'): generations perceived as primary and secondary social capital	Intergenerational solidarity as a couple's project	Culture of the gift: tax exemption for donations between generations within the family and relatives sphere and for associations promoting intergenerational solidarity	Reinforcement of extended reciprocity between families and those generations that descend from them
	Increased rights for children but also for parents, within the framework of their reciprocity	Relational culture: individual rights and duties are to be exercised in relation to the effects they have on other family generations	Greater responsibility of parents towards children and descendants, and greater responsibility of children towards their ancestors
	Civil associations (e.g. family associations) as social subjects with advocacy and social enterprise functions in the organisation of intergenerational solidarity services and rights	Encourage families to invest in associative forms of mutual aid and in services supplied by associations (a 'citizenship complex' of rights/duties granted to the family and to those associations operating in favour of intergenerational solidarity)	Family associations as societal networks linking primary and secondary social capital

Fig. 5.



4.3. Let us take the example of pensions and the health service: what we have are three separate models. The privatistic approach envisages that pensions and healthcare be the responsibility of individual generations, and in real terms of the individual members of those generations, through the stipulation of private insurance policies to such ends. Those who fail to stipulate such policies may be eligible for some state help, but only in cases of dire need. The family does not play a decisive role in this model, since private insurance companies do not perceive the insurance of the family as such to be a source of profit. Could this be otherwise? The answer is no, if we assume that the market acts solely for the profit motive.

The interventionist approach, on the other hand, requires that the State create institutions of binding solidarity. The State may be supported, to a greater or lesser degree, by solidarity within society, seen as the propensity towards helping others in need, and on helping them according to a criterion of justice centred solely on the needs of individuals. In any case, this is the principle of the traditional welfare State, whose solidarity consists in distributing welfare benefits without any reference to merit or private initiative, but at the very most, choosing the target beneficiaries (social groups) on the basis of certain selective criteria (means tests). The family is perceived as a social burden, and is thus considered one of the criteria employed in assessing needs, according to its economic potential.

The subsidiarity model combines private enterprise with public intervention by means of measures designed to provide both vertical aid and horizontal cooperation. In other words, the political community operates in order that individuals and families are able to meet their own needs in as independent a manner as possible. This means that individuals and families are encouraged to help themselves both singularly and collectively. The State provides a basic degree of welfare insurance, over and above which it is up to the individual to take the initiative through intermediate institutions of solidarity providing either internal or external forms of mutual aid. The principle of solidarity is used here starting from the very design of welfare programmes: thus solidarity consists not only in the distribution of benefits through the collective redistribution of wealth (via taxation or other means), but also consists in the formulation and application of a series of complex criteria able to avoid the 'welfarism' that creates dependency on benefits and leads the welfare state to bankruptcy.

4.4. The societal configuration. In order to summarise the societal approach put forward here, I first need to explain the meaning I attribute to the idea

of 'complex solidarity'. Solidarity does not mean simply providing a helping hand to those in need, since a more appropriate term for such actions would be 'charity'. You can dress this concept up so as to make it appear a right of citizenship, but this does not change its essential nature: by turning an action into a duty, all we are doing is saying that we have an obligation to provide charity. Solidarity, on the other hand, is something very different from charity: it is a collective action designed to help those in need to solve their own problems through the exercise of the greatest possible degree of autonomy. It thus provides the means, but these means are not granted in the form of a pleasant concession by the political-administrative system or of an abstract right (only exercisable on government paper), but in the form of effective rights to individuals and families, who are then completely free to exercise such rights, and are thus fully responsible for their exercise.

Solidarity is perceived as having two different aspects by western culture, juridical culture included: it is seen as a *binding tie* between debtors (in the case of those obligations pertaining to a plurality of subjects, it is a binding tie whereby each creditor has the right to demand settlement of the entire credit, and each debtor can be forced to pay the entire debt); it is also perceived as a *form of fraternity*, of reciprocal aid, between the various members of a community. These two characteristics are interrelated when solidarity is seen as the interdependence of credits and debts based on the sharing of certain goods by the members of the community. Thus we are some way off the traditionally social-democratic idea according to which solidarity consists in the distribution of benefits in cash and kind to certain groups of needy individuals (Ullrich, 2002, p. 123). Whether these benefits are provided as a form of charity or as citizenship rights makes little difference when such measures maintain individuals and families in a state of dependency. Equity is something very different: it is justice perceived as the fairness of treatment of individual cases according to what is best in a given situation, rather than any uniformity of treatment.

Intergenerational solidarity is thus very different from equity. Although both involve the question of justice, the viewpoints adopted differ significantly. In fact, justice is perceived in various different ways, which may be briefly summarised as follows:<sup>9</sup>

(A) justice as *equity* consists in treating each person properly from the commutative point of view, and it thus means pursuing the equality of

<sup>9</sup> The letters A, G, I, L refer to the dimensions of the AGIL scheme in its relational version (Donati, 2003a).

opportunity (rules designed to avoid all forms of illegal discrimination and to compensate situations of disadvantage within the community);

(G) justice as the duty to share (rule of the *redistribution* of goods);

(I) justice as the *reciprocity* of rights and duties;

(L) justice as recognition of human dignity and thus as the common right of each person to a decent standard of living; connected to the dignity of the individual, there are also the human rights pertaining to those primary social formations (communities and associations) in which people live.

By its very nature, subsidiarity implies solidarity, and it becomes complex when it conforms to all the above-mentioned characteristics and acts in such a way as to create a synergetic relationship between them. It thus includes the giving of benefits and the promotion of equal opportunities, while going beyond these limited characteristics and operating within a broader framework. What we define as intergenerational solidarity must comply with such prerequisites.

If we apply this to the field of pensions and healthcare, it means that all the actors involved must strive towards intergenerational solidarity, each according to his/her functions and criteria of action:

(A) within the economic field: businesses must treat generations in a suitable manner, avoiding any form of discrimination between them; moreover, they could encourage solidarity contracts whereby different generations share and share out work; banks could, or rather must, invest in those generations that are most at risk, such as young people who have to create a future for themselves, or the elderly who have to find somewhere to live and the necessary services in their old age; in doing so, the banks accept 'the reciprocity of the risks involved';

(G) the political-administrative system must guarantee sufficient redistribution in order to guarantee the social integration of the more disadvantaged generations; this regulation, however, must be such as to generate, rather than consume or cancel civil society's social capital;

(I) the world of non-profit, third-sector associations is the best suited to the creation of institutions of intergenerational solidarity based upon reciprocity;

(L) within families, solidarity between generations must be encouraged as a cooperative game involving systems of donation governed by the principle of reciprocity.

The 'subsidiary State' is a state that promotes a regulated differentiation between these spheres, together with their mutual synergy, in order to encourage a process of fair exchange between the different generations.

## *5. Conclusions and Prospects for the Future: The Creation of a New System of Institutions Based on Subsidiarity and Intergenerational Solidarity*

5.1. In concluding, I would first like to draw up a correct definition of intergenerational solidarity.

If the problem of intergenerational solidarity is an ecological one (that is, if it regards the sustainability of the ecosystem), then the question of social responsibility comes into play, and bioethical criteria must be adopted in all spheres of society: in the market, the family, the State and the third sector. In fact, the problem lies in the environment of society as a whole.

If the problem of intergenerational solidarity concerns welfare state entitlements, then the main responsibility lies with the political system, since binding collective decisions are needed in order to balance the needs of diverse social groups. However, political decisions must take into account the manner (along with the guiding distinction relational/non-relational) in which these entitlements work within the vitally important spheres of family life and of associative networks.

If the problem of intergenerational solidarity lies within the primary networks, in the sense that it regards the strength of the informal social ties and everyday exchanges between generations, then what is needed is a series of criteria for the relational subsidiarity between all those actors in question; and the sub-systems that first and foremost ought to implement the said criteria are families and civil associations.

This diversity of functions and duties should not be seen as a conflict of viewpoints, but should be valorised by creating synergies between the various social spheres.

Intergenerational solidarity cannot be delegated to a specialised sub-system: it cannot be the duty of the State alone, or of the family, or of some aid agency or other. It is, on the contrary, a problem that needs to be dealt with by all of society's sub-systems. The failures and weaknesses of solidarity derive from the fact that individual sub-systems perceive the problem of intergenerational solidarity in different ways and wish to deal with it by employing different instruments and by adopting diverse courses of action.

The solution to the problem needs to be based on the subsidiary regulation of solidarity by all of the various sub-systems. However, in order that this be brought about, there is a need for social spheres in which subsidiarity is encouraged as a culture, that is, as a symbolic code that uses subsidiarity as a generalized means of communication and interchange. These spheres are institutions that pursue intergenerational solidarity as their natural, specific aim.

5.2. The question now remains as to what these new social institutions, based as I have said on the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, are to look like.

We can try and define them in terms of the creation and use of existing resources at any given time and with regard to the future.

As far as the use of existing resources is concerned, limited examples of such new social institutions include: employment contracts shared among different generations; the creation of childcare facilities organised as networks run by parents together with childcare professionals; the creation of cooperative enterprises for the care of the handicapped and the non-self-sufficient elderly involving families who contribute towards intergenerational solidarity among themselves; swap or barter systems (like time banks) organised along family lines.

As regards investment for the future (minimum wage, pensions, welfare), economic enterprises can be set up to manage forms of insurance for families as well, rather than just for individuals. More generally speaking, bodies may be set up to formulate financial and social investment programmes for the new generations, by means of the involvement of various actors (banks, companies, associations representing the various professional categories). New forms of both internal mutual aid (mutual organisations) and of external mutual aid (public organisations) could be encouraged among those families who share the same generational problems. From the legal point of view, these institutions may be either private, public or mixed, given that what really matters is the organisational format based on the principle of subsidiarity.

To sum up, then, the principle of subsidiarity is considered to be the most suitable guiding principle in this field since it is based neither on profit (the exchange of monetary equivalents) nor on control (political power and the law), but on its own *model of action*, that of reciprocity as a rule of social exchange.<sup>10</sup> Reciprocity can be exercised in a variety of ways. It may be limited to tight circuits such as that of the family and relatives, or may exist in broader circuits such as that of the entire local community (Caillé, 1998; Godbout, 1998). It may be generalised and even developed using processes of learning (Ullrich, 2002). Reciprocity clearly implies acknowledgement of the *Other* as the subject of rights, and through its exercise, tends to reinforce such acknowledgement.

<sup>10</sup> I refer, in particular, to the work of writers such as J. Godbout (1998) and A. Caillé (1998) based on research by Marcel Mauss.

In order to create institutions of solidarity suited to future needs, the primary and secondary networks linking the various generations need to become social forces capable of developing the art of reciprocity and that organisational capacity I call 'subsidiary entrepreneurship' (Donati, 2004).

At the end of the day, it is the principle of reciprocity which, more than any other, proves capable of motivating and legitimising the construction of those social spheres in which the generations become those instruments of donation-exchange that guarantee intra-generational and inter-generational solidarity over the course of time.

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## COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR DONATI'S PAPER

HANNA SUCHOCKA

The starting point for Professor Donati's thoughts is the general assertion on the state of crisis in intergenerational solidarity. The existing models of applied social policy have materially contributed to this state of crisis (This analysis coincides with the assertions set forth in the document prepared by the Social Affairs Committee in the German Episcopal Conference, the social state – questions to be considered. Our German colleagues have played a considerable role in preparing this document).

Professor Donati then analyzes the concept of generation while pointing out the misunderstandings that follow from the different definitions of this concept for policy models; he also conducts a theoretical and critical analysis of the existing models of intergenerational solidarity and the social policy models that are supposed to support intergenerational solidarity, while singling out their drawbacks and the adverse consequences related thereto in the area of attaining intergenerational solidarity.

Professor Donati's text, which depicts the interdependencies between the individual elements that exert an impact on the shape of social policy in an extraordinarily concise and succinct manner, constitutes the basis for a more profound reflection on the social policy crisis and the changes in the family's role in the exchange process between generations, including those states that have been traditionally referred to as social states (such as Germany). This compels one to conduct proprietary analyses and to search for solutions that could be applied in specific states.

It is against this backdrop that reflections come to mind on the group of what are referred to as the post-communist states, to which I would primarily like to devote my attention in this context.

When considering the proposed optimal models (pages 175-177 and 182-183 – the principle of subsidiarity based on its own model of action, that of reciprocity as a rule of social exchange), the question of this model's

universality arises, i.e. the ability to apply it in states with different experience from the free market experience. To be sure, Professor Donati's consideration revolves around market economy states, i.e. states that have never had a deformed economy, a command-control economic system, that is, a system which L. Balcerowicz once called a system of 'ravaged (destroyed) capitalism'. Even though the system based on a command-control economy belongs to the past (at least one can hope that this is true), its repercussions are nevertheless stronger than it might seem. It may therefore turn out that the model which appears to be optimal for states reared in a market economy may collapse or undergo some deformation in 'post-communist' states. In these states, on account of the experience with the previous system, individual words (notions), concepts, principles frequently have a different meaning, they frequently have a stronger political undercurrent and therefore are understood differently.

Above all, the state's role is always perceived much more strongly by society, by individual peoples; expectations of the state are also considerably stronger.

This was the ground concerning the state in which the word solidarity was cultivated. One may have impression that it had a (totally) different dimension and meaning from the one attributed to it in the traditional free-market economy. In the command-control system, in the system of real socialism, the word solidarity denoted a fairly unilaterally focused type of solidarity. It entailed solidarity seen through the omnipotence of the state, the state as the political, economic and social regulator. That is why it meant solidarity 'against', social solidarity focused against the state as a protest against the state's specific policy. It insisted that the state provide for a 'more just distribution of goods'. One could therefore acknowledge that in this sense it was a principle that referred to the attainment of a social policy. It did not, however, most certainly entail charity (I also have the impression that it was a very limited type of 'brotherhood'). However, the system in which it was applied, or in which it was supposed to have been applied in my opinion does not fit within any of the models described by Professor Donati. For this reason, solidarity understood in this way, apart from its political aspect, could not be the primary social policy regulator (It completely neglected the role of the family).

This inherited concept (understanding) of solidarity as an alliance against something, more specifically, against the state, has remained in the mentality of the post-communist societies. For this reason, the models that are successfully used in states with a well-shaped market economy may

undergo deformation in post-communist states. Consequently, on account of the past system's legacy, the system proposed by Professor Donati on page 178 (the subsidiarity model combines ...) may collapse and lead to populist demands in the direction of the deformed model described by Professor Donati as the interventionist approach...

The post-communist societies with their own negative baggage were quickly engulfed with the adverse phenomena that are characteristic of developed societies including, among others, the disintegration of intergenerational bonds linked to the progressive family crisis. In this sense, we are dealing with a similar phenomenon as the wealthy western social states. One may therefore claim that while they originate from different systems, the current welfare states and the poor post-communist states cross ways in 'eroding the old forms of solidarity'.<sup>1</sup> This phenomenon is important insofar as these states will meet one another in the framework of a single economic organism, namely the European Union and the system of reciprocal interaction will be very strong, while the negative baggage of each one of the states will have a material impact on the selection of the social policy model within the European Union and consequently on the nature of the intergenerational bond within the entire community.

One should fully concur with Professor Donati's statement on page 164... At the same time, however, there are a number of doubts and questions. The view expressed by Professor Donati should be treated as a certain type of idea, as a certain type of expectation, while the process in the post-communist states appears to be moving in the opposite direction, a direction entailing the disappearance of the family's role as the mediator between the generations. This is associated both with misconceived modernity on the one hand (the family as an obsolete and unfashionable form) and the low level of per capita income on the other, i.e. a poor society in

<sup>1</sup> This phenomenon was accurately described by the Social Affairs Committee of the German Episcopal Conference:

The current structure of the social state has considerably contributed as the institutionalization of social solidarity to the absorption of the social threat inherent in the market economy (this part of the description refers only to western welfare states). On the other hand, the very same social state is today causing erosion in the foundations of social solidarity, especially through the fact that the social state's current distributive model weakens solidarity at the family level to a greater degree as opposed to strengthening it ... The decisive task will be to bolster the family as the first place where children are brought up, and thus as the guarantor of future generations, as well as to stimulate new forms of joint social security.

which there is fierce competition between the generations for access to financial resources from the state budget.

The fifteen years that have passed since the commencement of the process of the communist system's collapse show that the new Europe continually experimented in searching for new forms (it would be difficult to call them models) to carry out social policy. Evolution is fairly symptomatic, which testifies to the complexity of the problem and the difficulty to find the optimal model. The market's dominant regulatory role in social issues was first acknowledged. One may therefore say that this was an attempt at referencing a model referred to as a liberal model, which, of course, ended in protest and a negative reaction incensed by populists in a poor society, which was not at all prepared for this outcome. This elicited a diametrically opposite effect and efforts were made to find the way to reinstate the state's administration of social policy. Nevertheless, without a sufficiently strong budget and with weak market economy instruments, people began to use instruments that were reminiscent of real socialism, i.e. the distribution of deficit goods, which led to adverse budgetary repercussions on the one hand and completely destroyed intergenerational bonds on the other instead of bolstering them. For it created competition in gaining access to the very limited budgetary resources between retirees (older persons) and younger persons (education and earnings after university studies).

One should concur with Professor Donati's view on the importance of the principle of subsidiarity. It is symptomatic that this principle is to be found among the fundamental principles in what are referred to as the 'new democracies'. While the principle of solidarity was emphasized in the period prior to the fundamental breakthrough, i.e. during the reign of the communist system (especially in Poland), the principle of subsidiarity, after the fall of communism, became one of the important instruments for specifying the relationship between individual entities. It was seen as one of the instruments that shattered the centralized model of the state. Its introduction to the political system of the new states entailed introducing local autonomy. This was supposed to be the regulator in the split of powers between the central authorities and the local authorities, also in terms of administering social policy better, through the ability to utilize limited public funds better (In this sense, then, subsidiarity understood in this manner was also associated with the concept of reciprocity). It therefore fit in a certain sense in the model described by Professor Donati. These ideal assumptions, however, were not achieved in full and the principle of subsidiarity did not play the role that was expected of it, at least during the period of transformation to

date in the area of being the social policy regulator. The execution of this model requires social effort. There is therefore a major danger of ravaging it 'along the way' through social impatience and calling for state intervention. That is in fact what happened to a large degree. The legacy of the past system and the treatment of the state as the regulator of all social problems exerted a material influence. Under this approach, thinking about the family and the family's role within the framework of social institutions disappeared. This precipitated some degeneration in the accepted model. This cannot be treated, however as a negation of the model itself. Practice always validates certain ideal models. It is important not to transfer accountability to the model itself on account of the adverse practice. It is also important to be able to look for those instruments and forms within this framework whereby both subsidiarity and solidarity may be better achieved.

Therefore, while concurring with Professor Donati's final proposition (page 183), I am aware that the path to its attainment is a long one, while its effects depend upon the state's economic level and the mental preparation to think in new categories about the reciprocal relations between the individual entities (state – local self-government – family) while also depending on making oneself aware of the significance of intergenerational solidarity, which has not yet taken place in the post-communist states.

# INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE: PENSIONS AND HEALTH CARE

HANS TIETMEYER

## 1. PRELIMINARY NOTE

The subject of intergenerational solidarity encompasses many areas and aspects. The present paper will be mainly concerned with the following questions:

- Which welfare-state provisions aiming at intergenerational solidarity have contributed to the crisis currently besetting the welfare state in many countries?
- What conclusions are to be drawn from this with respect to the requisite reforms, especially in the areas of retirement pensions and health care?

In this connection, it must be remembered that welfare-state provisions often differ from country to country, and that the requisite reforms must therefore have divergent approaches and objectives. This owes something not only to the varying economic conditions, but also to the diverse traditions and social goals that have arisen over time.

For some while past, there has been no mistaking the fact that welfare-state regulations are in crisis in many countries. That goes particularly for the social security and social transfer systems, which are supposed to contribute at the same time to intergenerational solidarity. True, the magnitude of the crisis differs in accordance with the structure of the system in effect. First and foremost, however, it is industrialized nations that are affected. Hence the present paper is principally concerned with the problems that have to be recognized and resolved in those countries. The focus is mainly on Europe, with occasional reference also to the problems besetting Germany.

## 2. THE WELFARE STATE IN CRISIS

### 2.1. *From the Socially-Oriented State to the Welfare State*

The origin of the welfare state in its present form is closely connected with the dissolution of feudalistic social structures in the course of the industrial revolution. In the light of the new freedoms and inter-dependencies and the growing mobility, the older systems for guarding against elementary risks to life, such as sickness and poverty (especially in old age), often failed. In the first place, this necessitated the institution of new collective social security systems, to replace the vanished family and neighbourhood networks. Secondly, the surge of productivity triggered by the increased division of labour and innovation made it possible, for the first time, to establish an up-to-date health care system, and to provide an open-ended pension towards the end of citizens' lives. Since industrial enterprises were concentrating mainly on the payment of wages, in the newly industrialized countries of Europe the state increasingly saw it as its duty to arrange for the institution of compulsory insurance systems against those great risks to life, sickness and old age, and to organize relief for the poor. The fact that the introduction of German social insurance under Bismarck was decided upon in part on grounds of power politics, in order to resist the social democratization of the working classes, is not inconsistent with this, but rather a token of the political necessity (which became manifest at that time) of a minimum level of social insurance by the state.

Over the years, the original minimum level of insurance has been increasingly upgraded. The notion of the socially-oriented state has gained more and more support, especially in democratically-governed countries. For a long while, the associated increase in taxes and other official levies was accepted without much protest in view of the concomitant strong growth of the national product and employment. Marked opposition did not become apparent until expansion and employment began to slow down and the pace of social security spending accelerated disproportionately. This owed much to the virtual anonymity of both the taxpayers and the recipients of benefits. Social control, which used to be relatively close in the family and the immediate social environment, was gradually relinquished more and more owing to the anonymity of the system. Another significant factor was the huge attractiveness of sociopolitical election promises under democratic systems. In this connection, even the potentially controversial debate on the redistribution of assets could be sidestepped for a long time by referring to intergenerational obligations, and by distributing short-term

sociopolitical benefits while reconciling tax payers and other contributors to the tax burden by stressing future benefits.

It is important to bear in mind in this context that in most countries the established social security systems have hitherto followed the logic of expenditure-oriented transfer policies on a pay-as-you-go basis, with next to no capital cover, but rather the almost complete financing of current payments to the older generation by the younger generation. This has frequently given rise to the notion that redistribution is a positive-sum game. Especially upon the introduction or setting-up of such pay-as-you-go systems, virtually any level of (implicit) yield promises can be made to the first generation of recipients of such benefits, who have paid few or no contributions of their own. As long as the labour force and employment continue to grow fast, it is not unlikely that, from the standpoint of the insured, the return on a pay-as-you-go system will be higher than that on a fully-funded system. Not least Keynesianism – long the predominant doctrine – greatly helped to make the socially-oriented state more and more into a welfare state. This tendency was undoubtedly also encouraged over time by massive inertia on the part of the social bureaucrats and the institutions and bodies controlling the redistribution mechanism.

Ultimately, though, it was mainly the lack of direct financial responsibility in the democratic decision-making process which led in time to the original socially-oriented state, guarding against elementary risks to life, having degenerated in the meantime in many countries into a welfare state seeking to look after its citizens comprehensively in paternalistic fashion. Overall, however, the upshot has been not only well-known ‘poverty traps’ in the economic sense but also the virtual incapacitation of its citizens. Social security, with its typically compulsory nature, is often granted at the cost of individual freedom.

## *2.2. The Signs of Crisis and Their Main Causes*

In virtually all advanced industrialized nations, the financial basis of the socially-oriented or welfare state has become unsound. What are the main reasons for this?

There is hardly any industrialized country in which the state of the public sector budgets can be described as sustainable over the long term. In many countries, the disclosed budget deficits and public debt levels are approaching, or even exceeding, the limits that are deemed acceptable on fiscal grounds, on account of the associated increase in the interest bur-



den. That goes especially for cyclically adjusted deficits, although the details of any such adjustment are often highly controversial. But the full scale of public indebtedness does not become obvious until not only explicit debt servicing but also promises of future benefits (made primarily in connection with state-organized pension schemes) are included in the analysis as implicit state liabilities. For this purpose, recourse may be had, for instance, to the methods of intergenerational accounting.<sup>1</sup> In this way, it is also possible to compute the implicit debt, which, under the prevailing financing conditions, results primarily from the ageing of the population. Even in those cases where the current expenditure, mainly for the benefit of older people, is at present being covered by taxes and contributions (which are paid principally by members of the workforce generations), foreseeable demographic changes will generally lead to severe chronic financial bottlenecks. The magnitude of the implicit debt will depend on the sum total of this financial shortfall. To avoid a debt overload involving the risk of complete collapse, either the revenue will have to be stepped up or the spending cut as soon as possible. If the adverse effects on incentives normally associated with tax increases are not to proliferate any further, there remains, as a priority short-term measure, primarily the thinning-out of the expenditure side of the aggregate public sector budget (which is dominated today in many countries by so-called social transfer payments).

These unwelcome developments are often compounded by the structure of the welfare state itself. For example, in many countries today the prevailing social security regulations give rise to seriously flawed economic incentives, which result in both the inefficient allocation of economic resources and a failure to meet the redistribution targets originally set. In major societies, an anonymized system is frequently unavoidable, and is subject to substantial potential misuse. Very often – as experience goes to show – a welfare state designed along generous lines is accompanied not only by ‘an underlay of misallocation’ but also almost invariably by a number of unwelcome distribution effects.<sup>2</sup> And the likelihood of undesirable developments increases, the more the socially-oriented state develops into an all-embracing welfare state.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. for example Deutsche Bundesbank, *Monthly Report*, December 2001, pp. 29-44 and November 2003, p. 65.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Olsen, Mancur, *Aufstieg und Niedergang von Nationen*, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1991, p. 226 f.

Moreover, the almost universal phenomenon today of an expanding underground economy must be construed as an abuse of the welfare state, especially if it implies merely curtailment of the financing of social security, while lots of benefits continue to be claimed. That applies, for instance, to state-welfare benefits unrelated to contributions, or to health care services. The situation is different, however, under pension systems strictly related to contributions. There, unless corresponding contributions are paid, there is no increase in pension expectation. The widely apparent strong growth of the underground economy today must be seen not least as a sort of flight from tax authorities whose redistribution intensity has seemingly exceeded the bounds implicitly set by the prevailing notion of justice. Logically enough, this has had an adverse effect on people's willingness to contribute to the financing of tasks motivated by solidarity. Such rational behaviour on the part of individual economic units, accompanied by increasing activity in the underground economy, thus acts as a natural curb on any more far-reaching state redistribution – a natural protective mechanism against the out-of-control leviathan. (Fig. 1, p. 424).

These problems – already inherent in developed welfare states – will be greatly exacerbated in the foreseeable future by the demographic changes. Certain limited effects are already evident. For instance, the life expectancy of many people is increasing as a result of declining infant mortality, improved standards of hygiene, more intensive medical care, greater emphasis on prophylactic treatment and the like. This is reflected in Figure 1. Judging by the UN projection, the difference between industrialized countries and the world as a whole will decrease only very slowly.

Welcome though increasing life expectancy is, and although it reflects generally rising prosperity in which many have a share, its implications must be clearly appreciated as well. In the first place, it implies that (if the traditional entry-point of pensions is retained) a longer and longer proportion of life is going to be spent outside the labour force. The periods in which pensioners will be dependent on the output of the current labour force will then be correspondingly lengthy. (Fig. 2, p. 425).

A second consequence is illustrated in Figure 2: the population is on average getting older and older (since birth rates are declining as well). This has the result that what is known as the age quotient – here defined as the number of persons aged 65 and older relative to the number of persons of working age (i.e. between 15 and 64) – is rising perceptibly. In Germany – which in this respect may be regarded as typical (see Fig. 3, p. 426) – growth is expected from about 26% today via around 44% in 2030

to about 50% in 2050.<sup>3</sup> It must be remembered in this context that all these demographic projections are not conventional economic forecasts with all their uncertainties, which may likewise come out better than is currently expected. Most of the people included in these calculations have already been born. Hence these demographic prospects are largely certain and inescapable.

In the various areas of social security, especially in the fields of retirement pensions and health care, the current financial bottlenecks have hitherto hardly reflected these demographic upheavals. The dominant factors in these bottlenecks have mostly been, on the expenditure side, overly generous regulations and, on the revenue side, slower economic growth and structural dislocations on the labour market, which have become especially obvious in periods of sluggish business activity. However, these ongoing problems will be greatly exacerbated by the outcome of the demographic changes, most of which still lie ahead. At least in a number of European countries, this growing accumulation of problems has meanwhile strengthened the conviction that massive reforms are imperative, especially in the social security systems. This is of paramount importance if the burdens due to demographic developments are ever to be mastered in the future. Hitherto, though, the adjustment intensity of the welfare state has varied very considerably.

In the concrete area of state-regulated health insurance and state-organized medical care, the problems in sight are particularly complex. The market for health care is characterized to a particular degree by information asymmetries favouring those offering services, which asymmetries permit a certain supply-side expansion of demand. In other words, the insurance system is exposed to special moral hazard problems, which result in an inefficient increase in services. Finally, in practice it is hardly possible to distinguish between an inefficient increase in services, on the one hand, and a rise in supply, in line with the preferences of demanders and their willingness to pay, on the other. But state-organized health care systems likewise often have difficulty in providing efficient and low-cost services.

<sup>3</sup> The Federal Statistical Office comes to similar results. *10th coordinated population forecast, Variant 5* (median life expectancy, net immigration of 200,000 persons per annum), Wiesbaden 2003.

### *2.3. The Economic and Social Implications of the Crisis*

The implications of the current and still-growing problems besetting the welfare state are of momentous social significance. In many countries nothing less than an erosion of the economic foundations underlying the welfare state is looming. The challenge due to demographic developments is compounded by the fact that the labour market is in disequilibrium, especially in many European countries. This is not so much because of a current bout of economic weakness. What is more problematic is the fact that the unemployment rate has risen over a long period from cycle to cycle – in Germany, too. This is shown, for instance, in estimates of the inflation-adjusted unemployment rate, which disregards purely cyclical influences on unemployment (see Figure 4, p. 427).

It is also because of structural problems on the labour market that the regulatory deficits, escape responses and potential abuses of the social security systems have increased distinctly. In many countries, the inducements to retire early have been enhanced over many years, and they are still generally strong today. It seems that those bearing political responsibility are still hoping to lessen or defuse labour-market problems by reducing the workforce at the cost of the pension funds.

This is, however, merely a short-sighted strategy, not only because it destroys the production potential represented by older members of the workforce; it also disregards the repercussions on the labour market of the problems faced by the social security systems. If contributions are tied to the production factor 'labour', the already problematic wedge of official levies, which further raises labour costs, thus exacerbating employment problems on the cost side, is broadened by early retirement. In this way, the overloading of the real economic basis by an overstretched welfare state turns into a classic instance of a vicious circle.

This finding must be seen against the backdrop of national and, above all, international competition, which has been mounting steadily for a long while, and will presumably continue to grow. This is due partly to falling transport and communication costs, and partly to the policies of deregulation and the opening-up of markets. The latter factor induces some observers overhastily to blame what is known as the policy of globalization for the problems besetting the welfare state. As a matter of fact, globalization is being accompanied by enhanced transparency and comparability of the economic and social policy conditions obtaining in the respective states, and by increased competition between them. In such an environ-

ment, the redistributing national welfare state finds it more difficult to realize its objectives, in particular because capital and, to an increasing extent, the better-qualified part of the production factor labour can now change its location fairly easily. 'Voting with one's feet' is now becoming a challenge to national social security systems that must be taken seriously. Those systems have to be, and remain, competitive with respect to the organization of intergenerational solidarity as well. If, in connection with globalization, compulsion to be a member of such a society disappears, the pressure to justify redistribution will increase. The consequence will be competition between the social security systems that may well be salutary.

For the rest, it is among the accepted tenets of economics that openness and free trade enhance the prosperity of nations. Moreover, globalization is only to a minor extent a process deliberately initiated by policy makers. Distinctly more important are the advances in communication and information technology and in the opening-up and democratization process following the collapse of the so-called iron curtain. Striving for the international exchange of goods, financial assets and above all ideas and information can be suppressed only temporarily, but never permanently. Human ingenuity cannot be subjected everlastingly to state control.

The problems faced by welfare-state systems, as described to date, are mainly those affecting industrialized countries. Even so, understanding them is instructive for less developed economies, too, since many of them are aiming at a welfare state on the pattern of the more developed nations, or at least are moving in that direction. It is to be hoped that they will duly learn their lessons from these unwelcome developments, or from the failure of the industrialized countries to adjust.

However, the crisis of the welfare state must not be viewed in isolation. In the final analysis that crisis has, as mentioned, far-reaching implications for all society. Hence we should beware of allowing the pendulum to swing from one extreme to the other. The out-of-control welfare state cannot, and should not, be superseded by the caretaker state. It would be disastrous if the needful adjustments led to solidarity within society being completely undermined, and to state social security systems being run down or even entirely dismantled. Properly-organized and properly-judged social security, by lessening elementary risks to life, paves the way for an economic and social system, based on the division of labour, that is mobile and durable. What is needed, therefore, is not the wholesale dismantling of the welfare state, but rather its redesigning in such a way that it becomes durably functional again. That will entail returning the welfare state, which has expanded out of all proportion

in many countries, to the status of a socially-oriented state committed to the subsidiarity principle as well as to the solidarity principle, and to accepting individual responsibility. That must be the aim of the overdue reforms.

### 3. SOME GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR REFORMS

Reforms of the social security systems are imperative and urgent in many countries, especially in Europe. Although this general statement is widely agreed today, at least among experts, the debate usually becomes controversial once definite measures are discussed.

Furthermore, the politicians – notably in Germany – currently often give the impression that they are responding to acute problems primarily with ad hoc measures, without sufficiently considering the interactions between the various elements of the systems, and especially with the labour market. In the short run, politicians can gain time in this manner; but in the long run, confidence in their problem-solving capability increasingly wanes. The Societal and Social Change Commission of the German Bishops' Conference has recently drawn attention to the urgent need for long-term reforms in an 'impulse text' entitled 'Rethinking social issues', and has tried to provide some relevant guidelines. On the basis of an orientation, in principle, to individual human beings, subsidiarity and solidarity (in the sense of helping people to help themselves) are advocated as models for the requisite reforms.<sup>4</sup> Only on the basis of individual responsibility, as a right and an obligation, can the principle of solidarity be invoked in the long run in a humane and freedom-loving society. That goes equally for intergenerational solidarity.

In my view, however, such intergenerational solidarity is not just a matter of the relationship between those who are now young and at work and those who are older and retired, but also of the relationship between those who have and rear children and those who have not. There likewise arises, via conservation of the natural environment, the question of how society as a whole should treat its collective legacy, and which stock of material, non-material and cultural goods it is able and willing to pass on to succeeding generations. Only if the three-generation analysis also includes these points does an overall picture of intergenerational relationships emerge.

<sup>4</sup> German Bishops' Conference: Societal and Social Change Commission (December 2003).

But the question then immediately arises as to what the subjects of the often-invoked intergenerational contract must and can be. Which areas of life should and can be the subject of provisions extending beyond single generations? According to which principles are rights and duties to be defined? Under which conditions can intergenerational (distributional) equity, material living standards and economic efficiency be lastingly reconciled?

An attempt to provide guidelines in this complex area was made by the German Bishops' Conference and the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany back in 1997 in a Joint Statement on the Reform of the Retirement Pension System.<sup>5</sup> In that paper, intergenerational solidarity is subsumed mainly under the concept of sustainability. 'The present generation must not engage in economic activity, consume resources, undermine the functionality and efficiency of the economy, run into debt and pollute the environment at the expense of its children and grandchildren. Future generations, too, have a right to live in an intact environment, and also to exploit its resources'. The paper largely refrains from making concrete recommendations as to detailed reforms; but, together with a call for a long-term orientation, a key criterion of a 'socially equitable' policy is declared to be the maintenance of the freedom of future generations to take their own decisions. In short: among the features of social equity are the fact that the future is not fenced in, and that sufficient degrees of freedom are preserved.

In economic terms, the (implicit) social time-preference rate is a highly critical factor in intertemporally relevant political decisions. After all, the state, too, is subject to an intertemporal budget restriction, which in the long run rules out a negative cash value of its net assets. Though one generation may be able to evade this restriction with greater or lesser success, for the totality of generations there is, as a rule, no way out here.<sup>6</sup>

A widely accepted approach today is that of the differential principle, as advocated by Rawls.<sup>7</sup> For intergenerational relations, the principle of equitable saving follows from construing equity as fairness: every generation would wish that the preceding generation had accumulated capital to ben-

<sup>5</sup> Cf. German Bishops' Conference and Council of the Protestant Church in Germany: Responsibility and Farsight – Joint Statement on the Reform of Retirement Pensions in Germany, Bonn 1997.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Issing, Ottmar, "Staatsverschuldung als Generationenproblem" (Public Debt as a Generational Problem). In: Immenga, U., Möschel W., Reuter, D. (eds.), *Festschrift for Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker*, Baden-Baden 1996, pp. 191-209.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Rawls, John, *Gerechtigkeit als Fairness* (Equity as Fairness), Frankfurt a.M. 2003.

efit it. According to Rawls, the requisite saving for that purpose is equitable if, even under the 'veil of unknowing' (i.e. without having any information as to which generation one belongs to), one can consent to the principle of saving. Such a rather philosophical approach may, however, be helpful in the concrete political debate if, for instance, the older generation has to let itself be asked whether it would have accepted the burden of taxes and other official levies that is being imposed on the younger generation today and tomorrow on account of the ruling welfare-state provisions.

Given the challenges I have specified, a new balance will have to be found between the generations. In this connection, the aforementioned question arises as to which principles need to be adopted. In the first place, the distribution of roles between market and state must be reassessed. Hitherto, the welfare state has always included a paternalistic element as well. 'The poor' are to be educated a bit, and 'forced' to their own benefit. These features are no longer timely today. These days, by contrast, the model can only be that of the responsible citizen, who has a right to assistance under certain circumstances but who can and must also bear a far greater degree of personal responsibility than before. When the socially-oriented state came into being, unemployment or sickness, for example, were literally matters of life and death. Saying that this is no longer the case today in the developed industrialized nations is not belittling the problems. Today, even the households of most recipients of welfare benefits are owners of goods that only 30 years ago were tokens of affluence (such as cars, television sets, telephones or refrigerators). In addition, the capital and insurance markets have developed tempestuously, so that the old hypothesis of allocative market failure seems less and less persuasive.

Under these altered conditions, a new policy mix of solidarity postulate and equivalence principle must be found. If the wholesome efficiency of the market is to exert its influence in the fields of retirement pensions or health care as well, more importance must be attached to the balance between service and quid pro quo. Hence the instruments by which the welfare state is to be reformed must be gauged not least by the criteria of compatibility with incentives and conformity with market conditions.

#### 4. SOME CONCLUSIONS FOR THE REFORM OF RETIREMENT PENSIONS

For retirement pension systems, it follows from what has been said above that neither the level of insurance nor the range of benefits must any longer be taboo. Tomorrow's pensioners will no more be the poverty-strick-



en old people of the past. Just think of the wealth that generation will very probably inherit and bequeath some day. In general, such people can therefore reasonably be expected to accept a lower level of collectively-secured pensions, also because they will be able in most cases to compensate by means of provision of their own.

With regard to the financing method and financing mix, this implies that the element of individual capital cover is bound to increase in significance in provision for old age. This is not a matter of a complete changeover to a fully-funded system. Instead, the inevitable and foreseeable adjustment of benefits in pay-as-you-go systems will automatically augment the importance of individual capital cover. This not only makes sense from the standpoint of diversifying risk but also involves intergenerational redistribution to the detriment of the older generation and in favour of the younger one.

Pay-as-you-go systems of provision for old age are already increasingly coming up against the limits of their financibility, and this will soon become even more obvious. The present debate in Germany is strongly marked by the cyclical and structural problems affecting the labour market, which are leading to an erosion of the financial basis of pension insurance. At the moment, we are experiencing a 'demographic interval' because the high-birthrate post-war years are still in the work-force, while the pensioner age groups are relatively weak owing to World War II. But dramatic changes are to be expected after the year 2010, when the post-war 'baby boomers' will retire. Even so, the current financing difficulties have helped to enhance awareness of the problems posed by the demographic changes.

But these developments are not confined to Germany. In many other countries, such as Sweden or Italy, similar steps have already been taken or are under discussion. The financibility of pay-as-you-go systems is everywhere approaching its natural limits, which can no longer be talked away, masked or diverted, as in a marshalling yard. Difficult though political implementation is, it seems that in many countries willingness is growing to curtail the level of benefits paid by the state pension systems, and at the same time to make more room for fully-funded individual provision. Such reforms act mostly in the right direction, even if it remains to be seen in many cases whether their scale is adequate. However, policy makers' responsibility for creating stable underlying conditions for a smoothly-functioning international financial system is growing with the mounting significance of the capital market.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Auerbach, Alan J. and Hermann, H. (eds.), *Ageing, Financial Markets and Monetary Policy*, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 2002.

## 5. SOME CONCLUSIONS FOR THE REFORM OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

Where health services are concerned, the markets do not function efficiently in shaping prices. In many cases the distribution of information is asymmetrical, enabling suppliers to control demand themselves to some extent. This owes something to the inadequate transparency and the anonymity of the health care system. But any greater inclusion of the patient, and thus the creation of greater consumer sovereignty, presupposes a higher level of involvement by the insured person. Among the service-providers, barriers to competition of various kinds are to be seen in many countries. In this context, it undeniably takes great political courage to cut the Gordian Knot. This is partly because it is not only a matter of intergenerational redistribution in the field of statutory health insurance; other redistributions of an interpersonal nature (e.g. with respect to sex, marital status and earning behaviour) likewise play a part. However, the intergenerational aspect will increase in significance here, too, because – unlike in the case of pension insurance – demography comes to bear not only via the number of recipients of benefits but also via the average level of expenditure per payment.

The faster pace of ageing will undoubtedly subject health care as well to further adjustment pressure. But the prospects here are much more difficult to interpret than in the case of old-age pensions. True, the age-specific expenditure profiles of health-insurance companies show that spending on health is all the higher, the older the policy-holder is. Yet the conclusion that this applies equally to an ageing society is disputed. Some surveys suggest that spending on health depends less on the absolute age of the policy-holder than on his distance in time from death.<sup>9</sup> The steepest rise in expenditure regularly occurs when the final, ultimately vain efforts to prolong life are made. Thus it is not the case that, with rising life expectancy, this final phase of life is bound to become any longer; often it will only be deferred. Many health economists have held the view that it is not the age structure of a society in itself that determines health spending, but primarily advances in medical technology, which only rarely result in cost-cutting innovations and much more often in cost-boosting innovations.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Freyer, Friedrich and Ulrich, Volker (2000), "Gesundheitsausgaben, Alter und medizinischer Fortschritt: eine Regressionsanalyse" (Spending on health, age and medical progress: a regression analysis), *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* 220, pp. 1-17.

Even so, the question arises as to who is to finance, and how, the growing volume of prophylactic, medical and care services. It must be remembered in this context that the lids on expenditure often advocated by policy-makers are frequently inappropriate. After all, there is a risk that new goods and services will not materialize, and innovations fail to emerge, which individuals would have been quite willing to pay for.

In the area of health care, no uniform international trend can be made out as yet. Relative to old-age pensions, the network of groups involved in health care is much more complex, and possible solutions were and are correspondingly more manifold. They range from a national health system, as in the United Kingdom, to a health insurance system largely left to the market, as in the United States. In the United States, expenditure on health amounts to about 14% of the gross domestic product, whereas the ratio in the U.K. is only about half as high. How is that to be judged? A glance at life expectancy in the two countries does not show an advantage for the U.S.A. – rather the contrary. Needless to say, such a comparison is not sufficient for a final verdict. Instead, human well-being, which is so hard to measure, is no less important.

A conspicuous feature of the debate on intergenerational solidarity is the fact that the question of the appropriate financial contribution of older citizens to their health care is being raised more and more often. In a dwindling population, not only the share of older people in the population but also the share of deaths increases. Regardless of which hypothesis of demographically-induced cost rises is given greater weight, spending on health will continue to go up. At the same time, older people as a rule pay only a relatively small contribution to their state health insurance. This ‘subsidizing of the old by the young’ is currently being debated vigorously in Japan and many other countries, as well as in Germany. Usually there are calls for increasing the financial contribution of the older generation. In this connection, however, the repercussions of individual provision for old age on possible cuts in the benefits paid by the state-pension system, and the additional requirements for personal provision for old age, must be taken into account.

## 6. THE URGENCY OF LONG-TERM ADJUSTMENTS

Rapid, but above all lasting, solutions to the problems are urgently required. The pressure for adjustment, which is already high, can be expected to increase markedly before long.

With regard to the matter of urgency, it must also be remembered that any requisite changes interfere with legally-guaranteed, or at least credibly-promised, rights, and therefore can be implemented in states founded on the rule of law only with substantial time-lags or transitional periods, on account of the needful protection of confidence. After all, one must not turn a blind eye to politico-economic restrictions either. Once pensioners come to represent the manifestly dominant group of electors, the likelihood will decrease that reforms demanding sacrifices of them can be implemented by democratic means. The long-term effect of deferred adjustments, let alone of any failure to reform, is substantial, and the costs which society would have to bear in that event would be correspondingly high, on account of the 'compound-interest effect'.

Only really convincing reforms will be able to restore the confidence in economic and social policy which is needed if clear prospects and stable expectations are to take shape again. In such a clarified and calculable environment, the new economic dynamism which is required to cope with future challenges, and which is essential as an economic foundation for a modernized welfare state, can emerge more effectively even in the 'older' industrialized nations.

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## COMMENTAIRE À LA SUITE DE LA COMMUNICATION DU PROF. TIETMEYER “INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE: PENSIONS, SOCIAL SECURITY AND HEALTH CARE”

LOUIS SABOURIN

C'est avec empressement et une certaine réserve que j'ai accepté l'invitation de notre nouvelle présidente à agir à titre de commentateur de la communication de notre collègue, le Prof. Tietmeyer. Avec empressement, d'une part, car nul ne saurait se dégager d'une responsabilité que lui confie une nouvelle présidente dont on sait l'estime qu'on lui porte. Avec réserve, d'autre part, car ce n'est pas une tâche aisée de donner la réplique à un académicien dont on connaît bien les mérites intellectuels et professionnels. En fait, il faut un certain degré d'audace, pour ne pas dire de témérité, pour oser croiser le fer avec lui, tant son propos repose sur une longue expérience de la vie publique et un souci d'aborder les sujets qui l'intéressent avec une palette de talents, qui l'honorent certes, mais qui risquent de faire fuir celles et ceux qui oseraient engager un tel duel avec lui.

Mais c'est dans l'esprit que nous anime au sein de l'Académie, c'est-à-dire la recherche et l'avancement des connaissances dans le respect des diverses disciplines sociales et une ouverture à un humanisme universel tenant compte des diversités culturelles, que je ferai ce commentaire en signalant les points saillants de la très pertinente analyse du Dr Tietmeyer et en mettant en lumière quelques sujets découlant de son étude et de nos débats sur la solidarité intergénérationnelle.

Le Prof. Tietmeyer examine successivement et succinctement deux thèmes fondamentaux. D'abord, comment ce qu'il appelle l'armature et les dimensions de l'Etat Providence ont contribué à l'existence de la crise actuelle dans plusieurs pays, notamment en Europe et de façon spécifique, en Allemagne. Deuxièmement, quels sont les défis auxquels ces pays ont à faire face, d'une manière spéciale, en matière de retraite, de santé et de sécurité sociale?

Tant et aussi longtemps que la croissance était au rendez-vous et que le vieillissement des populations n'avaient pas frappé aux portes de l'Europe, les régimes sociaux mis en place ont pu faire face à la demande. Mais la faiblesse des économies, face à une mondialisation envahissante et une bureaucratie débordante, entre autres causes, ont amené des grains dans l'engrenage. Le Prof. Tietmeyer met en relief la précarité des fondements financiers des régimes de sécurité sociale et les décisions fort discutables en matière d'allocation de ressources budgétaires de même que la disproportion existant entre les bénéfices reçus et les contributions faites par les citoyens. En s'appuyant sur des statistiques démographiques déjà mentionnées par le Prof. Vallin, il met en lumière les limites du système social, les obstacles qui deviennent de plus en plus évidents et les conséquences inévitables. Il démontre, et c'est là la dimension la plus importante de son analyse, combien des réformes sont indispensables. S'inspirant du document de la Conférence épiscopale allemande, intitulée "Rethinking social issues" et les principes énoncés par le Prof. John Rawls, il rappelle que ces réformes doivent être fondées sur la responsabilité individuelle et la solidarité intergénérationnelle. Il conclue en soulignant de façon lucide que seule une prise de conscience de la gravité de la situation et de la nécessité de mettre en place à des réformes à longue échéance pourra amener des solutions.

\* \* \*

Ce texte du Prof. Tietmeyer m'incite à lui poser deux questions. D'abord, les pays européens et incidemment le Japon auquel il fait référence ont-ils la volonté politique de mettre en pratique de telles réformes? Deuxièmement, quelle serait, en pratique, la nature de ces réformes et quelles sont leurs chances de succès?

En conclusion, on me permettra de faire état de quelques réflexions que me viennent à l'esprit à la fois à la suite de la lecture de l'étude du Prof. Tietmeyer et des autres textes sur l'intergénérationnalité qui ont été préparés pour la présente assemblée. Je les résumerai sous trois chefs, à savoir que l'intergénérationnalité exige d'être aussi perçue et analysée en termes de temporalité, de territorialité et de finalité.

*Temporalité*, car comme l'a signalé de façon significative le Cardinal Rouco Varela, l'intergénérationnalité remonte aux sources de l'humanité. Toutes les époques ont été marquées et influencées par ce phénomène qui progressivement est devenu un trait majeur et déterminant de la famille humaine.

*Territorialité* ensuite car l'intergénérationnalité, comme l'a suggéré le Prof. Fukuyama, transcende les frontières et a des effets dans tous les secteurs de la vie des Etats contemporains. On ne saurait, sans craindre de faire une erreur de perspective, prétendre que le phénomène d'intergénérationnalité puisse être lié soit à un pays ou un groupe de pays, soit à un aspect particulier de l'existence, à commencer par le vieillissement des populations.

Enfin, de finalité, car l'intergénérationnalité ne peut être envisagée simplement comme un fait à analyser scientifiquement. La solidarité intergénérationnelle doit être perçue aussi comme un phénomène social, politique, économique, culturel qui a des dimensions individuelles, locales, nationales et internationales exigeant des approches et des réponses à tous ces paliers, notamment à celui de l'Eglise qui en reconnaît l'importance et la place. En guise de conclusions, je me réjouis du choix de cette thématique pour nos travaux et remercie le Prof. Tietmeyer pour sa contribution clairvoyante.



THIRD SESSION

GLOBALIZATION, INTERGENERATIONAL  
SOLIDARITY AND HUMAN ECOLOGY  
IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

# INTERGENERATIONAL WELL-BEING

PARTHA DASGUPTA

## *Prologue*

In this essay I provide an account of the way welfare economists have tried – literally over decades – to consider some of the crucial problems that arise when we try to come to grips with notions of *Intergenerational Solidarity, Welfare, and Human Ecology*. The subject is huge and much has been written on it. So I am selective, the choice in great measure reflects my own engagements and ability.

The philosopher Derek Parfit (Parfit, 1984) has classified problems in social ethics in terms of the domain of persons who fall within the range of consideration. His classification is three-fold: Same People Problems, Same Numbers Problems, and Different Numbers Problems.

When we deliberate over policies that would affect the *same* group of people (for example, parents choosing the allocation of food and health care within their household), we are in the realm of a Same People Problem. In discussing intergenerational solidarity, however, we are not in the realm of Same People Problems, because what we do today would be expected to have an effect on the *identities* of future generations, even if it does not have an effect on future numbers. For example, it could be that future numbers are *unaffected* by choice from among the policies under consideration, but the exact timing of conceptions are expected to be affected. In this case we are faced with a Same Numbers Problem. If, however, future numbers *are* affected, we have a Different Numbers Problem.

In an intergenerational Same Numbers Problem, alternative policies are evaluated in terms of their impact on ‘present’ and ‘future’ people. ‘Present’ people are alive now; ‘future’ people aren’t alive now, but will be alive in the future. Demographers refer to ‘present’ people when informing us that a country’s population has passed the one-billion mark. They

include 'future' people in their reckoning when issuing a forecast that the world's population will be 9.5 billion in 2050.

Discussions on economic policy usually presuppose a forecast of future numbers; which is to say that policy discussions are usually undertaken on the assumption that the choices involve Same Numbers Problems. This is obviously a simplification, for it is hard to imagine any economic policy that does not have an influence on future numbers; however, since it is a good approximation in many cases to imagine this, much policy discussion is based on it. This essay is devoted to the ethics of Same Numbers Problems. I had originally thought of adding a few sections on Different Numbers Problems.

But I have resisted the temptation, because the subject is immensely difficult: it calls for a framework that includes in our ethical deliberations *potential* people and, so, potential lives. It may be that at the Plenary, fellow Academicians will wish to discuss Different Numbers Problems. If that is so, I shall be happy to sketch what there is in the economics literature on the subject.

*A preliminary observation:* An individual's lifetime well-being is a construct of the flow of current well-being she experiences, while intergenerational well-being is a construct of the lifetime well-beings of all who appear on the scene. It is doubtful that the two constructs have the same functional form. On the other hand, I know of no evidence that suggests we would be way off the mark in assuming they do have the same form. As a matter of practical ethics, it helps enormously to approximate by not distinguishing the functional form of someone's well-being through time from that of intergenerational well-being. In what follows, I take this short-cut.

### 1. *The Ramsey Formulation*

We assume that the demographic profile over time is given. The problem is to strike a balance between the well-being of present and future generations, keeping in mind that there is a corresponding set of allocation problems arising from the need to strike a balance in every person's lifetime well-being. Intergenerational welfare economics was established in Ramsey (1928), a classic that reads as though it could have been written last week. The problem Ramsey formulated was a particular one: of its total output, how much should a nation save for the future? Ramsey interpreted his theory along the lines of Classical Utilitarianism. (For example, he used the term 'enjoyment' to refer to what I am referring to as well-being.)

Nevertheless, the framework he developed for analysing the problem of optimum saving has subsequently been found to have wide applicability, regarding both interpretation and issues – so wide, in fact, that within modern economics there is no rival framework for studying the intergenerational distribution of benefits and burdens. Here I offer an account of Ramsey’s theory and its interpretive extensions, without having any necessary commitment to Classical Utilitarianism. Let  $\tau$  and  $t$  alternatively denote *dates*, where  $\tau \geq t \geq 0$  (and 0 denotes the present). It helps to interpret the period between adjacent dates as the length of a generation. One can imagine that at the end of each period the existing generation is replaced entirely by its successor. This isn’t good demography, but it turns out not to matter. Every ethical consideration that emerges here makes an appearance also in worlds where demography is modeled better. Moreover, better models of demography would not raise any ethical issue that doesn’t appear here. Population size is assumed to be constant and the future is taken to be indefinitely long. Later I relax these assumptions. For simplicity of exposition, I consider a deterministic world. Let  $U_t$  denote generation  $t$ ’s well-being and let  $V_t$  denote *intergenerational well-being, as viewed from date  $t$* . Ramsey’s theory has it that we should regard  $V_t$  to be the sum of the  $U$ s from  $t$  onward into the indefinite future. Formally, this means that

$$V_t = U_t + U_{t+1} + \dots,$$

which I write succinctly as,

$$V_t = \sum_t^{\infty} U_t, \text{ for } t \geq 0. \quad (1)$$

Let us now put some economic flesh into the construct. I imagine that each generation’s well-being ( $U$ ) depends on the flow of some generalized consumption, which I call  $C$ .  $C$  includes food, clothing, shelter, health care, serenity, leisure activities, legal aid, and various types of public goods (including civil and political liberties and direct amenities from the natural environment). The various components are weighted so as to reflect their distribution among people of each generation. I take it that  $U$  increases with  $C$ .

As population is assumed to be constant, I ignore its size and regard a generation’s aggregate consumption as the determinant of that generation’s well-being. So,  $C$  does all the work in representing the determinants of *intragenerational well-being*. The move makes for expositional ease. It enables me to concentrate on intergenerational matters.

Denote generation  $t$ 's well-being as  $U(C_t)$ . As in (1), *intergenerational well-being*, or *social well-being* for short, is taken to be the sum of each generation's well-being. Let  $(C_t, C_{t+1}, \dots)$  be a *consumption stream*, which is a sequence of aggregate consumption from  $t$  onward. Denoting social well-being at  $t$  by  $V_t$ , Ramsey's theory has it that:

$$V_t = U(C_t) + U(C_{t+1}) + \dots,$$

which I write succinctly as,

$$V_t = \sum_t^{\infty} U(C_t), \text{ for } t \geq 0. \quad (2)$$

The present is taken to be  $t = 0$ . Ramsey's problem was to identify, within the set of feasible consumption streams, the one that maximizes  $V_0$ .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The account in its entirety, which can be skipped by fellow Academicians, if they so choose, is as follows: Generation 0 has inherited from its predecessors a wide range of capital assets, including natural resources and knowledge. Given this inheritance, the generation is able to select from a set of feasible consumption streams. Call this feasible set  $\mathcal{E}_0$ . Imagine now that  $(C_0, C_1, \dots, C_t, \dots)$  is that member of  $\mathcal{E}_0$  which maximizes  $V_0$ . Ramsey's theory calls upon generation 0 to consume  $C_0$ . This simultaneously leads to an investment decision, which in turn determines the technological possibilities that are open to generation 1. Denote the feasible set of consumption streams for generation 1 to be  $\mathcal{E}_1$ .

A typical member of  $\mathcal{E}_1$  can be written as  $(C_1, C_2, \dots, C_t, \dots)$ . The problem facing generation 1 would be to identify that element of  $\mathcal{E}_1$  that maximizes  $V_1$ . It is an interesting and important feature of expression (1) that generation 1 would identify the optimum consumption stream to be  $(C_1, C_2, \dots, C_t, \dots)$ . Plainly, then, generation 1 would consume  $C_1$ , invest accordingly, and pass on the optimum stocks of capital assets to generation 2. And so on. The ethical viewpoints of the succeeding generations are congruent with one another. Each generation chooses the policy it deems optimum, aware that succeeding generations will choose in accordance with what it had planned for them.

*Comment:* Ramsey's assumption that the future is infinite feels odd. We know that the world will cease to exist at some date in the future. So it would seem realistic to stipulate a finite horizon, say  $T$  periods, where the chosen  $T$  is large. The problem is that no matter how large  $T$  is, there is some chance that the world will survive beyond  $T$ . An alternative to Ramsey suggests itself: specify the capital stocks that are to remain at  $T$  for generations still to appear, and interpret social well-being to be the  $T$ -period sum of current well-beings and the size of the capital base remaining at  $T$ .

There is a problem even with this formulation. If  $T$  and the capital base that remains at  $T$  are chosen arbitrarily, the consumption stream deemed the best could be sensitive to the choice. This means that  $T$  and the capital stocks at  $T$  should not be chosen arbitrarily, but should be based on our understanding of what lies beyond  $T$  (for example, the needs

The point to which I want to draw attention is that in Ramsey's formulation future values of  $U$  are *undiscounted*. More than any other feature of his theory, it is this that has provoked debate among economists and philosophers. Ramsey himself wrote (1928: 261) that to discount later  $U$ s in comparison with earlier ones is '... ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination'.

Harrod (1948: 40) followed suit by calling the practice a '... polite expression for rapacity and the conquest of reason by passion'.<sup>2</sup>

But there is a problem with zero discounting. In such complex exercises as those involving the use of resources over a very long time horizon, it is *unsafe* to regard any ethical judgment as sacrosanct. This is because one can never know in advance what it may run up against. A more judicious tactic than Ramsey's would be to play off one set of ethical assumptions against another in not implausible worlds, see what their implications are for the distribution of well-being across generations, and then appeal to our intuitive senses before arguing over policy.

Consider, for example, the following ethical tension:

A) Low rates of consumption by generations sufficiently far into the future would not be seen to be a bad thing by the current generation if future well-beings were discounted at a positive rate. This suggests we should follow Ramsey in not discounting future well-beings.

B) As there are to be a lot of future generations in a world with an indefinite future, not to discount future well-beings could mean that the present generation would be required to do too much for the future; that is, they would have to save at too high a rate. This suggests we should abandon Ramsey and discount future well-beings at a positive rate.<sup>3</sup> The force of each consideration has been demonstrated in the economics literature. For example, it has been shown that in an economy with exhaustible resources and 'low' productive potentials, optimum consumption declines to zero in the long run if the future is discounted at a positive rate, no matter how low the chosen rate (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974), but increases indefinitely if we follow Ramsey (Solow, 1974a). This finding was the substance of Solow's remark

of those who may appear after  $T$ ). But then, why not include their claims in the planning exercise to begin with; why truncate the future into two bits? The route Ramsey followed, of regarding the future to be indefinitely long, is logically unavoidable; for, although we know that the world will not exist for ever, we don't know when it will cease to exist.

<sup>2</sup> Their position has been re-examined and endorsed by a number of modern philosophers; see Feinberg (1980), Parfit (1984), Goodin (1986), and Broome (1992).

<sup>3</sup> By 'discounting the future', I mean the same thing as 'discounting future well-beings'.

(1974b) that, in the economics of ecological resources, whether future well-beings are discounted can be a matter of considerable moment. In recent years, environmental and resource economists writing on sustainable development have taken this possibility as their starting point. On the other hand, it has been observed that Ramsey's ethical theory, when applied to the model economy he studied in his paper, can recommend that every generation save at a very high rate. For classroom exercises, the optimum saving rate has been calculated to be in excess of 60 percent of gross national product. In a poor country such a figure would be unacceptably high, requiring the present generation to sacrifice beyond the call of duty. The real problem is that we don't know in advance how to formulate the problem of intergenerational saving. The issues are far too complex. Unaided intuition is suspect.

However, another way to interpret Ramsey's finding would be to acknowledge that we don't know the correct way to formulate the ethics of intergenerational saving, but that Ramsey's formulation is a-priori plausible. If, on putting it through its paces in plausible economic models, it is found to prescribe acts that are too demanding for the current generation, the formulation ought to be rejected on grounds that it doesn't capture the right balance between the claims of the present generation and those of future ones. The insight one obtains from quantitative exercises is that the long-run features of optimum consumption policies depend on the relative magnitudes of the rate at which future well-beings are discounted and the long-term productivity of capital assets.

## 2. *Discounting the Future*

In a remarkable series of articles, Koopmans (1960, 1965, 1967, 1972) showed that consideration B above can overwhelm the Ramsey-Harrod stricture.<sup>4</sup> The stricture can imply that there is no best policy; that, no matter how high is the rate of saving, saving a bit more would be better. To see how and why, imagine a world where goods are completely perishable. We imagine that well-being  $U$  would increase if consumption  $C$  were to increase. Consider an economic programme where consumption is the same at every date. Now imagine that an investment opportunity presents itself in which, if the present generation were to forgo a unit of consumption, a perpetual stream of additional consumption  $\mu$  ( $> 0$ ) would be generated.<sup>5</sup> Suppose

<sup>4</sup> For a simple account of Koopmans's theory, see Dasgupta and Heal (1979: ch. 9). The exposition that follows in the text is taken from an even simpler account in Arrow (1999).

<sup>5</sup> This means that the rate of return on investment is  $\mu$ .

social well-being is represented by expression (2). Then, no matter how small  $\mu$  is, future generations, taken together, would experience an infinite increase in well-being as a consequence of the investment. ( $\mu$  'multiplied' by infinity is infinity.) So, for any level of consumption, no matter how low, a further reduction in consumption (possibly short of a reduction that brings consumption down to zero) would be desirable. Most people would regard this as unacceptable.

In consequence of this kind of paradox, Koopmans adopted a different research tactic from Ramsey. Social well-being in Ramsey's theory is the sum of utilities [equation (1)]. Ramsey's ranking of consumption streams [expression (2)] is derived from the sum of utilities. In contrast, the primitive concept in Koopmans's theory is that of a ranking of consumption streams. Koopmans's tactic was to impose ethical conditions on such rankings and to determine, if possible, the way they can be represented numerically. Social well-being in Koopmans's theory is a numerical representation of a ranking of consumption streams.

Koopmans (1960, 1972), and in a related manner P.A. Diamond (1965), showed that, if an ordering over well-being streams satisfies two minimal ethical properties, it must involve positive discounting.<sup>6</sup> Koopmans also identified a set of additional ethical conditions on consumption streams which imply that their numerical representations are of the form:

$$V_t = \sum_t^{\infty} \beta^{(\tau-t)} U(C_t), \text{ for } t \geq 0, \text{ where } \beta \equiv 1/(1 + \delta), \text{ with } \delta > 0. \quad (3)$$

In equation (3)  $U$  is interpretable as current well-being.  $\beta^{(\tau-t)}$  is the *discount factor* and  $\delta$  the corresponding *discount rate*;  $\delta$  is often called the 'rate of pure time preference'. Estimates of the costs and benefits of restricting global carbon emissions depend crucially on the choice of  $\beta$  (respectively,  $\delta$ ).<sup>7</sup>

While expression (3) looks like Classical Utilitarianism with discounting, it is not.  $U$  doesn't necessarily have the interpretation of utility, in the sense of the Classical Utilitarians. Koopmans's axioms lend themselves to a broader range of interpretations, which is an attraction.

It is an agreeable feature of Koopmans's theory that, as in Ramsey's theory, the ethical viewpoints of the succeeding generations are congruent

<sup>6</sup> I resist elaborating on the ethical axioms here.

<sup>7</sup> Social discount rates were discussed at a previous Plenary of our Academy.



with one another. Each generation chooses that policy it deems optimum, aware that succeeding generations will choose in accordance with what it had planned for them.

### 3. *A Problem with Koopmans*

Imagine that we adopted Koopmans's formulation of intergenerational well-being [equation (3)], applied it to a deterministic model of production and consumption possibilities, and discovered that if the rate of pure time preference ( $\delta$ ) is positive, optimum consumption will decline to zero in the long run, no matter how small  $\delta$  is. Suppose it is also discovered that if  $\delta$  is sufficiently small – but not zero –, the decline in consumption will begin only in the distant future – the smaller is  $\delta$ , the farther is the date at which consumption will begin to decline.<sup>8</sup> Should Koopmans's formulation be rejected on the ground that it recommends an eventual decline in consumption?

Many would reject it on that very ground.<sup>9</sup> But I have never understood why. Models of a deterministic world with an infinite horizon are mathematical artifacts. They are meant to train our intuitions about economic possibilities in a world with a long, but finite, horizon, when we are loath to specify the termination date, and are also loath to acknowledge that it has an uncertain date. The models must not be taken literally, because Earth will not last forever. We cannot, of course, know now when Earth will cease to exist, but we do know that it will cease to exist *by* some date, say,  $10^{12}$  years. (That's 1 trillion years; and Earth is a bit over a mere 4 billion years old). Suppose, for example, that we were to set  $\delta$  equal to  $10^{-n}$  per year and were to choose  $n$  sufficiently large, so that optimum consumption in the kind of deterministic model I have been considering would have a turning point in, say, year  $10^{30}$  (that's a billion billion trillion years). Should we care that consumption in the model will decline from year  $10^{30}$ ? I know of no reason why we should. On the contrary, justice would be ill-served if all generations were asked to save for a vacuous posterity. As an articulation of the concept of intergenerational well-being, Koopmans's theory is compelling.

<sup>8</sup> This has been shown to be the case in simple economic models involving exhaustible resources. See Dasgupta and Heal (1979: ch. 10).

<sup>9</sup> For example, Heal (1998). Earlier, I called it consideration A.

#### 4. Population Growth

Since Earth is finite, changes in the size of population when averaged over time will be zero over the very long run. The base case we have been considering so far, that population size remains constant, is thus valid when the reckoning is the very long run. But for the not-so-very long run, population can be expected to change. How should the notion of intergenerational well-being be formulated when population size changes over time? Two alternatives have been much discussed in the literature. Both reduce to the Ramsey-Koopmans formulation if population is constant. After presenting them I introduce a third formulation. It too reduces to the Ramsey-Koopmans formulation if population is constant. One alternative is to regard the well-being of a generation to be the per capita well-being of that generation (with no allowance for the numbers involved) and sum the per capita well-beings of all generations, possibly using a discount rate. To formalize, let  $ct$  be the index of aggregate consumption per head at  $t$ , and let  $U(ct)$  denote well-being per head of generation  $t$ . We then have,<sup>10</sup>

$$V_t = \sum_t^{\infty} [U(c_t)]\beta^{(t-t)}, \text{ for } t \geq 0, \text{ where } \beta \equiv 1/(1 + \delta), \text{ with } \delta > 0. \quad (4)$$

The other view is to interpret social well-being as the sum of the discounted flow of each generation's well-being. Specifically, if  $Nt$  is the size of generation  $t$ , and  $ct$  the average consumption level of generation  $t$ ,<sup>11</sup>

$$V_t = \sum_t^{\infty} [N_t U(c_t)]\beta^{(t-t)}, \text{ for } t \geq 0, \text{ where } \beta \equiv 1/(1 + \delta), \text{ with } \delta > 0. \quad (5)$$

Expression (4) regards people, not generations, to be the subject. In contrast, expression (5) regards generations, not people, to be the subject. To see in which ways their recommendations differ, imagine an economy in Utopia consisting of two islands, with populations  $N_1$  and  $N_2$ . People in Utopia are identical. A person's well-being is denoted by  $U$ , which increases with consumption, but at a diminishing rate. There is a fixed amount of consumption services, that the government has to distribute.<sup>12</sup> Let  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  be the amounts distributed to the two islands. As the economy is in Utopia, it is to be expected that, no matter how much is awarded to each island, the distri-

<sup>10</sup> See Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965).

<sup>11</sup> See Meade (1955), Mirrlees (1967), and Arrow and Kurz (1970).

<sup>12</sup> The example is taken from Meade (1955: 87-89) and Arrow and Kurz (1970: 13-14).

bution of consumption *within* each will be equal. The economy is timeless.

If numbers count, then analogous to (5), social well-being would be  $[N_1U(C_1/N_1) + N_2U(C_2/N_2)]$  and the government would distribute in such a way that consumption is equalized among all citizens.

This is obviously the right allocation, because geographical differences are an artifact for the problem in hand. On the other hand, if numbers don't count, so that social well-being is taken to be  $[U(C_1/N_1) + U(C_2/N_2)]$ , the Utopian government would distribute less to each person in the more populous island. Analogously, the use of (4) discriminates against more numerous generations. This simply cannot be right. Of (4) and (5), the latter reflects the notion of intergenerational well-being more adequately. Expression (5) measures *total* well-being of all who will ever live. It is of the same form as Classical Utilitarianism. But there is yet another way to formulate the concept of intergenerational well-being: it reflects the *average* well-being of all who are to appear on the scene. This has an attractive ethical basis: choice under uncertainty.

The idea is to regard an economy at  $t$  to be a different economy from that same economy at  $t + 1$ . Now suppose you were asked which of the two economies you would choose to inhabit if you did not know which person's shoes you would occupy in either, but attributed 'equi-probability' to each position.<sup>13</sup> Imagine next that in this thought experiment your choice is based on your *expected well-being* in the two economies. Expected well-being in the economy commencing at  $t$  is,

$$V_t = \left\{ \sum_t^{\infty} [N_t U(c_t)] \beta^{(t-t)} \right\} / \left\{ \sum_t^{\infty} N_t \beta^{(t-t)} \right\}, \text{ for } t \geq 0, \\ \text{where } \beta \equiv 1/(1 + \delta), \text{ and } \delta \geq 0. \quad (5)$$

Notice that  $V_{t+1}$  is of the same form as  $V_t$ , with  $\delta$  commencing at  $t+1$  in (6). You would choose between the two economies on the basis of  $V_t$  and  $V_{t+1}$ . This is the ethical justification of expression (6). Dasgupta (2001),

<sup>13</sup> See Harsanyi (1955). I have qualified equi-probability in the text because it makes no sense when the future has no termination. To give it sense we must suppose that the probability of extinction over the indefinite future is unity. We may then talk of equi-probability of the conditionals. We discuss this in the following section. See also Dasgupta and Heal (1979: ch. 9).

<sup>14</sup> Notice that in  $t+1$  the only shoes you will not have to consider are the ones that belonged to those of generation  $t$ .

Arrow, Dasgupta, and Mäler (2003), and Arrow, Dasgupta, Goulder, *et al.* (2004) have shown that expression (6) is the natural concept of intergenerational well-being if we were to deliberate over the notion of *sustainable development*, namely, the requirement that  $V_t$  does not *decline* as  $t$  increases. Notice though that, once we are given the population forecast, the denominator in (5) is independent of the policies that could be chosen at  $t$ . This means that a policy deemed to be *optimal* if (5) were used as the criterion of choice would also be judged to be optimal if instead (6) were used as the criterion of choice. For Ramsey the two expressions would amount to the same. However, they would be seen to differ if we wished to determine whether a policy is *sustainable*. This poses no paradox: *Optimality and sustainability are different concepts, serving different purposes.*

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# HOW TO SHOW INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH RESPECT TO THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

EDMOND MALINVAUD

## 1. *An Important but Difficult Subject*

In our attitudes and policies concerning the physical environment, what does solidarity with future generations mean? Partha Dasgupta wants to set out the methodological approach used by economists in order to deal with the question. This is a good opportunity to refer more generally to the methodology of economics with respect to all questions which concern a long-term future and require a judgement about what ought to be done for the common good. My aim is here to provide an essentially literary introduction to the paper, putting it in a somewhat broader perspective.

Normative issues about the long term are objectively difficult, because in particular they involve more than a target to a distant future: they truly require dynamic programming under uncertainty; they will have to be implemented in a political context, which cannot be perfectly forecast, and so on. We economists are naturally led to decompose these difficulties, hence to proceed at various levels. A major decomposition consists in finding answers to three types of questions:

- Which principles must underlie the choice of objectives?
- What is really the context?
- Which procedures can be adopted for well articulating the principles with the knowledge of the context?

## 2. *In Search of a Choice Principle*

The paper deals with only the first question, which is, of course, crucial in our deliberations during this session. It pays a special tribute to Tjalling Koopmans and to his 64-page article discussed precisely here in 1963 within the activities of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences.

At the time there were twenty or so of us economists gathered to examine 'The Econometric Approach to Development Planning'. Seven of us would later receive the Nobel prize. The ultimate aim of the colloquium was not like today's environmental policies but development plans of countries like Egypt or India. But the discussion of principles concerned like now normative questions about a long-term future. Only the context was different. The issue was how to best schedule the investment drive to impose on people, knowing that it would compete with the great immediate needs of these people.

In order to define choice principles to be applied, we could hardly expect help from philosophers. It belonged to economists themselves to build their methodology. We indeed discovered then this reality that, in order to reason correctly about choice principles, you had to confront them with some representation of the context in which they would be applied. The representation had to be simple but somehow similar to the real context. The need to refer to a so stylized context is so true that it is now acknowledged by various philosophers like John Rawls who, more recently, aimed at elaborating the theory of justice.<sup>1</sup>

In this introductory exercise I shall refer to two distinct stylized contexts, the first evocative of one of the main problems in management of the environment, the second representative of what we were discussing in 1963. In the two cases, human persons, all assumed to be identical, belong each to one generation and successive generations are assumed not to overlap, each living just one period.

## 3. *Sharing Non-Renewable Natural Resources*

Attention is now limited to a case in which generations for their living need only to draw from a non-renewable resource. The hypothesis is made

<sup>1</sup> Note that in his famous 1971 book, *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press), Rawls refers to the economic literature, especially to Pareto, Koopmans and Sen, when he sets out the 'principle of efficiency' and the 'difference principle', both belonging to the very core of his theory.

that what is consumed of this resource by a person can no longer serve to anything and that there is no other form of consumption. Moreover, the total available quantity of the resource is assumed known. Let us first assume also a finite number of generations. I need not insist on the unreality of all the assumptions just listed. However, one element of realism remains in the stylized context so defined, namely the problem still stands to decide how to share the quantity of the resource between generations and between persons within generations.

The problem is now so simple that any reader knows the answer: justice requires an egalitarian distribution of the total quantity between all present and future persons, at least if they can survive with the quantity so allocated to them. Notice, however, that I wrote egalitarian distribution between persons, not between generations which may have more or less numerous populations. This is obvious to the reader, I suppose. But there was discussion on this point among economists, as is reported by Dasgupta. Indeed, applied to our stylized context, equal distribution between persons is chosen with his formula (5) with  $\beta=1$  but equal distribution between generations with formula (4), which was presented here in 1963 by Koopmans (he obviously paid no serious attention to the fact that the assumption of equal number of persons in all generations was embodied in his axioms). How can it be that as shrewd a theorist as Koopmans had not realized that formula (5) had to be given? Simply because his intuition misled him: he did not think about an appropriate stylized context.

Applied to non-renewable mineral or oil resources in the ground, the hypothesis of *known* total quantities (that will ever be accessible to humanity) has to be dismissed as too unrealistic. In fact, estimates given in the past of such quantities turned out to be systematically too low. But it is unlikely that this will remain true for ever because the quantities in question are certainly finite. Without entering in the study of consequences to be drawn from such past underestimations, I may briefly explain one conclusion drawn from the approach usually applied by economists when they embody in their analysis uncertainty in our knowledge of the context. In this literary introduction I may feel less constrained than Partha who understandably assumes, for simplicity, a known world.

With respect to the stylized context used here, the change would be to introduce a probability law of the total quantity to be shared, a law that the central authority, the distributor say, would use when deciding about the share to be allocated to the present generation and to be equally dis-



tributed between persons of that generation. For simplicity in my presentation of this problem of programming under uncertainty I further assume: (i) there is a single person in each generation; (ii) the probability law is fully characterized by its mean and variance; (iii) the distributor knows how the utility attached by each present or future person to the share allocated to her or him would increase with the amount of the share; (iv) the utility in question would moreover increase less and less if the amount of the share would increase more and more. Then it can easily be proved that the share allocated to the first person would decrease as uncertainty would increase, more precisely as the variance of the probability law would increase, the mean remaining unchanged. In other words, increased uncertainty requires the distributor to be more prudent in allocating shares to members of the present generation. Such is the form of the precaution principle.

#### 4. *An Undefinite Future*

Turning now to a different question, I must draw attention to the fact that the formulas written by Dasgupta assume an infinite number of generations. This is explained in his section 1 about the Ramsey formulation, in particular in his long footnote 1. In a few words: we well know that our world will cease existing at some future date; but this date is so indeterminate for us that it is much less unrealistic to assume in our reflections an indefinite future than any known terminal date, as was assumed in the foregoing section.

But this simple remark is devastating with respect to the egalitarian solution given above as applying to our first stylized context. With an infinite number of persons and a finite quantity of the resource to be shared, the egalitarian solution is absurd: for ever the share allocated to each 'living' person will be nil. In order to avoid this paradox while maintaining solidarity with future generations, a natural solution is to discount future utilities attached to the allocations of the resource, for instance to use formula (5) with a discount factor  $\beta$  smaller than one.

Partha explains that a similar paradox would occur in other contexts, covering in particular my second stylized context. He then points to the resulting ethical tension, which forces us to give less weight to generations remote in the future than to present generations. Once this is admitted, we may as well endorse Koopmans's logic, properly modified so as to lead to formula (5) rather than (3).

### 5. *Promoting Intergenerational Solidarity*

Formula (5) must be read as specifying that the central authority has to: (i) choose a function  $U(c)$  characterizing the utility derived by any person from an amount of consumption  $c$ , (ii) choose a discount factor  $\beta$  smaller than 1 to the detriment of the second generation, (iii) then select for implementation the transgenerational profile of individual amounts of consumption which maximizes  $V$ , given what is feasible in the relevant context.

Notice first that, while  $\beta$  has to be smaller than 1, it may be very close to 1. All depends on the force of the concern for future generations. With my first stylized context, the higher will be  $\beta$  the less will the distributor draw from the reserve of the natural resource to the benefit of the present generation.

Secondly, notice that, if the utility  $U$  was chosen proportional to  $c$ , the whole reserve would be allocated to the present generation and nothing would be left. But the distributor, like everybody else, is very likely to think that the utility of an additional euro is much larger for someone living with one euro per day than for someone living with ten euros per day. The function  $U(c)$  must reflect this assessment, which rules out proportionality between  $U$  and  $c$ . The perceived utility of the additional euro, called the marginal utility in mathematical language, will have to be a decreasing function of  $c$ . The larger the rate of decrease the more will the distributor exhibit concern for future generations.

Hence, there are two ways to promote equity between generations: either to choose a discount factor  $\beta$  closer to 1, or to choose a function  $U(c)$  such that the marginal utility decreases faster. One way or the other will lead to a smaller withdrawal from the reserve by the present generation.

### 6. *Marginal Rates of Substitution*

At this point in the context studied here so far, we understand the terms in which 'the problem to strike a balance between the well-being of present and future generations' is posed (see first two lines of section 1 in Dasgupta's paper). We must now go a little deeper into this problem because doing so will help us to perceive how, more generally, all dynamic programming questions raised by the economics of the environment are approached, where the balance between the interests of present and future generations is always at stake.

Going deeper requires the introduction of a few useful mathematical concepts and even presentation of one mathematical result, but technical

aspects will be avoided as much as possible. The reader understands this is not the place for a display of mathematical rigour. Let us begin with heuristic considerations.

In all cases one has to confront what is desirable with what is feasible. Striking a balance means that one has to find, in the set of feasibilities, the point beyond which the interest of the present generation would be favoured or sacrificed more than intergenerational justice requires. Well-being of the present generation has to stand just at the margin between excessive greed and excessive austerity. We then understand why appropriate mathematical concepts are denoted as 'marginal': they have to permit assessments at the margin. The main focus of attention then concerns substitutions of a little more to the next generation for a little less to the present generation. One has to make assessments on the one hand for what would remain feasible and on the other hand for what would remain equitable. Hence a concept of marginal rate of substitution in feasibilities and a concept of marginal rate of substitution in equitabilities, both between the consumptions of two persons belonging respectively to the present and the next generation (for the substitutions here contemplated which are moreover assumed to occur without any change in the consumptions of other persons). There is an intuitively natural theorem: when the correct balance is struck, the first of these two marginal rates is equal to the second.

Application of this theorem is fairly easy with the stylized context of the sharing problem as I defined it and extended it to an infinite number of generations. Indeed, the marginal rate of feasibilities is equal to 1: giving one more unit of the resource to a person of the next generation requires that the person designated in the present generation receives one unit less, when consumptions of all other persons remain unchanged. Let me now sketch the consequence of the theorem for this case.

Given the meaning of intergenerational well-being, designated by  $V$  in Partha's paper, an equitable substitution has to leave the value of  $V$  unchanged. Let  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  be respectively the consumptions of the two persons concerned. Consider two small changes in these consumptions  $-dc_1$  and  $+dc_2$ . The utilities drawn of the consumptions will change by the amounts  $-U'(c_1)dc_1$  and  $+U'(c_2)dc_2$ , where  $U'$  is the derivative function of  $U$ . In the spirit<sup>2</sup> of for-

<sup>2</sup> Formula (5) assumes that all persons of the same generation receive the same consumption. Here only one person of generation 1 and one person of generation 2 experience a change in their consumption.

mula (5) the value of the indicator  $V$  will remain unchanged if:  $-U'(c_1)dc_1 + \beta U'(c_2)dc_2 = 0$ . The marginal rate of substitution in equitabilities  $dc_1/dc_2$  is then equal to  $\beta U'(c_2)/U'(c_1)$ . Given the theorem, a program which strikes the balance must be such that this ratio be equal to 1. Since  $\beta$  is smaller than 1, the value  $U'(c_2)$  must be larger than  $U'(c_1)$ . But we have seen at the end of our foregoing section that the marginal utility  $U'(c)$  decreases as a function of  $c$ . So  $U'(c_2)$  larger than  $U'(c_1)$  means that  $c_2$  is smaller than  $c_1$ .

As a qualitative result it is really not surprising: the conclusion that  $c_1$  should decrease with time in the future is a direct effect of discounting the future. But such equations as  $U'(c_1) = \beta U'(c_2)$ , written for all conceivable substitutions, together with the resource constraint, lead to a full quantitative determination of the intended dynamic program. Similarly in different contexts a set of equations is derived from the theorem which, together with feasibility constraints, solves the problem.

### *7. Striking a Balance Between Investment and Consumption*

My second example of a stylized context is meant to provide a simple image of what was discussed here in 1963 and has also been studied most often in economic theory since then. Development plans, as contemplated at the time, aimed at coping with the capital shortage which was maintaining poor countries in underdevelopment. To pull countries out one had to irrigate lands, produce fertilizers, increase transport equipment, and so on. In short, investments were required, hence savings to be withdrawn from what could also have been used for immediate consumption. In return, levels of consumption would later be raised. The problem was to know how to best plan not only the initial saving but also the future joint growth of investment and consumption.

The context had a few essential features. Production would be all the higher as the volume of capital would be larger, and this according to what productive techniques would permit. Production would be allocated in part to investment, the surplus going to consumption. Investment would imply an increase in the volume of capital. For our reflection is now considering aggregates suffices: hence four amounts in each period (production, capital, investment and consumption) and three necessary relations repeatedly applying along the sequence of periods. The first relation stipulated that the capital of the next period would be the sum of capital available in the current period and investment. The second relation gave production as a function of capital, the 'production function'. The third relation defined con-

sumption as the difference between production and investment. The problem was to maximize an objective function such as  $V$  defined by Partha in his equation (5). The solution of the problem gave in particular the 'optimal' series of consumption levels period after period.

Of that solution I shall quote here just one element, namely that the marginal rate of substitution in feasibilities between the consumption of a period and the consumption of the previous period directly depends on the marginal productivity of capital in the later period of the two. But this productivity, hence also the marginal rate of substitution, varies from one period to another: it is normally all the higher as the period begins with a lower capital. For countries initially suffering from capital shortage the usual conclusion states that, even with an unchanged technology not to speak of technical progress, the optimal program leads to an increasing time series of consumption levels. This is a just reward for the saving effort imposed since the beginning.

#### *8. Substitution of Produced Capital to Non-Renewable Natural Resources*

In the second stylized context no other natural resource than labour is present. But there is no difficulty in principle to combine the two stylized contexts, so as to account for the simultaneous existence of both produced capital and non-renewable natural resources. To refer to such a combination is even appropriate within any discussion about the attention to be given to the physical environment in a long-term strategy of intergenerational solidarity. Indeed, environmentalists closely study the feasibilities of developing and using techniques thanks to which capital produced from labour would be substituted, at least in part, to scarce natural resources.

Such is the purpose of many research projects which collect factual and scientific information about the phenomena involved. The ultimate goal of such research is to better gauge feasibilities and to discover new ways to restrict the use of non-renewable resources. The last Development Report of the World Bank<sup>3</sup> is paying much attention to the issue. If our Academy further extends its investigations about environmental policies, we also should pay attention to this research.

<sup>3</sup> *Sustainable development in a dynamic world – Transforming institutions, growth and quality of life*, World Bank, 2003.

### 9. *What Should We Mean by Consumption?*

In his section 1 Dasgupta refers to 'some generalized consumption' as the determinant of each generation's well-being. Such a consumption is meant to include 'food, clothing, shelter, health care, serenity, leisure activities, legal aid and various types of public goods (including civil and political liberties and direct amenities from the natural environment)'. In other writings Partha distinguishes 'welfare' from 'well-being', which differ because well-being ought to be measured from generalized consumption whereas welfare is usually evaluated from consumption, as may be found for instance in national accounts.

With respect to the earlier literature and to the object of our discussions in 1963, this is a new concept. Although I agree that the distinction makes sense, I want to also voice a warning. Proposing to replace 'welfare economics' by 'well-being economics' is a clear way of recognizing the validity of the criticism which long since blames economists for their too narrow conception of welfare. To this criticism we have been used to reply: 'Yes, economic analysis is not sufficient for dealing with some realities. For instance, it belongs to political analysis to speak about civil and political liberties, to evaluate and to explain them'. We often add, by the way, that those liberties do not appear to actually be in contradiction with economic welfare, as we measure it. It seems that such common type of reply was not enough and that critics would have liked to see all non-strictly-economic features being embodied in our analyses. With his comprehensive concept of well-being Dasgupta shows that we have no objection in principle to doing so.

But replacing 'welfare economics' by 'well-being economics' ought not to mean just a change in our vocabulary. It will be understood by some readers as a commitment. Are we able to fulfil the expectations so raised? Intuition leads me to have doubts in this respect. My job as a statistician is clearly part of the story: in order to merge with economic aggregates such as household consumption the now available indices of civil and political liberties, where could I find objectively justifiable weights to be respectively given both? The difficulty of the answer is revealing the still more challenging questions we would have to face in applied comparative analyses involving the concept of generalized consumption. Moreover I have serious doubts about attempts made so far by economists for significantly extending the domain of my discipline. For instance the so-called 'new political economy' brings very little in comparison with the previous state of affairs, according to which we added to the presentation of results reached by our economic analyses some common sense comments about possible interference of political factors.

# SPEAKING FOR CHILDREN AND FOR THE FUTURE

KENNETH J. ARROW

This essay is not a technical study in economics, though its initial motivation arose from technical issues, and I hope that it will lead back to improved measurements and policies. It is rather an attempt to think through a set of relations of the greatest importance for society in general and of major importance even in narrowly economic issues. I do not consider that I have resolved the issues, but I hope at least that the questions raised will be seen to be socially and morally significant.

The question at stake can be seen in a simple form in the measurement of income inequality. Naively, it might be said that the economy consists of a number of individuals, each of whom has an income, and so the distribution of income is simply defined. But if one looks at distribution statistics, one finds given instead the distribution of *family* incomes. There are a number of questions here, but one certainly is that children have no incomes, and yet entering them at zero incomes would clearly be a very misleading indication of welfare. The consumption and general well-being of a child is determined jointly by the economic capacity of the family and by the sense of responsibility of the family to the child.

The starting point is the normal approach of economics, more specifically of what is called, 'welfare economics'. Although there are many variants within this general framework and there are many critical analyses in specific contexts, the general philosophy may be expressed in relatively brief compass. The society consists of a number of individuals, each of whom has a set of values. The achievement of these values is limited by objective circumstances which, in part at least, govern the society as a whole. The aim is to achieve the individual values as well as possible within the objective constraints; the respect for the dignity and identity of the individual requires taking account of his or her values.

Of course, the kinds of values with which economic analysis works best are those that attach to commodities, that is items which can be transferred

among individuals. There is then a natural affiliation with the analysis of markets. It is not required that all valued commodities be marketed or even marketable, but clearly the norm of the market is the background for evaluation.

The question I want to raise is that treating all individuals in the same way, as implied in the usual discussions of welfare economics, overlooks the differences among individuals. There are several dimensions of difference, but the one I want to stress here is that some individuals are not as capable as others of articulating their values or needs. The most obvious case is that of children, limited in reflective and communicative capacities. But there are others. Among them are the future individuals who are linked to us by objective relations, whose potential realization of values we can affect, but who are simply not here to express the values whose realization we can help or hinder.

The implication I will draw is the more explicit recognition of a role of trusteeship or *stewardship*, a social obligation which must be taken account of in the expression of values: stewardship of parents for children and of present generations for future ones.

I organize the discussion into three sections. In Section 1, I review the importance of the representation of individual preferences or values in consequentialist welfare economics. In Sections 2 and 3, I use these arguments to develop the importance of stewardship for protecting the interests of children and of the future of humanity.

## 1. THE REPRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES IN CONSEQUENTIALIST WELFARE JUDGMENTS

I take as a starting point that the aim of social policy is to improve the *well-being* of the *members* of the *society*. Each of the italicized words stands for a problematic concept. To go into all aspects would be beyond my capacity and certainly beyond the limits appropriate to this paper. At a very minimum, then, we must define how wide the society is, who constitute its membership, and how we determine the well-being of members.

I take for granted that the individual members of the society, however, are indeed marked by individuality. Each has individual dignity and at least some degree of autonomy. The well-being of an individual depends, at least in part, on what may be termed, *goods*, that is, objects which can be affected by social or individual actions. These may include the consumption of commodities such as food or clothing, the provision or preservation of environments, both



man-made and natural, the maintenance of public order, the conduct of wars, the provision of medical care and public health, or the development and transmission of knowledge at every level. The irreducible diversity and individuality of human beings can be expressed by saying that the well-being of each depends on social goods in different ways. Let us call this relation between an individual's well-being and goods the individual's *value system*.

The standard assumption in economics is that value systems take the form of utility functions or preference orderings. These impose a considerable degree of consistency on values. For the present purposes, these restrictions are unnecessary.

The general framework of a social decision system (a system for policy determination) has as its elements the value systems of the individual members of the society, the objective circumstances which limit the ranges of goods available (resources, knowledge, institutions), and the actions that individuals and social organizations can take. The concept of a social decision system is very broad. Democratic political systems, dictatorships, theocracies, and the market are all examples of social decision systems; so is the mixture of these concepts which actually prevails.

The point is that to influence the outcome the value systems of all individuals have somehow to be represented. The bias of economic analysis is to assume that the individual represents his or her own values through actions. In the market, these actions may be purchases and sales. In a political system, the actions may be voting and other forms of political activity. The intermediate institutions of civil society represent still other opportunities for actions, including philanthropy, campaigns to influence public opinion and governmental action, volunteer activity for public goods, and non-profit activities. The outcome of all these individual and collective actions is some distribution of the goods in the society, a distribution which in turn determines the achievements of the values of individuals.

I raised three questions and have discussed one of them, the formal role of well-being. Does the society have boundaries and who are the individuals who act in the society and whose values are to be respected? One aspect of this question that I will not discuss today is the relation between the nation and the world. The nation is a major unit for social decision making, as the world is constituted today. One could ask the responsibility of nations to each other. More relevant for my purposes are the roles of those whose action potential is limited, such as children and of those who have no action potential at all, because they are not yet born. I turn to some discussion of these cases.

## 2. CHILDREN AS A SPECIAL CASE

### 2.1. *Value Representation*

At any moment there are individuals who cannot fully represent their value systems through actions, perhaps cannot even fully represent them in thought. The obvious example is that of children, though other forms of incapacity also come to mind. They have not the full intellectual or physical capacity of adults, they have not the other resources, and above all they have not the self-knowledge of their desires and moral capacities which would enable them to represent properly their value systems.

This observation creates a dilemma. Any reasonable system of ethical thought must acknowledge the humanity of children and their right that their values, what is good for them, be considered in determining the distribution of goods. We come to the need that the values of children have to be represented somewhere in the social system. That typically means that they have to be represented by someone. It will be immediately answered in your minds by the statement, 'parents represent children'. In a general way, of course, that is correct, but it raises a host of other issues, only some of which I develop below.

The crucial point is the need for what may be called *stewardship*. The well-being of one individual is represented by one or perhaps several other individuals. The debates on the foundations of ethics have been couched in terms of 'rights' versus 'utilities' or 'consequences', but neither of these fits the role of the steward. It is rather a question of an obligation to discharge.

### 2.2. *Parents as Stewards: Altruism and Conflict*

I find it somewhat surprising that religious and moral thought have given relatively little consideration to the right of the child to adequate stewardship. There are many texts on obligations to one's parents, the Fifth Commandment and many others, but none (to my limited knowledge) enjoining obligations to raise children in the children's own interests and with regard to the children's well-beings. One possibility is, of course, very optimistic; it was felt that there was no problem since the concern of parents for their children could be taken for granted.

Clearly, the world is so constructed that this assumption is largely true. At least as far simple nutrition is concerned, parental or at least maternal care is normal among many animals, especially but not only mammals.

Human childhood is extraordinarily long by animal standards, and the demands on the parents correspondingly great. Further, as human culture has accumulated over time, the parents have been thrust into the role of participating in the transmission of that culture. This process includes the development of language and the transmission of knowledge, not only of technology but also of acceptable social behavior and the concepts of morality. To be sure, the family is aided (sometimes hindered) by other social institutions. Children form peer groups. Formal institutions, the school and the church or other religious institution, have played increasingly important roles over time. But the parents have typically played a central though not exclusive role in meeting the cultural and moral as well as the physiological needs of the child.

Stewardship is an obligation, and, like any serious obligation, it can be and should be a taxing one. The steward is not the child. There are at least two areas in which conflict can occur: interest and knowledge. The parents have their own interests, their own well-beings to consider. Child labor is an obvious example. There may have been little conflict of interest in a simple world where productive capacity was measured by the operation of the family farm. Putting the child to work at farming adds both to the family income and to the child's knowledge, though overwork may threaten the child's long-term health. But in a world where education is a serious addition to the child's long-term potential both for income and for better understanding of human culture, the conflict can be real. Social policy has already recognized this potential for conflict in the form of compulsory education laws.

I must mention here, without development, that the conflicts between parental and child interests are not only economic. The family, like any social group, has the potential for emotional conflicts, and those between parents can have the most drastic implications for the children. The modern freedom of divorce and of unmarried parentage have increased the scope of expression for parents without necessarily recognizing the implications for the welfare of children. The stewardship obligation is not in fact treated as absolute.

I do not have any simple answers to these difficulties. The need for social regulation is obvious enough and in principle fully recognized. The large changes in behavior with relatively small changes in law show that the processes of moral suasion and attitudes are at least as important as official government policy in determining the conditions under which the stewardship of children is undertaken.

### 3. THE STEWARDSHIP OF THE FUTURE

Children are one group of individuals for which some kind of stewardship, some kind of representation of values by others, is a necessity. There is another group whose ability to influence the present is even less than that of children: the unborn. Clearly, what we do today can have strong influence on what will happen in the future, perhaps even the very distant future. It will affect those not yet in existence, perhaps many generations hence. By what criteria do we judge the consequences for them? Is there an obligation to weigh future generations at all and, if so, to what extent?

The crucial though obvious point is that the future generations cannot themselves represent their value systems. If they are taken account of at all, it must be because the present generation acts in part as stewards of the future. But it is more complicated than that. The present generation cannot control the future. It can make certain decisions which limit or enhance what the next generation can do, but it does not completely control what that generation can do. It must predict what they will do, and one aspect of that prediction will be the extent to which the next generation is itself going to act as a steward for generations beyond itself. When this analysis is continued, it is clear that the actions of the present generation taken in light of its stewardship depend on the stewardly behavior of all future generations.

Just to focus the mind, let us consider a few of the decisions by which the present influences the future. All have the characteristic that they represent comparing some consumption today with an alternative which yields benefits or the potential for benefits in the future. The most straightforward is ordinary investment; from the social point of view, this would be using resources to accumulate buildings and machinery which yield product in the future instead of using the same resources for the well-being of the current generation. The investment might be private or public. Another form of investment is education, the use of resources (skilled teachers who could be doing other things, buildings, and expenses) to transmit knowledge to the young and thereby keep it alive for still further generations. A third is the development of new knowledge through research and development. The knowledge will continue to yield its benefits as long as the human race continues to survive and to transmit it.

We have become aware of still another choice between present and future, the exploitation of natural and environmental resources. Minerals, including fossil fuels, used today can never be used by future human beings. Some industrial emissions into the atmosphere, such as carbon

dioxide and methane, remain for long periods of time and, it is generally agreed, lead to an increase in world-wide temperatures. Certain waste products are both very durable and very toxic. The extreme case is that of nuclear waste, whether from power plants or from nuclear arms, with major risks for up to 10,000 years.

I do not propose to go into any of these examples in detail for the purpose of this discussion. The relevant literature in economics, quite unlike that on the role of children, is very large, with regard to both foundations and applications to specific cases. However, consensus has not been attained.

At the foundational level, most economists rely for discussions of responsibility towards the future on the approach of *discounted utilitarianism*. There is a general view that the unborn future generations have their claims, which must be respected by the present generation. But it is usually held that the claim of a future individual is not as strong as that of one existing today. When put this way, this assertion makes everyone uncomfortable (e.g., Robert Solow), and it has been rejected by some leading economic thinkers (Frank P. Ramsey, Arthur C. Pigou). To take the example of nuclear power, suppose that we are pretty sure that nuclear waste can never be fully safeguarded, so that some people hundreds or thousands of years from now will die of radiation poisoning as a result of our getting cheaper power. If we discount future well-being at any rate measurably above zero, lives a thousand years hence will have essentially no weight in our decisions.

There is however a contrary argument first enunciated by the Dutch-American economist, Tjalling C. Koopmans. The future is very long in comparison with the present. Hence, if we don't discount, we would justify great deprivations for the present generation for a very small but permanent benefit. Indeed, implicitly, the sacrifices imposed by the Soviet Union on its people during the Thirties and, to a lesser extent, from 1945 to about 1960 were based on some such reasoning. I can remember hearing the first chairman of the Indian Planning Commission giving the same argument very explicitly in the early 1950s as a basis for his recommendations. If one rejects this extreme future-mindedness, then one seems forced to some version of discounting.

A new way of thinking about our responsibilities to the future is the concept of sustainability, given wide diffusion by the Brundtland Commission; each generation should leave the world and its resources with at least the same potential for production as it entered it. The meaning of this condition is certainly far from unambiguous, and its logic muddy, but it does provide a way of giving a meaning to the stewardship requirement on each generation. It may be remarked, though, that it leads to acceptable results only because there is an underlying belief in continued technological progress.

#### 4. FINAL REMARKS

Writing this paper has really been for me an exercise in working through some dilemmas in my own thinking about the future. It is disappointingly inconclusive and probably not suited to the more applied and policy-oriented character of this session. But perhaps it may stimulate some reflections on the meaning of intergenerational solidarity. I see the major issues of our time as solidarity with the future, including our living dependents.

## CHILDREN AND THE FUTURE: A FEW REMARKS ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

HANS F. ZACHER

### *The German Experience*

In Germany, until the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the spheres of life coming under our subject were primarily left to private initiative and society. In legal terms, that means they were entrusted to civil law, which constituted the family as an autonomous maintenance collective. Independent bread-winning activities were subject to occupational regulations. Dependent work was governed by labour legislation, which only gradually came to embrace the idea of workers' social protection. Children largely took part in the earning of livelihood – whether independent or dependent. Whoever was unable to make a living in this way found refuge in a minimum provision of poor relief. That also applied to children and the elderly. Elementary school education was compulsory and free of cost – an initial generalization of state concern for the opportunities of children. Restrictions of child labour accompanied this development. Conversely, secondary schools were attended on a voluntary basis and subject to fees. As from 1880, during the Bismarck era, the scene changed. Social insurance was introduced and further developed in the subsequent decades. The pension insurance system at first provided benefits to the disabled and the elderly, but later, like accident insurance, also to the widows and orphans of the deceased. These were the most important steps on the way to public, state responsibility for the needs of the various generations. Health insurance, in the course of time, covered also the family members of the insured on a non-contributory basis. As from the First World War, the protection afforded under labour law improved rapidly. Federal 'youth welfare' regulations served to generalize, beyond schooling, the state's attendant concern for the development of the younger generation. At the same time, however, the middle generation was

caught up in an ambivalent development: unemployment and the demand for labour began to alternate at short intervals.

After 1945, the immediate concern was to cope with the catastrophe wrought by the National Socialist regime. With the founding of the Federal Republic, however, the question of establishing a new social order gained more and more weight. Solutions were sought by further developing labour law and social benefit law. With full employment soon to set in, the situation of the dependent working population was comfortable in the medium-term perspective. New, tax-financed social benefit branches were set up to assist families: children's allowance, housing benefits, as well as the out-of-school promotion of children and adolescents. The free provision of learning aids (schoolbooks, etc.) was introduced in elementary and secondary schools. Attendance at all public schools, up to and including universities, was freed of charges.

Nevertheless, the decisive concept was coined in conjunction with the state pension reform of 1957, which also included a periodic adjustment of pensions to the general trend in earnings. The concept was labelled *Intergeneration Contract*. It is based on the idea that society consists of three generations. The old generation is taken care of because its members looked after the aged and raised children while they formed the middle generation. The middle generation is engaged in gainful employment, the proceeds of which are used to provide for the aged and to raise children. The youngest generation must be prepared for successfully assuming the tasks of the middle generation.

This image was broadly supported for a long time. The sciences, society, and politics were proud of the concept. In truth, however, it was full of discrepancies. To speak of a 'contract' was a pure illusion. For who were supposed to be the contracting parties? And how would these parties have concluded the contract or even been capable of doing so? Where were the penalties if one of the roles was not properly played? By individuals? Or by a whole generation? Both society and politics were increasingly willing to face this diversity. The ideal of 'individualization' was aimed at liberalization from predetermined roles. Social benefits were no longer only supposed to compensate for employment income that could not be earned; they were also to establish the freedom of not having to work. Alluding to Karl Marx, it was held that work was no longer supposed to be a commodity people were forced to sell. This model of 'de-commodification' was not conceived in Germany – yet it did manage to seep more and more into the German mentality. The most far-reaching flaw in speaking about the



Intergeneration Contract, however, was that the associative value of the image focused on the state pension system – which had become the field of the Intergeneration Contract's greatest normative force, while the rest of it vanished in the dark. Consequently, however, it lagged behind the problem that was supposed to be solved by the Intergeneration Contract: firstly, because the state pension system only affected the younger generation's relation to the other generations in terms of the marginal issue of orphans' pensions. Secondly, because the state pension system, though the most important form of old-age protection in Germany, is by no means the only one, and because the generational proportions differ for each of the forms.

This disparity between the initial normative appearance and the true normative effect of the Intergeneration Contract was underscored by the attendant institutional regime. In order to monitor the relationship between the trend in contributions and the trend in pensions, a competent institution was established and given the task of providing an annual set of accounting figures. This institution, too, deals only with the state pension system; it, too, knows nothing about the youngest generation's relation to the older ones. Other institutions deliver reports at irregular intervals on the situation of families, youth, and the educational system. Yet it never occurred to anyone to put these together to form an instrument for reviewing the *whole* Intergeneration Contract: for instance, by coupling an old-age protection report (and not merely a pension insurance report) with a family and education report to form an aggregate report on the status of the Intergeneration Contract's implementation. Instead, the Intergeneration Contract came to be identified with the contributions-to-pensions ratio of the state pension system. This was cemented by the fact that jurisprudence and the courts ultimately arrived at the conviction that pension claims are 'bought' through contributions and thus enjoy protection under the basic constitutional right of ownership, similar to other vested interests acquired through personal payments. A unique and daring attempt on the part of law to anticipate the future of society! But above all: what 'top-heaviness' of the Intergeneration Contract! The middle generation, beside its obligation to contribute, is left with at least some security in the event of invalidity and of death in respect of surviving dependents. The youngest generation is left with the orphans' pension. Otherwise, nothing is of comparable certainty. At the upper end of the age balloon, the Intergeneration Contract is supposed to attain the highest measure of legal certainty, while from there downwards uncertainty grows at a rapid and pressing pace. What kind of a 'contract' is that?

While constitutional law was thus seeking to anticipate the future of financial old-age protection, even the mere semblance of a balance which the term 'Intergeneration Contract' sought to insinuate began to go awry. On an increasing scale, the middle generation refused to assume the responsibility of child-raising. And so this generation increasingly changed within itself – and within its quantitative and qualitative relationship to the two other generations. The changes occurring in the world of work, and the migrations of capital and labour that went and still go hand in hand with globalization, led to rising unemployment. Simultaneously, the old were getting older. The duration of pension receipt was prolonged. This trend was accompanied by mounting expenditures for medical treatment and long-term care. For years now the state pension system has been faced by the permanent dilemma either of raising contributions, thereby progressively narrowing the incomes of the middle generation, or of lowering pension benefits to the older generation below the level that was long taken for granted. The illusion that the concept of the Intergeneration Contract is able to guarantee a self-supporting mechanism has imploded. The constitutional protection of ownership in respect of pensions has ceased to bear but a relative significance. Talk of the Intergeneration Contract has become sparse. It has been supplanted by the demand for *intergenerational justice*. This demand no longer tinkers with the image of a regulatory mechanism that enforces itself, but signifies the appeal to politicians to establish circumstances that are just for all generations.

Meanwhile, of course, the call for *intergenerational solidarity* has acquired a much broader meaning. In 1994, the following sentence (Article 20 a) was incorporated into the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (constitution): 'Mindful also of its responsibility toward future generations, the state shall protect the natural bases of life ...'. This sentence is primarily a response to the ecological challenges of our times. Yet it also implies that the 'responsibility toward future generations' is not limited to the 'natural bases of life' – that it goes beyond those, that it has a more general meaning. Nevertheless the connection is also indicative of the advice to introduce quite generally to 'intergenerational justice' that factor which has been developed in response to the ecological issue: *sustainability*. In the meantime, this term is believed to bear great normative significance. It appears self-evident to elaborate the meaning of 'sustainability' to embrace also the welfare state. Thus there are discussions on how the dilemma of the state pension system – swaying between inappropriate contribution burdens and inappropriate pension cuts – could be solved in favour of a 'sustainable'

regulation. One proposition has been to create a set of figures referred to as 'intergeneration accounts'. Based on prognostic assumptions concerning population development, productivity, and so forth, these figures are to determine what individual age cohorts pay into the public funds under the given contribution and benefit law, and what they receive in the form of public benefits. Any imbalances are to be corrected by amending the respective contribution or benefit legislation. If the pertinent data change, the consequences are to be distributed equally among the different generations. The concept has numerous indistinct boundaries. Firstly, every change in assumptions may demand adjustments that cannot be calculated in advance; and all adjustments can lead to changes in behaviour that necessitate new adjustments. Secondly, the focus on monetary redistribution leaves open how institutional benefits and services, such as infrastructure, education, and health care, are included. Thirdly, the focus on redistribution via *public* funds leaves open how private and societal services, notably those provided by families, are included. Fourthly, migrations add horizontal developments to the vertical development of generation cohorts. Further examples could easily be added. To date, the concept of sustainability has only served to give fragmentary political decisions the legitimation of being guided by integral rational contemplation. Nevertheless, these decisions in turn have so far corresponded fully with the gradients immanent in the political system: the priority of monetary redistribution through public funds; the priority of voters (the adults of the middle and older generations) over non-voters (children); the priority of the common interests of the middle and older generations (in old-age protection) over the particular interests of the shrinking proportion of parents within the middle generation (in lightening the load of families and promoting their children), and so forth. How can a word like 'sustainability' contend with such entelechy?

#### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

##### *Regarding Intergenerational Solidarity*

*Intergenerational solidarity* refers to an interpersonal stance that takes account of the particular possibilities and the particular disadvantages and risks inherent in individual phases of life. It is directed towards unfolding the potential of one's own stage in life as well as that of others, while helping to balance the disadvantages and risks facing others in different life

phases. This stance, in its elementary form, is fulfilled in the genealogical lines of the family. For it to be accomplished sufficiently, however, intergenerational solidarity must extend beyond familial bounds. That is due to the inevitable differences in family constellations, to the supra-familial nature of many life patterns that are essential both for unfolding individual potential and for guaranteeing interpersonal aid, and finally to the a priori trans-private, general and public nature of human life. In the course of civilization's development, the importance of supra-familial solidarity has increased more and more – and so has the responsibility of the state and law for ensuring the necessary diversity of federal systems, institutions, and practices. In this way, intergenerational solidarity ultimately came to be intertwined with politics.

In the course of the 19th century, the responsibility of the state and law for ensuring intergenerational solidarity was perceived with mounting clarity as an *element of the welfare state*. Securing economic existence became a prime concern of intergenerational solidarity. Accordingly, redistribution evolved into the essential medium of that solidarity. New outward forms were developed and later subsumed under the term 'social security'. In the wake of those developments, intergenerational solidarity was 'made' public – more precisely, it essentially remained *also* private, but its public share increased. Which at the same time meant that intergenerational solidarity was monetized, since public care for the living circumstances of individuals is provided with the least amount of friction through monetary benefits. In particular, the political dimension of intergenerational solidarity was realized through monetary redistribution. That not only corresponded to the democratic attractiveness of monetary giving; it also conformed to the interest, founded on the rule of law, in making sure of the provision. Correspondingly clear, on the other side, was intergenerational solidarity's political gradient between publicly organized monetary benefits – at the very top – and private (mainly familial) services and benefits in kind – down at the bottom – that is, simultaneously, between generality and individuality, between certainty and uncertainty.

After the Second World War, the industrialized countries of the 'free' world experienced a unique period of growth – both of their economies and their welfare state instruments. Among the most insistent features of this age was *the illusion that individual prosperity in the mid-phase of life could be extended into the phase of old age through 'social security' techniques*. The prolongation of life and the redistribution of capital, labour, and knowledge in a 'globalized' world have called this illusion into question.

At the same time it has become apparent that intergenerational solidarity must not be restricted to the economic basis of life – especially not to financial income. *Intergenerational solidarity must refer to all bases of life, notably the natural bases of life.* Finally, intergenerational solidarity must not focus on the relationship between the phases of gainful activity and old age. *The most important resource for every individual's life, for the life of all societies, and the life of humanity are human beings.* The most important thing a human being requires in all phases of life is his or her capability of living. Most recent experience has therefore proven that *intergenerational solidarity must be achieved in all phases of life.* If it were justified to attribute a special rank to one life phase, this would have to be the *phase of childhood and youth.* That is the *decisive phase for determining the capability of living and thus for achieving intergenerational solidarity with others.*

### *Intergenerational Justice*

In terms of *distributive justice*, this means that 'rights' and 'obligations' are spread out unevenly over the individual life phases. While the mid-phase is typical of giving (or at least of being supposed to do so), the child and youth phase as well as that of old age are typical phases of taking (largely of having to do so). In terms of *retributive justice*, this means that giving (also having to do so) in the mid-phase is justified by having taken in the child and youth phase, which is resumed in a 'right to take' in the phase of old age. *Intergenerational justice* therefore means that society, the state, and law should not only comply with the possibilities and needs of the individual phases of life, but that the burdens of the mid-phase must find adequate compensation in the 'rights' of the child and youth phase, as well as in the 'rights' of the old-age phase. In other words: the 'rights' of the child and youth phase must be in reasonable proportion to the burdens of the mid-phase, as must the 'rights' of the old-age phase. In the process, distributive and retributive justice will of course assume unequal proportions. The life assistance rendered in the child and youth phase cannot be made to depend on what will be given in the mid-phase of life. Its purpose is absolute: to provide the opportunity for young life to develop. Distributive justice *must* prevail. The life assistance granted in the phase of old age, by contrast, can very well be made to depend on what was achieved in the mid-phase. Retributive justice *can* prevail. *Intergenerational justice* therefore finds expression in a *sequence*: in the

*child and youth phase* it above all takes the form of distributive justice to provide opportunities to young life; in the *mid-phase* it comprises both distributive justice in accordance with personal performance as well as retributive justice in favour of the young and the elderly; and in the *old-age phase* it involves distributive *and* retributive justice depending on prior performance in the mid-phase and on the needs of old age.

The *hopeless complexity* of these interrelations has long become evident. Notwithstanding, they must be extended by yet another *two dimensions*. The *one* consists in the *endlessness of the generational chain and its relationship to the limitedness of resources*. Every generation has the responsibility to leave behind sufficient *regenerative* resources for the following generations – enough to support them if they make prudent use of their potential for replenishment. And every generation has the responsibility to leave behind sufficient *non-regenerative* resources to support the following generations – to enable all succeeding generations to go on living (at least) on the same level as earlier generations.

The *other dimension* consists in the *common ground of this earth* whose resources are not a priori and forever distributed across self-contained societies. It consists in the fact that it does not suffice for a certain society to sustain for its later generations the resources now available to it; rather, the earth's resources must be safeguarded for all generations who will live on this planet. And finally, it consists in the fact that it cannot be left to the discretion of a society or its members to abrogate the responsibility of another society for the resources of its territory – neither through the migration of people, nor through the utilization of resources.

Intergenerational justice is not only conceivable along national lines; nor, however, is it absolutely and directly conceivable on a global scale either. If one visualizes generational sequences vertically and resource distribution horizontally, and if one bears in mind that concrete constellations of allocating people to resources have developed on a country or perhaps also regional basis, this always means that concrete constellations of intergenerational solidarity will have developed as well. And when one considers that along the horizontal line the distribution of people and, via the markets, of resources can change as a result of human migration, it becomes evident how very much these changes (and above all human migrations) may potentially alter the conditions of intergenerational solidarity and the normative concepts of intergenerational justice. Of what import *sustainability* could be to these global and continental challenges is hard to see.

### *Normative Concepts?*

*Neither intergenerational solidarity, nor intergenerational justice, nor sustainability are self-evident and self-fulfilling normative concepts.* Even within the *national realm*, the complexity of intergenerational justice and the uncertainty of sustainability tend to multiply themselves. The difficulties of achieving an *international order* are even much farther away from any solution.

Adverse developments in the *national realm* are first of all attributable to the fact that the overall problematic nature is only gradually coming into focus and being analyzed. The solutions adopted hitherto have been unbalanced. This not only shows that full awareness of the given problems has only recently improved and that the limits to their solutions have only become visible in the course of experience; it also highlights differences in the political assertiveness of groups and interests, as well as in the political and technical attractiveness of problems and their solutions. All this is augmented by societal and political misjudgements of facts and effects, institutions and instruments. It is of utmost importance to know that intergenerational solidarity can only be fulfilled within the interrelationship between the state and society, within the private and the public sphere. Societal developments are, however, hard to steer (as evidenced not least by demographic data). The reactions of individuals, families, groups, and organizations to legally and administratively set data – notably in their massive interdependence – are scarcely foreseeable; indeed, they are not seldom surprising.

## PERSPECTIVES

### *The Comprehensive, Complex Responsibility*

Intergenerational solidarity denotes a problem area of far-reaching dimensions and extreme complexity. Solving these problems is the object of elementary and urgently needed interpersonal, societal, political, and legal responsibility.

### *The Incomplete, Open Normative Approaches*

Such concepts as ‘intergenerational justice’ or ‘sustainability’ (in its current sense) are impulses on the way to analyzing the problem area,

defining the problems, and evaluating the solutions. 'Intergenerational justice' can lead to a systematic ordering of the problems and their solutions; it cannot, however, order the concrete solutions. The concept of 'sustainability' serves as a guideline for viewing the problems and embarking on solutions. Even less so than 'intergenerational justice' does 'sustainability' produce the contents of the concrete solutions. No doubt seldom in the history of law has a single word been normatively overestimated as much as 'sustainability'.

### *The Knowledge of the Matter*

One of the major reasons why intergenerational solidarity is achieved only deficiently is the incomprehensive awareness of the problems and of feasible approaches towards finding solutions. A further-going rational investigation into the 'nature of the matter', into that which is meant by intergenerational solidarity, is therefore imperative if the responsibility for intergenerational solidarity is to be duly met. That requires reliable, honest fact-finding and reporting, academic research, and rational discussion. Society and the state must act in unison to fulfil these requirements. It does not suffice simply to gain new insights; these must also be conveyed. Hence, conveying comprehensive systematic knowledge on the matter of intergenerational solidarity constitutes an additional important demand in keeping abreast of the responsibility for intergenerational solidarity.

### *The Forces of Achievement*

New insights will not lead to achievements of their own accord. These require forces that adopt the insights along individual, social, political, or legal lines. Generally it will be those forces whose value concepts or interests conform to the insights. Yet there is no guarantee that these forces' understanding of the insights, or their use of them, will do justice to what would be commensurate with an order and a reality of intergenerational solidarity that is right in its entirety. Consequently, the political and legal system must be specifically structured so as to merge the particular forces to achieve the right measure of order.

Imbalances, however, also arise from the fact that certain values and interests are only weakly or not at all represented. For this reason, the political and legal system must ensure that these values and interests are safeguarded by way of stewardship. That can occur through normative



precepts and limitations (state objectives, fundamental rights, etc.). And that can occur through mandates of stewardship (ombudspersons, 'authorized agents', etc.). In many cases, freely formed groups (initiatives, non-governmental organizations, etc.) are respected as mandataries. In the private sphere, such mandates will be accorded to individuals (in their long-standing legal recognition as guardians). In general, normative rules, mandates of stewardship, and state responsibilities will have to complement each other. Proceeding thus to establish a balanced order that comes close to the ideal of 'the right kind of intergenerational solidarity' is certainly anything but simple.

*One Example: Children*

Among the most difficult problems here are the concerns of children. Children are dependent upon their family, notably their parents. Externally, they share common interests. But only parents have a fully valid mandate for safeguarding these interests. And forged into this one mandate are the parents' own individual interests. Thus it is up to parents to decide how to resolve conflicts if, say, as voters they give preference either to their own interests through one political party or to those of their children through another. Yet even if they wish to give preference to the 'party of their children', they do not have as many votes as they have children, but only their own one vote. Internally, parents and children also have different interests. Resolving these conflicts likewise lies within the responsibility of the parents. The number of factors thereby coming to bear, as well as the question of how and why such resolution occurs or does not, occurs adequately or inadequately, cannot and need not be outlined here. Other than in the case of the external relationship, the polity and law, perhaps also societal forces, will of course intervene in this internal sphere: youth authorities and courts, guardians, organizations that care for neglected and vulnerable children, neighbours, and others. In their educational function parents do not stand alone as it is. Schools and out-of-school youth facilities accompany both children and parents. And society, too, has a highly manifold impact on children: peers, the media, the large offer of merchandise and entertainment, and the like. All this can advance as well as jeopardize child development.

The order provided by the state for the relations between children, parents, and all 'co-educators' is not directly influenced as such – that is, as an

order – by the children. Political co-determination lies in the hands of the parents, who, however, share this right with all non-parents. They share it not only with the non-parents of ‘their’, the middle, generation, but also with the non-parents (and parents) of the elder generation. And in competing with all the others in the political arena, parents only have their own single vote.

That is all the more difficult since – as shown by the examples of schools, kindergartens, and other day-care facilities – political decisions that concern the accompaniment of parents in their child-raising work affect people’s value and life concepts in highly different ways. What, in effect, is intergenerational solidarity? To be sure, we encounter a similar problem with the older generation. Caring for the elderly is an irremediably difficult problem. Policy-makers thereby focus on monetary benefits, which is what society expects from them. Negligence in the care is acquiesced in case of doubt, despite all the complaint voiced every now and then. Granted, for old persons a dignified evening of life is at stake. But for children, it is a whole lifetime – including the contribution each of these children can make on behalf of all others, also on behalf of their elder and younger compatriots.

Regardless of all else that could be said, the obvious fact is that a political system ensuring intergenerational solidarity also on behalf of children has not yet been found.

#### *The Other Example: The Future*

This becomes even clearer when addressing the anticipation of the future: current consumption to the detriment of future generations (e.g., state indebtedness – a ‘gambling arrangement’ founded on the hope of extraordinary growth that will someday make repayment possible), irretrievable losses (e.g., fossil fuels), or the risk of having to disappoint some and/or exploit others (e.g., unrealistic old-age provision). That these problems *also* go to the expense of children demonstrates once again how inadequately developed intergenerational solidarity is, precisely for them. That these problems *also* go to the expense of the endless succession of coming generations nevertheless illustrates even more dramatically the responsibility incumbent on this day and age.

The threat to all future interests constitutes a problem of the political system. Democracy is characterized by the temporary mandate. That applies not only to the mandataries, but also to the mandate itself, its scope. If a mandatory is appointed for a certain period, it will be in the nature of

the relevant institution to give preference to tasks that lie within the term of the mandate. Put differently: in a democracy the future dimension atrophies; election cycles chop it up.

The future proves to be not only a weakness of democracy. It is a dilemma. A political system that must take due account of the future is not only confronted with the heightened risk of failure. For even a correct forecast is subject to the danger of circumstances developing differently from those taken as a basis for the projection. The more the 'temporary mandate' includes the future – its appraisal and its guidance in conformity with that appraisal – the more democratic legitimation will be at the mercy of human fallibility. On the one side lies false appraisal, on the other usurpation – arbitrary decision-making under abusive reference to the necessities of the future. To ease this dilemma, the ascertainment, analysis, and evaluation of the relevant criteria, as demanded above in general terms, is of utmost importance, as is simultaneously a form of politics that seeks to handle circumstances of the present in such a way that they can be adjusted to the challenges of the future.

### *Three 'Golden Rules'*

In this situation of yet great uncertainty about how intergenerational solidarity can be provided in normative and institutional terms, three 'golden rules' ought to be followed to narrow down the risks:

First, top priority should be given to the qualification of young persons. They should be sent on their way with as much competence as they are able to attain individually. They should be made capable of caring for themselves and others. And their dependence on collective systems should be reduced as far as possible. This capability should accompany them until they reach old age, and in making provision for and adjusting to old age.

Second, living in the present should be economized. Every burden on the future must be avoided at all cost, unless a temporary burdening of the future (not the present) is imperative for securing an advantage that would otherwise be irretrievably lost.

Third, the factual circumstances and their development require extensive and differentiated investigation and depiction, scientific research into their regularities, as well as a rational discussion of their evaluation. Only if the observation, prediction, and guidance of long-term developments is thus learned, could regulatory mechanisms of 'intergenerational justice' and 'sustainability' become feasible. Nevertheless, to forestall

these regulatory mechanisms would amount to negligent or deliberate deception. Very much more realistic is the endeavour to create the prerequisites for duly formulating and adapting individual, societal, political, and legal strategies of 'intergenerational justice' or 'sustainability' through an improved culture of acquiring, understanding, and evaluating the quintessential facts and their development.

FOURTH SESSION

THE MEDIATING STRUCTURES OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

## WELFARE AND DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OR MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS\*

JOSÉ T. RAGA

An attempt, albeit a synthetic one, to analyse the greatest social phenomenon of them all, the relationship between citizens (singular and unique human beings) and the institution holding political power (communities organised politically for the purpose of collective decision-making, and irrespective of the form such organisation takes – be it the modern democratic state, the absolute monarchy of medieval times, the ancient Roman Republic, the classical Greek democracy or the primitive forms of organisation still to be found in tribal societies) throws up an immediate result of great diversity.

Concentrating exclusively on the events of recent centuries, we soon conclude that this relationship, the very essence of life within a community, has been in a constant state of revision. The most obvious results of this are the substantial differences in the preponderance of the person against the institution on the one hand and the institution against the person on the other.

Once a dividing line has been drawn between what is private, characterised by singularity and individuality, and what is public, supposedly based on collective social interests and at times not incorrectly described as the ‘common good’, the manner in which who should exercise power is determined has held little importance.

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In the final years of the last century and the beginning of this, economic doctrine and other doctrines have again begun to examine the question of the positions that the individual and the State should occupy in terms of social relations, with a view to guaranteeing an enduring harmonic community. The reasons for focusing on this matter are diverse and so too are the results of the ensuing analysis.

At the core of the problem remains the question that in reality has always existed, being the aim of this paper simply to add a little to it. The question is, to what extent and to what degree the man, the singular person or individual, and to what degree the State, the organising structure of the community. To put it more crudely, how much power and the exercise thereof should be put in the hands of this social superstructure.

### *Singular Person and State*

When, in this paper, we speak of the State, unless otherwise indicated, we refer to the superior power structure in the organisation of a society, regardless of its profile or indeed its period in history. We also assume, more in terms of the qualitative space than the quantitative effects to be distributed between subject and State, a zero sum situation, i.e. the decision making territory is fixed and any advance on the part of the subject means a corresponding retreat on the part of the State and vice-versa. A different assumption could be made if we looked at the results of those decisions, because of the synergistic possibilities of both agent activities.

Thus, the problem to be studied, at almost any given time in history, is how to determine the spheres that, by nature if you like, belong to one or the other. It must obviously be understood that too great an influence on the part of the State implies a certain loss of liberty on the part of the subject, denying him the possibility of deciding for himself what the State has decided on his behalf. On the other hand if the dimension of the private sphere is too great, there is the risk of a lack of attention to community problems and a consequent neglect of intrinsically social needs, which the private dimension may feel incapable, or indeed be incapable, of satisfying completely.

Such as things are, a principle worth underlining from the outset and which serves to illuminate the considerations which hereby follow, is that in the selfsame Creation, man is recognised as a superior being with a mandate to rule over all other living creatures.

Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth and subdue it. Be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven and all the living creatures that move on earth.<sup>1</sup>

This superiority and its fundamentals constitute the foundations upon which this thesis is based. Said predominance is not a question of strength, beauty or agility, as there are numerous living creatures superior to man in this respect. It arises from the inherent dignity of the human being, the image of God and conscious of this fact, called to the meeting with the Lord and aware that his earthly life is transitory.

Therefore, man from the very outset has felt the calling to live in community 'Yahweh God said, "It is not right that the man should be alone. I shall make him a helper"'.<sup>2</sup>

It can therefore be deduced that along with that great quality of uniqueness, man has been conceived as a social being and thus is sociable. So much so that Paul VI stated that:

There can be no progress toward the complete development of man without the simultaneous development of all humanity ... we must ... begin to work together to build the common future of the human race.<sup>3</sup>

Far from being the *homo homini lupus*, man needs the community in order to perfect himself. His growth, biographical rather than biological, and above all his enlargement in the practice of virtue, requires him to belong to a society in which he has the opportunity to practice generosity, selfless commitment and cooperation. The fact that the State has, at given moments in history, assumed the role of providing aid and charity and has done so with more or less efficiency and generality, in no way overshadows the responsibility the individual human being has in this respect. In the last decade of the nineteenth century the, Pope Leo's encyclical said:

Nor must we, at this stage, have recourse to the State. Man is older than the State, and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any State.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed mankind precedes any kind of organised social structure. The latter exists because mankind has voluntarily created it and with a view to achieving those objectives he has set for it. Man precedes society, which in

<sup>1</sup> Genesis 1, 28, *The New Jerusalem Bible*, Doubleday, New York (1990).

<sup>2</sup> Genesis 2, 18-19, *The New Jerusalem Bible*, Doubleday, New York (1990).

<sup>3</sup> Paul VI, Encyclical Letter *Populorum Progressio*, Rome, 26.03.1969, n. 43.

<sup>4</sup> Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Rerum Novarum*, Rome, 15.05.1891, n. 6.



turn precedes the State and the subsidiarity principle, which is widespread but rarely put into practice in an effective manner, has its roots in this preferential scale. This scale is not determined exclusively by the question of time but is also governed by a qualitative acceptance of the essence of the human being.

If this is true, any power, responsibility, or function of the State has been conceded by the community and this concession, made freely and responsibly, is what gives the State its legitimacy. We will see that this has not been clearly recognised at times in history, not even in recent times, which nobody would hesitate to describe as social life in democracy.

### *The Concession of the People, the Instrument of Legitimacy*

There is an old legal principle that goes '*nemo dat quae non habet*'; i.e. 'one cannot give what one does not have'. Therefore, in order to transfer property, one must be the owner of said property.

Although our interest is basically in the economic dimension of the problem, it is still true that the economic organisation of a society and the distribution of the areas of decision-making between State and private sector are determined by the very concept of these two elements. This definition is more on the hands of philosophy and political science, fields on which the other social sciences tend to feed.

Political texts of a constitutional nature, establishing the framework of the relationship between subjects and the political structure, present us with diversity. It is true that the differences can be attributed to several factors, amongst which we find: the historical origin of the social group, the process of formation or change and its revolutionary or evolutionary character; the environmental influences at the time in question, the authority and not simply the power of the group or person that leads the configuration, etc. It is, however, also true to say that there is, as well, a mutual conditioning factor in that the definition of the citizen/State relationship influences the way activities within a society are carried out and that social behaviour conditions the distribution of responsibilities between the State and the private sector.

Nobody can be surprised at the degree of economic freedom in the United States of America if, before entering into a judgement of economic policy, he takes into account the text of the Constitution.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the

common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.<sup>5</sup>

From the very beginning of the text of the Constitution of the Union, there is no doubt whatsoever that the people, the community of men and women that propose to form a Nation or State, precede this Nation or State, are its owners with the right to create it and that it is their expressed will that leads to its creation. Any structuring to be carried out subsequently will always or should always respect this prevalence of the people – unique persons – over the superstructure of the State or, in this case, the Union.

The American text is perfectly coherent with the historic environment at the time it was written. Barely ten years had gone by since the appearance of Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. It is also consistent with the thinking of its founders, who were heavily influenced by the political philosophy of Hume, Locke and Hobbes.

The people as owners of sovereignty who, by their will, legitimise the creation of the State and its authority, contrast with situations prevalent in the medieval era. Five and a half centuries before the constitution of the United States of America, the concession of rights to the citizens as a voluntary act on the part of a monarch was also to be found in a constitutional text:

John, by the grace of God King of England ... to his archbishops ... and to all his officials and loyal subjects, Greeting.

Now that before God, for the health of our soul and those of our ancestors and heirs, to the honour of God, the exaltation of the holy Church, and the better ordering of our kingdom ... It is accordingly our wish and command ... that men in our kingdom shall have and keep all these liberties, rights, and concessions, well and peaceably in their fullness and entirety for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs, in all things and all places for ever.<sup>6</sup>

The English text is at exactly the opposite end of the scale to its American counterpart. It is, of course, true that in an era when power was believed to reside in the King and his to administer for the good of his subjects by divine concession, the subjects are the beneficiaries of the royal

<sup>5</sup> Constitution of the United States of America. (Approved by the Convention on September 17th, 1787). Preamble.

<sup>6</sup> 'Magna Charta Libertatum'. (Given in the meadow that is called Runnymede, between Windsor and Staines, on the fifteen day of June, 1215. Reconfirmed by the King Henry III, given in Westminster on February 11th, 1225). Preamble, and number 63.

administration and certainly not in the possession of the rights by which this power is exercised.

More than four and a half centuries after that Magna Charta of Henry III, another English text seeks the approval of the people to organise and govern, albeit by means of representation. The text outlines the representative nature of the political bodies in the following terms:

Whereas the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons assembled at Westminster, lawfully, fully and freely representing all the estates of the people of this realm, did ... present unto their Majesties, then called and known by the names and style of William and Mary, prince and princess of Orange, being present in their proper persons, a certain declaration in writing made by the said Lords and Commons in the words following ...<sup>7</sup>

The French revolutionaries did not go much further in their role as constituents when declaring the rights of man and the citizen. They did so in the following terms:

The representatives of the French people, constituted in the National Assembly, believing that ignorance, forgetting and flouting of human rights is the only cause of public ills and the corruption of Governments, have decided to outline, in a solemn declaration, the natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man, and that such a declaration, constantly present for all members of the social body, serves to remind you always of your rights and duties ...

In consequence, the National Assembly recognises and declares, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, the following rights of man and the citizen ...<sup>8</sup>

For our purposes there is an important difference between the English and the French text of little more than a century later. Both texts refer to the representation of the people as an instrument of legitimization. However, in the English text it is the representative element that continues to support legitimacy whereas in the French text, the exercising of sovereignty corresponds to the already constituted National Assembly and later to the Nation. From that point, the ownership of the people, composed of the collective desires of each individual owner or unique person, is silenced.

<sup>7</sup> 'Bill of Rights'. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown. (February 13th, 1689). First paragraph.

<sup>8</sup> 'Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen' (August 26th, 1798). Preamble. [Author's translation].

For confirmation of this, the text of the third article of the French Declaration reads as follows:

The origin of all sovereignty lies essentially with the nation. No organ or individual can exercise authority which does not emanate expressly from it.<sup>9</sup>

It is clear, therefore, that the 'nation' assumes the sovereignty and overrides the citizens who are its real owners. This pronouncement is one which predominates in the constitutional texts of many European countries.

The tone of the Spanish Constitution of Cádiz in 1812 is similar. The influence of the American text is evident in substantive terms while, in the formal ones, it is the French text which leaves its mark.

Article 1. The Spanish nation is the union of all Spaniards from both hemispheres.

Article 3. Sovereignty lies essentially with the nation and therefore the right to establish fundamental laws belongs exclusively to her.<sup>10</sup>

Although the first article strongly emphasises the singularity of the people as subjects of rights 'union of all Spaniards', it is the nation, and not all Spaniards, that holds the sovereignty and the power to establish laws.

It is with the second Spanish Republic that once again a reference to the people as the owners of the sovereignty is included in the constitutional text. It reads: 'Spain is a democratic Republic ... The powers of all its organs emanate from the people'.<sup>11</sup>

The mention of the people as owners of the sovereignty was to be the norm in the European constitutions following the Second World War. This can be seen in the Italian constitution of 1947 which states that 'Italy is a democratic Republic ... sovereignty and the right to exercise it belongs to the people ...'.<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, the French Constitution of 1958 establishes that: 'national sovereignty belongs to the people, and it is they who exercise it ...'.<sup>13</sup> The

<sup>9</sup> 'Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen'. (August 26th, 1798). Article 3. [Author's translation].

<sup>10</sup> 'Constitución española'. (Cádiz, March 18th, 1812). Articles 1 and 3. [Author's translation].

<sup>11</sup> 'Constitución de la República española'. (December 9th, 1931). Preamble and article 1. [Author's translation].

<sup>12</sup> 'Costituzione della Repubblica italiana'. (December 27th, 1947). Article 1. [Author's translation].

<sup>13</sup> 'Constitution de la V<sup>ème</sup> République française'. (October 4th, 1958). Article 3. [Author's translation].

preamble to the same text emphasises even more the role of the people over and above that of any other structure.

The French people solemnly proclaim their adhesion to the rights of man and to the principles of national sovereignty as defined in the declaration of 1789 ...<sup>14</sup>

Something close to it is to be found in the Fundamental Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, which states: 'All public power emanates from the people. This power is exercised by the people ...'.<sup>15</sup> In a similar vein, the Portuguese constitution of 1976 states that: 'sovereignty, unique and indivisible, resides in the people, who exercise it ...'.<sup>16</sup>

The current Spanish Constitution also proclaims the sovereignty of the people: 'National sovereignty resides in the Spanish people and from them emanate the powers of the State ...'.<sup>17</sup>

Although the constitutional texts reflect the idea of the people in the role of owners of rights and faculties and therefore the extension and justification of the powers of the State and its relationship with the individuals, it is obvious that over time this relationship has experienced considerable evolution, with relevant changes which have been treated as such in the texts referred to.

Despite the substantial differences to be observed in the constitutional proclamations, due to the time, the place and above all to the political circumstances giving rise to their creation, it is worth underlining the differences between the composition of the Constitution of the United States of America and that of European countries, even those countries in which the people are recognised as the owners of the sovereignty.

Only in the Constitution of the United States do the people decide and confer the regulations governing the political structures. In the American Constitution, the people speak for themselves and assume the leading role, which all the men and women voluntarily give to the collective structure of

<sup>14</sup> 'Constitution de la V<sup>ème</sup> République française'. (October 4th, 1958). Preamble. [Author's translation].

<sup>15</sup> 'Grundgesetz für Bundesrepublik Deutschland'. (Bonn, May 23rd, 1949). Article 20-2). [Author's translation].

<sup>16</sup> 'Constituição da República Portuguesa'. (April 2nd, 1976). Article 3-1. [Author's translation].

<sup>17</sup> 'Constitución Española'. (Approved by referendum on December 6th, 1978 and sealed by H.M. The King before the Cortes, on December 27th, 1978). Preamble and article 1-2. [Author's translation].

the State or Nation. In contrast, in the European constitutions, even where recognition is given to the fact that the ownership of sovereignty is in the hands of the people, a third party proclaims their decision.

*The Person and the State in Economic Decisions*

Now, the question arises as to the effects, if any, political doctrine has on the role of the individual in the political destiny of the community, on its inter-relationship with the State, its absorption by structures such as the Nation, Parliament, etc. as outlined in the constitutional texts, and in the doctrines and behaviour reflected in the economic policy decisions adopted at any given time on behalf of a society. In other words, whether, as we outlined at the beginning, the living conditions of a community influence the wording of the constitutional texts and the proclamation of the rights and duties of the individual subject with respect to the State.

Leaving to one side the references made to the medieval period, the first reference to the representation of the people in the public interests of a community is to be found in the 'Bill of Rights' of 1689 after the work of Thomas Hobbes had outlined a model of a bourgeois and atomised market society. Let us not forget that his Leviathan is no more than the combination of all the little men of whom it is made up. Therefore, his recommendations to the Sovereign are aimed at increasing the wealth of the Nation, and it encourages the accumulation of capital by private businessmen motivated by self-enrichment. This recommendation is very appropriate to the first period in which the accumulation of capital became an option.

At the time of enactment of the 'Bill of Rights' of 1689, the works of the liberal John Locke were also well known. These works, despite their general air of mercantilism, allowed some room for doubt with respect to the possibility of regulating interest rates in monetary loans between economic agents.

This climate of incipient liberalism, in which the individual person assumes relevance in the area of economics, was to become even more emphatic in the following century with the writings of David Hume. At the same time as J.J. Rousseau professed that he did not believe in the beneficial effects of a *laissez faire* without regulation, Hume, in a definitive attack on the latest forms of mercantilism and its defence of protectionism against foreign goods, was in favour of free trade across borders. He claimed that when a Nation becomes wealthy it does so not only for itself but that it also inadvertently creates wealth in the surrounding nations.

This is the atmosphere in which the thinking of Adam Smith would take form and bear fruit in 1776 in the shape of his greatest contribution to economic doctrine: *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. This appeared only eleven years prior to the Constitution of the United States and twenty-two years before the proclamation of the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen in France.

Far removed from the materialistic individualism of Hobbes, in the work of Smith, the individual subject plays the leading role in economic activity and is indeed the creator of the wealth of the nation. However, in Smithian thinking, society exists as the personal nucleus of the subjects and upon it fall the effects of the economic decisions of the individuals of which the community is composed.

Smith claims that:

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.<sup>18</sup>

For Smith, self-interest is what determines the behaviour of the individual subject. Such self-interest is at no point portrayed as being necessarily materialistic but rather is described as an internal force which causes the subject to act and take decisions. It would be unfair to forget that Smith, prior to the *Wealth of Nations*, had published a book on moral philosophy in 1759 in which the person was described as a subject capable of controlling his passions through profound self-examination.<sup>19</sup>

Years later, an Austrian liberal would declare that:

It is arbitrary to consider only the satisfaction of the body's physiological needs as 'natural' and therefore 'rational' and everything else as 'artificial' and therefore 'irrational'. It is the characteristic feature of the human nature that man seeks not only food, shelter, and cohabitation like all other animals, but that he aims also at other

<sup>18</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, First Edition in W. Strahan and T. Cadell in the Strand (London, 1776). The reference is from the edition of R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. Liberty Classics (Indianapolis, 1981), as an exact photographic reproduction of the edition published by Oxford University Press (1776); vol. I, book IV, chap. II, p. 454 [4].

<sup>19</sup> Vide Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (London and Edinburgh, 1759).

kind of satisfaction. Man has specifically human desires and needs which we may call 'higher' than those which he has in common with the other mammals.<sup>20</sup>

The text quoted from the *Wealth of Nations*, far from having any normative pretensions, adopts a strictly positive dimension. The terms '*exerting*' and '*has in view*' do not hold any normative vestiges whatsoever. On the contrary, they are derived from the facts themselves and from the individual action itself. The only trace of valuation to be observed in the passage is the reference to the use of resources, referred to in the text as '*capital he can command*'. This optimum use of resources is captured in references such as '*most advantageous employment*' and is based on the scarcity of resources and on the rationale of economic behaviour, which suggests the appropriate use of said resources.

In the thinking of Smith, we find the concept of society or the community of persons, as a combination of people, or individuals if you like. These communities also have needs; needs which can be favoured or damaged by the actions of individual subjects.

It is true that in the passage, a qualitative distinction is not drawn between the concepts of society and the individual subject and, in line with the commonly accepted political doctrine of the time, society is no more than a numerical combination of its human constituents. Consequently, the well-known concept of the '*invisible hand*' is based on an underlying logical structure. In the text, this is clearly represented by the warning '*naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer*'. Therefore, the benefit to society is consistent with the factual logic or, as Smith expresses it, '*employment which is most advantageous to the society*'.

This optimum use of resources is simply the consequence of the maximum utility that can possibly be obtained individually from each and every person of the society, but, in contrast to what is commonly held, society 'as such' is indeed included in the economic model outlined in the *Wealth of Nations*.

In the same text in which Smith uses the metaphor of the '*invisible hand*', his individualistic substratum goes beyond its explicit aims in favour of the public interest, which also benefits from the individual behaviour of subjects acting in their own self interest and for their own gain.

<sup>20</sup> Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action. A Treatise on Economics*, William Hodge and Company Limited (London-Edinburgh-Glasgow, 1949), pp. 19-20.



Therefore, Smith does not hesitate to declare:

He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.<sup>21</sup>

Like the previous example, the description is totally positivist. Terms such as *'intends'*, *'preferring'*, *'pursuing'*, *'promote'* are all free of valuation. As in the previous example, the only reference to valuation is in terms of efficiency, use, interest and utility.

Likewise, expressions such as *'greatest value'*, *'own gain'*, *'more effectually'* emphasise what is inherent in all economic behaviour of individuals, i.e., that the scarcity of resources is what creates the personal and collective responsibility for their optimum use.

In the first text quoted, the term society appears, as does the concept of society. In this second text we see such terms as *'public interest'* or *'society'*, there being little difference, if any, between them and the concept of common good, which the Social Doctrine of the Church has placed at our disposal and described as a good belonging to each and every person of the community.

In this way, Smith's liberalism distances itself from the exclusive individualism of Hobbes's political philosophy – *homo homini lupus* – by presenting man as a social being within a community in which he feels himself to have an important role. Similarly, it is also far removed from the abstraction, which would later take shape, of a society without persons or, to express it in more political and less economic terms, a State without citizens. This concept is reflected in Marxist thinking and, even, in that of the utopian socialists, such as the collectivism of Charles Fourier<sup>22</sup> or in the

<sup>21</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, First Edition in W. Strahan and T. Cadell in the Strand (London, 1776). The reference is from the edition of R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. Liberty Classics (Indianapolis, 1981), as an exact photographic reproduction of the edition published by Oxford University Press (1776); vol. I, book IV, chap. II, p. 456 [9].

<sup>22</sup> Vide Charles Fourier, 'Théorie des quatre mouvements' (1808), and 'Traité de l'association domestique agricole' (1822).

exaltation of the regulatory State of J.G. Fichte,<sup>23</sup> who would attribute to the State the task of the most minute economic planning, and whose arguments are impregnated by a pervasive Kantian idealism.

The liberal spirit, whereby, the singular person or subject is seen as a political social and economic decision-maker and as the owner of sovereignty with all its entailing responsibilities apart from those responsibilities conceded to the State by the individual, was to be severely curtailed at the end of the eighteenth century in France and in the nineteenth century in Spain. In both cases, this limitation was effected by means of pronouncements of a revolutionary nature. The most visible result of these pronouncements is the disappearance of the individual person from the political scenario, to be substituted by a collective abstraction: the Nation. The latter is declared to be the possessor of national sovereignty and the source from which all power and authority emanates.

Later it would be the visible effects of the Industrial Revolution on the working classes and a series of social shortcomings in the wealthiest countries that would give impetus to the ideas of greater social equity, casting doubt on the principles of the supremacy of the individual subject proposed by liberalism.

At the same time as the violent position of class struggle advocated by Marx and Engels<sup>24</sup> or, perhaps with greater moderation, by Kautsky,<sup>25</sup> at least in the latter part of his life, the Social Doctrine of the Church drew attention to the moral disorder which was taking place in social, economic and, especially, labour relations as a visible result of the Industrial Revolution.

This series of phenomena would of necessity bring with it a reduction in the importance of the role of the individual with respect to the State, under the excuse that by means of the State superstructure it would be possible to prevent or at least correct the inadmissible social situations, prevailing in those times, of accumulation of wealth, agrarian crises and the migratory movements from the country to the city which would provide a surplus of labour supply for the factories and industrial processes in general.

<sup>23</sup> Vide Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Der geschlossene Handelstaat* (Berlin, 1800).

<sup>24</sup> Vide Karl Marx, *Das Capital* first volume published in 1867; vide also with F. Engels 'Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei' (1847-1848). The first edition in English was printed in London in 1850.

<sup>25</sup> Vide Karl Kautsky, *Die Internationalität und der Krieg* (1915); also *Die Diktatur des Proletariats* (1918), in which he opposes this dictatorship and the substitution of the Parliament by the Soviets, which would earn him the merciless attacks of Lenin.

Even so, Leo XIII himself would state:

... the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action as far as is consistent with the common good and the interests of others. Nevertheless, rulers should anxiously safeguard the community and all its parts.<sup>26</sup>

In the doctrine of the Pope himself, absorption is impossible, given that man predates society and society in turn predates the State.<sup>27</sup>

But what cannot be denied is that in a period of more than half a century of revolutions, ending up in two world wars separated by a great economic crisis affecting both the United States and Europe to an immeasurable degree, State intervention reared its head in the search for a solution to the problems being faced.

### *Social Welfare and State Activity*

Perhaps this is a good time to ask if there is any truth in the *Wealth of Nations* principle, which states that if each person acts in his own self-interest and focuses his efforts to his own advantage, he unwittingly achieves the optimum use of resources for society as a whole. Whether the response to the question is affirmative or not, how does one clarify the role of the State, be it wide or restricted, in order to ensure the common good, or at least the economic and social well-being which would not hinder the achievement of the common good, both for society as a whole and for its individual members.

Today we are convinced that all political power emanates from the people, and that they are the unique holders of it. Therefore and regardless of any constitutional proclamations and irrespective of the degree of clarity with which they refer to this matter, it seems clear that all attribution of functions, power and responsibilities to the State or public administration, at whatever time in history one cares to analyse, is the result of a concession by its true owners – the people, individually and congregated as a social group – so that such functions, power and responsibilities, can be exercised by the State. This concession is made with a view to either guaranteeing that these functions are indeed exercised or that they might be exercised more effectively than they would be by private individuals.

<sup>26</sup> Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Rerum Novarum*, Rome, 15.05.1891, n. 28.

<sup>27</sup> Vide footnote number 4.

It is true that the growth in the functions of the State or, if you like, the resources it coactively absorbs from the community, cannot easily be justified by this concession, whether it is expressed or tacit, whereby society transfers a part of its authority and the desire to satisfy determined goals to the public sector so that the latter assumes the responsibility of satisfying these requirements more efficiently. The theory of market imperfections is perhaps that which has given most theoretical support to the enormous growth of the Public Sector.

Most schools of economic thinking have accepted the function of the State, in this progression towards the welfare of the community and its individual members. However, it is Adam Smith who outlines in a structured way, the role of the liberal State in the economic field. Thus, in book V of the *Wealth of Nations*, he defines the obligations of the Sovereign to the community. The first of these is to protect the society from invasion and violence on the part of other independent societies, by means of military force. The second consists of protecting each individual from the injustices and oppression of other members of the society.

Deserving of special consideration, however, is the third obligation Smith assigns to the Sovereign of a Republic.

The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it, therefore, cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain.<sup>28</sup>

Clearly apparent in this text is the principle of subsidiarity in its true dimension: the creation and maintenance of institutions and public works which '*though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society*' ... The benefit to society as a whole is an essential requisite, *conditio sine qua non*, for the production or financing of a public good by the State.

It is clear that if the benefit attributable to the good or service – the institution or public work – were to be aimed at and consequently enjoyed

<sup>28</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, First Edition in W. Strahan and T. Cadell in the Strand (London, 1776). The reference is from the edition of R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner. Liberty Classics (Indianapolis, 1981), as an exact photographic reproduction of the edition published by Oxford University Press (1776); vol. II, book V, chap. I, p. 723 [1].

by a small segment of the population, it would in effect be a good or service of a private nature and one which should be financed directly by the beneficiaries. There would be no theoretical or practical justification whatsoever for the intervention of the Public Sector in the guaranteeing or financing, as the case may be, of such a good or service.

Once this first requirement has been satisfied, the second arises from the prevalence of the individual subject with respect to the providence of the republic. It is the absence of private activity to provide these works or institutions that confers upon the State the legitimacy to create and maintain them. Despite being of general benefit, the disproportionate cost of providing them with respect to the benefit any one individual or group of individuals might obtain from them is such that *'cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain'*. It is the principle of subsidiarity in its most demanding and rigorous dimension.

Smith's ideas with respect to the distribution of functions between subjects and the State would meet dissidence from within the Classical School,<sup>29</sup> although it is Marxist theory that represents a revolutionary rupture in the functions pertaining to the State and those pertaining to individuals. This rupture was to become a reality after the 1917 Revolution with the construction of the Proletarian State, in which the proletarians, each proletarian, would be annulled by the omnipresence of the State.

However, it would be in 1872, when, at a meeting in Eisenach, a group of university academics and intellectuals of the highest order, along with leading figures on the fields of economics and public finances would define and make known by means of a 'Manifesto' the model of the State which, they believed, might serve to solve the problems faced by Germany and other countries at the end of the nineteenth century.

As a counterpoint to liberal ideas, they designed a political, economic and social model with a high degree of State intervention in order to protect the working class, which would otherwise be subjected to abuse by capitalists and businessmen. At the same time they favoured the participation of working people in political and social activity.

The doctrine of historicism to be found in the German university would help the new line of thinking. Adolph Wagner and Gustav von Schmoller promoted the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, an association whose

<sup>29</sup> Think of John Stuart Mill and his aspiration of social reform, which would have implications for the right to private property through the imposition of an inheritance tax.

aim was to put into practice in society the theoretical criteria forming the substratum of the new model of State that was being proposed. This model was of a highly interventionist State, capable of guaranteeing the smooth running of the economy, the welfare of the entire German nation and that of its individual citizens. It would have the objective of controlling the effects of industrialisation, bearing in mind the experience of the Industrial Revolution in the Anglo-Saxon world, by establishing aid to subsidise the needs of its poorest individuals.

The social aspects of the labour world were one of the focal points of the work of the *Association in favour of Social Policy*. These included salary levels, growth in total earnings, training of workers, working hours, social security and assistance, social services etc., and were dealt with by the intellectuals and politicians under the banner of the new Association.

This strong State advocated by the *Verein*, and already outlined in the Eisenach Manifesto, was to materialise and be put into practice by Chancellor Bismarck. It was well received both by the classes it was designed to favour and by Emperor William I. The Emperor, addressing the Reichstag on November 17th 1881, expressed his conviction that

the solution to social problems lies not only in the suppression of social-democratic abuses but also in the most correct promotion of the welfare of workers.<sup>30</sup>

The Church spoke out at this point, warning of the dangers that might ensue from this annihilation of the unique and unrepeatable human person whose capacity for creation, innovation, and perfection could be attributed to his inherent qualities. '... The sources of wealth would themselves run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry ...'.<sup>31</sup> Almost a century would go by before the politicians and leaders of the different countries, in the light of the most recent historical facts, became aware of the full extent of Leo XIII's warning.

The appeal left little room for doubt and is expressed even more emphatically in the following terms:

The first duty ... of the rulers of the State should be to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration

<sup>30</sup> Wilhelm I, *Kaiser Wilhelms des Grossen. Briefe, Reden und Schriften. II Band: 1861-1888*, Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn (Berlin, 1906), 3rd Edition, p. 383. [Author's translation].

<sup>31</sup> Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Rerum Novarum*, Rome, 15.05.1891, n. 12.

of the commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and private prosperity. This is the proper office of wise statesmanship and the work of the heads of the State.<sup>32</sup>

The mission of those who govern or the State administered by them is not to create the prosperity of the people themselves. Their task should be limited to establishing the conditions of civic security and political and social stability so that, given such conditions and without further intervention, the desired prosperity, from which all benefit can arise spontaneously from the collective activities of the individuals.

This claim for a strong State, though not necessarily a social claim, would, in the first half of the twentieth century, find an extraordinary ally, which would serve to confirm what was augured by the frequent conflicts of the second half of the nineteenth century. A world war at the beginning of the century followed by another of more far reaching effects twenty-five years later and an economic crisis between the two, would require the continual presence of an ever larger State, with ever greater economic resources accumulated through the sacrifice of the citizens in the production of goods and services.

An economist, John Maynard Keynes,<sup>33</sup> was to attribute to this State the function of correcting economic trends that would evolve were the economy to be given free rein, trends which had inexorably led to the economic crisis that began in the autumn of 1929 in the United States and the effects of which would be felt in Europe in the spring of 1930.

Subsequent to the work of Keynes, State intervention, in addition to the functions it had already carried out in its recent history of the previous fifty years, would also be capable of guaranteeing economic growth, stability, full employment and a more equitable distribution of income.

This represented an injection of responsibilities and hopes in a supposedly omniscient and perhaps also omnipotent State which, despite the capacity, knowledge, experience and expertise of its subjects, had the ability to make better forecasts, to carry out tasks better, and to address better those objectives which benefit society as a whole. It was not necessary to wait even forty years to witness the dashing of the hopes vested in the Keynesian State.

<sup>32</sup> Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Rerum Novarum*, Rome, 15.05.1891, n. 26.

<sup>33</sup> Vide John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, McMillan (London, February 1936) (First edition).

Once again, we face crises, instability, unemployment and inflation, and not because economic freedom was unable to provide guarantees about where it would lead society, as had been argued about the crisis of 1929-30, but rather because the State, which had been entrusted with the task of monitoring and correcting market trends, had also failed in its mission. Instead of speaking about the *market failure*, which had led to the appearance of the regulatory State, the guarantor of welfare, and to public intervention in the economy, there was solidly based criticism of the *Government Inefficiencies*.<sup>34</sup> In any case, subsequent to the Second World War and despite its shortcomings, the dimensions of the Public Sector have grown to an extent that would have been inconceivable in any previous period.

Keynes, in 1926, had circumscribed State activity in the economy in a way reminiscent of what was already present in the work of Smith. He said:

Government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at the present are not done at all.<sup>35</sup>

This is a distinctly subsidiary perspective, similar to the third obligation of the sovereign in the *Wealth of Nations*, the construction and maintenance of public works and institutions which, while being of benefit to the entire society, nobody is interested in constructing or maintaining.

Just a few years after this Keynesian reference, but still five years prior to the publication of *General Theory*, and at a time when the effect of the great crisis of 1929-30 was at its zenith, when everybody everywhere was calling for Government intervention to resolve the economic problems, Pius XI would defend the position that individual subjects and their associations should adopt against the constant advances of the Public Sector.

The Pope said:

... it is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and to commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity, functions which can be per-

<sup>34</sup> Vide Horst Hanusch [ed.], *Anatomy of Government Deficiencies*, Springer-Verlag, (Berlin Heidelberg, 1983).

<sup>35</sup> John Maynard Keynes, 'The End of Laissez-faire', *Laissez-faire and Communism*, New Republic, Inc. (New York, 1926), p. 67.



formed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb them.<sup>36</sup>

This derives from the supremacy of man over all that has been created, including the structure of the State and institutions that he himself has performed.

### *Abuses and Errors*

The history of the twentieth century has shown us that the yearned for predominance of the singular person with his capacity for doing and being and as the holder of the sovereignty from which emanates the power of the State, has been substituted by the pre-eminence of the State.

This is true, not only in those spheres which naturally belong to the subject or those which, according to the subsidiarity principle, the private sector cannot guarantee, but in so many others that the only support for it is to be found in a spirit of nationalisation rather than in the development of a social function. This spirit of nationalisation has generally characterised the Public Sector for more than a century, particularly the Public Sector model prevalent in European countries.

In the process of Public Sector expansion in a social culture, such as that of Europe (less so in the case of the Latin American countries, and the United States of America), the Public Administration has acquired the responsibility for the activities of education, university education in particular, where private activity is unusual or minimal. In addition, it has assumed the responsibility for other industries with greater short-term impact on the economic life of the community, such as: telecommunications, energy, and air and rail transport. There has also been outrageous intervention in sectors ranging from the production of consumer goods, to the provision of hotel and banking services, etc. All this has been in addition to activities traditionally more immediately associated with the Welfare State, including health, pensions and the general covering of labour risks, be they caused by market shortcomings or safety aspects related to work.

The advance of the Public Sector led to a point where, in the late seventies and early eighties, in the majority of European countries, more than

<sup>36</sup> Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Quadragesimo Anno*, Rome, 15.05.1931, n. 79.

50% of Gross Domestic Product was in the hands of the State or Public Administration agencies, irrespective of their level. – Let us remember that, still in 1993, the Public Expenditure in Sweden was 73 % of the GDP, while Finland reached 64 % in the same year –. Therefore, given the area in which the economic game unfolds and the absence of competition in the markets, owing to the privileges enjoyed by public production and distribution activities, the private sector was crowded out for reasons which had nothing to do with the efficiency or the productivity of resources, but with a poorly interpreted social function serving to change the economic rules about the optimum use of the resources available to mankind.

Along with the activities of production, distribution and assistance, the State also played an excessively meticulous regulatory role in the economy, which further separated the economic decisions of the private sector from the criteria demanded by economic rationale.

A new type of businessman emerged, quite different from the one with a special capacity and sensibility for the perception, within a free market, of profitable opportunities.<sup>37</sup> The new businessman was characterised by his intimate relationship with a regulating government, a relationship conferring upon him advantages and privileges, which could be exploited economically in his professional area.

The ensuing experiences were very eloquent because, as John XXIII said:

Experience, in fact, shows that where private initiative of individuals is lacking, political tyranny prevails. Moreover, much stagnation occurs in various sectors of the economy, and hence all sorts of consumer goods and services, closely connected with needs of the body and more especially of the spirit, are in short supply. Beyond doubt, the attainment of such goods and services provides remarkable opportunity and stimulus for individuals to exercise initiative and industry.<sup>38</sup>

Private initiative has to be respected as a right of the single person. It is he who directs his activities towards the goals that he has set and he alone is responsible for his action. Therefore,

... civil authorities must undertake ... that citizens – in giving attention to economic and social affairs, as well as to cultural matters –

<sup>37</sup> Vide Israel M. Kirzner, *Perception, Opportunity and Profit. Studies in the Theory of Entrepreneurship*, The University of Chicago Press (Chicago, 1979).

<sup>38</sup> John XXIII, Encyclical Letter *Mater et Magistra*, Rome, 15.05.1961, n. 57.

feel themselves to be the ones chiefly responsible for their own progress. For a citizen has a sense of his own dignity when he contributes the major share to progress in his own affairs.<sup>39</sup>

Nobody is authorised to limit the protagonism, which naturally belongs to man. To do so is tantamount to accepting restrictions on liberty and is, in consequence, the tyranny of which John XXIII spoke. Not even the purely social organisation would be totally immune to the effects of that restriction.

Where society is so organized as to reduce arbitrarily or even suppress the sphere in which freedom is legitimately exercised, the result is that the life of society becomes progressively disorganized and goes into decline.<sup>40</sup>

Man is oriented towards good. Moreover he is created for the pursuit of good. His destination is his origin; the road to the Creator. Though this is completely true, man cannot embrace good, or direct himself towards it, unless he approaches his aims by means of deliberate action and personal commitment.

Only in freedom can man direct himself toward goodness ... authentic freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine image within man ...

Hence man's dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free choice.<sup>41</sup>

When this does not occur, when freedom is hindered by all kinds of interference on the part of public powers, be it directly, through economic intervention, or indirectly, by means of economic regulation, freedom in general, including economic freedom, is seriously and adversely affected.

The indexes of economic freedom and their evolution in the period 1996 to 2002 are shown in Table I and Figure I of the Appendix (p. 428). The numerical values of the indices in reality represent the degree of public interference. Therefore, the higher the index, the lower the degree of freedom in the economic system in question.

It can be observed that the difference between the systems with higher and lower intervention of the countries taken into consideration, the European Union, United States and Japan, is more than one entire point, unevenly distributed over the fifty variables included in the calculation

<sup>39</sup> John XXIII, Encyclical Letter *Mater et Magistra*, Rome, 15.05.1961, n. 151.

<sup>40</sup> John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus*, Rome, 01.05.1991, n. 25.

<sup>41</sup> Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, Rome, 07.12.1965, n. 17.

process. In contrast to some countries showing a very high stability trend, the most remarkable case being Belgium, although the United States and Austria are also deserving of mention, others present a very significant degree of fluctuation.

Even in the most stable countries, the difference between the values can be quite significant. While the United States moves between minimum and maximum liberty of 1.85 and 1.75, Austria scores between 2.10 and 2.05 and Belgium remains stable for the entire period at 2.10. It is worth noting that with the exception of France, which constantly increases public intervention, the other countries show a clear trend towards greater freedom, or in other words, to a reduction in intervention.

It must be underlined that several countries increase intervention considerably at times of economic difficulties and do so following the Keynesian expectation that the State has the capacity to implement counter-cyclical policies of great efficiency to solve them. The most notable case is that of Japan in 2002, followed closely, in the same year by Ireland, France and Greece. The latter two fall into the highest bracket of the values expressed, whereas in Ireland, intervention is kept in a lower range.

A restriction on liberty represents an attack on human dignity and a severe damage to the community. More than a century has gone by since Leo XIII spoke of the value of the response capacity of individual initiative to act in the benefit of society as a whole. It is certainly true that no wealth exists that does not have its origin in man, who is charged with mastering creation being all wealth designed to serve him, lord of all that is created.

The consideration and protection of this anthropological dimension of the individual subject's initiative for the good of the person and society should be at the centre of Government activity. It is the most significant distinguishing element in the construction of a public structure that truly respects human dignity. From this is born the correct distribution of functions without strangulation or displacement.

In the decade of the eighties, to which we have referred, John Paul II warned:

... in today's world, among other rights, *the right of economic initiative* is often suppressed. Yet it is a right, which is important not only for the individual but also for the common good. Experiences show us that the denial of this right, or its limitation in the name of an alleged 'equality' of every one in society, diminishes, or in practice

absolutely destroys the spirit of initiative, that is to say *the creative subjectivity of the citizen*.<sup>42</sup>

Somewhat later, considering this creative and perceptive capacity of each subject to be an important source of wealth in the service of the community, the same Pope would express himself in the following terms:

It is precisely the ability to foresee both the needs of others and the combinations of productive factors most adapted to satisfying those needs that constitutes another important source of wealth in modern society ... Organizing such a productive effort, planning its duration in time, making sure that it corresponds in a positive way to the demands which it must satisfy, and taking the necessary risks – all this too is a source of wealth in today's society. In this way, the role of disciplined and creative human work and, as an essential part of that work, initiative and entrepreneurial ability becomes increasingly evident and decisive.<sup>43</sup>

Man, the human person, once again above all things and above all structures.

It is true that at specific moments in time and, above all, in certain industries, there has been a possible deficiency of private initiative for reasons that have led to apathy, confusion or lack of confidence in society. This has at times reached the point where the resources available have lain unemployed for long periods, something that calls for State intervention, in order to create incentives that would encourage action in the sleeping economy. This has happened on more than a few occasions and continues to occur, with varying effects from case to case, judging from the data to be found in Table I and Figure I.

Without wishing to eliminate the possibility of using these instruments of economic policy but, at the same time, doubting their effectiveness in most cases, we would like to underline that any such intervention should be temporary, with the system of liberty being restored at the earliest possible opportunity.

As John Paul II said:

... in exceptional circumstances the state can also exercise a substitute function, when social sectors or business systems are too weak or are just getting under way, and are not equal to the task at hand. Such supplementary interventions, which are justified by urgent

<sup>42</sup> John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, Rome, 30.12.1987, n. 15.

<sup>43</sup> John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus*, Rome, 01.05.1991, n. 32.

reasons touching the common good, must be as brief as possible, so as to avoid removing permanently from society and business systems the functions which are properly theirs, and so to avoid enlarging excessively the sphere of state intervention to the detriment of both economic and civil freedom.<sup>44</sup>

The Pope would continue to denounce this extraordinary growth in intervention, in the following terms:

In recent years the range of such intervention has vastly expanded, to the point of creating a new type of state, the so-called 'welfare state'.<sup>45</sup>

In addition to the abuse of the Public Sector with respect to its intervention in economic activity and the perverse effects thereof, such as the crowding out of the private sector; the strangulation of private initiative and business activity, (and outlined in a great part of the doctrine to which we have herein referred), it is worth noting the mistakes in the application of said intervention and the damaging results on society.

The fundamental origin of those mistakes is the materialistic concept of human life, and the corresponding definition of the person based on material useful goods, which, from a hedonistic perspective, are capable of providing happiness.

Thus, the Welfare State has been concentrating more on the provision of goods and services than on the establishing of conditions in which the people under its jurisdiction, and all those who belong to the great human family, might find true happiness. Happiness of less ephemeral nature, based on hope, the esteem and appeal of the spiritual rather than the material ends, and based on a fascination with the construction of a fraternal society rather than on the temptation to implement an aggressive selfishness, which destroys any vestige of community.

On undervaluing human life, the beauty and wonder of the birth of a new member of the community is not valued. Moreover, in this hedonistic race, the newly born child, and even the pregnancy period is considered a nuisance to be avoided. The Pope said:

In the richer countries ... excessive prosperity and the consumer mentality, paradoxically joint to a certain anguish and uncertainty about the future, deprived married couples of the generosity and courage

<sup>44</sup> John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus*, Rome, 01.05.1991, n. 48.

<sup>45</sup> John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus*, Rome, 01.05.1991, n. 48.

needed for raising up new human life: thus life is often perceived not as a blessing, but as a danger from which to defend oneself.<sup>46</sup>

The result, at least in wealthy countries and supported by irrefutable evidence, is a society incapable of maintaining itself due to its lack of reproductive capacity. Fertility rates – live born children per woman – standing at an average of 1.5 in the European Union in 2000, do not offer cause for optimism. Even less so if one considers the data for certain countries, such as Spain and Italy with an average of 1.2; Austria and Greece 1.3; Germany 1.4; Belgium, Portugal and Sweden 1.5; France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland and the United Kingdom 1.7; Denmark 1.8 and finally Ireland at 1.9, standing out as the country with the highest rate.<sup>47</sup>

The result is an ageing society in which, for each person of active age involved in a productive activity, there are an even greater number of people of advanced age, old people and very old people, within a community with lack of capital due to the scarce savings. These people require medical and economic assistance and human proximity and, consequently, the system becomes impractical due to a deficiency of means. This situation is even more difficult where the pension system is based on Pay As You Go, rather than on capitalisation, as it is the case in many countries.

The Pay As You Go system is characterised by the financing of current pension payments with the current contributions of the working population, whereas the capitalisation system involves the creation of an accumulated fund during the working life of the individual from which his pension is going to be paid. As Krueger and Kubler argued,

... in a realistically calibrated closed economy with production risk-sharing benefits of an unfunded social-security system tend to be dominated by its negative effects on capital accumulation and hence mean aggregate consumption.<sup>48</sup>

In Table II and its representation in Figure II (p. 429), we can observe the Effective Economic Dependency Ratio for the different countries of the

<sup>46</sup> John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation *Familiaris Consortio*, Rome, 22.11.1981, n. 6.

<sup>47</sup> For additional information, vide José T. Raga, 'A New Shape for the Welfare State', in E. Malinvaud (ed.), *Intergenerational Solidarity*. The Proceeding of the Eighth Plenary Session of The Pontifical Academy of the Social Sciences, 8-13 April 2002. The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (Vatican City, 2002), pp. 209-247, plus an annex of tables and figures.

<sup>48</sup> Dirk Krueger and Felix Kubler, 'Intergenerational Risk-Sharing via Social Security when Financial Markets are Incomplete'. *The American Economic Review*, vol. 92, n. 2, May 2002, p. 409.

European Union and for the Union as a whole.<sup>49</sup> Here we can see the relationship between those who generate wealth in a country – individuals involved in an economic activity, be they self-employed or on the payroll of a company – and people over the age of fourteen who do not carry out any productive activity and whose subsidies and social services have to be financed by the former.

In the year 2000, the figures are alarming for countries such as Belgium, Greece, Spain and Italy and considerably more alarming if we look at the forecasts for 2050. In 2050, for every person employed in Italy there will be 1.45 who are inactive, and therefore dependent on the former. In Belgium and Spain, 1.28 people will depend on the income generated by one employed person. The figure for Greece is 1.18, followed by Austria (1.11), Germany (1.05), Finland (1.04), and the Netherlands (1.02). In the other European Union countries the dependent population will be lower than the employed population and the average for the Union as a whole is 1.06 dependent people per person employed.

We see that the desire to increase the well-being provided by material goods and consequently, the goal of economic growth, has caused people to forget that true human life resides within man himself, in his values and his capacity to assert himself in nature and, as Genesis says, dominate it.

The Welfare State has forgotten man; or rather has concentrated on his body, on what surrounds his existence, but not on his existence itself. Inclined to follow nihilist temptation, it has failed to recognise what is essential for the human person and for the existence of a community capable of surviving. In this respect, the human being has received less attention from the public authorities than other species of living beings belonging to the animal and plant kingdoms.

We busy ourselves with conversationalist culture instilled by the ecological policies of the states and international organisations, and ensure the life of the most fragile butterfly, the most robust elephant, and the weakest leaf or flower, all of which, no doubt, is in accordance with the natural order; we forget, however, the reproductive incapacity of human beings, trying to end their lives before they are born and bringing forward the time of their demise. On the other hand we carefully attend all kinds of necessities man

<sup>49</sup> The author apologises for using primarily the statistical sources published by the European Union. The reasons are, on the one hand, because of the long history of the EU members in establishing universal welfare systems and, on the other, because of the advantages in using a homogeneous source of information.



may feel to live in solitude, even those necessities which humiliate him when, man, by nature, is social and therefore born to live in community.

The State, whose aim is to be the Welfare State, cannot ignore this problem and should never have omitted the individual as such from the configuration of the welfare model. The Council said:

Within the limits of their own competence, government officials have rights and duties with regard to the population problems of their own nation, for instance, in the matter of the social legislation as it affects families ...<sup>50</sup>

Mistakes in both means and ends and abuses with respect to their content, both in qualitative and quantitative dimensions, have led the Welfare State to the point where its viability is doubtful in terms of its financial capacity. At the same time, it is suffering from an identity crisis and the accumulation of objectives and their diversity, in addition to the contradiction between ends and means, have called into question the appropriateness of its existence.

Stiglitz's thoughts about the possibilities and limitations of government, focused precisely on:

Why is it so difficult to implement even Pareto improvements? I knew the immense complexity of political decisions involving trade-offs among different groups. But surely, if we as economists had anything to contribute, it would be to identify Pareto improvements, changes (perhaps complex mixes of policies) which held out the prospect of making some people better off without making anyone worse off. I quickly saw that although a few potential changes were strictly Pareto improvements, there were many other changes that would hurt only a small, narrowly defined group ... But if everyone except a narrowly defined special interest group could be shown to benefit, surely the change should be made.<sup>51</sup>

### *The Return of Responsibilities to Their True Origins*

From the recognition of the erroneous path, begins its correction. For the expression '*return of responsibilities*' to have real meaning, both indi-

<sup>50</sup> Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, Rome, 07.12.1965, n. 87.

<sup>51</sup> Joseph E. Stiglitz, 'The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions. Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 12, n. 2, spring 1998, p. 4.

viduals and intermediary institutions must be convinced that, by themselves, they can do more and better than the State and, in addition, they must be committed to doing so.<sup>52</sup>

In the light of what we have been saying, it is opportune to remind ourselves of the words of John Paul II:

... excesses and abuses, specially in recent years, have provoked very harsh criticisms of the welfare state, dubbed the 'social assistance state'. Malfunctions and defects in the social assistance state are the result of an inadequate understanding of the task proper to the state. Here again the principle of subsidiarity must be respected: a community of higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions ...<sup>53</sup>

This is not to deny the function of the State in the economy. This function was not denied by Adam Smith, the father of the Classical School and great thinker in the field of economic liberalism, neither has it been denied by the neo-classicals, nor by the liberals of the end of the twentieth century.

The subsidiary function of the State was present in the *Wealth of Nations* and was also clearly outlined in Keynes' writings before the Great Crisis. But subsidiary does not mean prevalence. The role of the State is also considered by John Paul II as being twofold:

Indirectly and according to the principle of subsidiarity by creating favourable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity, which will lead to abundant opportunities for employment and sources of wealth. Directly and according to the principle of solidarity, by defending the weakest, by placing certain limits to the autonomy of the parties who determine working conditions, and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum support for the unemployed worker.<sup>54</sup>

It is true that the modern State has considerably reduced its framework and the intensity of its intervention. There is, however, still a long way to go

<sup>52</sup> Vide José A. Herce and Jesús Huerta de Soto, 'Presentación', in José Antonio Herce *et al.*, *Perspectivas del Estado del Bienestar: devolver responsabilidad a los individuos, aumentar opciones*, Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales, Papeles de la Fundación, n. 57 (Madrid, 2000).

<sup>53</sup> John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus*, Rome, 01.05.1991, n. 48.

<sup>54</sup> John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus*, Rome, 01.05.1991, n. 15.

with respect to regulation, which continues to develop widely at levels which can by no means be justified by the demands of social order or if its objective is the welfare of the members of the community. A good indication of this is the size of gross domestic product allocated to public expenditure.

If we consider the situation at the end of the eighties and even the first half of the nineties, when public spending absorbed between 55% and 60% of Gross Domestic Product, on average, it is of interest to analyse the data contained in Table III and its representation in Figure III (p. 430).

We are aware that a long time has passed since Colin Clark, at the beginning of the twentieth century, proposed 25% of GDP as an appropriate level of public spending, in the light of social advances and greater ensuing needs. It is also true that the figures represent an improvement over those of recent history and that a downward trend can be observed in the majority of European Union countries.

Because of its level, the case of Sweden is striking, although as we have mentioned the trend is downward. Looking at 73% in 1993, as we already mentioned, in 1999 it stood at 60.3%, with the forecast for 2004 being 58.2%. At the opposite extreme, with the lowest degree of public spending, referred to GDP, and with the same downward trend we find the Republic of Ireland, which begins the period with expenditure equivalent to 36.3% of GDP and ends it with a forecast of 33.6% for 2004. Countries such as Spain and Italy with a solid tradition in Public Sector intervention reduced their spending from 40.8 to 39.6 and from 48.9 to 47.5 respectively.

There are cases where the opposite trend is to be observed, such as: the United Kingdom which goes from 40.1% to 42.2%, the extraordinary jump in Luxembourg (from 42.6% to 46.4%), Portugal (from 44.8% to 46.9%), Greece (from 45.2% to 46.2%), the Netherlands, which goes from 46.5% to 47.7%, and France, which, despite having a spending level of more than fifty percent, goes from 53.5% to 53.8%, although it had risen to 54.1 in 2003.

From this data and especially if one observes that, with some exceptions, the cases of greatest increase take place in the years 2002 and 2003, period of generalised economic contraction, it can be stated that the Public Sector in the European Union is shedding functions which previously created spending, and shifting them to other smaller entities and also to individuals and associations with an ensuing reduction in public spending and doubtless an increase in efficiency.

The narrow margins within which these movements occur and their cyclical effects lead us to the conclusion that the reduction in the size of the Public Sector is not due to any conviction in the objectives which have

to be met and nor is it due to the application of the subsidiarity principle. It is rather due to the commitment with the growth and stability pact for countries in the Euro zone and generally, to a lack of economic and financial resources.

Assaf Razin, and others, assessed that the retreat of the welfare state, ... coincides with the aging of the populations in the advanced economies, as the majority prefers a smaller tax burden and less generous transfers to the growing dependent population.<sup>55</sup>

### *Privatisation Processes*

We have already said that after the Second World War and in the period of reconstruction and relaunching of economies, in some countries more than others, but in all countries to some extent, at least in Europe, the public activity in the production processes of goods and services took the initiative with a view to accelerating the take off of the economy.

In the mid-sixties, the different States had a wide range of companies and institutions in the area of production and distribution which not only placed the responsibility for economic planning and management in the hands of the State but also turned the Public Sector into a business leader with the theoretical ability to perceive and detect needs and organise resources to meet the objectives it proposed.

The reported inefficiency of the system demanded financial resources from the Government budget which on the one hand reduced the financial capacity of the economies of the private sector and on the other, clouded and reduced the transparency of the system, thereby hindering private business activities and forecasts.

The privatisations taking place both in Europe and in the United States can be attributed to the generalised social dissatisfaction with the economic results of public companies. In the United States, the effects of taxpayer revolts in the sixties and beginning of the seventies had an unquestionable effect on the privatisation process. A large number of functions – more than fifty – were privatised with great success in the United States.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka and Phillip Swagel, 'The Wage Gap and Public Support for Social Security', *The American Economic Review*, vol. 92, n. 2, May 2002, p. 394.

<sup>56</sup> Calvin A. Kent, 'Privatization of Public Functions: Promises and Problems', in C.A. Kent (ed.), *Entrepreneurship and Privatizing of Government*, Quorum Books (New York, 1987), p. 5.

The *raison d'être* of the privatisations lies in three fundamental points. The first was an economic one, which centred on the supposed interest of governments to achieve a more efficient use of productive resources. Therefore, privatisation only made sense when private management was considered to be more efficient than public one. The hypothesis of greater efficiency on the part of the private sector is based on the greater definition and sense of responsibility, skill and power of private managers in comparison to their public counterparts. It is also based on their greater capacity to encourage productivity.<sup>57</sup>

This is not the time to go into the matter, but it would later be demonstrated that unless the structure of the market in which the company operated also changed, the efficiency benefits deriving from the change of ownership were less than might initially have been imagined. If efficiency is the objective, the structure of the company is significant, but much more so is the market structure in which the company sells its products and buys its resources.

The second point, on which the privatisation process is based, was of a financial nature and centred on the benefits to be derived from the reduction or elimination of the public deficit. One of the causes, and structurally perhaps the most important, of the increase in the budget deficit, was the production and supply of goods and services by the Public Sector, often requiring subsidies to compensate for inefficiency.

De-nationalisation not only provided a positive cash flow at the time of the sale of company assets but simultaneously eliminated future company losses, thus reducing the level of debt which would otherwise have been necessary.

The third and final point is of a political and ideological nature and therefore the suppositions on which it is based have little empirical support. It was originally based on a respect for private property on the one hand and on the other, on the subordination of this right for a determined social end, although the objective and the social end to be pursued were sometimes a matter of debate.

At that time, the end of the eighties, advocates of one or other theses were to be found in the visions of the New Right and the Traditional Left in countries such as the United Kingdom. In the opinion of the New Right,

<sup>57</sup> David A. Hensher, 'Privatization: An Interpretative Essay', *Australian Economic Papers*, vol. 25, n. 47, December 1986, p. 158.

bureaucrats were free to pursue their private objectives: higher salaries, status, power, etc. and an easy life in general. All these were incentives for increasing the budget of the administration both in their own sphere of action and that of the administration in general. Therefore, the New Right saw privatisation as a remedy for the over expansion of the Public Sector and for the inefficiency in the provision of goods and services.<sup>58</sup>

The Traditional Left, on the other hand, with a boundless passion for all public things, not always in accordance with the social nature of the action, defends the ethics of public service, which characterises and is present in the way of doing and in the general behaviour of public servants. These public servants, far from wishing increases in public spending or over-supply of public services, behave with loyalty to their mission and attention to the users of such services.<sup>59</sup>

We are convinced that in, reality, statistical evidence to support either position could be produced. Even allowing for the presence of the ideological element it would not be surprising that, faced with the same reality, two different conclusions could be reached by the two different political persuasions.

What can be said, more than a decade after the start of the processes geared to returning to the private sector and to the market those economic activities that had been in the hands of the Public Sector, is that, those countries – and as always we are speaking of developed economies – which have embraced the privatisation process with greatest diligence, have managed to clean up their finances and achieved greater stability in their economies. However, those who, acting with greater reticence and defending an obsolete sense of national interest in certain productive sectors, maintaining them in the hands of the State, are experiencing serious difficulties in the balancing of their budgets, incurring in excessive deficits, depriving the private sector of financing possibilities and stagnating their economies, to the detriment of what, at least in theory, they aim to protect: the national interest.

### *Human Person, Risk and Welfare*

These are the three elements that go to make up the most important framework, originally for the creation and today for the maintenance of the

<sup>58</sup> Kate Ascher, *The Politics of Privatization: Contracting out Public Services*, McMillan Education, Houndmills (1987), p. 247.

<sup>59</sup> Kate Ascher, *The Politics of Privatization: Contracting out Public Services*, McMillan Education, Houndmills (1987), p. 251.

Welfare State. It is clear that providing cover for risks that are perceived as such and being conscious of such cover, increases the well-being of the person, eliminates anxiety and allows the subjects to concentrate on their objectives without worrying about matters outside their control, such as longevity, illness, accidents, disability, unemployment, etc.

The forecasting of needs and how to cover them is a characteristic of the rational process of the human being in the taking of decisions, which bring him closer to a state of well-being.

Thus the attempt to provide for the satisfaction of our needs is synonymous with the attempt to provide for our lives and well-being ... But men in civilised societies alone among economising individuals plan for the satisfaction of their needs, not for a short period only, but for much longer periods of time ... Indeed, they not only plan for their entire lives, but as a rule, extend their plans still further in their concern that even their descendants shall not lack means for the satisfaction of their needs.<sup>60</sup>

What was so evident for Menger was not quite so clear for Bismarck and the *Verein*, or later on for Beveridge. Nor has it played a part in the construction of the modern economic systems in which the Welfare State has been firmly integrated. This has its basis in a supposition, which, while it may be true to a minor degree, can by no means be generalised.

Man, as far as the Welfare State consider him, is a subject at the mercy of his pressing interests, a prisoner of his most immediate passions and therefore, incapable of predicting the future, and much less so of providing for those situations, which, in the future will require resources for their satisfaction.

It is this inability on the part of the subject to foresee uncertain but possible events, that causes the State, with its superior powers of predicting such risks, to protect the individual, even against his will, and assist him in illness, retirement, old age, orphanhood, unemployment, poverty, etc.

This hypothesis has given rise to the generalised or Universal Social Security Systems. They were not born in an attempt to marginally protect the prodigals, the poverty-stricken, the needy, owing to lack of foresight, or those who live for the present and ignore the future. The Social Security Systems, throughout practically the entire European Union, were of a com-

<sup>60</sup> Carl Menger, *Principles of Economics*, The Free Press, Glencoe (Illinois, 1950), pp. 77-79.

pulsory and universal nature from the outset for society as whole. It is true, however, that this universality is diverse in nature because of the existence of subsystems: freelance workers, domestic service, the agricultural sector and civil servants, who would constitute exceptions to the general rule. Nevertheless, these peculiarities do not contradict the principle of universality adopted by the system itself.

The perverse results shown by the cumulative experience have their roots in different causes: some of them would be avoided by returning control to smaller entities, and others by recognising the role of the subjects in the decisions affecting them. As Akerlof says,

the problem is to design a system that will not crowd out a healthy private response so that people will have as much incentive as possible to take care of their own problems, and not just rely on the government.<sup>61</sup>

Let us examine some aspects of this:

a) *Unemployment protection*. Today nobody would accept the principle that he who does not work does not eat. The Social Doctrine of the Church says that,

The obligation to provide unemployment benefits, that is to say, the duty to make suitable grants indispensable for the subsistence of unemployed workers and their families, is a duty springing from the fundamental principle of the moral order in this sphere, namely the principle of the common use of goods or, to put in another and still simpler way, the right to life and subsistence.<sup>62</sup>

Given that this principle is undeniable, the problem should be analysed from two perspectives; on one side the adverse effects that a high subsidy might have in terms of the attitude and motivation of the worker, and on the other, the incentive for development of fraudulent attitudes on the part of beneficiaries which would serve to undermine the very essence of the protection.

It is obvious that, from the quantitative point of view, a subsidy close to the net salary received by the worker for doing his job, is an incentive, like it or not, to remain unemployed or at least to adopt an indolent attitude in

<sup>61</sup> George A. Akerlof, 'Men without Children', *The Economic Journal*, vol. 108, n. 447, March 1998, p. 308.

<sup>62</sup> John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Laborem Exercens*, Castelgandolfo, 14.09.1981, n. 18.



the search for work. The situation is even more transparent when there is no time limit on the payment of the subsidy and when nothing is demanded of the worker in return for it.

These effects are reduced when there are discomfort costs for the unemployed worker, such as the obligation to present himself at the relevant public office a certain number of times per month and whenever he is requested to do so, and the obligatory attendance at job interviews with the obligation to accept a job which corresponds to his capacities and abilities, while always bearing in mind his dignity.

The other aspect mentioned is that of fraud in the receipt of unemployment subsidies. If we assume that the unemployment subsidy is paid to cover the involuntary loss of a job, it should be incompatible in time, at least conceptually, with remunerated employment. Therefore the carrying out of paid work and the receipt of said subsidies simultaneously is inconsistent with the principles on which the latter are based and represents fraud with respect to the public resources allocated to the social provision.

Without necessarily considering a publicly formulated accusation, the type of fraud based on this attitude is by no means exceptional. It can be attributed to two factors. The first is a lack of efficiency in the control of such subsidies. The second is related to the positive economic balance the fraud produces for its perpetrator. High subsidies together with derisory penalties, in the case of being caught, lead to a positive cost/benefit relationship and consequently constitute a stimulus for fraudulent behaviour.

Without doubt, the placing of the control in the hands of smaller agencies, both in the case of indolence and in the lack of personal incentives in the search for and acceptance of work as well as for fraudulent receipt of subsidies, would improve the efficiency of the system. Local governments, labour organisations, private management agencies, local work-related institutions, etc. are, in the exercising of their functions, closer to the worker and his sphere of action. They are therefore better placed to exercise functions of control and the consequent gain in efficiency would serve to reduce or eliminate such problems.

b) *Health care*. Similarly, health care should be guaranteed for everybody, irrespective of their economic situation. This is understood to include both clinical medical assistance such as surgery or hospital requirements and pharmaceutical needs. Given that this principle is irrefutable, there are however certain grey areas which should be examined.

One thing is to ensure that nobody is denied medical attention due to insufficient resources, and a very different one is to establish an obliga-

tory system to which the entire population is subjected, in caring for their health. There is also a difference between guaranteeing the service, and the condition that the service has to be produced by the Public Sector itself. This phenomenon is of such importance that in those countries where a universal and obligatory public health system exists, the citizens' ability to choose the *'how and where'* of the treatment for their illnesses has almost disappeared.

In many cases, even with an obligatory public system, there has been a large increase in private insurance with the same objective as the public service. On the one hand, this indicates a social awareness of the inefficiency of the compulsory system and highlights the injustice, for those who perceive the risk, of the obligation to contribute twice in order to cover the same risk.

Having said this, the causes of the inefficiency of the public system can be found on both the supply and demand sides, or if you like, because of the attitudes of both the suppliers and those who demand the service.

In the case of the former, the desire to avoid problems and claims which might arise due to dissatisfaction with the attention to patients, whether it be justified or not, leads them to a cautious approach of requesting analytical and radiological tests over and above those which would normally correspond to the medical case in question. Likewise, and for the same reasons, they are careless with respect to medical prescriptions, prescribing more of a product than is necessary to satisfy the observed medical needs.

In the case of the users, the fact that the system is completely free of charge with respect to attention and highly subsidised with respect to medicines prescribed, encourages over-consumption, both in terms of health personnel and medicines. This inefficiency with respect to personnel, apart from its effects on the cost of the service, also implies the risk of less attention been given to cases where the need for such attention is greater; not to mention the unjustified losses in terms of working hours. In the second case, the inefficiency cost is reflected in the storage, in the homes of beneficiaries, of a great number of medicines until their expiry date, the only reason for this being that such products are practically free of charge.

It is obvious that returning functions and responsibilities in this field to the private sector, to people and smaller institutions, would contribute to a better use of resources as well as greater freedom of choice and thus improve the well-being of the citizens. All this should be done but the guarantee that nobody is left without assistance, irrespective of his economic situation, must remain in force.

c) *Assistance in the face of poverty.* Poverty is a fact. Even the richest countries have to admit the existence of poverty gaps, in contrast with situations of opulence. The causes are very diverse, and this is not the moment to examine them, although there is a wide body of literature that analyses at macroeconomic and microeconomic levels the factors determining poverty.

We have already said that not even the most radical of liberals would entrust the market with the task of solving this serious human problem. The problem is severe in both its personal and social dimensions. The market is ready to operate with efficiency in the allocation of goods and services that can be exchanged by means of prices. Thus, and regardless of what we go on to say in this respect, this should be a specific function of the Public Sector.

Furthermore, with humanity devoid of values of a moral tradition and on a spiral of hedonistic materialism, who else but the State can assume the responsibility of subsidising the most deserving cases? As J. Bentham outlined, nobody would be voluntarily prepared to give up part of his income to remedy the shortages of others. Only the State can carry out such a task.

However, neither one thing nor the other has completely occurred. Man has not returned to the roots of his humanity and neither has the State managed to remedy the cases of poverty always present in society. It is true, however, that since the State has proclaimed itself the holder of the deeds to solidarity, and a solidarity that is official in nature, a certain reduction has been observed in what was once a very widely implemented private charity.

Thus the following observation of John XXIII must be considered:

Although in our day, the role assigned the State and public bodies has increased more and more ... it is quite clear that there will always be a wide range of difficult situations, as well as hidden and grave needs, which the manifold providence of the State leaves untouched, and of which it can in no way take account. Wherefore, there is always wide scope for humane action by private citizens and for Christian charity. Finally, it is evident that in stimulating efforts relating to spiritual welfare, the work done by individual men or by private civic groups has more value than what is done by public authorities.<sup>63</sup>

Therefore, an end to private charity and that of private institutions and the Church, can never be justified on the grounds that such solidarity is now

<sup>63</sup> John XXIII, Encyclical Letter *Mater et Magistra*, Rome, 15.05.1961, n. 120.

exercised by the State. The dominion of charity is very close to the heart of Christians and nobody can take this from us.

We believe that the most obvious failure of the State lies in this field. The local councils, in the area of public resources, have a role to play. However, it is above all the Church, through its work and institutions, charitable foundations and associations of individuals in small, specialised voluntary groups that must respond to the challenge of mitigating the terrible effects of poverty. And if all this is true for poverty at national level, it is even more so at international level, where we are confronted by the poverty of entire countries and their populations.

Because, what cannot be forgotten by us Christians is that, in our economic relations, whatever they might be,

... charity 'which is the bond of perfection' must play a leading part. How completely deceived are those inconsiderate reformers, who, zealous only for commutative justice, proudly disdain the help of charity. Charity can not take the place of justice unfairly withheld, but, even though a state of things be pictured in which every man receives at last all that is his due, a wide field will nevertheless remain open for charity. For justice alone, even though most faithfully observed, can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can never bring about a union of hearts and minds.<sup>64</sup>

d) *Work-related pensions*. Within all the aspects that go to make up the Welfare State, this is amongst those requiring most attention. Out of all the Social Security System, perhaps retirement pension is that which merits preferential consideration. On the one hand, it quantitatively influences the determination of other welfare payments such as the widow's pension, and on the other because the risk covered in the case of retirement is the only one with the characteristics *incertus an, certus quando*. In this respect, it is deserving of even greater attention than the covering of the risk of death which falls within the framework of *certus an, incertus quando*. It can, therefore, be deduced that the person is worried about his living conditions during his working life and perhaps even more so during the period of retirement. We dare to contend that the health system and the pension system represent the hinge on which the construction of the Welfare State turns.

This preoccupation has existed since the beginning of the Welfare State. While the system born of the *Verein* was being structured in Germany by

<sup>64</sup> Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Quadragesimo Anno*, Rome, 15.05.1931, n. 137.

Chancellor Bismarck, and long before the two W. Beveridge reports of 1942 and 1944 in the United Kingdom, Spain established what was known as 'Worker Retirement Insurance' at the beginning of the 1920s. Its prior doctrinal reference can be found in the contribution of José Maluquer to the First Social Week in Spain, held in Madrid in 1906 and entitled 'Study on the Christian implications of worker retirement'.<sup>65</sup>

At the very beginning and particularly in the Mediterranean countries, the professional assistance funds and mutual benefit societies were taken as a reference for the institutional management and control of pensions. Today, eloquent vestiges of those enterprises still remain. They operated on the basis that the workers affiliate as contributors to the insurance scheme supervise and control the resources obtained, their use, and the distribution of risks across the collective community.

The majority of these professional assistance funds and mutual benefit societies disappeared with the arrival of the Universal Social Security System which was supposedly better equipped to cover such risks. The scenario was not difficult to appreciate after two world wars and an economic crisis between them.

Today, however, the pension system, in various European countries, is a source of great concern. The fact is that resources are insufficient in most cases and therefore it is necessary to correct or completely modify the model so that the worker is still covered during his working life and in the period of retirement even if the conditions of such cover are different.

We have already said that the concentration of welfare on material goods had stripped the subject of his spiritual dimension, inclined him towards a life of comfort, surrounded by goods and services but isolated with respect to the family and society. This brought with it a decrease in the fertility rate, which along with an increase in life expectancy brought about by medical advances, resulted in an extraordinary increase in the dependant population in relation to the working population.

In Table IV and its representation in Figure IV (p. 431), we can observe the trend in pension costs before tax in the different European Union countries, expressed as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product for each year. Special mention must be made of those countries where the drop in fertility rates has occurred in relatively recent times. This has meant that the

<sup>65</sup> Vide José Maluquer, *Curso inicial de seguro obrero (los orígenes del Estado del Bienestar en España)*, Ediciones Orbis, S.A. (Barcelona, 1986).

retired or dependant population represents a heavy burden for the, now smaller, working, or independent population. This is the case of Spain and Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Germany.

The problem of insufficient resources does not exist in Ireland, since pensions account for a low percentage of the GDP. However, in Greece and Spain it might well be described as alarming. It is forecasted that in the year 2050, almost one quarter of Greece's GDP will be necessary to finance the pension system. In Spain the figure will be 17.70%, and in Germany 14.60%. Finland with 16% and Austria with 15.10% are ahead of Germany in this respect although the trend in Austria has been downward since the 1940s.

The basic reason for all of this, in addition to what we have already pointed out, is that the majority of European States opt for a Pay As You Go system rather than a capitalisation one. In contrast, these countries would never allow private insurance companies to operate on the basis of this redistribution system.

The Pay As You Go system is based on the assumption that the working population contributing to the system and consequently the Gross Domestic Product, grows constantly and in a proportion greater than or equal to the passive population benefiting from the system. When this fails to happen, there is a financial imbalance and social security becomes social insecurity, thereby dashing the hopes of those who place their confidence in the system. We cannot but remind ourselves of the words of John XXIII with respect to this confidence:

It is also quite clear that today the number of persons is increasing who, because of recent advances in insurance programs and various systems of social security, are able to look to the future with tranquillity. This sort of tranquillity once was rooted in the ownership of property, albeit modest.<sup>66</sup>

Allow us to furnish some figures for the case of Spain, which indicate the magnitude of the problem. In Table V and Figure V (p. 432), which represents it, we can see the relationship between the number of contributors to the system – active workers paying Social Security contributions – and the number of pensioners or beneficiaries. The figures cover the period from 1985 to 2050 with the figures from 2005 to 2050 being forecasted figures. As against more than two contributors for each beneficiary in 1985, we have less than one contributor per beneficiary in 2050.

<sup>66</sup> John XXIII, Encyclical Letter *Mater et Magistra*, Rome, 15.05.1961, n. 105.

From this relationship, it is an easy task to deduce the pension accounts in Spain based on a P.A.Y.G. system. These can be observed in Table and Figure VI (p. 433), and are expressed as percentage of Gross Domestic Product. In the revenues – contributions to the system – and expenses – pension payments from the system – accounts, we can see that from the year 2010 Spain goes into a deficit position which reaches a peak of 4.31% of GDP in 2045. This trend of the deficit is slightly downward from 2045 onwards.

A capitalisation system, whereby contributions to the system, irrespective of quantity, confer the right to receive a pension corresponding to the amount of the contribution and financed by an accumulated fund, would not have allowed such a financial situation to develop. It would also have been the same system, which the State has obliged private insurance companies to adopt in similar situations.

If, at any given moment, the Spanish Public Sector had to make a once off settlement to the value of acquired pension rights, the financial result would be certain: bankruptcy. The same could be said of any other State in a similar situation and the reason would also be the same, i.e., the unfunded system.

Table and Figure VII (p. 434), show the technical provisions necessary to meet the obligations of the pension system in Spain. They are, we repeat, the reserves that a private insurance company would have been obliged to create in order to meet the same obligation. All the obligations, in the corresponding period in which they can be called in or claimed, have been discounted at the present moment [year  $\alpha$ ] using an annual discount rate of 3%, i.e., each annual obligation has been discounted to the year of reference with the amount to be paid being the sum of the corresponding discounted liabilities.

Hence:

$$TP_{\alpha} = \beta_{\alpha} + \sum_{\alpha+1}^{\alpha+n} \beta_{\alpha+1-\alpha+n} \frac{1}{(1+0.03)^t}$$

Where  $TP_{\alpha}$  are the technical provisions in the year of reference, which would give financial cover to the rights acquired [years 1993, 1994, 1995 or 1996].

$\beta_{\alpha}$  are the rights of pensioners to their payments in the year of reference [1993, 1994, 1995 or 1996].

$\beta_{\alpha+1-\alpha+n}$  are the rights of pensioners to their payments between the year subsequent to the reference year and the year in which the payment obligation ends [death of pensioner].

The figures corresponding to the general pension system of the Social Security and those corresponding to the system applicable to civil servants appear separately. Therefore, if the Spanish Government had to provide a reserve to cover the acquired pension rights of current pensioners for a given year, due to a portability agreement for example, the obligation would be greater than Gross Domestic Product for any of the five years analysed, ranging from 110.37% of GDP in 1992 to 120.99% in 1996.

If we add the rights being acquired by the working population currently contributing to the system, which amount to 78.71 billion pesetas for 1995 and 80.22 billion pesetas for 1996, the total obligation of the Social Security System for these two years would be equivalent to 232.06% of GDP of the year 1995 and 229.44% of GDP for 1996.

The figures are more than sufficient to demonstrate the financial situation of a Universal Social Security System, which, if it had to make provisions to guarantee the payment of pensions, would have to face irredeemable financial difficulties, which might result in the bankruptcy of the system.

There are several possible solutions at this point in time. The first would be to stop recognising, at least in quantitative terms, some rights that are currently recognised. This measure would, for the purposes of calculating the pension payable, include the total contributions over the working life of the individual and not just those of the final years, which tend to be higher.

Another possibility would be to increase the age at which full retirement rights are acquired, currently sixty-five in Spain, either by law or through a set of incentives. This would have the dual effect of delaying the time at which pensions become payable and shortening the duration of the payment period.

The final possible solution is to encourage the population to take out private pensions plans with financial organizations or insurance companies to complement the public pension. This represents an apocalyptic attempt to warn of the risk or insecurity of the system of supposed social security.

Little time will be needed before this function is returned to the citizens, the professional bodies, associations, mutual benefit societies, in other words to a sphere of action and provision other than the public one.



*Conclusion*

The Welfare State, conceived to attend to the needs of private individuals subject to the risks of life and work, has concentrated on enormous economic areas which it has been unable to control: economic growth, productive activity, wealth, population growth, relative sustenance of age structures, etc.

The social and economic scenario has undergone radical change. The birth rate, particularly in the developed countries, has plummeted and this, along with advances in medical science, has led to a transformation in the structure of population age. We are advancing towards, if we have not already reached, a stage of an elderly population in need of attention, and an even smaller young population to sustain it.

The age pyramid is narrowing at the base, a narrowness which is moving towards the upper vortex, in such a way that it is foreseeable that in a few years, the pyramid will become a cylinder with a slight upward or downward widening.

Given all of this, the very structure of the Welfare State has to be reconsidered. The need for this is more urgent when even its most fervent supporters can see that it is suffering from an identity crisis which it tries to resolve by searching for its appropriate place and the point of reference it has lost.

There are needs. The subjects who feel them demand attention. However, the inability of the Public Sector to satisfy them may well be one of the causes of the dissatisfaction. The State grew enormously and badly, particularly after the Second World War. An examination of the situation, and the loss of well-being for the population, has led it to reduce its size from a level that should never have been reached. In this respect, more drastic change is needed. The individual person has to be seen, by right, as the true owner and protagonist of political, economic and social activity.

It is the person, both individually and with the institutions he created, who is the true decision-maker with respect to the economic activity designed to satisfy present needs and foresee future needs. In order to apply the subsidiarity principle, on the one hand, and in recognition of the shortcomings of the Government in achieving its objectives, on the other, the responsibilities assumed by the State must be returned to society, to the individuals and their social nucleus so that these responsibilities can be exercised under their strict control.

In this way, the State can better accomplish its mission and the individuals and community can, with greater social responsibility, achieve that objective which rightly belongs to them in a fraternal society that aspires to greater well-being, not only to greater welfare, for all its members.

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## COMMENT ON JOSÉ RAGA'S 'WELFARE AND DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OR MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS'

PEDRO MORANDÉ

It is a pleasure for me to comment on the interesting approach to the distribution of social responsibilities proposed by José Raga, specially his affirmation that it is necessary and desirable that these responsibilities 'return to their true origin'. I should clarify, however that the difficulties confronting the 'welfare state', which motivated the analysis of Raga, correspond essentially to a European phenomenon, totally unknown to Latin American countries, either because they never had 'welfare state' in the magnitude developed in the European countries, or because they have already resolved some of the problems that our speaker worries about. In the case of my country, for example, we have had a retirement pension system of individual capitalisation since the beginning of the eighties. And although the phenomenon of demographic transition begins to affect us with similar characteristics in relation to the population's aging, we still do not know if its results will be comparable to those described for the European case. I would not like, therefore, to make a comparative analysis with Latin American statistics, but rather, to concentrate on the discussion that is at the basis of the analysis on the social distribution of responsibilities between the public sector and the private one, at individual level or at the intermediate associations, since this discussion is also for our countries of the utmost relevance.

Raga makes a very interesting recount of the history of the ideas developed around this problem, including the juridical-constitutional discussions regarding the place people have in the definition of sovereignty; the concepts of society and of public interest by Adam Smith and by other authors that have studied the role of the State in the economy; and the principles which shape the social teaching of the Church by the authorized

voice of papal teachings. The concept of subsidiarity and its practical form of application is at the core of the debate. Although it is recognized that the term 'subsidiarity' was introduced by Pius XI in his encyclical letter *Quadragesimo anno*, the concept involved in this expression has a longer tradition that practically crosses the whole modern history. A sociologist would say that subsidiarity became problematic since society transformed its ranked ordered social structure into a functionally differentiated order, because this radical change brought about a necessary redistribution of the responsibilities associated with the different positions. Remembering the authors of the past has the great advantage of recognizing the evolution that this problem has suffered due to historical and social circumstances, but it also allows us to appreciate the deficiencies and inadequacies of the available conceptualisations.

I have no doubt that the two social subsystems which anticipated all the others in developing a functional organization were the political subsystem, that solved the jurisdictional question by means of the universal and impersonal rule of law and the economic subsystem, that solved the problem of scarcity of resources for the satisfaction of people's needs by a division of labour that efficiently allocated resources by means of the free market, based on the monetarisation of economy and the development of financial markets. It is understandable that in the context of this early subsystems differentiation, the discussion about the social order between people and the associations of different types was concentrated on the usually tense relationships between State and market, a discussion that now extends more thoroughly to the relationships between State and civil society.

However, I think that it is necessary to enlarge even more this conceptualisation, since also other important subsystems of society have already completed their processes of functional reorganization. The subsystem of science and the subsystem of education, to mention just two important examples, nowadays play an equally decisive role for the survival of society, without which neither the State nor the market could operate efficiently. Although all these subsystems are interrelated to each other in terms of input/output, they are self-regulated systems whose bounds do not necessarily correspond to those of the juridical order or to those which determine the chain of payments. As a current example, I can mention the high probability that someone may decide to carry out a clonation of human beings: he/she could do it thinking exclusively of the interest of science or of some particular laboratory, even when it has been legally prohibited at national or international level. In the case of educa-

tion, I am thinking of the regular curricular changes of educational study plans, carried out with technical-pedagogical approaches, but with independence of their eventual impact on the formation of economic agents or future social demands.

These examples and many others I could add, may excuse me from making a detailed analysis of the process of functional differentiation. For instance, nowadays the role carried out by mass media, by the use of technology, or by ecological determinations is of great importance. What seems evident is that the social conditionings of the exercise of people's freedom and of their responsibilities making decisions do not depend exclusively on the regulative or administrative role of the State and on the size of the public sector, even when they continue to be important elements to consider. Nor could it be affirmed that people's freedom is assured if its activity is developed in the private sector. Nowadays there exist transnational private corporations of greater size than many States and which could even condition their sovereignty. People's freedom and their responsibilities as well as their associations also depend on many other social factors which have in common the fact that they force people to use knowledge and information selectively and to assume the risks and responsibilities associated to that selection. The functionally organized society has exponentially increased the complexity of its operations, with the consequence that such a complexity is not transparent neither for people nor for their reference groups. It seems that society has evolved faster than ideological discussions and so it is very frequent to discover that decisions relating to the distribution of responsibilities among the different social sectors require more and more a technical character and at the same time pragmatic decisions, rather than ideological ones.

In this context, the idea of subsidiarity not only represents a doctrinal principle of the tradition of the Church, or of any other school of thought; but a practical and effective mechanism of distribution of decisions and responsibilities in contexts of high complexity and risk. In this sense, I have an optimistic overview regarding the development of modern society. Functional differentiation itself has forced a growing individuation process, due to the fact that it can no longer identify the role with the person, as it happened in ranked ordered societies. Functional differentiation organizes the phenomenon of attribution and generation of expectations in the specific contexts in which functions are coded and each person participates simultaneously of many of them. I have the impression that what has favoured market efficiency at so many levels of social life has not been a liberal or neo-liberal ideology nor any other ideology, but its own development



of complexity, specially by attributing worth to available information and expected knowledge; a process which is so highly contingent that it cannot be centralized. As I have repeatedly mentioned in this Academy, Luhmann describes current society as an 'acentric' or 'policentric' society, because in the present levels of complexity there is no omniscient observer nor could there be, neither personal nor institutional, that could by itself gather all the available information in real time.

This overspecialisation of knowledge and of its associated information compels that subsidiarity must be supplemented with solidarity, as H.H. John Paul II visionarily outlined. Not only at the level of direct assistance to the survival of the weakest ('The poor cannot wait', he said in Chile), but also in the most complex ways facing the assistance of those who know and are informed versus those who do not know and are not informed. Could someone who takes an airplane not blindly trust that the complex net of people involved in its production, maintenance and control of the functioning of the plane has enough knowledge to interpret correctly all the information related to its performance? Could any patient who enters a complex clinic not simply trust in the ability to codify and decode information of all the professional teams that will work in the process? It is true that present society operates with growing levels of risk, sometimes incalculable, but on the other hand it also operates with growing levels of trust in people that have specialized knowledge and join their efforts for a team work. The Hobbesian idea of fight of all against all (*homo homini lupus*) does not have a place in an information regulated society, at least not as a basic overview for understanding social life. Evidently there are and there will be many social conflicts with different grades of violence so much at the domestic as at the international level. But the dynamics of the specialization of knowledge and information compel us daily to a reciprocal trust in the abilities of each one.

I think this is the present deficit of strong and centralist States. They can concentrate enormous quantities of resources, but they cannot concentrate a complex level of knowledge on highly contingent circumstances and variables. The capacity of institutions to foresee has been strongly restricted to their particular environment and it is highly improbable that one of them can gather by itself the knowledge of the whole society. Neither the State, nor markets, nor universities, nor companies, nor laboratories would be able to sustain this pretense of wholeness. Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity turns out to be the most efficient when using intelligence and the capacities of all people for the development of common good or of general interest. If in the past its priority might have been doctrinal or ide-

ologically founded, the organization of current society has given it a reasonability and plausibility that even common sense understands.

In emergent societies, such as the one in which I live, the fundamental role of the State has primarily been to guarantee the population's security against eventual external aggressors, which has been achieved; thereafter, to guarantee the institutional juridical order, which has also been achieved in spite of times of uncertainty and of alteration of the political order. Thereafter, it has been to guarantee the macroeconomic stability of the balance of payments, the stability of the currency, and the international confidence and credibility, which in my country, a particular case, has also been achieved, but not so in all Latin American countries. The new challenge, still unreachable, is to guarantee an education of quality that would allow most of our population to be integrated with proficiency in the understanding and knowledge of highly specialized information needed in complex societies today. But our governments know that they can only trust those groups of citizens which have already achieved a higher quality in their education. Any policies that ignore this fact would not only harm the population but also the foundations of the State itself. Contrary to the examples that Raga analyses about the responsibilities attributed to the public sector and the private one, this analysis cannot presuppose the model of a 'zero-sum game', but rather take into account the synergies that brings about the circulation of knowledge and information which aims at value addition, creativity, technological innovation, new forms of organization and co-responsibility.

In my country, for example, there are two truly complex universities due to the number of faculties they have and because they carry out so many educational activities as well as research. One is public, the University of Chile and the other is private, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, to which I belong. They have approximately the same size, both receive the best students from our second level school system and they compete hand by hand for the quality of their alumni and for their research funds. The fact that they are good universities makes them much more similar than what differentiates them in the origin of their financing or the juridical statute which defines them. In fact, in both cases, the financing sources are both public and private. Both have a public responsibility in our society, due to their contribution to the education of high level professionals who assume leadership positions in their respective specialization areas and to their research and publications. Both are well administered. Neither would the State think of nationalising the Pontifical Catholic University nor the market or the population of privatising the University of Chile just because

it belongs to the State. This situation has not been the result of the application of an ideological model but of a long history of guaranteeing the population the quality of their education. I wanted to draw your attention to this example to show that in the context of the operation of a complex society, not only the dispute between State and market is relevant but also all factors that society has increasingly organized in particular functional subsystems, which have fostered further specialization of knowledge and further cooperation among those who are mutually responsible for the service to society and people.

Anyway, I fully agree with Raga in the foundation of his argument: the inalienable value of the dignity of each human being and the subsidiarity and solidarity principles as the best ways of guaranteeing people's freedom and simultaneously the well-being of society as a whole. But the real conditions of organization of the current society also demand a more complex understanding of social relationships, taking into special account the role of production and transmission of knowledge and information in all social environments, even in those more closely linked to interpersonal and familiar relationships. If this intellectual effort is not made, I think that one runs the risk that freedom and subsidiarity could become purely rhetorical concepts with no relation to real society.

## THE SUBJECTIVITY OF SOCIETY

RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS

As we look toward the future of Catholic social doctrine, the inevitable question is asked about the lasting contribution of the pontificate of John Paul II. During this remarkable quarter century, the Holy Father has insisted again and again that social doctrine is, in fact, doctrine. That is to say, social doctrine is not simply the practical application of the Church's authoritative teaching but is an integral part of the Church's teaching patrimony grounded in the deposit of faith. With respect to social teaching, many have claimed to see in this pontificate instances of the 'development of doctrine', as the meaning of that phrase was delineated by John Henry Cardinal Newman. Others are more critical, suggesting that the teaching initiatives of this philosopher-pope have been excessively marked by personal, even eccentric, perspectives reflecting his own personalist and phenomenological commitments and methodology. I do not propose in this paper to enter upon these disputes, never mind to attempt to resolve them. Suffice it to say that I am inclined to believe we have witnessed developments of doctrine in the Church's social teaching, and that these developments will be part of the enduring legacy of the pontificate of John Paul II.

Here I would draw our attention to the 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus*. This is often called the economics encyclical, but I believe that is somewhat misleading. It is more accurately described as an encyclical on the free and just society, which includes, very importantly, the market or business economy. I would further refine the subject by focusing on a particular phrase that is central to the argument of *Centesimus Annus*, namely, the subjectivity of society. The concept of the subjectivity of society is, I believe, deserving of the most careful scholarly study and elaboration in the years ahead. I can in this paper only gesture toward some of the theoretical and practical implications of the concept as they pertain to the subject of our conference. I trust you will understand if some of my references are

specific to the American experience in government and public policy. That is because I know the American experience best, and also because, for better and for worse, the American experience has at present, and likely will have for the foreseeable future, such an enormous influence in the world's thinking about what is required for a society to be free and just.

The subjectivity of society requires that we think about society and politics 'from below'. As we shall see, this way of thinking is closely tied to the Catholic understanding of 'subsidiarity'. Politics is inescapably a moral enterprise. Aristotle conceives of politics as free persons deliberating the question, How ought we to order our life together? The 'ought' in that definition clearly requires an explicitly moral deliberation. This does not mean that politics is the exclusive preserve of moral theologians or philosophers, nor that they are even notably adept in addressing the tasks of politics. The subjectivity of society requires, on the contrary, a certain humility on the part of theorists and policy makers. They are to learn from the ways in which people, given the opportunity, actually order their lives together as they think they ought to order their lives together. Some say that the idea of the subjectivity of society is 'populist'. The better word is democratic.

John Paul has repeatedly said that the entirety of Catholic social doctrine has its foundation in the dignity of the human person. He has written at length on the acting person and the acting person in community. A just society is ordered by the free interaction of subjects who must never be viewed and should never view themselves as objects. This idea of the acting, thinking, creating person makes democracy both possible and necessary. *Centesimus* is by no means the first authoritative Catholic document to affirm the democratic project, but it does so with a force and nuance that is, I believe, unprecedented. The economic corollary of that democratic vision is the 'circle of productivity and exchange' by which free persons create wealth and mutually benefit from the creation of wealth. Economics is emphatically not a zero-sum proposition of dividing up existing wealth but is chiefly the enterprise of an open-ended production of wealth by means of the God-given human capacity for creativity. This understanding requires us to attend also to those who are excluded, or exclude themselves, from the circle of productivity and exchange. They are frequently described as 'the exploited', but I believe John Paul is right in saying that they are more accurately described as the marginalized.

Addressing the problems of the marginalized requires that we clearly distinguish between state and society. *Centesimus* insists upon the limited nature of the state, which is one of the key concepts of democratic gover-

nance. In this sense, the teaching is anti-statist but it is not anti-state. It is not enough to be opposed to the inflation of state power that is called statism. Indeed, unless one embraces anarchy, resisting such inflation requires a strong and positive understanding of the appropriate role of the state. We are to resist the 'politicizing' of the entire social order, while knowing that the acting person is also political by nature and is to be trained in the virtues of the politics of freedom. Here the argument of *Centesimus* is very close to the well-known claim of Edmund Burke: 'To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affection'. Similarly, and with specific reference to the American order, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, 'In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made'. The science – and also the art – of association is of the essence in understanding the subjectivity of society.

Unlike many earlier Catholic discussions, *Centesimus* does not discuss the state in terms of divinely established hierarchies of order. Or, to put it differently, one might say that it turns those hierarchies on their head. The state is the instrument or the servant of society. It is to help provide a framework of freedom and security in which society can flourish. The subjectivity of society – human creativity, cooperation, and aspiration – is protected but is not generated or controlled by the state. In American political culture, there is a running debate over 'big government'. Conservatives decry it and liberals are in favor of it (Here I use 'conservative' and 'liberal' in the distinctly American sense of those terms.). Or one might suggest that there are two apparently conflicting tendencies in American politics. People typically desire an expansive definition of governmental responsibility and an increase in programs from which they benefit while, at the same time, wanting to reduce the bureaucratic, depersonalizing, sometimes oppressive and always very costly operations of 'big government'. *Centesimus* points to a way out from this apparent contradiction, and the key to that way out is the clear distinction between society and the state.

For instance, in addressing problems of unemployment, *Centesimus* speaks about what society should do, what the state should do, and sometimes about what is to be done by 'society and the state' (n. 15). The goal, if we take seriously the subjectivity of society, is an open process in which society organizes itself (n. 16). The state is in the service of that goal. Society is precedent to the state in both time and dignity. Agreeing with (although not citing) Tocqueville, John Paul says that 'the right of associa-

tion is a natural right of the human being, which therefore recedes his or her incorporation into political society'. He does cite Leo XIII who wrote that 'the state is bound to protect natural rights, not to destroy them; and if it forbids its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence' (n. 7). Again, the state is not society but is one of many necessary actors within society, and is always in the role of servant rather than master. The state is to provide a framework of law and security that enables society to spontaneously organize itself. That, at least, is the fundamental concept and orientation. How it is to be lived in practice is the endless task of politics – the free deliberation of the question, How ought we to order our lives together?

As I said, the understanding of the subjectivity of society is closely related to the principle of subsidiarity. First articulated by Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), the principle of subsidiarity has perhaps never been articulated with such force and nuance as it receives in *Centesimus*.

A community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good (n. 48).

Within the comprehensive argument of *Centesimus*, it is obvious that we are being invited also to rethink conventional notions of 'higher' and 'lower'. This is what I referred to as turning hierarchies on their head. For instance, in the hierarchy of organized power in society, the state is 'higher' and the family, for example, is 'lower'. But, according to John Paul II, the family is, in fact, higher in terms of priority and rights. The word 'subsidiary' suggests an auxiliary agent that supplies aid and support. Or we speak of subsidiary in the sense of one thing being derived from and subordinate to another – for instance, a stream that is a subsidiary of a larger body of water. The state is subsidiary to society in service, as it is also subsidiary in being derived from society in its moral legitimacy. In the American experience, this democratic understanding is reflected in the statement of the Declaration of Independence that 'just government is derived from the consent of the governed'. In this context, 'consent' means not acquiescence but active participation in government that governs by serving the acting persons and institutions that constitute society.

In the words of the American Founders, society is 'We the people'. The state is not 'We the people'. The Preamble to the Constitution declares, 'We the people of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution

for the United States of America'. The principle of subsidiarity can thus be seen as closely linked to a proper understanding of democratic theory and practice. *Centesimus* was, of course, written in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet empire. In Eastern Europe there was at that time much discussion of 'civil society'. The constituting premise of totalitarianism is that there is only one society and its will is embodied in the state under the direction of the party. There may be purely private 'societies', but they are not public, they are not civil, they are not permitted to influence the *civitas*, which is the sphere that in totalitarian theory belongs exclusively to the party-state. Also in democratic societies today, the totalitarian impulse is evident in habits of speech and mind whereby what is governmental is termed 'public' and everything else is described as 'private'. If we understand the subjectivity of society and its correlate, the principle of subsidiarity, we know that the *res publica* pertains to, in the first instance, the persons and institutions that constitute society, which it is the proper mandate of government to serve.

In current American discussions, the principle of subsidiarity is today commonly addressed in terms of 'mediating institutions'. When Peter Berger and I first wrote about mediating institutions in *To Empower People* (1977), we observed, 'Taken seriously, they could become the basis of far-reaching innovations in public policy, perhaps of a "new paradigm" for at least sectors of the modern welfare state'. Berger and I make no great claim to originality in advancing the idea of mediating institutions; we were admittedly drawing on the insights of Burke and, especially, Tocqueville, with significant contributions from Max Weber. Under Democratic Party auspices, there was soon launched a New Paradigm project that helped shape some policies in the Reagan and Clinton administrations, and discussions of 'civil society' and a 'communitarian' approach to social policy gained considerable panache in academic and public policy circles, sometimes under the title of 'social capital'. Since both historically and at present the most vibrant networks of associationalism in American life are religious, it is not surprising that the current Bush administration has carried the mediating institutions approach into the encouragement of 'faith-based initiatives' in the meeting of social needs. In this connection, Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard has made important contributions in her understanding of mediating institutions as 'seedbeds of memory and mutual aid'. It is important to emphasize that the mediating institutions approach does not aim at dismantling or replacing the modern welfare state but at enabling the welfare state to carry out its responsibilities in a way that, minimally,



does not weaken these 'people-sized institutions' and, maximally, employs them in the service of the common good. These we call the 'minimal' and 'maximal' propositions and, in the spirit of *Centesimus*, we have a great deal more confidence in the first than in the second.

The family is the most notable but by no means the only intergenerational association of memory and mutual aid. *Centesimus* speaks of intermediary or mediating associations, noting that

the social nature of man is ... realized in various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic, social, political, and cultural groups that stem from human nature itself and have their own autonomy, always with a view to the common good (n. 13).

Berger and I defined mediating institutions, or mediating structures, as those that stand between and mediate between the isolated individual and the megastructures, including but not limited to the state. *Centesimus* speaks of 'intermediate communities' that provide a zone of freedom for the individual who 'is often suffocated between two poles represented by the state and the marketplace' (n. 49). The idea in both cases is that these communal institutions give the individual an identity and a necessary leverage over against the massive anonymous forces that would otherwise control the entire social order, turning people into objects rather than subjects.

The family is the premier instance and, one might say, the 'ideal type' of the structural mediation inherent in 'the subjectivity of society'. 'The first and fundamental structure for "human ecology"', says *Centesimus*, 'is the family, in which man receives his first formative ideas about truth and goodness, and learns what it means to love and to be loved, and thus what it actually means to be a person' (n. 39). The family is a seedbed of culture, and culture, it is repeatedly emphasized in *Centesimus*, is the most important dynamic in shaping the social order. Different cultures are different ways of understanding personal existence and personal existence in community, John Paul II has insisted again and again. This insight, not incidentally, is behind the Holy See's campaign that the constitution of Europe include a specific reference to its legacy of Christian culture. Some view that campaign as self-serving on the part of Christians and of Catholics more specifically. There may be some truth in that, but the campaign is driven by the belief that a political community cannot flourish in a cultural vacuum. The vaulting universalism and attempt to transcend cultural specificity that marks so much secularist thinking is at odds with the natural human need for a cultural matrix within which questions about the

meaning of personal existence can be asked, explored, and answered – and within which such questions, explorations, and answers can be intergenerationally transmitted. The understanding of state and society proposed by *Centesimus* would as well serve for a campaign to include Apollo or Immanuel Kant in the EU constitution – were, as a matter of historical fact, Apollo or Kant as seminal in the formation of European culture as are Christ and Christianity.

To speak of marriage and family in the context of the intergenerational flourishing of culture is inevitably to come up against anti-familial and anti-natalist dynamics in our several societies. Without children there is no family, and without family – the ‘first and fundamental’ mediating institution – there is no sustainable culture. Or at least no culture that is, in another favored phrase of this pontificate, a ‘culture of life’. In the United States there has been a sharp decline in births, although the population ‘replacement rate’ is sustained by immigration, chiefly immigration from the culturally Christian countries to the south of us. The American birth decline, however, is not near the magnitude of the decline in almost all of Europe. It is now generally recognized that Europe faces the prospect of a catastrophic depopulation in the course of this century, possibly sooner rather than later. It is a painfully real question whether demographically dying societies can sustain or even be open to the ‘culture of life’.

It is a cliché to say, but it is nonetheless true to say, that the reasons for such a ‘birth dearth’ are complex. One undeniable reason, I believe, is political and cultural hostility to the understanding of ‘the subjectivity of society’ proposed by *Centesimus*. As we shall see, this hostility has had an important and negative impact on marriage and family. Politically, the modern democratic society is always susceptible to the totalitarian impulse toward weakening or eliminating rival communities of allegiance, memory, and mutual aid. Thus, in the United States an activist judiciary ever more narrowly defines ‘religious freedom’ in a way that confines religion to the realm of ‘privacy’, safely sealed off from the *res publica*. The systematic attempt to exclude religion and religiously-grounded moral argument from the political – from ‘the deliberation of how we ought to order our life together’ – results in what I have described in a book by that title ‘the naked public square’. I should add that the dynamics in America are not all in one direction. Europeans regularly remark (sometimes with alarm!) on the vitality of religion in American public life. And it is true that religion and religiously-informed convictions seem to be irrepressible in American political culture and today may be in a mode of insurgency. At the same time,

however, that insurgency is powerfully opposed by most of the elite culture in the media, academy, and, not least, the judiciary.

The resulting conflict is commonly referred to as the 'culture wars' that mark American public life. The metaphor of warfare is, alas, not inapt. The divisions are deep and, or so it seems, deepening. In an unprecedented and, in my view, troubling way, the two major parties are increasingly defined by religion. Of all the sociological variables – race, income, education, region, etc. – the most important difference between the parties is religious commitment as measured by professed belief and actual observance. Family and religion combine as the perceived enemies of self-identified secularists set upon a statist triumph as the necessary resolution of the tension between state and society. Those who identify themselves as pro-family, pro-life, and pro-religion – and they are mainly evangelical Protestants and Catholics – are lumped together by secularists as the dangerously threatening 'religious right'. The subjectivity of society that finds expression in family and religion is derided as bigoted, irrational, and authoritarian. So the hostility to the subjectivity of society is in large part driven by the statist political ambitions of those who would subsume society under the jealous god of state sovereignty. This is rightly seen as a totalitarian impulse, although, as with even the worst of totalitarianisms, it is not likely to succeed totally. And it is being sharply challenged today, not least by those who understand the promising alternative proposed in Catholic social doctrine.

The statist impulse – including superannuated versions of socialism that, it is claimed, 'haven't been tried yet' – is only part of the story, however. Also hostile to the subjectivity of society and its policy implications is a powerful cultural dynamic that finds expressions in sundry 'liberationisms' that draw on a pervasive moral 'emotivism' (MacIntyre, *After Virtue*) and are directed toward the radical autonomy of the individual. These impulses are commonly attributed to 'the sixties' and the counter-cultural insurgencies associated with, but not limited to, that period. An argument can be made that the movements of unbounded liberationism have their origins in the early part of the twentieth century and were only temporarily disrupted by the Great Depression, along with World War II and its aftermath of recovery and Cold War sobriety. In this view, the deconstruction of normative traditions and institutions that is today associated with 'postmodernism' is but a resumption and intensification of the 'modernism' of art, literature, and elite consciousness of eighty and more years ago. However we understand it historically, the liberationist impulse, the felt need to break from tradi-

tions and institutions that are perceived as inhibiting the expression of the authentic self, are at war with the mediating structures that give communal expression to the subjectivity of society. This is notably the case with the institutions of marriage and religion. As has frequently been observed, the apparently contradictory dynamics of radical individualism and statist collectivism converge in their hostility to mediating institutions which resist the reduction of the social order to only two actors: the isolated individual and the all-embracing state.

All normative institutions tend to be viewed as a danger to both individual autonomy and the monopolistic sovereignty of the state. In a suggestive statement in the 1990 encyclical on evangelization (*Redemptoris Missio*), John Paul II tries to alleviate fear of the Church's missionary mandate by declaring, 'The Church imposes nothing; she only proposes'. That message needs to be communicated also with respect to the Church's teaching on marriage and the family. There is today in developed (overdeveloped?) societies a widespread view that marriage is no more than a contractual arrangement of mutual interest between adults, and children are strictly optional. With respect to divorce and the establishment of new contractual arrangements, it is assumed – despite massive evidence to the contrary – that children are 'resilient' and will readily adjust without lasting damage. This approach is today given an extreme expression in the agitation for 'same-sex marriage' or state certification of a variety of affective relationships. Here one sees a precise example of the convergence of the quest for individual autonomy and the expansion of state power, to the grave disadvantage of the 'first and fundamental' mediating institution that is the family. The Church cannot impose, but she can persuasively and persistently propose a better way. And there is encouraging evidence today that people, especially young people, do want the goods associated with the 'traditional' family. Efforts to deconstruct marriage and the family, it should be noted, are driven not by democratic deliberation but by court decisions. The Church proposes and the judiciary imposes.

The subjectivity of society and its mediating institutions require a sympathetically attentive state. Leo XIII, says John Paul II in *Centesimus*, understood that

the state has the duty of watching over the common good and of ensuring that every sector of social life, not excluding the economic one, contributes to achieving that good while respecting the rightful autonomy of each sector.

Lest that statement be taken in a statist direction, however, the Holy Father immediately adds,

This should not lead us to think that Pope Leo expected the state to solve every social problem. On the contrary, he frequently insists on necessary limits to the state's intervention and on its instrumental character inasmuch as the individual, the family, and society are prior to the state and inasmuch as the state exists in order to protect their rights and not stifle them (n. 11).

Like the biblical prophets, John Paul II calls for justice to roll down like mighty waters, but he does not presume to prescribe the irrigation system. The general principles proposed, however, have numerous and evident practical applications in economics, family life, education, social welfare and other spheres of the *res publica*.

The concepts of subsidiarity and the subjectivity of society do not give us precise instructions on when or how state intervention is appropriate. They do provide a conceptual framework that helps us understand what has gone wrong in so many areas of social policy, and what are promising alternatives. In the U.S., for example, it is generally agreed on all sides that the 'black underclass', which includes about one fifth of black Americans, has been significantly helped by the 'welfare reforms' of the 1990s that raise expectations and requirements for productive economic participation. People are treated not as wards of the state, not as objects, but as subjects and acting persons. This is part of the 'moral reconstruction' that *Centesimus* says is urgently necessary in formerly socialist countries, and is also necessary in affluent democracies that have created patterns of dependency on the state that are not economically sustainable and, more important, do grave damage to the 'human ecology'. Essential to such a moral reconstruction is changing our mental habits – to understand the state as the servant of society and its mediating institutions, to understand the distinction between what is public and what is governmental, and to understand that the promise of improvement depends on policies built not upon the pathologies but upon the potentialities of the poor and those excluded from the circle of productivity and exchange.

It is as though *Centesimus* is proposing that, in the realm of social policy, the first maxim for the state might be taken from the Hippocratic Oath: 'Do no harm'. The state, says *Centesimus*, is not to 'absorb' but to 'defend' the mediating institutions of society, recognizing that these institutions 'enjoy their own spheres of autonomy and sovereignty' (n. 45). From Hobbes to the last century's totalist theories of state power, the idea of mul-

tiple sovereignties in the social order is emphatically rejected. But I believe it is at the heart of Catholic social doctrine regarding the free, just, and democratic society. John Paul's use of the language of spheres of autonomy and sovereignty is also, it might be noted in passing, of ecumenical interest. That language has long been associated with Abraham Kuyper, the Dutch Calvinist theologian, political, and public philosopher of the early twentieth century. The understanding of state and society proposed by *Centesimus* is strikingly similar to that proposed by the Protestant proponents of 'Kuyperism' today, and both serve as moral and theological correlates to the current rediscovery of 'communitarianism', 'social capital' and 'civil society' mentioned earlier.

I am keenly aware that there are dimensions of this conference's topic that I have not addressed. I have limited myself to Catholic social doctrine on the flourishing of the subjectivity of society, in the belief that it is suggestive for the successor generation's rethinking of the achievements and failures of welfare state democracies. Such a rethinking will require a revitalizing of politics – the free deliberation of the question, How ought we to order our life together? *Centesimus Annus* is a rich resource for that deliberation. Of the problems associated with older ways of thinking, John Paul II writes,

By intervening directly and depriving society of its responsibility, the social assistance state leads to a loss of human energies and an inordinate increase of public agencies that are dominated more by bureaucratic ways of thinking than by concern for serving their clients, and that are accompanied by an enormous increase in spending.

The proposed alternative of the subjectivity of society replaces clients with acting persons, and acting persons in community. The state is no longer the Leviathan that commands but an ancillary instrument of service. *Res publica* is reconceived as a general good that is realized by particular goods created by people helping people through the people-sized communities that are mediating institutions. 'In fact', writes John Paul II, 'it would appear that needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are closest to them and who act as neighbors to those in need' (n. 48). 'Who is my neighbor?' That question of venerable biblical pedigree is a promising place for the successor generation to begin their deliberation of how they ought to order their lives together.

## LA SOGGETTIVITÀ DELLA SOCIETÀ E LA “SOGGETTIVITÀ MORALE”

VITTORIO POSSENTI

La Presidente Mary Ann Glendon, cui va il mio più sincero augurio per l'alta responsabilità attribuitale, mi chiese di commentare la relazione di P. Neuhaus, e di ciò le sono grato. Il tempo ristretto di cui ho potuto disporre – il testo è pervenuto solo pochi giorni fa – ha reso più complessa la stesura di un commento adeguato. Inoltre la situazione è mutata per la malattia del relatore. D'intesa con la Presidenza si è ritenuto di procedere dapprima a sintetizzare il contributo di Neuhaus e poi a esporre il mio commento, che avrà un'ampiezza maggiore di quello che sarebbe stato svolto in presenza del relatore.

L'intervento sarà condotto lungo due direttrici: un dialogo con le posizioni dell'autore e in secondo luogo un allargamento dell'orizzonte del suo *paper* che si rivolge intenzionalmente alla situazione americana, e che nella Dottrina sociale della Chiesa (DSC) assume come riferimento l'enciclica *Centesimus Annus*, letta attraverso l'importanza che attribuisce alla “soggettività della società”. Se non mi inganno, un certo allargamento del quadro è connesso all'indirizzo generale della presente sessione, in cui le questioni della solidarietà intergenerazionale, del welfare e della ecologia umana sono perlopiù declinate avendo dinanzi allo sguardo l'ambito dei Paesi occidentali. Naturalmente, oltre questo confine pur rilevante si dovrebbe aprire un immenso discorso su quell'ampia sfera di mondo che non si chiama Occidente, e in cui non possiamo assumere a priori che vari aspetti delle scienze sociali europee e forse anche alcune parti di secondo livello della Dottrina sociale della Chiesa possano valere senza revisioni e modulazioni. In effetti in Asia, in Africa e nell'Islam l'esperienza umana elementare, l'autoconsapevolezza, le stesse forme linguistiche che strutturano la comprensione che singoli e gruppi formano di se stessi risultano differenziate, e potrebbe essere un equivoco assumere che l'elaborazione cultu-

rale e delle scienze sociali sulla solidarietà intergenerazionale, il welfare e l'ecologia umana svolta in Occidente possa venire trasferita quasi intatta in quegli ambiti.

Anticipo i temi che toccherò:

- la soggettività della società in rapporto alla valorizzazione delle “società intermedie”;
- il nesso fra Stato e società;
- le minacce alla solidarietà intergenerazionale e all'ecologia umana provenienti dall'individualismo radicale e dalle biotecnologie.

Adotto un approccio socioculturale che va alla ricerca delle *culture influenti*, alla luce dell'idea che la cultura e in specie quella morale valga come *l'anatomia della società civile*. È così introdotto un metodo antimarxista, essendo il marxismo definito dall'idea che sia l'economia politica e non l'etica l'anatomia della società civile.

1) Il tema delle “società intermedie” appare centrale per un recupero della soggettività della persona e della società, alla luce dell'idea che la persona è sorgente d'azione, un *social agent* che agisce guidato tanto da un'etica della convinzione come da un'etica della responsabilità. Introducono nell'argomento alcune precisazioni terminologiche attinte nella *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (1987) e nella *Centesimus Annus* (1991). Nella CA Giovanni Paolo II osserva: “la socialità dell'uomo non si esaurisce nello Stato, ma si realizza in diversi *gruppi intermedi*, cominciando dalla famiglia fino ai gruppi economici, sociali, politici e culturali che, provenienti dalla stessa natura umana, hanno – sempre dentro il bene comune – la loro propria autonomia. È quello che ho chiamato [nella SRS] la ‘soggettività’ della società” (n. 13). Nel n. 49 si legge: “Oltre alla famiglia, svolgono funzioni primarie ed attivano specifiche reti di solidarietà anche altre *società intermedie*” (nelle due citazioni i corsivi sono miei). Nei termini “gruppi intermedi” e “società intermedie” (cui si potrebbe aggiungere quella di “corpi intermedi”) i sostantivi potrebbero essere resi in inglese con “groups” e “societies”, piuttosto che forse con “institutions”, “structures” o simili. Il problema sorge piuttosto con l'aggettivo dove l'italiano possiede un termine (intermedio) e l'inglese con maggiore proprietà due: *intermediate* e *intermediary*. In effetti essere intermedio significa nella fattispecie due cose: porsi quasi spazialmente in mezzo fra singolo e Stato da un lato (*intermediate*), e dall'altro porsi in mezzo operando un'attiva funzione di mediazione (*intermediary*).

In entrambi casi la soggettività sociale che si esprime nelle formazioni sociali intermedie si organizza dal basso verso l'alto come opportuna-



mente ricorda il testo di Neuhaus. Questi osserva a buon diritto che l'ambito della *res publica* è certamente più ampio del solo ambito del governo (*administration*) e anche dell'ambito dello statale. La polarità fra pubblico e privato non corrisponde né si sovrappone a quella fra statale e privato. A questo elemento si collega il fatto per cui la fede religiosa non può essere confinata nel privato come ancor oggi il secolarismo di secondo illuminismo pretende.<sup>1</sup>

Nella cultura dei gruppi sociali intermedi si punta sul processo di autoorganizzazione della società a partire dal basso, ossia dai luoghi in cui concretamente si manifestano bisogni e necessità. Tali gruppi appartengono alla società e non allo Stato, senza peraltro che si debba accogliere in tutto la concezione formulata da Tom Paine secondo cui la società sarebbe il prodotto delle nostre virtù, il governo e lo Stato dei nostri difetti e cattive tendenze. Vi è una certa ingenuità nel ritenere che la società sia il luogo del bene, e la politica o, come si dice spesso in Italia, "il palazzo", il luogo dell'ambiguo. La soggettività della società sarebbe mal compresa se volesse dire che ciascuno si regola come meglio crede: si tratta invece di una soggettività cooperante e sinergica, di un modello di socialità a cerchi concentrici, dove secondo R. Dahrendorf opzioni di libertà e legami comunitari debbono completarsi.<sup>2</sup> La necessità di fare perno sui corpi intermedi, ed attraverso essi di assegnare alla gente maggiore autorità e iniziativa (*to empower people*), deve oggi confrontarsi nelle società multiculturali con un delicato problema, che richiederebbe specifiche ricerche empiriche: quale grado di omogeneità culturale è necessario promuovere nei gruppi intermedi affinché fioriscano? In effetti, mentre fino ad un passato recente in essi l'omogeneità culturale era alquanto alta, e questo poteva favorire lo

<sup>1</sup> Anni fa lessi il noto volume di P. Neuhaus *The Naked Public Square*, che avanza la posizione secondo cui la religione riveste particolare rilievo nella vita pubblica e non può venire ridotta solo al privato. Il titolo dell'Istituto presieduto da P. Neuhaus – *Institute on Religion and Public Life* – riconferma l'assunto. Si tratta di un tema che ha occupato a lungo anche la mia riflessione ed è naturale che mi senta affine a chi fa altrettanto con intenti simili (cf. i miei *Religione e vita civile*, Armando, Roma 2002, 2a ed., e *Tra secolarizzazione e nuova cristianità*, EDB, Bologna 1986).

<sup>2</sup> "Gli uomini hanno bisogno di qualcosa di più dei diritti e del denaro per vivere una vita piena e soddisfacente. Hanno bisogno di metri che diano senso alla loro vita, supporti orientativi per il loro cammino ... Tutti noi abbiamo bisogno di vincoli e di rapporti che ci impediscano di scivolare in una condizione di 'anomia'", R. Dahrendorf, *Per un nuovo liberalismo*, Laterza, Bari 1988, p. 182. L'insieme di questi vincoli e rapporti è spesso chiamato "legature" dall'autore.

scambio e la tolleranza, e nutrire una base di speranze comuni e di memorie comuni, oggi non possiamo più presupporre questo elemento.

La validità delle formazioni sociali intermedie riceve un significativo avallo dal punto di vista antropologico e politico in una scuola che ha costituito un elemento notevole del pensare filosofico del XX secolo, quella del *personalismo comunitario*, di cui l'esteso dibattito mondiale fra *liberals* e *communitarians* ha ripreso decenni dopo alcuni aspetti. Nella Carta Costituzionale italiana si incontra una chiara presenza di tale scuola in specie nell'art. 2, che non pochi studiosi ritengono la chiave di volta dell'intero disegno costituzionale:

La Repubblica riconosce e garantisce i diritti inviolabili dell'uomo, sia come singolo, sia nelle formazioni sociali ove si svolge la sua personalità, e richiede l'adempimento dei doveri inderogabili di solidarietà politica, economica e sociale.

Le idee della DSC sui gruppi intermedi sono affini ad un modello di socialità aperta di origine aristotelica. In effetti secondo Aristotele la socialità umana, partendo dalla famiglia, conduce dapprima al villaggio come raggruppamento di più famiglie e successivamente alla *polis* dove si perviene alla piena sufficienza di vita. È stato spesso notato con ottime ragioni che il modello di socialità proposto da Aristotele è aperto verso l'alto e può essere prolungato oltre il livello della *polis/civitas*, man mano che le forme politiche della convivenza umana evolvono, mutano, si complessificano come è accaduto con l'apparizione dello Stato. Non è difficile estendere tale modello per seguire future evoluzioni della socialità dal livello statale a quello della "società cosmopolitica" in via di formazione a livello mondiale, col suo profondo bisogno di poteri pubblici sopranazionali, liberati dalla pesante ipoteca che su loro pone la prassi della sovranità dello Stato e la teoria che da secoli le corrisponde. L'applicazione di tale modello corrisponde quasi alla perfezione al criterio di sussidiarietà che occorre far valere nel rapporto fra i popoli, gli Stati, e la società internazionale.

Nel corso dell'epoca moderna i gruppi sociali intermedi sono stati ampiamente compressi a causa di un'errata idea dello Stato e di un'errata idea dell'individuo. Nel primo caso occorre richiamare la regola dei totalitarismi nei quali vigeva l'assioma "Tutto per lo Stato, niente al di fuori o contro lo Stato", e nel secondo l'assunto perfettamente individualistico di Rousseau secondo cui l'individuo nasce come un tutto di per sé perfetto e chiuso, dunque solo accidentalmente ed estrinsecamente sociale (cf. *Le Contrat Social*). Ancor prima della nascita dei totalitarismi, l'individualismo radicale si è mostrato duramente contrario ai corpi intermedi. Valga l'e-

sempio della legge Le Chapelier del 1794, partorita dalla Rivoluzione francese e rimasta in vigore per un secolo in Francia. Essa, vietando ogni corpo intermedio fra l'individuo e lo Stato, fu all'origine, non solo in Francia, di uno schiacciamento accanitamente perseguito dei corpi intermedi.

Oggi nelle società occidentali il problema delle formazioni intermedie sussiste prendendo un nuovo aspetto. Non quello delle *società volontarie* che vengono all'esistenza per libera scelta di singoli e/o di gruppi, ma quello delle società "naturali" ascrittive – quali la famiglia, il gruppo etnico, la comunità religiosa – verso cui la mentalità liberale spesso manifesta un disagio marcato a doppio titolo: 1) per il sospetto che nutre verso tutto ciò che appartenendo all'ambito del naturale, è in qualche misura sottratto alla libera scelta del singolo; 2) perché assume che le società ascrittive siano potenzialmente fonti permanenti di autoritarismo, intolleranza, di scarsa apertura verso l'altro e al diverso. In sostanza è accaduto un cambiamento del mix fra naturale e volontario a vantaggio del secondo.

Ciò introduce difficoltà permanenti a riconoscere i diritti comunitari, i diritti delle comunità come altrettanto importanti che quelli personali.

Nel XX secolo la cultura dei gruppi intermedi, tradizionale nella DSC, è stata rilanciata in Occidente proprio nei decenni in cui (1960-1995) si attenuava la spinta verso il socialismo e schizzava verso l'alto la rivendicazione individualistica, e molti eventi sociali venivano fatti ruotare intorno al singolo. Si sono così sommati due fattori fra loro lontani ma anche – paradossalmente – difficilmente districabili: da un lato il richiamo ai gruppi intermedi per costruire un modello di socialità diverso da quello dello Stato centralistico, dall'altro l'ascesa del singolo e del *selfinterest*. In questi anni accadeva la "rivoluzione delle donne", passate dalla cultura della casa, della cura, dell'oblatività, ad una cultura di autorealizzazione sociale e pubblica.

2) *Nesso fra società, gruppi intermedi e Stato*. La CA insieme ad altre encicliche precedenti e susseguenti illustra il carattere non-assoluto ed anzi "strumentale" e di servizio dello Stato nei suoi rapporti con la società civile e politica. L'idea "strumentalista" dello Stato, nel senso che questo è l'organizzazione della vita comune rivolta a servire le persone viventi in società, è un assunto che troviamo nel pensiero di autori quali J. Maritain, K.R. Popper, R. Dahrendorf, Y.R. Simon, solo per citarne alcuni. Lo Stato è la parte *superiore* della società politica ma non assorbe quest'ultima di cui rimane parte: parte alta, superiore, ma comunque parte. La società politica è il tutto, lo Stato parte e tuttavia portatore di compiti insostituibili.

Ora la CA, riprendendo posizioni già espresse nella DSC, non solo afferma il carattere di servizio dello Stato e il suo essere "strumentale"

rispetto alla società politica, ma con pari chiarezza mette in luce il suo compito di indirizzo, integrazione, stimolo, correzione ed il suo dovere di difendere i beni collettivi:

È compito dello Stato provvedere alla difesa e alla tutela di quei beni collettivi, come l'ambiente naturale e l'ambiente umano, la cui salvaguardia non può essere assicurata dai semplici meccanismi di mercato (n. 40).

Questi aspetti risultano taciuti in un certo spettro di letture della CA. In tal caso lo Stato è *inteso riduttivamente come una società o un attore come molti altri*. Andrebbe piuttosto valorizzata l'idea che lo Stato ha dei compiti, che ha un suo obiettivo, un suo bene comune da assicurare, che potremmo chiamare il *bene pubblico*. Non andrebbe perciò sostenuta l'idea che lo Stato in quanto organizzazione alta della società politica non ha un compito meramente sussidiario, come se fosse equiparato ad una delle tante associazioni che operano nella società. Tutto ciò sia detto senza negare l'idea che la *res publica* non si identifica nello Stato, e nuovamente ripetendo che l'area del pubblico è maggiore di quella dello statale.

Naturalmente il tenere fermo un ambito di responsabilità per lo Stato non significa puntare sulla sovranità dello Stato, la "cattiva sovranità" di cui è fin troppo carica la storia moderna, e che nell'ambito internazionale produce lo scontro a morte fra le soggettività statali e la guerra di tutti contro tutti. Non posso perciò che aderire all'invito di P. Neuhaus di tenere gli occhi aperti sul *jealous god of state sovereignty*, un falso dio da sottoporre costantemente a critica nei suoi vari aspetti che includono la falsa sovranità dello Stato verso l'interno, cioè verso la società civile e le formazioni sociali intermedie, e la falsa sovranità dello Stato verso l'esterno ossia verso l'ordine internazionale e il rapporto con gli altri Stati. La grande questione che rimane aperta e che va oltre l'ambito cui si riferisce il testo di P. Neuhaus, consiste nel domandare se la soggettività sociale non debba esprimersi anche verso l'alto e l'esterno, ossia volgendosi verso il rapporto internazionale. Non è infrequente che coloro che a giusto titolo trovano contestabile la sovranità o la assoluta preminenza dello Stato verso l'interno, non la giudichino parimenti pericolosa nel rapporto verso l'ambito internazionale. In questo elemento consiste una delle massime contraddizioni della prassi politica mondiale attuale, perché sovranità dello Stato significa nel suo nocciolo la rivendicazione dello *jus ad bellum*, del terribile diritto di dichiarare guerra. Non potremo fare passi avanti lungo la strada della convivenza mondiale se non avremo il coraggio di negare agli Stati esattamente lo *jus ad bellum*, ponendo la sicurezza internazionale nelle mani di poteri pubblici sovranazionali.

3) Rimane comunque aperto un complesso problema: accolta l'idea che lo Stato non debba essere "socialista" né debba prevaricare sui gruppi sociali, come si deve regolare la società civile con la multiforme ricchezza dei suoi gruppi affinché l'esito sia quello che Neuhaus dipinge, ossia una società libera e "giusta"? A mio avviso per maneggiare la delicata questione della giustizia sociale il riferimento alla CA non appare sufficiente in quanto questa enciclica si occupa soprattutto di un sistema di lavoro, impresa, partecipazione e democrazia, ma non tratta espressamente il tema della "giustizia sociale". Come pervenire ad una società non solo libera ma giusta e, aggiungerei, liberata dall'alienazione? Intendo qui per alienazione il significato preciso e profondo che CA assegna a questo termine, ossia l'inversione fra mezzi e fini illustrata al n. 41:

È necessario ricondurre il concetto di alienazione alla visione cristiana, ravvisando in esso l'inversione fra mezzi e fini: quando non si riconosce il valore e la grandezza della persona in se stesso e nell'altro, l'uomo di fatto si priva della possibilità di fruire della propria umanità e di entrare in quella relazione di solidarietà e di comunione con gli altri uomini per cui Dio lo ha creato ... È alienato l'uomo che rifiuta di trascendere se stesso e di vivere l'esperienza del dono di sé ... È alienata la società che, nelle sue forme di organizzazione sociale, di produzione e di consumo, rende più difficile la realizzazione di questo dono ed il costituirsi di questa solidarietà interumana.

Dare il potere alla gente è un passo nella direzione giusta ma non garantisce che potremo arrivare a forme adeguate di giustizia sociale, che pur rimane un termine di paragone del discorso della DSC col duplice richiamo al principio di sussidiarietà e a quello di solidarietà (ad es. CA, n. 15). I gruppi intermedi possono garantire autonomia, iniziativa e altre qualità desiderabili, difficilmente possono raggiungere in modo automatico un *output* giusto, a meno di assumere che è di per sé giusto quell'*output* che emerge dal libero confronto di interessi e attività nel mercato.

4) *I rischi della "soggettività morale"*. Oltre alla soggettività positiva della società esiste un'ambigua soggettività morale che può sfociare nel relativismo etico. La crisi di solidarietà fra generazioni non pare riportabile solo a fattori di tipo economico ma anche a fattori culturali: la solidarietà diventa ardua quando l'individualismo alza la testa. Procedendo a fare perno esclusivo sulla scelta del singolo, esso rende problematica la cooperazione fra generazioni e mina la possibilità di azione efficace dei gruppi intermedi. Influisce in questo esito una concezione contrattuale della società, che

difficilmente conduce alla solidarietà intergenerazionale. P. Neuhaus osserva opportunamente che il peso dell'individualismo radicale è sottovalutato. In effetti sembra che la maggior sfida cui sono soggetti gruppi intermedi, fra cui in primo luogo la famiglia, provenga da qui. Ad essa con molta difficoltà si riconosce di valere come l'istituzione più necessaria e più capace di generare solidarietà fra le generazioni. Forse non è più il tempo di evocare il socialismo verso cui taluni guardano ancora come ad un grande pericolo di spersonalizzazione e di assistenzialismo, poiché l'epoca dello statalismo ottuso appare in buona misura alle nostre spalle. Occorre invece di volgere lo sguardo e l'analisi all'individualismo, in auge da molti decenni e che non manifesta segni di regresso.

All'individualismo sono legate la razionalità strumentale e la morale del benessere che sono entrate in profondità nella determinazione della vita buona, segnando la comprensione di se stessi e della vita. È cresciuta la competizione sociale e diminuita la base di verità comuni. Ciò che lega insieme una società non è in primo luogo la competizione, ma la solidarietà, nonostante i bene intenzionati ci ricordino che competizione, provenendo da *cum-petere*, segnala un processo di ricerca comune. Con la sola competizione i cittadini rischiano di rimanere estranei e di non condividere alcuno schema di valori.

Prolungando le riflessioni di Neuhaus, direi che l'individualismo interpreta lo Stato come un'organizzazione artificiale e contrattuale senza vero scopo e bene comune, e dove *la produzione della legge civile va incontro ad una metamorfosi*: si tratta di un punto su cui è opportuno sostare. Nelle società occidentali altamente pluralistiche dal punto di vista morale, in cui vige non un *universo* ma un *pluriverso* etico, il compito della legge civile consisterebbe secondo la posizione individualistica radicale nel *concedere reciproche autorizzazioni*. Come si può procedere ad una deliberazione morale nella società e nei gruppi intermedi, se ciascun componente vede se stesso solo come un centro di riferimento che entra in contatto con gli altri attraverso l'assunto del pluralismo etico e del metodo delle reciproche autorizzazioni?

L'esistenza di un pluriverso morale produce due componenti residue: la *morale procedurale* e il *diritto positivo*. Il ricorso alla ragione procedurale costituisce un tentativo per sormontare il crescente grado di astrazione e di estraneità reciproca nel rapporto fra i cittadini, che appaiono l'un l'altro come stranieri morali, appartenenti a "tribù morali" eterogenee, che si comprendono con difficoltà e che riescono a con-vivere solo concedendosi reciprocamente autorizzazioni a fare o non fare. Esse configurano un inedito

federalismo etico, l'esistenza cioè di spazi o regioni morali entro le quali vigono regole morali diverse e contrapposte: in un Paese si dovrebbero realizzare tanti sistemi sanitari quante sono le principali credenze morali sulla vita, la morte, l'aborto, l'eutanasia, prevedendo almeno un sistema sanitario cattolico, uno islamico, uno agnostico, uno libertario, al cui interno si offrano o non si offrano certe pratiche. In tale soluzione la soggettività morale della società si esprimerebbe solo frammentandosi e scindendosi.

Che non si tratti di soluzione ipotetica lo afferma T. Engelhardt jr. Alla domanda su come sia possibile dirimere i disaccordi che si moltiplicano su terreno etico, egli suggerisce che l'autorità morale provenga dalle persone:

Argomenterò la centralità del principio di autonomia come consenso e in tal modo perverrò a una morale laica che ha il proprio cardine nella centralità delle persone come fonte della morale stessa...  
L'idea è semplice: se non tutti odono la divinità e se non c'è una visione della razionalità morale accettata da tutti, allora l'autorità morale può discendere soltanto dalle persone.<sup>3</sup>

Messi da parte la trascendenza e gli argomenti razionali, il consenso diventa l'unica fonte della morale secolare.

Una considerazione analoga si può sviluppare sulle *biotecnologie* e sul modo in cui esse influiscono sulla trasmissione di un senso. Col riferirci ad esse operiamo un prelievo tematico nel senso che nei tre termini che appaiono nel titolo della presente *Plenary Session* ci concentriamo sulla famiglia quale legame fra generazioni e luogo della trasmissione della vita.

Il passaggio di generazione in generazione ha sempre incluso, oltre al momento della trasmissione della vita fisica, quello della trasmissione di un senso, ossia ciò che appropriatamente si chiama una tradizione ricevuta e fatta avanzare. Essa segna la continuità vitale di una civiltà, il fondo comune condiviso nell'esistenza di singoli e di popoli. La tradizione tanto come contenuto quanto come processo incorpora radici e memorie comuni, ed è più incisiva se raggiunge punti molto sensibili che strutturano l'identità, il modo con cui ci pensiamo e il luogo verso cui vogliamo dirigerci. In ogni tradizione risulta in un modo o nell'altro inclusa la domanda sull'uomo: uomo chi sei? Al cuore delle tradizioni sta la questione antropologica, la capacità di veicolare un'intuizione sull'*humanum*, che risulta oggi appannata. Conseguentemente diventa arduo tenere ferme esperienze centrali dell'essere uomini e trasmetterle.

<sup>3</sup> "L'autonomia come principio cardine della bioetica contemporanea", in AA.VV., *Bioetiche in dialogo*, a cura di P. Cattorini, E. D'Orazio, V. Pocar, Zadig, Milano 1999, p. 111s.

Consideriamo gli atti centrali dell'esistenza, quelli cui nessuno può sottrarsi e che ci costruiscono in un modo o nell'altro: procreare, nascere, vivere, amare, lavorare, invecchiare, morire. Atti che, rappresentando il tessuto universale della condizione umana, si candidano a valere come particolarmente idonei a stabilire un nesso fra generazioni. Ora su questi nuclei cominciano ad influire, almeno in Occidente, le biotecnologie che intervengono con crescente intensità proprio sul procreare, nascere, vivere e morire. Il loro effetto non è solo tecnico, ma morale e soprattutto antropologico. Esse cambiano in maniera pervasiva la percezione e il significato degli eventi più basilari dell'esistenza, quelli da cui abbiamo tratto per migliaia di generazioni un ancoraggio complessivamente stabile.

Per rendercene conto possiamo prendere in considerazione la differenza fra *procreazione naturale* e *fecondazione tecnica extracorporea* spesso chiamata impropriamente "fecondazione assistita" (Fivet). Lo scopo è lo stesso: arrivare ad ottenere un "figlio in braccio", ma i cammini e i significati sono diversissimi, nonostante l'apparente somiglianza. Nel caso della procreazione umana possiamo dire, parafrasando un versetto del *Credo*: *procreatus (genitus), non factus*, procreato, non prodotto. Nel secondo vale l'espressione contraria: *factus* (tecnicamente), *non procreatus*. Nonostante l'inapparenza dell'evento (che differenza fa se un minuscolo embrione umano è prodotto in provetta invece che nel corpo materno? Ci sono altri accadimenti che colpiscono assai di più), un approccio meditante riconosce che si sta sviluppando una rivoluzione, la quale rischia di stravolgere coordinate essenziali del modo di comprenderci come esseri nati da un incontro di sentimenti e di corporeità.

Una quota della cultura occidentale, spesso non sensibile al problema delle radici e del senso, e che invece punta sulla libertà individuale di scelta, fatica a percepire questi aspetti. In essi si presta attenzione al criterio dell'utilità e allo scopo, marginalizzando i fattori culturali e spirituali propriamente umani, che però presto o tardi riemergono nella vita di ognuno dopo essere stati registrati nell'inconscio come qualcosa che va elaborato e che comunque inquieta, disturba. Il tentativo di impiegare le tecnologie della vita per affermare la liceità di ogni scopo e di ogni intervento sull'uomo nell'area della generazione rischia di semplificare e di alterare il sentimento dell'umano che è depresso in noi, sostituendolo con una comprensione ridotta di noi stessi.



*Commiato*

Occorre proseguire la valorizzazione delle società intermedie e della soggettività sociale, non confondendola con quella morale, e non dimenticando che il bisogno antropologico fondamentale non è forse quello di libertà ma di senso, di identità, di riconoscimento. Ritrovare in noi e negli altri un significato, pervenire alla cognizione di chi siamo, sapersi accettati dall'altro: singoli e popoli si domandano chi essi siano, e cercano di rispondere facendo riferimento a beni e valori che per essi rivestono maggiore rilievo. Questi elementi producono soddisfazione e vita pacificata più che un'assolutizzata e astratta rivendicazione di libertà di scelta. Sembra perciò necessario aprire una discussione con la cultura occidentale prevalente su quello che forse è il suo nucleo più intimo: la concezione della libertà, la quale sembra incompleta e perfino erronea su punti essenziali. Abbiamo bisogno di pensare le società intermedie non solo come nuclei di iniziativa ma anche come nuclei di cooperazione, scambio umano, comunicazione non distorta.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Su questi aspetti cf. V. Possenti, *Le società liberali al bivio. Lineamenti di filosofia della società*, Marietti, Genova 1992, 2a ed.

FIFTH SESSION

CONCLUSIONS – GENERAL DISCUSSION

## CONCLUSIONS ON: 'INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY, WELFARE AND HUMAN ECOLOGY'\*

### *A Threefold Crisis*

The conference papers made clear that the immense and rapid demographic and economic transitions of the late twentieth century have generated a welfare crisis and a crisis in family life both in developed and developing societies. Underlying these crises, and impeding effective remedies, is a crisis in human ecology, a deterioration of the social environment evidenced by a widespread breakdown of social norms. Many elements of these developments are historically unprecedented and thus pose new and difficult challenges for social science, social policy, and Catholic social thought.

### *The Welfare Crisis*

The combination of falling birth rates and increased longevity is putting pressure on all social systems to which human beings look for support and security in times of need: the family, the structures of civil society, employment and related benefits, and public assistance. Although it is urgently necessary to address the problems linked to a shift in the ratio of active workers to the dependent population, few societies have taken even a few small steps.

### *The Family Life Crisis*

Developments that indicate a widespread crisis in family life include, in affluent societies, dramatic increases in divorce and births outside marriage, dramatic decreases in birth rates and marriage rates, and a rising tendency to treat marriage as primarily for the benefit of the individual adults involved. In many developing countries, family life is undermined by crush-

\* These Conclusions were drawn up by the President, Professor Mary Ann Glendon, and approved by the participants at the end of the X Plenary Session.

ing poverty and disrupted by migration. In many African countries, the AIDS pandemic has devastated family life by claiming the lives of a large proportion of parents and productive workers.

### *The Crisis in Social Environments*

The weakening of child-raising families and their surrounding networks, together with a breakdown in social norms, amount to a social 'ecological crisis'. This deterioration in social environments has far-reaching implications for welfare – for it is hard to see how healthy economies, or socially conscious states can be sustained without the habits of cooperation, individual responsibility, and concern for others that are primarily nurtured in families and their surrounding networks. As with threats to the natural environment, many of the developments that endanger social environments are the by-products of genuine advances. Thus a central problem becomes: how can social, economic and political progress be advanced without eroding the cultural foundations upon which social, economic and political goods ultimately depend?

Efforts to address these three crises have been impeded by widespread acceptance among policy makers and social scientists of certain flawed assumptions about human beings and society. Discussions of welfare commonly suppose a view of society as composed of self-seeking individuals competing for scarce resources, rather than as a fabric of relationships, to a certain extent ambivalent and conflictual, in need of solidarity. Such views of personhood and society lead to approaching the welfare crisis in terms of conflict – conflict between old and young, rich and poor, men and women, child-raising and childless families.

### *Recommendations*

In general, policy makers and social scientists should adopt a more 'ecological' approach to the crises of welfare, family life and social norms. That is, an approach aimed toward finding approaches that promote synergy among the four main pillars of support and security (and their respective criteria of social justice): the state (distributive justice); the market (equal opportunities); the family (sharing); and the mediating structures of civil society (mutual aid and extended reciprocity). The principle of subsidiarity is best understood as aimed at liberating the intelligence and creativity of individuals and social groups for the promotion of the common good.

### *Strengthening Family Life*

The basic flaw in current state-based, market-based, and mixed approaches is that they neglect the family – either by treating society as a collection of individuals in competition with one another for scarce resources, or by treating the family as a public instrument to remedy failures of state and market. In so doing, they undercut the very solidarity that would be needed to remedy those failures.

– Policy makers must pay more conscious attention to families, recognizing the key role that families and their surrounding networks play in dealing with dependency. A nation without a conscious family policy has a family policy made by chance, by the operation of policies and programs in other areas that have an impact on families.

– Intergenerational solidarity is not just a matter of the relationship between those who are now young and at work and those who are older and retired, but also of the relationship between those who have had and reared children and those who have not. *The standard of living of married couples with children should not be worse than that of couples without children.* Men and women who raise children in stable marriage-based families are not just doing something for themselves and their children, but for society and the future. Their contribution to the formation of human capital is irreplaceable.

– Caregiving, paid or unpaid, needs to be recognized as socially valuable work.

– Policy makers must make it more feasible for those who are most motivated and best qualified to care for the sick, the elderly and the very young to do so.

– Means must be found to restore a sense of social opprobrium for those who neglect family responsibilities, and to counter the culture of immediate gratification fostered by the entertainment industry.

– When social institutions become involved with families, they should endeavor whenever possible to assist families in carrying out their proper functions, rather than trying to substitute for those functions.

### *Strengthening the Mediating Structures of Civil Society*

– Accord more attention to the ‘mediating structures of civil society’, perhaps by undertaking studies of different types of mediating structures with a view toward finding examples of the most effective, and discovering what sustains or weakens them.

– Study the impact on child-raising families and mediating structures of programs and policies in other areas (labor, tax, social assistance) – by analogy to environmental impact studies in the natural sciences.

– Initiate pilot programs to find out what works and what does not, with a view toward building on successful experiments. Experiments using the mediating structures of civil society to perform some of the tasks that governments have assumed over the years might not only result in more efficient and humane delivery of some social services, but could strengthen the mediating structures themselves.

### *Addressing the Crisis of the Welfare State*

– The conflict model that assumes that the gains of one generation can only be realized at the expense of others and the view that regards caring for others as only involving costs and burdens must be replaced by structures that promote cooperative solutions. It would be a disaster if the necessary adjustments drastically undermined social solidarity or led to the wholesale dismantling of the welfare state.

– The welfare state must be redesigned in such a way that it becomes durably functional again: a socially oriented state committed to the subsidiarity principle as well as to the solidarity principle.

### *Questions and Dilemmas for Further Consideration*

Notwithstanding broad consensus on the urgency of protecting the social environments upon which all human beings fundamentally depend, it is extremely difficult to establish consensus on practical measures to be undertaken. Various well-intentioned laws and programs often have perverse unintended effects on family life, or interact with it in such complex ways that very little opportunity is afforded for purposeful planning. All too often, laws, programs and policies meant to strengthen families produce the opposite effects from those intended.

Therefore difficult questions remain:

Given that social policy for the past century has emphasized individual rights over the subjectivity of the family, could the family become an agent of its own development? Can the family be treated as a legal entity? And how can the family's surrounding and supporting institutions be reinvigorated, without stifling the legitimate freedom that is necessary for development?

Are changes in the meanings people attribute to family life leading toward a decline in the family as an ultimate concern or to the 're-norming' of society and to new forms of inter-generational solidarity?

Can one elaborate institutional modes of representation of 'children' or 'future generations', or formulate normative guidelines for the exercise of stewardship of parents for children and present generations for future ones?

How can society take account of children's needs (and the preferences of most mothers) without perpetuating women's subordination?

How can societies develop an adequate response to the immediate distress of many families while attempting to shift probabilities so that fewer families will find themselves in such distress in the future?

How can society respond to persons in need without perpetuating unhealthy forms of dependency?

How completely can a society respect individual freedom without undermining the stable familial and communal structures upon which it relies for the socialization of its future work force and citizenry?

How can solidarity with future generations be balanced with our responsibility to those among us who are most in need right now? ('The poor cannot wait').

### *Questions for Catholic Social Thought*

*Young people.* Catholic social thought has been rather silent on the situation of young adults. A deeper analysis seems to be required of the new circumstances they face, both in society and within the family. The Church should address them more directly and fully in her teaching.

Should the Academy think of working with a view toward offering the Holy See elements, or an encyclical on inter-generational relations? If so, the work at this session would need to be supplemented by philosophical, theological, political and legal elaborations, and by deeper reflection on the person, society, and solidarity.

## CONCLUSIONI SU “SOLIDARIETÀ INTERGENERAZIONALE, WELFARE ED ECOLOGIA UMANA”\*

### *Una triplice crisi*

Le vaste e rapide trasformazioni demografiche ed economiche che hanno avuto luogo nell'ultima parte del ventesimo secolo hanno prodotto una crisi nel welfare ed una crisi nella vita familiare sia nelle società sviluppate che in quelle in via di sviluppo. Alla base di questi problemi, e tale da impedire l'individuazione di rimedi efficaci, vi è una crisi nell'ecologia umana, un deterioramento dell'ambiente sociale che è evidenziato dal diffuso collasso delle norme sociali. Molti di questi fattori non hanno precedenti nella storia e pongono quindi nuove e difficili sfide per le scienze sociali, la politica sociale, e per il pensiero sociale cattolico.

### *La crisi del welfare*

L'associazione tra il crollo dei tassi di natalità e l'aumentata longevità sta mettendo pressione su tutti i sistemi sociali a cui, in tempo di bisogno, gli esseri umani guardano in cerca di sostegno e sicurezza: la famiglia, le strutture della società civile, il lavoro con i suoi connessi benefici, e l'assistenza pubblica. Sebbene sia urgente e necessario affrontare i problemi legati al profondo mutamento nella proporzione tra lavoratori attivi e popolazione a carico, solo alcune società hanno preso a tale riguardo qualche piccolo provvedimento.

### *La crisi della vita familiare*

Nelle società ricche gli elementi che segnalano una diffusa crisi nella vita familiare comprendono: il drammatico aumento dei divorzi e delle nascite

\* Questo Messaggio è stato redatto dalla Presidente, Professoressa Mary Ann Glendon, e approvato dai partecipanti alla fine della X Sessione Plenaria.



fuori dal matrimonio, la spaventosa diminuzione nei tassi di natalità e nel numero dei matrimoni, ed una crescente tendenza a trattare il matrimonio in primo luogo come un istituto a favore degli adulti in esso coinvolti. In molti paesi in via di sviluppo, invece, la vita familiare è minata da una schiacciante povertà ed è distrutta dalla emigrazione. In molti paesi africani, l'AIDS pandemico ha devastato la vita familiare appropriandosi della vita di genitori e di lavoratori produttivi.

### *La crisi degli ambienti sociali*

L'indebolimento delle famiglie che allevano i propri figli e di tutta la rete di rapporti che le circonda, insieme al collasso delle norme sociali, indicano una vasta "crisi ecologica" e sociale. Questo deterioramento degli ambienti sociali ha implicazioni di vasta portata per il welfare – perché è difficile concepire come economie sane, o stati socialmente consapevoli possano sostenersi se non hanno l'abitudine alla cooperazione, alla responsabilità individuale, e all'interesse per gli altri, in primo luogo per coloro che vengono allevati nelle famiglie e nella loro circostante rete di relazioni. Come per le minacce all'ambiente naturale, molti dei fattori che mettono in pericolo gli ambienti sociali sono effetti secondari di quelli che in origine erano degli autentici passi in avanti. Per questo il problema centrale è: come può il progresso sociale, economico e politico essere portato avanti senza corrodere le fondamenta culturali su cui il bene sociale, economico e politico in definitiva si basa?

I tentativi che sono stati compiuti per affrontare queste tre crisi sono stati ostacolati dalla diffusa accettazione fra i responsabili della politica e gli studiosi di scienze sociali di certi presupposti sbagliati circa gli esseri umani e la società. Le discussioni sul welfare solitamente presuppongono una concezione della società composta da individui egoisti che competono per accaparrarsi scarse risorse, piuttosto che come un tessuto di rapporti, fino a un certo punto ambivalente e conflittuale, che necessita di solidarietà. Tali concezioni della persona e della società portano ad affrontare la crisi del welfare in termini di conflitto – conflitto tra giovani e anziani, ricchi e poveri, donne e uomini, famiglie senza figli e famiglie con figli.

### *Raccomandazioni*

In generale, i responsabili della politica e gli studiosi delle scienze sociali dovrebbero adottare un approccio più "ecologico" alla crisi del welfare, della vita familiare e delle norme sociali. Ovvero, un approccio mira-

to all'individuazione di metodologie che promuovano la sinergia fra le quattro principali colonne che fungono da sostegno e sicurezza (ed i loro rispettivi criteri di giustizia sociale): lo stato (la giustizia distributiva), il mercato (le pari opportunità), la famiglia (la condivisione), e le strutture di intermediazione della società civile (l'aiuto reciproco e la reciprocità estesa). Il principio di sussidiarietà viene meglio compreso quando viene presentato come qualcosa che mira a liberare l'intelligenza e la creatività degli individui e dei gruppi sociali per lo sviluppo del bene comune.

### *Rafforzare la vita familiare*

Il difetto fondamentale negli attuali approcci basati sullo stato, sul mercato, e su una mescolanza di questi due approcci, è che essi trascurano la famiglia – sia nel trattare la società come fosse un insieme di individui in competizione tra loro per accaparrarsi scarse risorse, che nel considerare la famiglia come uno strumento pubblico grazie al quale porre rimedio ai fallimenti dello stato e del mercato. Così facendo, essi indeboliscono quella stessa solidarietà che invece sarebbe necessaria per porre rimedio a quei fallimenti.

I responsabili della politica devono prestare una più consapevole attenzione alle famiglie, riconoscendo il ruolo chiave che le famiglie e la loro circostante rete di relazioni hanno nel fronteggiare i problemi delle persone economicamente dipendenti. Una nazione priva di una consapevole politica sulla famiglia lascia che la politica sulla famiglia sia affidata al caso, alle conseguenze di politiche e di programmi rivolti ad altre aree che tuttavia hanno un forte impatto sulle famiglie.

La solidarietà intergenerazionale non è solo una questione di rapporto tra coloro che ora sono giovani ed hanno un lavoro e coloro che sono più anziani ed in pensione, ma anche del rapporto tra coloro che hanno e crescono i loro figli e coloro che non ne hanno. Il tenore di vita delle coppie sposate con figli non dovrebbe essere inferiore a quello delle coppie senza figli. Gli uomini e le donne che crescono i loro figli in famiglie fondate su matrimoni stabili non fanno solo qualcosa per se stessi e per i loro bambini, ma per la società nel suo complesso e per il futuro di tutti. Il loro contributo alla formazione del capitale umano è insostituibile.

È necessario che il servizio di assistenza, pagato o non pagato, sia riconosciuto come lavoro socialmente molto utile. I responsabili della politica devono renderlo più facilmente realizzabile per coloro che sono

maggiormente motivati e meglio qualificati nel prendersi cura dei malati, degli anziani e dei giovanissimi.

Devono essere trovati i mezzi per ristabilire un senso di scandalo sociale nei confronti di coloro che trascurano le responsabilità familiari, e per contrastare la cultura della gratificazione immediata che viene promossa dall'industria del divertimento.

Quando le istituzioni sociali si occupano delle famiglie, dovrebbero sforzarsi, ogniqualvolta sia possibile, di assisterle nell'eseguire le loro funzioni, piuttosto che cercare di sostituirsi a loro in quelle stesse funzioni.

#### *Rafforzare le strutture di mediazione della società civile*

Prestare maggiore attenzione alle "strutture di mediazione della società civile", magari intraprendendo studi sui diversi tipi di strutture di mediazione al fine di trovare gli esempi più efficaci, e di scoprire ciò che le rafforza o ciò che le indebolisce.

Studiare l'impatto che hanno sulle famiglie con figli e sulle strutture di mediazione i programmi e le politiche attuate in altre aree (lavoro, tasse, assistenza sociale) – analogamente a quanto avviene nelle scienze naturali per gli studi sull'impatto ambientale.

Avviare programmi pilota per comprendere ciò che funziona e ciò che non funziona, al fine di basarsi su esperimenti che siano risultati efficaci. Gli esperimenti che utilizzano le strutture di mediazione della società civile per eseguire alcuni dei compiti che i governi si sono assunti nel corso degli anni potrebbero produrre non solo una più efficiente ed umana fornitura di alcuni servizi sociali, ma potrebbero rafforzare le stesse strutture di mediazione.

#### *Affrontare la crisi del welfare*

Il modello conflittuale che presuppone che i guadagni di una generazione possano essere realizzati soltanto a spese delle altre generazioni, nonché l'opinione che prendersi cura degli altri implichi soltanto costi ed aggravii, devono essere sostituiti da strutture che promuovono soluzioni di cooperazione. Sarebbe un disastro se gli aggiustamenti che sono necessari minassero profondamente la solidarietà sociale o conducessero allo smantellamento complessivo dello stato sociale.

Lo stato sociale deve essere riprogettato in maniera tale che ritorni ad essere a lungo funzionale: uno stato socialmente orientato, impegnato a far rispettare il principio di sussidiarietà e di solidarietà.

*Domande e dilemmi per ulteriori considerazioni*

Nonostante il largo consenso circa l'urgenza di proteggere gli ambienti sociali da cui tutti gli esseri umani fondamentalmente dipendono, è estremamente difficile ottenere il consenso sulle misure concrete da intraprendere. Numerose leggi e svariati programmi che nascono con le migliori intenzioni spesso hanno effetti perversi e non previsti sulla vita familiare, o interagiscono con essa in maniera così complessa che è scarsissima la possibilità di elaborare una precisa programmazione. Troppo spesso le leggi, i programmi e le politiche che intendono rafforzare le famiglie producono effetti opposti a quelli desiderati.

*Rimangono dunque difficili domande cui dare risposta*

Dato che la politica sociale nel corso degli ultimi cento anni ha posto l'accento sui diritti individuali a scapito della soggettività della famiglia, può la famiglia diventare agente del suo proprio sviluppo? La famiglia può essere trattata come un'entità legale? E come possono essere rinvigorite le istituzioni che le ruotano attorno e che le sono di supporto, senza soffocare la legittima libertà che è necessaria allo sviluppo?

I cambiamenti nei significati generalmente attribuiti alla vita familiare stanno portando al declino della famiglia quale interesse primario ovvero alla "ri-regolamentazione" della società, nonché a nuove norme di solidarietà intergenerazionali?

Si possono elaborare modalità istituzionali di rappresentanza per i "figli" o per le "generazioni future", o formulare linee guida normative per l'esercizio della gestione domestica da parte dei genitori nei confronti dei figli e delle attuali generazioni nei confronti di quelle future?

Come può la società tener conto dei bisogni dei figli (e delle priorità della maggior parte delle madri) senza perpetuare la subordinazione delle donne?

Come possono le società fornire una risposta adeguata alle necessità immediate di molte famiglie, tentando allo stesso tempo di invertire rotta in modo tale che in futuro meno famiglie si trovino nelle stesse difficoltà?

Come può la società fornire risposte alle persone bisognose senza perpetuare malsane forme di dipendenza economica?

Fino a che punto la società può rispettare la libertà individuale senza indebolire la stabilità delle strutture familiari e comunitarie su cui la società fa assegnamento per l'integrazione della sua futura forza lavoro e dei cittadini di domani?

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Come può la solidarietà nei confronti delle future generazioni essere bilanciata dalla nostra responsabilità verso coloro che fra noi in questo momento si trovano in una situazione di estremo bisogno? (“I poveri non possono attendere”).

*Domande per il pensiero sociale cattolico*

*I giovani.* Il pensiero sociale cattolico si è espresso molto poco sulla condizione dei giovani adulti. Un’analisi più approfondita appare necessaria a seguito delle nuove circostanze che i giovani si trovano ad affrontare, sia nella società che all’interno della famiglia. La Chiesa dovrebbe rivolgersi a loro in modo più diretto e completo nel suo insegnamento.

Dovrebbe l’Accademia pensare di lavorare per offrire alla Santa Sede gli elementi per una enciclica sulle relazioni intergenerazionali? Il lavoro in questa sessione dovrebbe essere integrato da approfondimenti filosofici, teologici, politici e legali, e da una riflessione più attenta sulla persona, la società e la solidarietà.

## DISKUSSIONSDOKUMENT: „INTERGENERATIONELLE SOLIDARITÄT, WOHLFAHRT UND HUMANÖKOLOGIE“

### *Die Krise ist eine dreifache*

Der enorme und rasch voranschreitende demographische und wirtschaftliche Wandel des späten zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts hat sowohl in den entwickelten wie auch weniger entwickelten Gesellschaften zu einer Wohlfahrtskrise und einer Krise im Familienleben geführt. Eingebettet sind diese Krisen in einer Krise der Humanökologie, die zugleich wirkungsvolle Lösungen erschwert; sie führt zu einem Verfall des sozialen Umfeldes, der sich in einer weit verbreiteten Auflösung sozialer Normen widerspiegelt. Viele Elemente dieser Entwicklungen sind geschichtlich ohne Beispiel und stellen mithin Sozialwissenschaft, Sozialpolitik und Katholische Soziallehre vor neuen und schwierigen Herausforderungen.

### *Die Wohlfahrtskrise*

Fallende Geburtenraten in Verbindung mit steigender Langlebigkeit setzen all jene gesellschaftlichen Systeme unter Druck, von denen sich die Menschen gerade in Zeiten der Not Unterstützung und Sicherheit erhoffen: die Familie, die Strukturen der Bürgergesellschaft, Arbeit und damit verbundene Leistungen, Sozialhilfe. Wenngleich die dringende Notwendigkeit besteht, sich den Problemen einer Verschiebung im Verhältnis von erwerbstätiger zu abhängiger Bevölkerung zu widmen, haben bislang wenige Gesellschaften es geschafft, auch nur kleine Schritte in diese Richtung zu vollziehen.

### *Die Krise des Familienlebens*

Zu den Entwicklungen, die auf eine umfassende Krise im Leben von Familien hinweisen, gehören in den Wohlstandsgesellschaften eine dramatische Zunahme von Scheidungen und außerehelichen Geburten, ein dramatischer Abfall der Geburten- und Heiratsraten sowie eine steigende

Tendenz, die Ehe als Einrichtung primär zugunsten der beteiligten Erwachsenen zu sehen. In vielen Entwicklungsländern wird das Familienleben durch erdrückende Armut geschwächt und durch Abwanderung zerrissen. Infolge der hohen Sterblichkeit bei Eltern und produktiven Arbeitskräften hat die Aids-Pandemie in vielen afrikanischen Ländern verheerende Auswirkungen auf das Familienleben.

### *Die Krise in sozialen Umfeldern*

Die Schwächung kindererziehender Familien und der sie umgebenden Netze, gekoppelt mit einer Auflösung sozialer Normen, führt zu einer sozialen „ökologischen Krise“. Der Verfall sozialer Umfeldern hat weitreichende Folgen für die allgemeine Wohlfahrt – denn es ist schwer einzusehen, wie gesunde Volkswirtschaften oder sozial bewusste Staaten ohne die gewohnten Formen von Kooperation, individueller Verantwortung und Fürsorge, die primär in der Familie und der sie umgebenden Netze gedeihen, aufrechterhalten werden können. Wie bei Bedrohungen der natürlichen Umwelt sind auch viele Entwicklungen, die soziale Umfeldern gefährden, Nebenprodukte echter Fortschritte. Damit entsteht ein zentrales Problem: Wie kann sozialer, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Fortschritt vorangetrieben werden, ohne die kulturellen Fundamente zu untergraben, auf die soziale, wirtschaftliche und politische Güter letztlich angewiesen sind?

Bemühungen, sich mit diesen drei Krisen auseinander zu setzen, wurden bislang dadurch erschwert, dass politische Entscheidungsträger und Sozialwissenschaftler bestimmte fehlerhafte Annahmen in Bezug auf Menschen und die Gesellschaft weitgehend akzeptiert haben. In Diskussionen zum Thema Wohlfahrt wird die Gesellschaft gemeinhin als Verbund selbstsüchtiger Individuen gesehen, die untereinander um knappe Ressourcen konkurrieren, statt als ein Geflecht von – in gewissem Maße ambivalenten und konfliktbehafteten – Beziehungen, die der Solidarität bedürfen. Solche Ansichten über das Menschsein und die Gesellschaft führen dazu, dass man sich der Wohlfahrtskrise im Sinne eines Konflikts nähert – eines Konflikts zwischen Alt und Jung, Reich und Arm, Männern und Frauen, kindererziehenden und kinderlosen Familien.

### *Empfehlungen*

Im Allgemeinen sollten Politiker und Sozialwissenschaftler einen mehr „ökologisch“ orientierten Weg zur Bewältigung der Krisen von Wohlfahrt,

Familienleben und Sozialnormen einschlagen. Einen Weg hin zur Entwicklung von Ansätzen, die Synergien zwischen den vier Hauptsäulen der Unterstützung und Sicherung (und ihrer jeweiligen Kriterien sozialer Gerechtigkeit) fördern: zwischen dem Staat (austeilende Gerechtigkeit), dem Markt (Chancengleichheit), der Familie (Teilhabe) und den vermittelnden Strukturen der Bürgergesellschaft (gegenseitige Hilfe und erweiterte Reziprozität). Das Prinzip der Subsidiarität lässt sich am besten verstehen als das Streben nach Freisetzung von Intelligenz und Kreativität einzelner Personen wie auch sozialer Verbände zur Entwicklung des Gemeinwohls.

### *Stärkung des Familienlebens*

Der grundlegende Defekt derzeitiger staatlicher, marktwirtschaftlicher und gemischter Ansätze liegt in deren Vernachlässigung der Familie – entweder durch die Behandlung der Gesellschaft als Ansammlung von Individuen, die um knappe Ressourcen untereinander konkurrieren, oder durch die Behandlung der Familie als öffentliches Instrument zum Ausgleich staatlicher und marktwirtschaftlicher Fehlentwicklungen. Damit untergraben diese Ansätze genau jene Solidarität, die erforderlich wäre, um die Fehlentwicklungen zu korrigieren.

Die politischen Entscheidungsträger müssen sich bewusster an Familien wenden und dabei die Schlüsselrolle erkennen, welche Familien und die sie umgebenden Netze spielen, um mit Abhängigkeit fertig zu werden. Eine Nation ohne bewusste Familienpolitik verlässt sich auf den Zufall, auf politische Strategien und Programme in anderen Bereichen, die Familien beeinflussen.

Intergenerationelle Solidarität spiegelt sich nicht nur im Verhältnis zwischen den Jungen, die jetzt arbeiten, und den Älteren, die sich in Rente befinden, sondern auch im Verhältnis zwischen denen, die Kinder bekommen und großgezogen haben, und denen, die es nicht taten. Der Lebensstandard verheirateter Paare mit Kindern sollte nicht niedriger sein als jener kinderloser Paare. Männer und Frauen, die in einer stabilen, auf einer Ehe gegründeten Familie Kinder großziehen, leisten nicht nur etwas für sich und ihre Kinder, sondern für die Gesellschaft und die Zukunft. Ihr Beitrag zur Schaffung von Humankapital ist unersetzlich.

Pflegedienste, ob bezahlt oder unbezahlt, müssen als gesellschaftlich wertvolle Arbeit anerkannt werden.

Die politischen Entscheidungsträger müssen es denjenigen leichter machen, die für die Versorgung von kranken, älteren und sehr jungen



Menschen am ehesten motiviert und am besten qualifiziert sind, damit sie diese Aufgaben auch wahrnehmen können.

Es muss dafür gesorgt werden, dass sich ein Gefühl gesellschaftlicher Schande bei denen wieder einstellt, die Familienpflichten vernachlässigen, und dass der von der Unterhaltungsindustrie geförderten Kultur sofortiger Bedürfnisbefriedigung entgegengetreten wird.

Soziale Einrichtungen, die sich mit Familien befassen, sollten wo immer möglich danach streben, Familien bei der Durchführung ihrer eigentlichen Aufgaben zu unterstützen, anstatt zu versuchen, diese Aufgaben zu ersetzen.

### *Stärkung der Vermittlungsstrukturen der Bürgergesellschaft*

Dies könnte geschehen durch erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit für die „Vermittlungsstrukturen der Bürgergesellschaft“, möglicherweise durch Untersuchungen unterschiedlicher Strukturarten, um Beispiele für die effizientesten Strukturen zu ermitteln und dabei festzustellen, was sie aufrechterhält oder schwächt;

durch eine Untersuchung der Frage, wie sich politische Strategien und Programme anderer Bereiche (Arbeit, Steuern und Sozialhilfe) auf kinder-erziehende Familien und Vermittlungsstrukturen auswirken – analog zu Umweltverträglichkeitsstudien in den Naturwissenschaften;

durch Pilotprogramme, um herauszufinden, was funktioniert und was nicht, wenn es darum geht, an erfolgreichen Experimenten anzuknüpfen. Experimente, in denen bürgerschaftliche Vermittlungsstrukturen einen Teil jener Aufgaben erfüllen, die im Laufe der Zeit von Regierungen übernommen wurden, führen möglicherweise nicht nur zu einer effizienteren und menschenwürdigeren Verrichtung gewisser Sozialdienstleistungen, sondern könnten die Vermittlungsstrukturen selbst kräftigen.

### *Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates ansprechen*

Das Konfliktmodell, basierend auf der Annahme, dass die Gewinne einer Generation nur auf Kosten anderer realisiert werden können, und die Ansicht, dass die Sorge um Mitmenschen nur aus Kosten und Belastungen besteht, müssen durch Strukturen zur Förderung kooperativer Lösungen ersetzt werden. Es wäre ein Verhängnis, wenn die erforderlichen Anpassungen zu einer drastischen Schwächung gesellschaftlicher Solidarität oder zum umfassenden Abbau des Wohlfahrtsstaates führten.

Der Wohlfahrtsstaat muss so umgestaltet werden, dass er auf Dauer wieder funktioniert: ein sozial orientierter, dem Subsidiaritäts- wie auch dem Solidaritätsprinzip verpflichteter Staat.

*Fragen und Ragen und Problemstellungen zur Weiteren Erwägung*

Trotz breiter Übereinstimmung hinsichtlich der Dringlichkeit des Schutzes sozialer Umfelder, auf die alle Menschen grundsätzlich angewiesen sind, fällt es außerordentlich schwer, einen Konsens über die zu ergreifenden praktischen Maßnahmen zu erzielen. Diverse gut gemeinte Gesetze und Programme haben oft abwegige unbeabsichtigte Auswirkungen auf das Familienleben oder interagieren damit auf derart komplexe Weise, dass nur mehr sehr geringe Möglichkeiten für zielgerichtete Planung bestehen. Allzu oft bewirken Gesetze, Programme und politische Strategien zur Stärkung von Familien das Gegenteil von dem, was sie beabsichtigen.

Mithin bleiben schwierige Fragen offen:

Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Sozialpolitik im vergangenen Jahrhundert individuelle Rechte stärker betont hat als die Subjektivität der Familie, könnte die Familie nun zu einer Kraft ihrer eigenen Entwicklung werden? Kann die Familie als Rechtssubjekt behandelt werden? Und wie können die sich im Umfeld der Familie befindlichen und die sie unterstützenden Institutionen neu belebt werden, ohne die für den Fortschritt notwendige legitime Freiheit zu ersticken?

Führt der Wandel in den Bedeutungen, die Menschen dem Familienleben beimessen, zum Niedergang der Familie als eine vorrangige Einrichtung oder zu einer „Umnormierung“ der Gesellschaft und somit zu neuen Formen intergenerationeller Solidarität?

Kann man institutionelle Formen der Vertretung von „Kindern“ oder „künftigen Generationen“ ausbauen oder normative Richtlinien für die Ausübung der Verantwortung von Eltern für Kinder und von gegenwärtigen Generationen für zukünftige Generationen formulieren?

Wie kann die Gesellschaft den Bedürfnissen von Kindern (wie auch den Präferenzen der meisten Mütter) Rechnung tragen, ohne die Unterordnung der Frau fortzuführen?

Wie können Gesellschaften eine angemessene Antwort auf die unmittelbare Not vieler Familien entwickeln und zugleich versuchen, die Wahrscheinlichkeiten so zu verlagern, dass in Zukunft weniger Familien in derartige Notsituationen geraten?

Wie kann eine Gesellschaft auf Menschen in Not reagieren, ohne schädliche Formen der Abhängigkeit beizubehalten?

Wie umfassend kann eine Gesellschaft die Freiheit des Einzelnen respektieren, ohne die stabilen familiären und kommunalen Strukturen zu unterminieren, die sie für die Sozialisierung ihrer zukünftigen Erwerbsbevölkerung und Bürgerschaft benötigt?

Wie lässt sich die Solidarität mit künftigen Generationen in Einklang bringen mit unserer Verantwortung gegenüber jenen Mitmenschen, die gerade jetzt am stärksten in Not sind? („Die Armen können nicht warten.“)

*Fragen an die Katholische Soziallehre*

*Junge Menschen.* Die Katholische Soziallehre hat sich hinsichtlich der Situation junger Erwachsener bislang eher still verhalten. Eine tiefer schürfende Analyse der neuen Umstände, denen sich diese Menschen sowohl in der Gesellschaft als auch innerhalb der Familie gegenübersehen, erscheint geboten. Die Kirche sollte sich in ihrer Lehre diesen Fragen direkter und umfassender widmen.

Sollte die Akademie eventuell ihre Arbeit darauf ausrichten, dem Heiligen Stuhl Elemente für die Abfassung einer Enzyklika über Generationenbeziehungen anzubieten? Die Arbeit dieser Sitzung müsste um philosophische, theologische, politische und rechtliche Ausführungen ergänzt werden, sowie um eine vertiefte Betrachtung über das Menschsein, die Gesellschaft und Solidarität.

## FINAL REPORT

MARY ANN GLENDON

*Is not Venice built upon the sea, even though it was built in such a way that a generation finally came along that did not notice this at all, and would it not be a lamentable misunderstanding if this latest generation was so in error until the pilings began to rot and the city sank?*

(Søren Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*)<sup>1</sup>

*Among democratic peoples ... the fabric of time is torn at every moment and the trace of generations is effaced. Those who have gone before are easily forgotten, and no one gives a thought to those who will follow.*

(Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, II, 2, 2)

In this first Plenary Meeting on Intergenerational Solidarity, the Academicians were like explorers slowly making our way into a new territory, clearing away obstacles, and charting the main features of the terrain. Building on our earlier, preliminary expeditions,<sup>2</sup> we chose to concentrate in this phase of our project on the implications of changes in inter-generational relations for ‘welfare’ (broadly understood as encompassing all the networks and institutions upon which the very young, the frail elderly, the sick, and the incapacitated depend for support and security). The speakers and commentators confirmed the existence of a sobering array of challenges for social science, social policy and the Church’s social teaching. There was significant agreement concerning the nature and urgency of

<sup>1</sup> Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 98.

<sup>2</sup> See papers by Dasgupta, Donati, Glendon, Llach, Malinvaud, Raga, Ramirez, Villacorta, Zampetti, and Zubrzycki in *Intergenerational Solidarity*, Acta 8, Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (Vatican City, 2002).

those challenges. The conference also generated a number of proposals for addressing those challenges, and a number of questions for further study.

In this report, I have reviewed our proceedings with a particular question in mind. In keeping with the central concerns of Catholic social thought and with the welfare theme chosen for this meeting, I focus primarily on what the changing picture of intergenerational solidarity means for human *dependency*. By human dependency, I mean not only the composition of the dependent population at any given time, but the dependency that is an inescapable fact of the human condition for all men and women at various stages of their lives, including the dependency of the human race on its natural and social environments. I have divided these reflections into five parts: the demographic earthquakes, the dependency-welfare crisis, the breakdown in social norms, the new 'woman question', and scotomas in social policy and the social sciences.

### *Demographic Earthquakes*

One point upon which all participants agreed is that the latter 20th century was a time of extraordinary upheavals in generational relations. The extent and rapidity of the changes are plain from studies that document what Professor Vallin described as

that great historical movement known as the demographic transition that has changed the face of humanity and whose latest phase, now in course, is leading us toward age structures that we know will bring about profound transformations in our societies.

Many persons alive today need no special demonstration of how far-reaching that historic transition has been, for they have personally witnessed the passage from one way of life to another. In a short story written in the 1950s, and titled, simply, 'Life' the Irish writer Liam O'Flaherty provides a telling glimpse of generational relations as they existed in many subsistence economies before the 'demographic transition'.<sup>3</sup> The story begins shortly after a baby boy has been born to a farming family in rural Ireland. Three generations of the family live together in the same house: the farming couple, the wife's elderly senile father, and six of the couple's ten living children (four other children having died in infancy). The youngest and the

<sup>3</sup> Liam O'Flaherty, 'Life', reprinted in *Being Human: A Bioethics Reader* (President's Council on Bioethics: Washington, D.C., 2004).

oldest members of the household have similar needs – they both have to be fed and cleaned and kept from hurting themselves. The busy women of the family attend to those needs – readily in the case of the infant, rather impatiently in the case of the old man. Between the little boy and his grandfather there is a special bond. They both take pleasure in such things as basking in the summer sunshine, or watching birds in flight. One day, while they are outdoors together, the grandfather falls lifeless to the ground. The story's final image – of the little boy hopping merrily beside the body of the old man – speaks of human continuity and renewal of 'life'.

The story evokes without sentimentality a not-far-distant world where the links in the chain among generations were taken for granted. In many ways, it was, as Professor Vallin pointed out, a harsh world where children often died in infancy and women in childbirth. The elderly, if unable to work, were entirely dependent on family members; and opportunities for men and women to reach their full human potential were severely limited.

The developed nations left that world behind over a century ago as the majority of men, and later, women began to work for wages outside the home. By the end of the 20th century, many developing countries were experiencing a transition from age-old patterns of work and family life, often on an accelerated basis. And yet, the human race remained every bit as dependent on child-raising families and on the earth itself as it had been in ages past. What was new was a spreading forgetfulness of the simple fact of human dependency ('Is not Venice built upon the sea ... even though a generation finally came along that did not notice this at all ...').

The speakers and commentators at the Academy's 2004 Plenary Session presented a sobering picture of the demographic upheavals – the aging of populations, changes in sexual and family behavior, the migrations of peoples – that have transformed and are transforming the social landscape. The participants pondered the implications of these changes, both for the most vulnerable members of the human family and for the institutions to which people turn in times of need. (There was some speculation about whether economic, political and cultural causes led to changes in generational relations or the other way around. But discussion of that question remained inconclusive, for economies, politics, cultures, and family structures are mutually conditioning systems whose effects on one another are hard to isolate. That, of course, is what makes the social sciences seem so unsatisfactory to so many people – everything seems to cause everything else to the point where few people are willing to draw any conclusions or make specific recommendations. For present purposes, it seems enough to

note that even those who disagreed about the causes of these changes were in accord on the seriousness of their consequences).

If one asks what those upheavals have meant and are likely to mean for the world's dependent population, probably the most striking fact is that, with declining birth rates and improved longevity, that population now includes a much smaller proportion of children and a much larger proportion of disabled and elderly persons than it did a century ago. This is so even in developing countries where dependent children still outnumber the dependent elderly, but where the relatively high birth rates are declining.<sup>4</sup> In 2002, the world's fertility rate was down to 2.6 children per woman, roughly half of what it was in the 1950s when the O'Flaherty story was written.<sup>5</sup>

What, one wonders, will the picture of dependency look like for our children and grandchildren if current trends described by Professor Vallin continue: if life expectancy exceeds 85, if one-child families become the norm, and if far fewer girls than boys are born than has ever been the case before in human history? It will be interesting to follow developments in China where the transition to a market economy has produced a breakdown in the post-1948 'danwei' system of state-run urban and rural collectives – which until recently provided assistance to citizens in times of need.<sup>6</sup> As its one-child families age, that populous nation will have a smaller working population to support the elderly, the majority of whom will not have pensions. (Each child potentially will be responsible for two elderly parents, each couple for four). And if the preference for male children continues, who will perform the care-taking roles traditionally performed by women? And what effect will a large cohort of unmarried men have upon social stability?

No less portentous, in terms of implications for welfare and dependency, is the revolution in sexual and family behavior that erupted between 1965 and 1985 in the affluent nations of North America, Europe, Australia, and to

<sup>4</sup> Over the past 50 years, life expectancy in western Europe has increased by about 10 years, and the share of the population above 65 in the current 15 members of the EU is expected to grow from 16% in 2000 to about 21% in 2020, while the share of the working age population will decline. Wolfgang Lutz, 'Determinants of Low Fertility and Aging Prospects for Europe', *Family Issues Between Gender and Generations* (Luxembourg: European Communities, 2000), pp. 49-69; 'The Century of Aging: A Graying Europe Wonders how to Pay its Pensioners' (Zenit News Agency, October 4, 2003).

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, 'Global Population Profile: 2002', (March 2004).

<sup>6</sup> Donald J. Adamchak, 'The Effects of Age Structure on the Labor Force and Retirement in China', 38 *Social Science Journal*, p. 1 (2001).

a lesser extent in Japan.<sup>7</sup> The shifts in demographic indicators in that period were so unexpected that they took even professional demographers by surprise: birth rates and marriage rates fell sharply, while divorce rates, births of children outside marriage, and the incidence of non-marital cohabitation climbed to high levels. The changes were widespread, profound, and sudden: widespread, because all developed nations were affected to varying degrees; profound, because the changes involved increases or decreases of more than fifty percent; and sudden, because the changes took place in less than twenty years. Perhaps not sufficiently explored in our discussions was the fact that those changes in family behavior were both driving and driven by less quantifiable but equally momentous *shifts in attitudes*, that is, in the *meanings* that men and women attribute to sex and procreation, marriage, gender, parenthood, and relations among the generations.

At about the same time in the affluent countries there were signs of disturbance in schools, neighborhoods, churches, local governments, and workplace associations – the mediating institutions that have traditionally depended on families for their support and that in turn have served as important resources for families – especially in times of stress. The law changed rapidly, too, becoming a testing ground for various ways of re-imagining family relations and an arena for struggles among competing ideas about individual liberty, equality between men and women, human sexuality, marriage, and family life. It does not seem an exaggeration to speak, as Professors Donati and Fukuyama did, of a breakdown in social norms.

By the 1990s, the major demographic indicators more or less stabilized in the developed countries, but they remained near their new high or low levels, registering only modest rises or declines since then. The tremors of the demographic earthquake subsided, but the social landscape of the developed countries was irrevocably changed. The full extent of the damage, however, was not immediately apparent because, for a time, it was widely accepted as a kind of liberal dogma that actions and decisions in the highly personal areas of sex and marriage were of no concern to anyone other than the ‘consenting adults’ involved. It took time and sad experience for the understanding to sink in: that individual actions *in the aggregate*

<sup>7</sup> Francis Fukuyama, ‘The Great Disruption’ (New York: Free Press, 1999); Louis Roussel, ‘Démographie: deux décennies de mutations dans les pays industrialisés’, *I Family, State, and Individual Economic Security*, M.T. Meulders and J. Eekelaar eds. (Brussels: Story Scientia, 1988), p. 27.



exert a profound influence on what kind of society we are bringing into being. When large numbers of people begin acting with regard primarily to self-fulfillment, the entire culture is transformed. We can now see that the cumulative effects of the changes in family behavior that took rise in the 1960s have been especially detrimental to children and thus have cast a cloud over the futures of the societies involved. As Professor Arrow put it,

The modern freedom of divorce and of unmarried parentage have increased the scope of expression for parents without necessarily recognizing the implications for the welfare of children.

The late twentieth century saw equally profound disruptions in many developing countries. As Professor Llach pointed out, the transitions in the developing world have taken many different forms. In China, for example, the processes of urbanization and industrialization similar to those that were spread out over the course of a century in Europe and North America have been experienced in a single generation. In sub-Saharan Africa, the social environments of several nations have been devastated by the AIDS epidemic which has already claimed twenty million lives worldwide, and which has taken its greatest toll among the parenting and working-age population. And in many places, as Llach emphasized, poverty, unemployment, and gross income disparities, have played crucial roles.

### *The Dependency-Welfare Crisis*

The demographic upheavals of the late twentieth century have impaired the carrying capacity of all of the social systems upon which individuals depend for support and security, producing the growing dependency-welfare crisis upon which a number of speakers focussed. Professors Raga and Tietmeyer began by tracing the early efforts of 'socially conscious' industrialized states to respond to the dislocations of urbanization and industrialization by affording a safety net against certain basic risks. The economic crises of the early 20th century prompted the establishment of more ambitious welfare programs that aimed to assure health, security and subsistence for all citizens. When these programs were first established, the population of contributing workers was relatively large in comparison to the expected size of the beneficiary population. But today, as the dependent elderly population expands and the cohort of active workers contracts, all welfare states are coming under severe strain. The average European expenditure on old-age pensions rose by 32% between 1991 and 2000 (when it stood at 12.5% of GDP), and in most of these countries, public health

spending has outpaced economic growth.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, the increase in poor, female-headed families puts pressure on public resources from the other end of the life cycle. Professor Tietmeyer stated bluntly: 'In many countries, nothing less than an erosion of the economic foundations underlying the welfare state is looming'.

The situation in the United States is less acute for the reasons Father Neuhaus mentioned: its somewhat higher birthrate and its steady influx of about a million immigrants each year. But even the United States, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan said in 2004, 'will almost surely be unable to meet the demands on resources that the retirement of the baby boom generation will make'.<sup>9</sup>

Attempts to fashion political solutions are impeded by a number of factors. Donati, Tietmeyer, and Raga pointed to evidence that overly ambitious welfare states have contributed to dependency and fostered a certain loss of individual initiative and responsibility. And both Llach and Fukuyama warned about attempts to address work-force deficits through the importation of workers from other countries. What, Llach asked, will be the effects of massive international migrations on the countries of origin? And what, wondered Fukuyama, will be the consequences in some liberal democratic destination countries, as they 'attempt to absorb large numbers of people whose beliefs and practices are not tolerant or liberal?' Even modest proposals to relieve pressures on welfare systems through limiting benefits or raising the age of retirement, have thus far proved politically divisive. For, as noted by Tietmeyer and Fukuyama, the considerable political influence of the elderly and their lobbying organizations is augmented by support from family members who have become accustomed to the status quo, as well as from the general population of adults who expect, or at least hope, to be elderly one day themselves. In that connection, Professor Dasgupta noted an interesting 'free rider' problem: childless individuals (who as a group enjoy a higher standard of living than child-raising persons as a group) expect to be cared for in old age through benefits financed by a labor force to which they did not contribute.

If political deliberation continues within a framework based on the idea of competition for scarce resources, the outlook for children and child-rai-

<sup>8</sup> Robert Pear, 'Spending on Health Rose 9.3% in 2002 to a Record Level', *New York Times*, January 8, 2004, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> 'Enough to live on', *The Economist*, March 27, 2004, p. 10.

ing families is troubling. With the declining birth rate, children are less visible in many societies: adults are less likely to be living with children; and neighborhoods less likely to contain children. As the proportion of childless households grows, many societies are becoming ever more adult-centered, and the general level of societal concern for children declines. (The increasingly adult-oriented content of television programs is but one indicator). Political support for measures that might address the needs of child-raising families is difficult to rally, in part because policy-making elites in modern societies are disproportionately composed of men and women who are either childless or who see little of their children. As the old saying goes, 'Out of sight, out of mind'. Yet, is not Venice a city built upon the sea...?

Thus, if we consider how the advanced welfare states currently deal with the needs of two classes of dependents – children and the frail elderly – we can see that the state's priorities are generally the reverse of the rural family's priorities in 'Life'. Families in subsistence economies are acutely aware of the importance of the human capital represented by children, while modern welfare states typically favor the elderly over the young where social spending is concerned. Needless to say, most people consider it one of the blessings of modern social security and health care systems that they have made elders more independent, relieving families of much of the burden of elder-care. At the same time, however, the bulk of the poverty population in modern welfare states, as in the rest of the world, is composed of mothers and children. Thus, no small part of the impending dependency-welfare crisis is the prospect of divisive competition for resources, and of conflict rather than solidarity among generations (None of the papers for this meeting, except that of Msgr. Schooyans, made reference to the most ominous 'solutions' to this conflict: the growing normalization in many societies of the abandonment or even extermination of persons who are inconvenient and burdensome to maintain at life's frail beginnings and endings).

There was a strong suggestion, in papers by Donati, Tietmeyer, Raga, Neuhaus and implicitly in the paper by Archer, that lasting solutions would require structures that improve the ability of persons and groups to solve their own problems through the exercise of initiative and responsibility. As Cardinal Rouco pointed out, many of the deficiencies of the welfare state have 'derived from an inadequate comprehension of the competencies, limits and duties that are [the state's], most concretely the forgetting of the principle of subsidiarity' which requires supporting the competence of those the state aids, wherever possible, rather than reducing them to passivity.

*The Deeper Crisis*

The prevalence of conflict models in discussing the dependency-welfare crisis, Professor Donati suggested, is a sign of an even deeper crisis that policy makers seem reluctant to acknowledge. Discussions of welfare regularly neglect the family, even though the family has always been and remains, as Cardinal Rouco put it, 'the school par excellence of humanization and social living'. One of the main reasons for that neglect today, as Father Neuhaus observed, is that to speak of the family 'is inevitably to come up against anti-familial and anti-natalist dynamics in our several societies'. But even prior to the culture wars, there was a tendency among 20th century social planners to treat society as a collection of individuals in competition with one another for scarce resources, and, if they focus on the family at all, to regard it as an instrument to remedy failures of state and market. That tendency to treat the individual as the basic social unit, Donati maintained, both obscures and aggravates the underlying problem: the breakdown of social norms upon which healthy economies, republics, and socially conscious states all ultimately depend.

Consider the implications for dependents, especially children, of the dramatic changes in social norms that took place in the affluent countries of Europe and North America in the late 20th century. The fact is that changes in the sexual mores and marriage behavior of large numbers of adults have transformed the experience of childhood in ways that would have been unimaginable in former times.<sup>10</sup> The age-old idea of marriage as an institution mainly for the procreation and raising of children is now rivaled and in some places surpassed by the very different idea of marriage as primarily for the benefit of the adult individuals involved.

The consequences for children, upon whom the human future depends, have been drastic: millions of children have been lost to abortion, and an unprecedented proportion of children are spending all or part of their childhoods in fatherless homes, often in poverty. Female-headed families created by divorce, desertion, or single parenthood now constitute the bulk of the world's poverty population.<sup>11</sup> As for intact child-raising families, their

<sup>10</sup> Peter Uhlenberg, 'Changing Adulthood Changes Childhood: A Working Paper for the Council of Families', Working Paper No. 57 (New York: Institute for American Values, 1998).

<sup>11</sup> Joan Williams, 'Our Economy of Mothers and Others: Women and Economics Revisited', 5 *Journal of Gender, Race & Justice*, pp. 411, 412 (2002).

standard of living is generally lower than that of childless households, especially if the mother stays home to care for the children. The conclusion is inescapable that the affluent western nations have been engaged in a massive social experiment – an experiment that has opened many new opportunities and freedoms to adults, but one that has been conducted at the expense of children and future generations. Further, and more radical, experiments, moreover, are already underway in these countries via advances in bio-technology. Professor Possenti evoked the haunting question: What will it mean for the relations between generations if children come to be seen as products of design and manufacture?

In sum, the drastic declines in birth and marriage rates that have taken place in the developed nations, together with sharp rises in fatherless households, have cast a cloud over the economic and political futures of those societies. In places where the state once ambitiously took over many roles that formerly belonged to the family, governments are less and less capable of fulfilling their commitments, while the family has lost much of its capacity to care for its own members. In his Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, *Ecclesia in Europa*, Pope John Paul II referred to a spreading ‘existential anguish’ and fragmentation characterized by the difficulty of making lasting commitments, feelings of loneliness, rise of ethnic and religious tensions, and attitudes that ‘will marginalize the less powerful and increase the number of poor in the world’ (8).

Meanwhile, Professors Morandé, Ramirez and Zulu urged the Academicians not to lose sight of the important fact that intergenerational solidarity is only one dimension of the virtue of solidarity. While it is essential to plan for the future, the Holy Father has reminded us that: ‘The poor cannot wait!’ In sub-Saharan Africa, alarming numbers of children have been deprived of parents and caretakers by the AIDS epidemic. Already, more than 11 million children under 15 have lost at least one parent to AIDS. The UN Children’s Fund estimates that figure is likely to rise to 20-25 million by 2010.<sup>12</sup> The total number of African children who have lost one or both parents to AIDS and other causes is 34 million – twice that in any other region of the world. If UN projections are correct, 1 in 7 children in a dozen countries will be left with only one parent by 2010, and in some countries that figure will be 1 in 5. With the loss of so many parents, teach-

<sup>12</sup> Michael Wines, ‘AIDS Blamed for Legions of Orphans in Africa’, *New York Times*, November 11, 2003, p. A6.

ers, and others in the prime of life, these countries may become societies of old people and children.

In *Ecclesia in Europa*, Pope John Paul II identified the deepest crisis afflicting contemporary societies as a loss of hope. 'At the root of this loss of hope', he wrote,

is an attempt to promote a vision of man apart from God and apart from Christ. ... Forgetfulness of God led to the abandonment of man. It is therefore no wonder that in this context a vast field has opened for the unrestrained development of nihilism in philosophy, of relativism in values and morality, and of pragmatism, and even a cynical hedonism, in daily life (9).

### *The New 'Woman Question'*

The observation by some of our speakers that too little attention has been paid to the family by theorists and policy makers seems incontestable. I would add, however, that too little attention has also been paid to the situation of women, especially women who are mothers. As Archer pointed out, 'the provision of care across any generation has been an almost exclusively female preserve – and continues to be so'. And as Tocqueville observed at the dawn of the modern era,

Everything that influences the condition of women, their habits and their opinions is of great political interest, for it is women who are the main teachers of children and through whom the mores are transmitted to the next generation.<sup>13</sup>

Perhaps no single development, apart from fatherlessness, has had more impact on the environment of childhood, the care of dependents, or the health of the mediating institutions of civil society than the increased labor force participation by women, including mothers of young children. It is a mark of great progress, and something to celebrate, that we now live in a world where women have more freedoms and opportunities than ever before in history. No society, however, has yet figured out how to assure satisfactory conditions for child-raising when both parents of young children work outside the home. And no society has yet found a substitute for the loss of other types of care-giving labor previously performed mainly by women.

<sup>13</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, II, 3, 9.

For many women, moreover, the picture of progress is ambiguous. Though birth rates are declining, the majority of women still become mothers. When mothers of young children enter the labor force, whether because of necessity or desire, they tend to seek work that is compatible with family roles. That often means jobs with lower pay, fewer benefits, and fewer opportunities for advancement than those available to persons without family responsibilities. Thus, ironically, the more a woman foregoes advancement in the workplace for the sake of caring for her own children, the more she and her children are at risk if the marriage ends in divorce. On the other hand, the more she invests in her work, the greater the likelihood her children will have care that is less than optimal. It is not surprising therefore that women in developed countries are hedging against these risks in two ways: by having fewer children than women did in the past, and by seeking types of labor force participation that are compatible with parenting. In so doing, they often sacrifice *both* their child-raising preferences and their chances to have remunerative, satisfying, and secure employment.

Women in developing countries face even heavier burdens. As working age men increasingly commute to jobs in the modern sector or migrate to distant places in search of work, rural life no longer takes the form of the family production community. Today, in addition to performing the traditional tasks of child care, food preparation, and gathering wood and water, women are increasingly left to take over responsibility for cash-crop farming. Katherine Hawa Hoomkwap, a remarkable Nigerian mother of five who served with me on the Holy See's delegation to the Beijing women's conference, gave me a small statue that says it all: it is an African woman who is carrying a baby in a sling on her back, balancing a basket of food on her head, and grasping a hoe in her hands.

Thus, while enormous economic advances have been made by women without children, mothers face new versions of an old problem: Caregiving, one of the most important forms of human work, receives little respect and reward, whether performed in the family, or for wages outside the home.<sup>14</sup> Despite these risks, most women still become mothers. In marriage, they accept primary responsibility for child care, thereby incurring disadvantages in the labor force. If divorce or separation occurs, they seek and

<sup>14</sup> Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder, *The Subject of Care: Feminist Perspectives on Dependency* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), p. 1.

accept primary responsibility for the care of children even when they are not well-equipped financially to do so. Indeed, if women did not continue to shoulder these risks and burdens, it is hard to see how any social institution could make up for the services they now provide.

The main solutions proposed by the feminism of the 1970s (at the zenith of the welfare state) were the socialization of care-giving and equal child care responsibilities for fathers and mothers. But those ideas have not had broad appeal – either for parents or for tax-payers. They ignore that for many women, caring for family members is central to identity; sustaining the relationships that make life meaningful. As Archer put it in her critique of cost-benefit analysis as applied to family life:

*Who* people are derives from their ultimate concerns which are expressive of their identities and therefore are *not* a means to some further end.

Cost-benefit analysis does, however, expose some peculiarities of social policy in the wake of the demographic revolutions. Despite the fact that those who perform care-taking roles within the family confer important benefits on the whole society, a mother who is left destitute when a family breaks up is often treated by welfare law as a social parasite and by divorce law as a burden to her ex-husband. In the 1970s and 80s, when family law was extensively revised in the developed countries ‘to conform to social reality’ (as it was said at the time), a highly unrealistic principle, self-sufficiency, was established as the aim of post-divorce economic arrangements.

### *Scotomas in Social Policy and Social Science*

Among the accomplishments of this meeting on intergenerational solidarity was the identification of a number of blind spots in contemporary thinking about welfare and dependency. How is one to explain the neglect of such obvious facts as: the reality of human dependency, the breakdown of social norms, the value of care-giving, and the importance of the family, and its surrounding networks? The world’s democratic experiments, market economies, and socially conscious states alike all depend on the character and competence of citizens, workers, and public servants. How, therefore, can they remain indifferent to what helps or harms the settings that determine whether or not people develop such qualities as self-restraint, respect for others, work ethic, honesty, ability to cooperate, independence of mind, concern for the vulnerable, and attentiveness to the natural and



probable consequences of one's actions? 'Is not Venice built on the sea ... even though a generation came along that did not notice this ...?'

Several speakers pointed to certain flaws in prevailing modes of social, economic, political and legal thought that contribute to these oversights: incomplete concepts of personhood and society, together with a tendency to focus on the individual, the market, and the state to the neglect of families and the mediating structures of civil society.

Paradoxically, the concepts of the human person that are prominent in social science and social policy both over-emphasize individual self-sufficiency and under-rate individual human agency. The image of the free, self-determining individual exerts such powerful attraction for modern imaginations that we tend to relegate obvious facts about human dependency to the margins of consciousness. Nevertheless, human beings still begin their lives in the longest period of dependency of any mammal. It is still a fact that circumstances can catapult anyone at least temporarily from a secure to a dependent position. It is still a fact that almost all persons spend much of their lives either as dependents, or caring for dependents, or financially responsible for dependents. It is still a fact that we all depend on the earth for the resources that make life possible. As Alasdair MacIntyre has written:

It matters ... that those who are no longer children recognize in children what they once were, that those who are not yet disabled by age recognize in the old what they are moving towards becoming, and that those who are not ill or injured recognize in the ill and injured what they often have been and will be and always may be. It matters also that these recognitions are not a source of fear. For such recognitions are a condition of adequate awareness of both the common needs and the common goods that are served by networks of giving and receiving and by the virtues both of independence and of acknowledged dependence. ... In order to flourish we need both those virtues that enable us to function as independent and accountable practical reasoners and those virtues that enable us to acknowledge the nature and extent of our dependence on others. Both the acquisition and the exercise of those virtues are possible only insofar as we participate in social relationships of giving and receiving. ...<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (1999), p. 146.

Perhaps we do not like to think about dependency because we do not like to think about being vulnerable. But, if we were not dependent, would we be fully human? Aristotle's answer to that question was this: 'The man who has no need of others is either a beast or a god'.

Strangely, the over-emphasis on self-sufficiency in contemporary social thought co-exists with an approach to welfare that under-rates human capacities. As Archer, Neuhaus and Raga emphasized, social policy has been influenced by mind-sets that treat human beings as passive subjects or instrumental rationalists rather than as acting persons whose decisions are influenced not only by calculation of self-interest but by strongly held values. Surely social policy and social science would benefit from more attention to the fact that human beings are *both* able and dependent, with variations over one's life span. No doubt the Academy will return to this subject in its 2005 Plenary Meeting devoted to the topic: 'The Vision of the Human Person in the Social Sciences'.

Prevailing concepts of 'society', too, need re-examination. As Donati insisted, society is not just a collection of individual competitors for scarce resources; it is 'a fabric of relationships, to a certain extent ambivalent and conflictual, in need of solidarity'. There was wide agreement that a number of conceptual adjustments will be needed if policy-makers are to move beyond unpromising proposals based on conflictual models of human relations.

Here perhaps is where Catholic social thought, as President Malinvaud emphasized in our 2002 roundtable, could enter into mutually beneficial dialogue with the social sciences. Catholic social teachings have long promoted a vision of society where the dignity of the human person is the highest value; where the family has priority over the state; where all legitimate types of work, paid or unpaid, are respected; and where families, local communities and the mediating structures enjoy an appropriate autonomy. It has long presented a vision of human personhood in which each man and woman is understood as uniquely individual yet inescapably social; as a creature of unruly passions who nevertheless possesses a certain ability to transcend and even transform the passions; as a knower and a chooser who constitutes himself or herself, for better or worse, through his knowing and his choosing. It has elaborated a concept of solidarity, not as a mask for collectivism, but as a *moral and social attitude*, a *virtue* based on recognition of the interdependence of the members of the human family (SRS, 38). It has offered the fertile concept of subsidiarity in which an important role for the state is to help set conditions for personal, social and economic flourishing.

Subsidiarity, however, is not a mechanical formula or a dogma, but rather a principle whose application depends on the ever-changing relations among state, market, civil society, families and individuals in each society. Professors Stiglitz and Kirchof cautioned about excessive mistrust of the state even in countries where the state is very strong, and Professor Fukuyama observed that the standard critique of the excesses of the welfare state does not apply well to poor countries where the absence of a strong rule-of-law state is a major impediment to development. There are places, as Professors Ramirez and Villacorta reminded us, where civil society and even family structures are too strong, as well as places where they are in danger of being overwhelmed by the market or the state. The question is always one of seeking an optimal balance. Professor Morandé's observation was much appreciated: 'The principle of subsidiarity turns out to be most efficient when using intelligence and all people's capacities for the development of the common good'.

Whether and how policy-makers in modern states might accommodate a more capacious concept of personhood, an approach to gender equality that makes room for different individual vocations and roles, a deeper appreciation of the dignity of all legitimate human work, or an understanding of the cultural importance of families and the mediating structures upon which they depend are fateful questions whose answers lie hidden in the future. As Father Neuhaus wrote, it would require a certain humility on the part of theorists and policy makers to 'learn from the ways in which people, given the opportunity, actually order their lives together as *they* think they ought to order their lives together.' And it would require a certain tragic sensibility, for in the area of social policy, the problem is often, as Professor Dasgupta reminded us, one of striking balances among conflicting and competing goods.

No one will suggest that this First Plenary Meeting on Intergenerational Solidarity has reached the stage of confident answers, but it is no small thing to be able to ask the right questions. And that, I believe, our speakers have done.

TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ACADEMY

## WELCOME AND PRESENTATION OF THE ACADEMY

MARY ANN GLENDON

Presidents of Sister Academies, Honorable Ambassadors, Esteemed Guests, and Dear Colleagues,

On behalf of the members of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, it is a great pleasure to welcome you to this celebration of the tenth anniversary of our founding, and to thank our distinguished visitors for honoring us with their presence here.

Shortly after Pope John Paul II established the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences in January 1994, he welcomed the original members of this group with the exhortation to 'Be not afraid' in the quest for knowledge. He urged us to search for 'all the grains of truth present in the various intellectual and empirical approaches' of the disciplines gathered under this roof. As a model, he held up St Thomas Aquinas whose unrestricted desire to know led him to seek dialogue with the most advanced natural and human science of his time, and to engage the ideas of the great minds of antiquity.

On that occasion, he also reminded us that we must not be content merely with harvesting the wisdom of the social sciences. He made clear that we were not to regard the secluded and beautiful Casina Pio IV as an ivory tower where scholars commune only with each other. As might be expected from the philosopher-Pope who has traveled the world speaking truth to power for the past twenty-five years, John Paul II enjoined us to bring the wisdom of the social sciences to bear on human realities 'with a view to finding solutions to people's concrete problems, solutions based on social justice'.

Since then, in each meeting with our young academy, he has asked us to stretch our capacities, to be bold and creative in deploying the resources of our disciplines. In his 1998 address, he told us to keep in mind that sometimes we would be called to play the role of 'pioneers ... to indicate new

paths and new solutions for solving in a more equitable way the burning issues of today's world'.

The Pope also expressed his hope that the relationship between Catholic social thought and the social sciences would be a two-way street. Quoting from his social encyclical *Centesimus Annus*, he said that by entering into dialogue with the disciplines concerned with the human person, the Church not only 'assimilates what these various disciplines have to contribute', but also 'helps them to open themselves to a broader horizon' (CA, 59).

Over the past ten years, we Academicians have tried to live up to those expectations, under the inspiring leadership of President Edmond Malinvaud, whom we honor today. We have concentrated thus far on four areas where it seemed to us that 'burning issues' posed new challenges for the human family, for policy makers, for the social sciences, and for Catholic social thought: the changing world of work, the risks and opportunities presented by globalization, the dilemmas of democracy, and the topic to which we gave the name 'intergenerational solidarity'. Later in this program, the coordinators of the first three of those projects will report on what has been accomplished under those headings. Then, as the coordinator of the fourth and newest of these projects, I will say a few words about where our work on intergenerational solidarity stands at the end of the first plenary session on that subject.

First, however, I would like to tell you a little more about our Academy, the ways in which it is like its sister academies all over the world, and some ways in which it has a distinctive character.

In his 1994 Apostolic Letter establishing the Academy, John Paul II recalled the remarkable flourishing of Catholic social thought in the century following Pope Leo XIII's path-breaking 1891 encyclical on labor questions, *Rerum Novarum*. He wrote that,

Over the last century the Church has strengthened her 'citizenship status' by perfecting her social doctrine ... [in] close collaboration, on the one hand, with Catholic social movements, and on the other, with experts in the social sciences.

He recalled how Pope John XXIII had stressed, in *Pacem in Terris* and *Mater et Magistra*, 'that the social doctrine must always strive to take into account "the true state of affairs" by maintaining a constant dialogue with the social sciences'. Then, citing 'the great tasks the future has in store', John Paul II said the time had now come to give 'new expression' to this long-standing interdisciplinary dialogue. Accordingly, he founded the Pontifical Academy

of Social Sciences, alongside the four hundred year old Pontifical Academy of Sciences. He charged the new academy with the task of

promoting the study and progress of the social, economic, political, and juridical sciences, and of thus offering the Church the elements which she can use in the study and development of her social doctrine.

Like other learned academies, the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences is dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, but a distinctive feature that influences our choice of subjects is that we are expected to provide the Church with useful material to aid in the continuing 'development of her social doctrine'. In that sense, we are something like the Councils that governments appoint when expert knowledge on such matters as, for example, bio-technology, is required. Like such advisory bodies, our role is not to announce or develop doctrine, but to make sure that those who do explain, announce, and develop doctrine have the best possible information and the most promising ideas at their disposal.

But unlike governments, who seek expert opinion to aid in the formulation of policy, the Church does not make policy prescriptions, nor does she offer technical solutions to specific problems. As John Paul II has put it,

The Church has no models to present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations, through the efforts of all those who responsibly confront concrete problems in all their social, economic, political and cultural aspects, as these interact with one another (CA, 43).

The aim of the social doctrine, as the Pope put it in his encyclical *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, is to offer 'principles for reflection, criteria of judgments and directives for action' showing that the Gospel message in all its richness and newness applies 'to people's lives and the life of society (SRS, 8)'. As he elaborated in an address to our Academy four years ago, the social doctrine is meant to be

a vehicle through which the Gospel of Jesus Christ is brought to bear on the different cultural, economic and political situations facing modern men and women. ... The Church's task – her right and her duty – is to enunciate those basic ethical principles forming the foundation and proper functioning of society, within which men and women make their pilgrim way to their transcendent destiny.

To promote the building up of a society that enables each man and woman to perfect his or her own nature, the Holy Father urged the Academicians to

help to insure that social doctrines do not ignore the spiritual nature of human beings, their deep longing for happiness and their super-

natural destiny which transcends the merely biological and material aspects of life.

Guided by those counsels, the Academy has made what we believe are important contributions to the understanding of human work, globalization, and democracy. Its thirty-three members, emblematic of the universal concerns of the Church, come from all continents of the world, and each is a specialist in at least one of the human sciences. It has not been easy for this diverse group of men and women to learn to communicate across disciplinary, cultural, and linguistic boundaries. But in ten years we have made great progress, educating and being educated by each other in this multinational, multidisciplinary setting. All would agree, I believe, that it has been an extraordinarily enriching experience to be able to hear such a wide range of thoughtful perspectives on the problems we have studied. We look forward to ever greater progress in fulfilling our mission to the Church, the social sciences, and to humanity.



## COMMEMORATION DE L'ACADÉMIE

EDMOND MALINVAUD

Il me revient de vous parler de la création de l'Académie Pontificale des Sciences Sociales, telle qu'elle a été annoncée dans la conférence de presse qui s'est tenue au Vatican en janvier 1994. En mars 1996, c'est-à-dire 27 mois plus tard, se tenait la seconde session plénière, la première dont le programme scientifique ait été sérieusement préparé dans le cadre d'un des trois grands thèmes choisis par l'Académie à sa première réunion plénière en novembre 1994. Nous pouvons dire que les deux années 1994 et 1995 ont été consacrées au lancement de l'Académie. C'est la période qu'il me revient d'évoquer cet après-midi. Bien entendu, la création de l'Académie avait été préparée antérieurement, mais je ne prétends pas bien rendre compte de cette histoire antérieure, car ce serait trop long.

Je dois simplement évoquer comment l'Académie a été, disons, mise sur les rails dans les dernières années qui ont précédé sa création. Je dois évoquer surtout l'action de quelques personnes qui, depuis la fin des années 80, se sont efforcées de rendre possible la réalisation de ce projet. C'est ainsi que je vais citer les rôles de quatre académiciens. D'abord le professeur Schambeck parla de la création de notre Académie au Cardinal Casaroli, alors Secrétaire d'Etat. Puis, grâce au père Schasching, Herbert Schambeck noua des liens très étroits avec le père Utz, notre doyen d'âge jusqu'à son décès en Octobre 2001, à l'âge de 93 ans. Depuis le moment où ils s'étaient rencontrés, le père Utz et le professeur Schambeck portèrent le projet qui fut mis au point au Secrétariat d'Etat du Vatican par notre collègue, aujourd'hui Archevêque de Dijon, Monseigneur Minnerath.

La conférence de presse qui annonça l'institution de l'Académie en janvier 1994 était présidée par le Cardinal Etchegaray, alors président du Conseil Pontifical Justice et Paix. La conférence fut surtout consacrée à la présentation du Motu Proprio du Saint Père. Ce texte d'une part exposait les raisons qui conduisaient à la création de notre Académie, d'autre part définissait ses

fonctions. Ce fut aussi l'occasion de présenter la liste des 31 premiers académiciens. De mes nouveaux collègues, je n'en connaissais que quatre, c'était déjà pas mal au fond: Kenneth Arrow, René Rémond, Louis Sabourin et Hans Tietmeyer. L'année 1994 fut évidemment consacrée en grande partie à mettre en place les institutions de l'Académie: ce fut la fonction d'une "commission de lancement", présidée par Monseigneur Mejía, maintenant Cardinal, qui était alors adjoint du Cardinal Etchegaray. Outre moi-même participèrent à cette commission les académiciens Schambeck, Schasching et Zampetti. La commission se réunit à plusieurs reprises avant l'été.

Le premier Conseil de l'Académie, désigné en Octobre 1994, fut chargé d'assurer la relève. La session inaugurale de l'Académie se tint du 24 au 26 novembre 1994. Elle permit la première réunion du Conseil et deux Assemblées Générales consacrées à l'organisation et aux programmes futurs de l'Académie. Une première assemblée le 24, une deuxième le 26: entre les deux, la réunion du Conseil le 25. Les règles de fonctionnement à retenir et les publications à réaliser furent discutées. La décision fut prise par l'Assemblée Générale de ne pas diviser l'Académie en sections suivant les disciplines représentées (première définition stratégique). De même il fut décidé que, au moins dans une période initiale, l'Académie se réunirait en principe une fois par an. Lors de la première Assemblée Générale une vingtaine de grands thèmes furent envisagés comme pouvant faire l'objet de nos travaux futurs; il convenait de choisir ceux qui figureraient dans les premiers programmes de travail, une question qui fut longuement discutée. Le Conseil qui se réunit le lendemain fixa son choix sur trois des thèmes envisagés: le travail et l'emploi, la démocratie, enfin la solidarité entre générations. Le Conseil a aussi décidé que l'étude du thème du travail et de l'emploi serait entreprise lors de la seconde Session Plénière. Ce choix fut entériné au cours de la seconde Assemblée Générale.

A priori il était concevable que la première Session Plénière s'en tienne à un tel agenda, accompagné évidemment d'échanges de vues sur les sujets les plus divers sans autre préparation ni autre finalité que celle de souder la communauté des académiciens. À la réflexion il avait cependant paru opportun de s'essayer à l'examen d'un sujet choisi, je dois dire, par moi-même en accord avec le Cardinal Etchegaray. Il s'est agi de l'étude des inégalités sociales dans les différentes disciplines représentées à l'Académie, étant entendu que cette étude devait, avant toutes choses, reconnaître le principe fondamental de l'égalité entre toutes les personnes humaines. Cette décision d'avoir un premier échange de vues sur un sujet de notre compétence laissait, à vrai dire, très peu de temps pour la prépa-

ration des papiers et de la discussion. Aussi ceci fut fait “à la bonne franquette”, par des échanges de lettres assez nombreuses entre les nouveaux académiciens et leur président. Dix académiciens ayant chacun accepté de rédiger une note en relation avec le sujet, nous avons pu lors de la session écouter, lire et discuter dix communications. La publication des *proceedings* de la session est ainsi aux trois quarts réservée à son volet scientifique. Au total j'estime que ce premier essai a bien rempli son rôle et nous a aidé à orienter utilement nos échanges scientifiques ultérieurs.

Mais après cette première session il restait beaucoup à faire pour préciser nos méthodes de travail, pour organiser sur plusieurs années la préparation de nos réflexions et investigations sur les trois grands thèmes qui avaient été sélectionnés, enfin pour porter grand soin à la seconde session plénière prévue comme devant se tenir en mars 1996. La seconde réunion du Conseil en mars 1995 et sa troisième réunion en novembre 1995 devaient veiller à ce que des progrès satisfaisants se réalisent vis-à-vis de chacun de ces objectifs.

En mars 1995 trois décisions principales furent arrêtées. Premièrement il fut convenu de prendre très au sérieux le concept de dialogue entre l'Eglise et les sciences sociales tel qu'il était exprimé dans le Motu Proprio du Pape. À tout le moins nous devons bien connaître la doctrine sociale de l'Eglise sur les thèmes que nous allions aborder. La première priorité était donc d'avoir un bon document de référence à ce sujet. Deuxièmement, pour préparer nos activités sur chacun des trois thèmes retenus, nous avons décidé la nomination de comités, chacun ayant un animateur. Ainsi un comité fut créé à propos du travail et de l'emploi, l'animateur étant le professeur Margaret Archer, un autre comité sur la démocratie, l'animateur étant le professeur Hans Zacher etc. Troisièmement, grâce au dévouement du père Schasching, nous avons pu compter avoir, bien avant la tenue de la seconde session plénière, un très substantiel document écrit qui présenterait la doctrine sociale de l'Eglise sur le travail et l'emploi. Les règles de fonctionnement à retenir pour la préparation des contributions écrites, pour les exposés et discussions en séance, enfin pour la publication des *proceedings* furent aussi examinées dans cette seconde réunion du Conseil.

La troisième réunion du Conseil a été consacrée en partie, évidemment, à la préparation de la seconde Session Plénière qui devait se tenir quatre mois plus tard. Je ne vais rien dire à ce sujet, puisqu'il sera traité par le professeur Archer dans un moment. Pour cette réunion du Conseil, je retiens qu'elle fut consacrée aussi à examiner le point où en étaient arrivés les divers comités qui avaient été institués six mois auparavant. Je retiens en outre qu'elle pro-

gramma l'exécution de nos projets sur un horizon de plus de deux ans. Il fut convenu à cette occasion que, non seulement la seconde session de l'Académie en 1996 mais aussi la troisième en 1997, seraient consacrées au thème du travail et de l'emploi. Quant à la quatrième session de l'Académie en 1998, elle traiterait de la démocratie, mais, afin de préparer le sujet, un séminaire se tiendrait en décembre 1996 pour examiner les conceptions et les problèmes de la démocratie dans les différentes parties du monde.

Voilà ce que j'avais à dire sur cette période des deux années 1994 et 1995. Vous apprendrez, mais ceci sera présenté par le professeur Sabourin, que plus tard un quatrième thème, celui de la mondialisation, s'est intercalé dans nos travaux.

## REPORT ON THE INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROJECT

MARY ANN GLENDON

This year's Plenary Session of the Academy was devoted to the topic, 'Intergenerational Solidarity, Welfare, and Human Ecology'. Since this was the first Plenary Session to be devoted to the Intergenerational Solidarity project, and since the conclusions of the meeting have already been reported, this account will be brief. The intergenerational project was launched in response to concern about the way that changing relations among the generations were affecting the natural and social environments. For this initial plenary discussion, the speakers and commentators were asked to focus primarily on the challenges posed by the fact that changes in family behavior have placed increasing strain on every society's capacity to provide for the needs of the very young, the frail elderly, and the severely ill or disabled. In so doing, we heeded the Pope's reminder when he first addressed this Academy ten years ago that the very *raison d'être* of social programs 'should be protection of the weakest'.

Our aim was to move well beyond standard debates over the 'welfare crisis'. For, as many of the speakers this week argued, a deeper crisis of meanings and values underlies the welfare crisis. In particular, changes in family behavior are fueling, and being fueled by, changes in *ideas* about dependency, the human person, and family life that have far-reaching implications for the human prospect – for the world's experiments in self-government, for the health of economies, for human rights, and for the future of our social and natural environments.

By lifting up the concept of 'solidarity' we sought to challenge solutions based on conflict models that are grounded in widely held but problematic concepts of man and society. With our reference to 'ecology' we signaled that we are searching for ways to shift probabilities in favor of keeping the human person at the center of concern. Our hope for this plenary conference was modest: to emerge not only with a better understanding of the questions, but with a set of conclusions that will serve as

springboards for continued exploration of this subject in future meetings and study groups.

We began our deliberations with a survey of the treatment of intergenerational solidarity as it appears currently in Catholic social teaching. Then, we heard a number of presentations on demographic and cultural developments that are affecting relations among the generations all over the world in diverse ways. Those presentations were followed by exchanges regarding how these developments are playing out in different contexts, what they may mean for the human prospect, and what men and women of good will might be able to do to chart more favorable courses for the future.

Among our conclusions were that the great transitions of the late twentieth century have jeopardized the care of the very young, the frail elderly, and other dependents – both in welfare states and in countries where government's role in providing social services is minimal or non-existent. No society has been unaffected, and no society has yet fully faced up to the unprecedented challenges posed by these changes. We noted that to the extent that the looming welfare crisis receives public attention, it is typically presented in terms of conflict, rather than solidarity, among the generations. Although a conflict model dominates discussion of the welfare crisis, nearly complete silence reigns about the intergenerational conflicts that fester in the underlying crisis of meanings and values, such as the conflict between the desires of adults and the needs of children (and child-raising families) in cultures that have become increasingly adult-centered. Ironically, the ambition of the world's welfare states to free individuals from much of their dependence on families, and to relieve families from some of their responsibilities for their weaker members, may have succeeded just well enough to put dependents at heightened risk now that the welfare state itself is in crisis.

A recurring theme in the discussions was that one of the most influential ideas in the modern social sciences is showing its flaws: the concept of the human person as radically autonomous, self-determining, and self-sufficient. Thus, before holding another session on the Intergenerational Solidarity project, the Academy will devote its plenary session in 2005 to an exploration of the concepts of the human person that are embedded in Catholic social teaching, economics, social theory, law and politics.

# REPORT ON DEMOCRACY

HANS F. ZACHER

## SELECTING THE TOPIC

When the Academy started its work and we discussed possible topics, 'democracy' was soon sighted as a theme deserving priority. There were three mainlines of argumentation:

### 1. *The Central and Complex Importance of 'Democracy' for Everybody's Life*

– That means: The fact that the democratic state is a product of all the individuals involved, just as their conditions of living and acting are a product of the law and the politics which they themselves create through 'their' state, 'their' government, 'their' courts, 'their' administrations, and 'their' army or police.

– But also the very different significance this word '*their*' has for the majority and the minority, for those who dominate (through money, media, religion, ethnicity etc.) and for those who do not, for the active and the passive participants.

### 2. *The Manifold Changes in the Experience of 'Democracy'*

– The many histories of non-democratic (communist, fascist, authoritarian, colonial) regimes which since the end of World War II broke down and have embarked on the endeavour of 'democracy'.

– But also in longstanding democracies: The innovation of democratic rules, structures and procedures, of their use and their effects on the one hand – the fatigue of democratic traditions, the abuse of democratic structures and the decay of democratic morality on the other hand.

– Finally the growing dynamics of supranationality and internationality, and the competition and conflict between national, regional, continental and global systems of governance.

### 3. *Also the Distance Between the Tradition of the Catholic Social Doctrine and 'Democracy'*

– The relatively short history of a positive relationship between the Catholic Church and 'democracy' and a sometimes still reserved wording of the Church's social doctrine on 'democracy'.

– And the immense burden on the magisterium, which is asked to provide answers that are both valid for all of humanity and its global relations and institutions, as well as useful and convincing for the extremely different situations in potentially all states and regions of the earth.

– In any case: The relevance of the modern state and its democratic character for religious personalities, religious groups, Christians and non-Christians, the Christian communities and Christian churches.

#### THE WORK

The Academy's work on 'democracy' started in December 1996 with a *workshop*. The meeting pursued three aims:

– To lay a common basis of knowledge about the development of the Church's social doctrine on 'democracy'.

– To gain an overview of the very different situations of 'democracy' in the various continents and subcontinents.

– And to identify useful topics to approach the subject.

On this basis two *plenary meetings* dealt with 'democracy'.

The first plenary meeting took place in *April 1998*. It concentrated on three main themes:

– *Firstly: 'Democracy' and values*. Is 'democracy' itself a value? Is 'democracy' a means to materialise and to protect values? Or is it a danger for 'values'? Are values a precondition for 'democracy'?

– *Secondly*: What is the essence of '*civil society*'? What is the relation between 'democracy' and '*civil society*'?

– *Thirdly*: '*Democracy*' and supranationality; '*democracy*' and *internationality*.

The second plenary meeting took place in *February 2000*. Two of the subjects had to be elaborated more intensively:

– '*Democracy*' and *values*

– and the interplay between *democratic structures* and *civil society*.



Beyond that, a series of special topics had to be approached for the first time: education, public opinion and media, economy, labour, welfare state, ethnic structures, religion.

Then the Academy had to decide on *how to come to an end*. You have already been informed about our successful experiment with closing our project on 'labour'. As an alternative trial for 'democracy', three steps were planned.

– *First step*: Three *experts* were to evaluate the outcome of the Academy's meetings. They were not to be members of the Academy but specialists on Catholic Social Teaching. As the Academy, following its statutes, should 'offer the Church the elements which she can use in the development of her social doctrine', the experts were to design hypotheses on how such elements could be offered. The experts – that were: F. Sergio Bernal Restrepo (Rome), Professor Michael Novak (Washington), Professor Rudolf Weiler (Vienna) – presented their reports in spring 2002.

– *Second step*: During the *plenary meeting in April 2002*, a Final Discussion presented a comprehensive opportunity for integrating the results.

– *Third step*: A small working group of members of the Academy drafted a *Final Document*, which seeks to sum up the 'elements' which the Academy can offer the Church to be used 'in the development of her social doctrine'. That Final Document has been passed during this plenary meeting.

The entire proceedings will be published.

'ELEMENTS' OFFERED TO THE CHURCH TO BE USED 'IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HER SOCIAL DOCTRINE'

### *Democracy Is a Responsibility*

The Final Document starts with a central statement:

*'Democracy' denotes a central responsibility.*

*If there is no 'democracy'*, striving for 'democracy' may be a comprehensive way to improve human life. Or: if there are deficits in the recognition and implementation of social values, striving for 'democracy' may be the most effective way towards achieving the recognition and implementation of the denied social values.

In *present times* the majority of countries call themselves 'democratic' and even try to be 'democratic' in one way or another. *'Democracy' is a normality*. In so far, the 'normal' question is not to opt for or against 'democra-

cy', but rather to ask: '*what democracy?*' There are always differing opinions about what a 'true democracy' is. And there are always differences between the norms and institutions of a given 'democracy', and the reality of its practices and effects. Thus the *responsibility for understanding and implementing 'democracy' is crucial, even if a state is called a 'democracy', even if its government claims to be 'democratic', and if the people want to live in a 'democracy' and feel as if they do.*

*This responsibility is manifold.* It is the responsibility of those who run the state – the governmental and the legal machinery: the politicians, judges, other officials, experts and advisers. It is the responsibility of the whole civil society: of all individuals, all those who live in families, in groups, or act in organizations, of all leaders and all followers, especially all those who – for instance through the mass media – influence the attitudes and sentiments of others. And so it is a responsibility also of the Church.

#### *The Main Chapters of the Document*

The deliberations are subsumed under three chapters:

- Democracy: the value and the values;
- Democracy and civil society; and
- Democracy in the international and global context.

It is impossible to render a detailed account in the brief time available.

#### *The Unfinished Character of the Democratic Task*

But let me quote the closing remarks:

Democracy is a task. It will always be that. There is no ready, nor even an ultimate recipe for shaping a democratic state and handling democracy. Democracy will always remain unfinished. Catholic Social Teaching cannot finish it. That is true all the more as the Gospel is not a programme for governance and legislation. It is an inspiration. Catholic Social Teaching, however, can offer its assistance in mastering the unfinished task of democracy. It can transmit the direction and impetus coming from the Gospel into the reflections on and the practice of democracy. That includes the endeavour to approach the essentials of a perfect democracy as far as possible, but at the same time requires openness for the various forms and developments, watchfulness for their risks and opportunities, as well as creative sensitivity in seeking ways to minimise the risks and maximise the opportunities.

## REPORT ON 'WORK & HUMAN FULFILLMENT'

MARGARET ARCHER

In the beginning I suppose it was almost inevitable that a Pontifical Academy founded for the social sciences should have taken up the encyclical, the first social encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, of 1891, and that we should have decided to dedicate our first work to this topic, the topic of work and employment in modern societies. Equally understandably, ten years ago, we were all, wherever we came from, shocked and appalled, in different ways, by the impact of unemployment in our various societies. We were shocked in the western world that in some societies up to 25% of young people attempting to enter the labour market could not find jobs; we were shocked that in the developing world there were millions who could not gain entry to the mainstream economy and yet for whom agriculture no longer constituted a viable means of subsistence. That is why, fairly naturally, we turned to the theme of examining what was called in one of the later encyclicals, 'the dreadful scourge of unemployment' in our societies.

But we were new and we were brash and we had a great deal to learn. Perhaps, in this context, I could draw upon our new President's reference to Thomas Aquinas. When he was towards the end of his great work, the *Summa*, he had a very direct spiritual experience in the light of which he declared that everything he had written so far was a straw – and he put down his pen. I think, in a way, it took us the three years that we devoted to this theme to assume the necessary and proper humility of an Academy of Social Sciences. On the one hand, we were quite right, indeed entirely correct to be shocked and appalled by unemployment but, on the other hand, we had to learn modesty and to recognise that we could not put forward recipes for changing the face of the earth. I acknowledge that I was as guilty as anybody was for being too ambitious in the beginning, for seeking the kind of concrete formulae which the Holy Father has told us

quite rightly that it is not the Church's task to advance. The lesson learnt was that it is not the Academy's task either.

But we have to make our contribution and there were certainly three factors that prompted us to try to think of new solutions to the world of work and how work could become available to everyone. These focal points still seem entirely legitimate.

The first one was something which I remember Mary Ann Glendon pointing out very early on, about the limits of the law. She gave a paper in one of our early sessions in which she noted that although the right to work is embedded in most of the world's Constitutions, in those countries (unlike my own) that have written Constitutions, the right to work actually bore no relationship whatsoever to labour policy or to the actual state of employment in any of these countries. This was the case despite the fact that the right to work was also embedded in the United Nations' 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. In other words, the limits of the law in this respect are very limited indeed and really restricted to providing persuasive normative reminders of the demands of human justice and social solidarity.

Secondly, we were extremely aware about the difficulties that the welfare state was undergoing, difficulties which have become even more pronounced since then. I think we were very well aware that the welfare state, particularly as conceived of and discussed by thinkers like T.H. Marshall at the time, was not simply intended to be an economic safety net but was conceived of as an essential plank in social citizenship: one that would reinforce democracy by strengthening social solidarity and one that would override economic class divisions. Because we were rightly worried that with a reduced role for the welfare state in this respect, then the progressive economic marginalisation of those without jobs, without posts, without employment, would also increase. In turn, this threatened their exclusion from effective political participation. As such, this seems a proper concern for the Academy. It is a concern that we have continued to worry about and to pursue right up to our deliberations this week about the possibility of new mediating structures that could provide the framework for a robust civil society in which marginalisation becomes a decreasing phenomenon.

And finally, we were extremely and acutely aware of the way in which institutions that in the past had performed a proper, appropriate and wholly positive role as the representatives of labour were no longer capable of performing those historic functions: that the trade unions were weakening numerically in terms of their membership and qualitatively in terms of the kinds of interventions they could make in their respective societies.

Moreover, the unions which used to be part of civil society were not providing this bridging function, could not provide this mediating function towards the unemployed – they were representatives literally of those working, of workers with jobs. Now, I think it is true to say that these three contextual factors continue to preoccupy us right up to today.

I will not go into in detail about what we did during the following two years; we have the Acta, the annual proceedings, documenting our efforts. The only thing I would like to do is to give one last reflection in relation to how we went about it. I suspect that we, as we say in English, bit off more than we could chew. We wanted so much to make a positive contribution that we reviewed so many possible ways forward, part-time work, flexitime; we summarily reviewed the finance markets, the role of the multinationals; we travelled into the territory of changes in gender roles and the new entry of women into employment, its repercussions for the family, what this might imply for responsible parenthood, and the famous 'new man' that we keep hoping will one day arrive on the horizon. And we even went so far as to consider, in the vaguest terms possible, that there was a need for some kind of global regulatory body exerting certain controls over the multinational companies and imposing certain fiscal levies over speculative capital gains, etc. Probably, as I have admitted, we were too brash and premature in being too concrete. Conversely, I believe that there is always a balance that we have to strike, because, as the Holy Father stressed in *Centesimus Annus*, countervailing institutions are needed at the global level to ensure, as he put it, that 'les intérêts de la grande famille humaine soient équitablement représentées'. Now, we have not got to this point, this point is not even in view. Yet, just as the Church must be visionary, as the Holy Father was being then, I think we saw it and still see it as part of our function to help to render that vision more concrete. Thank you.

## RAPPORT SUR QUATRE RENCONTRES SUR LA MONDIALISATION

LOUIS SABOURIN

Je suis particulièrement heureux, à l'occasion du dixième anniversaire de l'Académie, de faire le point, à titre de coordonnateur, sur les travaux portant sur la mondialisation. Ce thème s'est imposé presque spontanément à la suite des requêtes formulées par de nombreux membres de l'Académie, compte tenu de la croissance et des effets de la mondialisation sur l'ensemble des sociétés et, il ne faut pas l'oublier, des interventions répétées sur le sujet par Jean-Paul II.

Nous avons d'abord organisé, en février 2000, un séminaire, réunissant à la fois des experts invités et des membres de l'Académie, afin de définir les principaux domaines qui feraient l'objet des travaux sur la mondialisation. Les actes de ce séminaire, *The Social Dimensions of Globalization* (2000) ont été publiés quelques mois plus tard et ont permis de tracer un plan de recherche axé sur des thèmes précis qui ont fait l'objet des débats lors des assemblées générales des trois années consécutives et des publications suivantes:

- *Globalization, Ethical and Institutional Concerns* (2001)
- *Globalization and Inequalities* (2002)
- *The Governance of Globalization* (2003).

Notre objectif était quadruple. D'abord, retenir des thèmes déterminants qui permettraient de tirer profit de la riche expérience de la majorité des membres de l'Académie dans ce domaine. Deuxièmement, inviter aussi des spécialistes qui ont longuement réfléchi aux sujets figurant à l'ordre du jour et des praticiens de diverses régions du monde et de différents milieux afin de refléter le mieux possible les réalités diverses de la mondialisation. Troisièmement, chercher à ce que ces recherches et ces débats puissent contribuer aux réflexions de l'Église en matière de mondialisation. Enfin, nous espérons pouvoir préparer une synthèse de ces travaux en vue de futu-

res discussions aussi bien avec le magistère qu'avec d'autres groupes ailleurs dans le monde, comme nous l'avons fait à Rome en 2002 avec les ambassadeurs près le Saint-Siège ainsi qu'à l'occasion d'un colloque très fructueux au Mexique, en juin 2004.

La mondialisation est évidemment l'aboutissement d'un long processus qui plonge ses racines dans l'Histoire. Pour plusieurs observateurs, la mondialisation remonterait au 15<sup>ème</sup> siècle à l'époque des conquêtes européennes et du mercantilisme. Elle s'est transformée graduellement au fil du temps, des inventions, des idéologies dictées principalement par les grandes puissances. Ainsi, l'apparition du capitalisme en Angleterre et de la révolution industrielle au 18<sup>ème</sup> siècle ont donné une grande impulsion à la mondialisation. L'émergence du système de production et de consommation de masse aux États-Unis, l'expansion des entreprises multilatérales, l'irruption du pétrole et de l'électricité, le boom de l'acier et de l'industrie chimique, la recherche de l'innovation et la nouvelle organisation du travail y ont aussi contribué.

L'explosion des transports et des communications, l'internationalisation des marchés financiers, le développement du commerce international et des investissements à l'étranger, les mouvements de populations, la multiplication du nombre des États et des organismes internationaux ont été d'autres éléments qui ont favorisé la montée de la mondialisation à côté des conflits, des préoccupations en matière de développement et d'environnement sans oublier les changements technologiques. Si la mondialisation est là, on constate toutefois que le monde est loin d'être un.

En réalité, il existe de nombreuses façons d'envisager la mondialisation, à partir de critères économiques, financiers, politiques, philosophiques, démographiques, juridiques, sociaux, culturels, religieux, écologiques et bien d'autres encore. De plus, chacun l'envisage la plupart du temps, à partir de son propre pays ou de son institution, en tenant compte de ses aspirations et de ses intérêts. Enfin, les acteurs de la mondialisation ne cessent de croître. A côté des 191 États qui sont maintenant membres des Nations Unies et des 450 organismes interétatiques, on compte des milliers de firmes multinationales qui jouent un rôle déterminant dans l'économie internationale et d'associations non gouvernementales qui veulent s'exprimer au nom des sociétés civiles. Et ce nombre grandira à l'avenir, on peut en être certain.

Si la gouverne d'une telle mondialisation est devenue une nécessité, il n'existe pas de consensus sur ce qu'elle devrait être et quelle forme elle devrait prendre car l'idée d'un véritable gouvernement mondial demeure toujours un projet illusoire. C'est un défi gigantesque qui revient presque

à dire qu'il faut gouverner sans gouvernement à l'échelon mondial. C'est sans doute pourquoi on a inventé, il y a une vingtaine d'années, les expressions "gouvernance mondiale" et "bonne gouvernance". Si la bonne gouvernance est devenue le "crédô" de plusieurs institutions nationales et internationales, notamment en matière de gestion et d'aide au développement, la gouvernance mondiale est un phénomène plus difficile à saisir et à définir. On l'envisage le plus souvent par strates, c'est-à-dire par couches successives en sachant fort bien que les notions de souveraineté, de pouvoir, de puissance et de défense des intérêts nationaux sont toujours au cœur des rapports internationaux, mettant ainsi des freins à la mise en œuvre d'une véritable gouvernance mondiale.

C'est pourquoi la gouvernance mondiale demeure à la fois un concept abstrait et un vœu. Sa conception théorique doit inévitablement s'accompagner d'une approche dynamique qui en fournirait les conditions de viabilité et de fonctionnement efficace, c'est-à-dire d'exister et de prospérer. Il faudrait en fait s'entendre sur l'organisation de la direction et sur les objectifs à moyen et long terme, sur la mise en commun des ressources, sur la définition des formes de coordination et des procédures de contrôle diplomatique. Le cahier de charge, on s'en rend compte, sera très lourd. Il comprendra pas seulement des tâches à caractère économique et technologique mais aussi à caractère stratégique, politique, social et environnemental et d'autres encore. Le fardeau est multidimensionnel et exigera une bonne dose de réglementation au moment où la déréglementation et la libéralisation sont à la mode. Par-dessous tout, à une époque où on a l'impression que certains ont mis l'avion sur "pilote automatique", il faudra se demander à qui l'humanité devra confier son pilotage.

Je me permettrai de tirer trois conclusions spécifiques qui découlent de nos travaux.

Premièrement, après avoir analysé les différents paramètres à la fois verticaux et horizontaux de la globalisation, il faut conclure que les visions que l'on s'en fait diffèrent grandement d'un milieu à un autre. Ces visions dépassent les cloisonnements étanches que laisseraient entendre les porte-parole soit d'un élargissement et d'un approfondissement du processus actuel de la globalisation, soit d'une réforme profonde réclamée par les "anti" et les "alter" mondialistes.

En second lieu, comme on l'a vu lors de l'assemblée portant sur les aspects éthiques et institutionnels de la mondialisation, celle-ci exige l'établissement de normes et d'institutions qui peuvent la réguler pour qu'elle puisse servir non pas une minorité mais l'ensemble de la population de la



planète. Or les travaux de l'assemblée suivante, ont mis en lumière combien la globalisation n'avait pas suscité un rétrécissement des inégalités mais avait contribué au contraire à les élargir dans plusieurs régions du monde.

Troisièmement, les revendications en vue de l'établissement d'une nouvelle gouvernance mondiale émanent aussi bien des pays industrialisés que des pays en développement où la solution des principaux problèmes politiques, stratégiques, économiques et sociaux passe par la quête d'une gouvernance planétaire. Comme on l'a vu lors des travaux qui ont mené à la publication du volume sur le sujet, cette quête d'une nouvelle gouvernance mondiale fait face à des obstacles majeurs et n'est donc pas pour demain. Cependant, comme les États ne peuvent apporter seuls des solutions aux crises de différentes sortes auxquelles l'humanité doit faire face, la gouvernance mondiale exige de nouveaux types de coopération à divers niveaux et pas seulement entre les États et les organismes interétatiques mais aussi avec d'autres entités représentant la société civile. L'Église a évidemment une place à occuper et un rôle à jouer. C'est dans cet esprit que nous souhaitons préparer une synthèse de nos recherches et nos publications.

Je saisis l'occasion qui m'est offerte ici pour remercier tous ceux et celles, membres de l'Académie et experts invités, qui nous ont accompagnés dans ces travaux sur la mondialisation.

COMMENTS ON THE TEN YEARS OF THE PASS  
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE ACADEMY  
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN AUSTRALIA

SUE RICHARDSON

*President's Column*  
*The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences*

The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences invited me – as President of a sister Academy – to participate in its 10th birthday celebrations. In the end, the Vatican being a long way from Adelaide, they welcomed me as a participant in their entire symposium for 2004. The symposium was held at the Vatican from 29 April to 3 May, with the theme of ‘Intergenerational Solidarity’. The Pontifical Academy has similarities to, and differences from our own. It is much smaller, comprising at most 40 people. Its gender ratio favours men much more than does ours. It has, as part of its purpose, the charter of drawing on the insights of the social sciences to enrich the thinking of the Catholic Church on social issues. Members are appointed by the Pope, drawn from a small number recommended by the Council of the Academy. They need not be Catholic (a number are not) and they come from all corners of the world. They must, naturally, be distinguished social scientists, though not all are academics. They are drawn principally from the disciplines of sociology, economics, law and politics. The economists amongst us will recognise Edmond Malinvaud and the Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, who are distinguished members, while Joe Stiglitz had just been appointed. I was delighted to find among the members one of our own Fellows, George Zubrzycki, who has been a member for many years. His presence at the meeting helped to make me feel particularly welcome and his contribution to the debates did our Academy proud. Like our Academy, the Pontifical Academy comprises people who have made major contributions to the social sciences and retain a lively intellectual interest in major contemporary issues.

Members take their role very seriously, as did the two invited speakers (Jacques Vallin – Chair of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, and Francis Fukuyama – the prolific and influential, political scientist). Most contributions to the symposium were provided in writing in advance (no doubt in part to facilitate the simultaneous translation into English, French and German). This enabled the President (Professor Mary Ann Glendon, a lawyer from Harvard) to prepare a draft summary and evaluation of the main contributions to the theme of inter-generational solidarity. This initial draft was then modified in the light of the spontaneous contributions during the symposium. Her insightful summary was of great value to members, but was also motivated by the requirement of the Pontifical Academy to go beyond reflection to provide tools for analysis and evaluation of concrete contemporary issues. The Academy does not attempt to do this on the basis of one symposium. Instead, it uses an initial symposium to canvas the issue, then establishes a working party comprising a sub-set of its members, who work diligently over several years to produce a final document on the topic that the whole Academy is invited to discuss and endorse. The Pontifical Academy is concerned to deal with major social issues. Unlike our Academy, it pays attention to the social teachings of the Catholic Church in deciding what are the major issues. But it is interesting nonetheless to report the topics they have chosen to bring into focus in their first 10 years. We also need to reflect on this question – what are the major social issues? – when we choose topics for the ARC Learned Academies grant applications; when we choose the topic for our annual symposium; when we contribute to discussions of the National Academies Forum; when we commission and publish *Occasional Papers* and when we respond to requests from Government for advice (for example, on the setting of the National Research Priorities). The Pontifical Academy has to date selected only four topics, since each forms the basis for several years' research. The topics are:

- Work;
- Democracy;
- Intergenerational solidarity; and
- The meaning of the human person (for 2005).

The topic of Intergenerational Solidarity encompasses several of the themes of the Australian National Research Priorities: such as the implications of the changing demographic structure of populations; the obligations between different generations and the capacity to meet those obli-

gations (including care for children); and the environmental inheritance passed from one generation to the next. To the Pontifical Academy, it meant using the lens of solidarity (care for the vulnerable and the motivation of civic friendship) to understand and evaluate the emerging relations between the generations, viewed as individual family histories and as national demographic changes. The crisis in the European welfare state attracted a lot of attention, as did the changing nature of families and how to ensure a future orientation among adults who neither have, nor intend to have children. The intellectual exchange was exhilarating. In addition, it was a rare opportunity to spend five days within the walls of the Vatican, experiencing its tranquility in the middle of the pressures of modern Rome, its historical architecture and its formal gardens. I was also generously included among the Pontifical Academy members in their audience with the Pope, to whom I was introduced as President of the Australian Academy.

### *Reflections*

The Pontifical Academy contains outstanding scholars and other thinkers, who put a great deal of care and effort into their contributions to the work of that Academy. Their thinking is sharpened by the objective of producing reasonably concrete conclusions that will assist the Catholic Church in the development of its social teaching on major issues. This requirement to go beyond the life of the mind for its own sake, to more instrumental outcomes, is pertinent to our own Academy. Such an approach could reasonably be applied to the request to our Academy from the Government for more policy-relevant thinking, under our recent Higher Education Innovation Program (HEIP) grant. It would be beneficial in promoting genuine integration of the insights of different disciplines, partly because it requires descent from very abstract language and intellectual space to more concrete realms. The potential to have an influence for the good on policy and outcomes is clearly one motivation for the voluntary effort of the members of the Pontifical Academy, as it is for our Fellows. The Pontifical Academy process of nominating a major theme, having an initial symposium on the topic (where contributions from members are supported by those from several invited scholars), appointment of a smaller team to work solidly on the topic and having at least one further symposium on the topic, leading finally to publication, has much to recommend it. It suggests to me that we could consider making more systematic use of

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our own programs to develop deep thinking on a small number of major topics. We could, for example, use a combination of workshops and an ARC-funded research program to develop material for final presentation and discussion at our annual symposium. This symposium could be invited to develop (perhaps with written contributions in advance) some specific and concrete policy recommendations.

## TRIBUTE TO EDMOND MALINVAUD

MARY ANN GLENDON

For ten years, this Academy has flourished under the leadership of Edmond Malinvaud. And, as is often the case when an institution is running smoothly, we took that happy state of affairs for granted. In recent months, however, as I have prepared to take over the presidency, I have been made vividly aware of the sheer amount, as well as the magnificent quality, of the work that he has done to give our infant academy the best possible start in its life. And I have begun to glimpse the personal sacrifice that was involved.

So it is indeed fitting and just that we honor him today, even though that may embarrass him a bit, due to the courtly reserve and modesty that are among the qualities we treasure in him.

In my country, the First President has always held a special position in the collective memory of the citizens. The chilly winds of revisionist history have blown about all of his successors, but George Washington remains immune: we remember him as first in our struggle for our independence, first in building a new nation, and, as we still say, first in the hearts of his countrymen. As first president of our Academy, Edmond Malinvaud too has been *primus inter pares*.

Dear President Malinvaud, you have nurtured us through our infancy. You have led us in our struggle (so much more difficult than that of any national academy) to achieve effective collaboration across linguistic, cultural and disciplinary boundaries. You have been patient with our difficulties and shortcomings, while never once relaxing the standards of excellence you impose on yourself and others. We look forward to being the continued beneficiaries of your gifts, and to next year's plenary session which you have generously agreed to coordinate.

Of the qualities of Edmond Malinvaud that we celebrate today, I would like to mention just three that have been particularly inspiring to me. The first I have already noted: his unflinching commitment to the highest stan-

dards of academic excellence. Secondly, he has shown us what it means for a renowned specialist in his own field to be truly dedicated to interdisciplinary cooperation. His deep interest in, and understanding of, the other social sciences, and his lively appreciation of how they must work together, have provided a model for us all. Finally, how can one fail to be moved by the way that Edmond Malinvaud, as a Catholic layman, has taken to heart the clarion call of Vatican II to laypeople to be in the forefront of evangelizing the secular sphere? That call is often lifted up by Pope John Paul II who tells us that what is expected of lay women and men is a 'great creative effort' in transforming the various sectors of family, social, professional, cultural, and political life (*Ecclesia in America*, 44). Our esteemed first President has shown in an exemplary way what it is to answer that call.

So, thank you, *Monsieur le Premier Président*, for setting an example that, like George Washington's, is impossible to replicate, but that inspires every one of your colleagues to reach a little higher.

HANS F. ZACHER

Dear Professor Malinvaud! Our new President has asked me – along with Professor Arrow – to address a few words of gratitude to you for the decade in which you held the responsibility of being our President. So I will attempt to do so, at the same time begging your indulgence for the presumption of accepting this task.

When, more than ten years ago, the founding members of this Academy were invited to join in the endeavour of establishing a Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, not one of us could truly imagine the reality of such an institution. The ideas we had differed widely. Our backgrounds varied in manifold ways. None of the experiences we brought with us fully fitted the special conditions of the project. So we had to learn to live with those conditions – and we did under your successful leadership. Now, ten years after that start, the knowledge about our role and the way we should play it has grown considerably, as has our confidence that we are heading in the right direction.

What has been the secret of your success? I believe the first rule by which you abided in governing the Academy was to avoid all too many abstract discussions about the critical questions of our *raison d'être*. Instead, you created a climate in which the concrete work was a matter of course. You led us on the experimental path of trial and error, thus also

helping us to gain orientation on principal issues. The second rule you followed, I think, was to select the right topics for the concrete work. And I feel – especially in this point – that the Academy was extremely fortunate to have listened to your advice. The third rule of your leadership was to be pragmatic in drafting the procedures of the concrete work. It was especially this maxim that enhanced the supply of our expertise. Finally, a fourth and very personal rule accompanied your governing function: your own active participation in the concrete work. Again and again, you elaborated your own contributions to our research – mainly in your capacity as an economist, although your share was not restricted to that. Let me just mention your report on the state of the Church's Social Teaching on intergenerational solidarity. Your academic reflections were not only an important contribution to the scientific work of the Academy, but also a vital source for the strength of your presidency.

Thus I am approaching the innermost reason for your success: your personality. On the one hand, your unique competence – your outstanding experience in institutional leadership, your famed and productive literary achievement as a scholar, your national as well as international rank, but also your manifold merits and your great reputation within the Church. On the other hand, your style, the discipline of your gestures, the measure of your appearance. Whenever, during the papal audiences, you addressed the Holy Father I was impressed by the respectful and at the same time upright attitude you assumed in doing so – quite the way I wanted to be represented. To be sure, if there were to be a balance between distance and proximity, your risk would not be too much proximity. But what is more important is the credibility of your equal distance to all members of the Academy. That, I believe, was a good foundation for building confidence among all of us.

Thank you for the long and risky journey you shared with us. Thank you for the example you set by your convincing authority, through which you contributed essentially to the impressive development of this extraordinary Academy in its first decade.

Dear Edmond, my great respect and warm thanks. We look forward to many years of meeting, cooperation and friendship.



## HOMÉLIE À LA MESSE DU DIMANCHE 2 MAI 2004

CARDINAL ROGER ETCHEGARAY

Chers Amis, Académiciens pontificaux,

Le mot de “solidarité” est le leitmotiv autour duquel, tel un boléro, vous avez développé et comme enroulé les réflexions de votre 10<sup>ème</sup> Assemblée Générale.

Et maintenant, ici, dans cette basilique saint Etienne des Abyssins qui remonte au premier millénaire et était, est toujours l'église la plus proche du tombeau de Pierre, ce même mot de solidarité a bien sa place au cœur de votre Eucharistie et y reçoit la plénitude de sa signification spirituelle.

Solidarité, qui es-tu?

Solidarité, pourquoi es-tu?

Solidarité, avec qui es-tu?

Solidarité, comment vis-tu?

### 1. *Solidarité, qui es-tu?*

Nous le savons. Voilà un mot de plus en plus côté à la Bourse des rencontres internationales et qui a fait son entrée dans le marché ecclésiastique. Le mot n'appartient pas au vocabulaire de la Bible, il vient du droit ou de la physique pour définir un tout qui se tient compact, fiable, solide comme un sou d'or (le “solidus”). Dans la société du 19<sup>ème</sup> siècle, il a pris même un accent anticlérical et a essayé de dévaluer, de dévaloriser, de rendre caduque la charité. Depuis Pie XII, les Papes l'ont récupéré, ennobli, voire canonisé par Jean-Paul II qui a osé en faire une “vertu chrétienne” (*Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, n. 40). Non, certes, pour lui donner une interprétation laïcisante de la charité, mais parce que ce mot séculier parle davantage à l'ensemble de l'humanité. Mais à nous, chrétiens, il revient de l'enrichir de toutes les harmoniques de la vraie charité, qui reste le maître-mot ayant cours partout, “sonnante et trébuchante”.

## 2. *Solidarité, pourquoi es-tu?*

L'idée force autour de laquelle pivote la pensée de l'Eglise est celle-ci: la solidarité est bien plus que le simple constat d'une interdépendance ou un vague sentiment de compassion. Elle est, comme le définit Jean-Paul II, "la détermination ferme et permanente de travailler pour le bien commun, c'est-à-dire pour le bien de tous et de chacun, parce que tous nous sommes vraiment responsables de tous" (SRS, 38).

Et seul le Christ peut déclencher et motiver cet engagement global. Il nous hisse jusqu'à un horizon d'où se dévoile l'unité de la famille humaine selon le plan divin qui fait que tous sont égaux et également aimés d'un même Père. Seule cette vision unitive rend, sans jeu de mots, la solidarité solide.

## 3. *Solidarité, avec qui es-tu?*

La solidarité est universelle ou elle n'est pas. Elle va au-delà de tout corporatisme ou solidarisme. Une solidarité sélective est le contresens de la fraternité. On choisit ses amis, mais pas ses frères et sœurs; ce qui rend la fraternité, par son caractère indélébile, plus onéreuse que l'amitié, surtout que la fraternité embrasse l'humanité entière.

Votre Assemblée a réfléchi sur la solidarité entre les générations, qui est aussi difficile sinon plus à vivre que la solidarité entre les cultures, car elle pénètre au sein des familles là où la filiation constitue la chaîne la plus intime.

Solidarité avec tous, mais aussi avec la création tout entière, comme l'exige le respect de l'écologie, d'une écologie tournée vers le futur qui entraîne donc le souci des générations à venir. La solidarité couvre ainsi l'espace et le temps.

## 4. *Solidarité, comment vis-tu?*

Il n'y a bien sûr, aucune recette qui puisse assurer la solidarité. Mais l'Eglise nous offre une clef qui paradoxalement, nous introduit à la solidarité universelle à travers une solidarité particulière, la plus surprenante, la plus pressante: la solidarité avec les pauvres.

Cette clef a été forgée au cours des siècles au sein du peuple de Dieu et le Christ en a fait la clef d'or de l'Evangile dans son ministère inaugural à Nazareth (Lc 4, 16-21) et dans sa parabole du Jugement dernier (Mt 25, 39-46).

"L'option privilégiée", "l'amour de préférence", "le choix prioritaire" des pauvres, ne sont pas seulement des slogans, des cris qui ont fait fureur il y

a 20 ans, notamment en Amérique Latine, et seraient maintenant dépassés, démodés. Jean-Paul II nous l'a rappelé à l'occasion du Jubilé de l'An 2000: ils représentent "un engagement ferme et irréversible".

Non seulement la rencontre du pauvre mais le partage de la vie du pauvre éveillent et garantissent notre disponibilité à être solidaires de tous: qui ne connaît pas la morsure de la vraie pauvreté risque de s'endormir dans son confort solitaire, il ne peut plus affiner son regard pour découvrir de nouveaux espaces ouverts à une solidarité sans cesse élargie. Paraphrasant saint Jean, je dirais: celui qui prétend aimer les pauvres qu'il ne voit pas (et donc moins encombrants parce que plus distants) et n'aime pas le pauvre couché devant sa porte, celui-là est un menteur. Au cours des siècles, tout le renouveau de l'Eglise s'est fait à travers des alliances avec les pauvres, en particulier dans la vie religieuse.

Vous me permettrez de citer un livre que j'ai lu récemment *Quand la misère chasse la pauvreté*, écrit par un Iranien Majed Rahnema, professeur dans une université californienne, qui a représenté son pays à l'ONU et l'ONU au Mali. Il démontre "combien une transformation radicale de nos modes de vie, notamment une réinvention de la pauvreté choisie, est désormais devenue la condition sine qua non de toute lutte sérieuse contre les nouvelles formes de production de la misère".

Nous qui sommes, en ce moment, réunis autour de la table Eucharistique, reconnaissons que nous sommes des privilégiés pour donner à la Solidarité toute sa verdeur et toute sa vigueur. L'exemple du Christ nous entraîne dans la logique pascal qui dépasse toutes les logiques humaines. Partager par amour conduit toujours plus loin dans le partage que partager par justice.

Certes, les chemins de la solidarité sont divers; ils sont surtout longs, très longs: on n'a jamais fini de les parcourir. Que l'élan pascal, renouvelé de dimanche en dimanche, nous pousse toujours en avant parce que nous savons que le Christ nous précède toujours en Galilée et jusqu'aux extrémités de la terre. Il nous entraîne à être solidaires avec tous... mais d'abord avec nous-même, au fond de nous-mêmes, solidaires avec Dieu qui nous a créés à son image et ressemblance.

Amen

## TABLES




Figure 1. Pyramide des âges de la Russie au 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1997. *Source*: Caselli et Vallin, 2001a.




Figure 2. Pyramide des âges de la Roumanie au 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1995. *Source*: United Nations, 1997.




Figure 3. Pyramide des âges de la Chine au recensement de 1990. *Source*: PCO, 1993.




Figure 4. Les effets du changement de régime démographique: pyramides des âges comparées de l'Inde en 1951, du Kenya en 1969, de la France en 1911, de l'Italie en 1995 et de la Suède en 1950. *Source*: Caselli et Vallin, 2001a.




Figure 5. L'effet des migrations: pyramides des âges de l'Italie en 1911, de l'Algérie en 1974 et du Koweït en 1980. Sources: Algérie: ONS, 1976; Italie, DGSL, 1914; Koweït, CSO, 1995.




Figure 6. L'effet des migrations: pyramides des âges de Fiuminata (Italie) en 1991, de Sun City (Arizona) en 1980. Sun City: Leridon et Toulemon, 1997; Fiuminata: ISTAT, 1995.




Figure 7. Évolution comparée de la part des jeunes de moins de 20 ans dans les populations de l'Inde et du Kenya, de 1950 à 2000. *Source*: United Nations, 2003.




Figure 8. Croissances comparées des populations de l'Inde et du Kenya d'après les estimations des Nations unies et projections jusqu'en 2050. *Source*: United Nations, 2003.






Figure 9. Évolution des pyramides d'âges française et anglaise depuis le milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle (suite page suivante). *Source:* Caselli et Vallin, 2001a; Vallin et Meslé, 2001.




Figure 9 (suite). Évolution des pyramides d'âges française et anglaise depuis le milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle. *Source:* Caselli et Vallin, 2001a; Vallin et Meslé, 2001; Conseil de l'Europe, 2001.




Figure 10. Évolution de la part (%) des 60 ans et plus dans la population totale de la France et de l'Angleterre-Galles depuis le milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et au Japon depuis 1930. *Source*: Caselli et Vallin, 2001a; Vallin et Meslé, 2001; Conseil de l'Europe, 2001; NIPSSR, 2003.




Figure 11. Structures par âge des populations stables associant la mortalité française du milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle aux fécondités françaises de la même époque (5,6), de 1974 (2,1) et de 1999 (1,8). Sexe féminin.




Figure 12. Structures par âge des populations stables associant différents niveaux de mortalité ayant prévalu en France depuis le milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle à un TFT de 2,1 ou de 1,8 enfants par femme.




Figure 13. Évolution de la part (%) des 60 ans et plus dans la population totale de la France et de l'Angleterre-Galles depuis le milieu du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et au Japon depuis 1930 (figure 10) comparée à celles de quelques populations stables construites sur la base de données françaises.




Figure 14. Évolution depuis 1950 de la proportion des 60 ans et plus et projections jusqu'en 2050 selon les hypothèses de fécondité haute (H), basse (B) et moyenne (M) des Nations unies. *Source*: United Nations, 2003.




Figure 15. Évolution depuis 1950 et projection jusqu'en 2050 de la proportion (%) de population de 60 ans et plus dans quelques pays en développement comparée aux États-Unis, à l'Europe occidentale et au Japon. NB: pour les pays développés: en trait continu, hypothèse haute, en pointillé, hypothèse basse; pour les pays en développement: à gauche (A), hypothèse moyenne, à droite (B), hypothèse basse.




Figure 16. Évolution depuis 1950 de la proportion des 20-59 ans et projections jusqu'en 2050 selon les hypothèses de fécondité haute (H), basse (B) et moyenne (M) des Nations unies. *Source*: United Nations, 2003.




Figure 17. Évolution depuis 1950 et projection jusqu'en 2050 de la proportion (%) de population de 20-59 ans dans quelques pays en développement et au Japon. NB: pour les pays développés: en trait continu, hypothèse moyenne, en pointillé, hypothèse haute; pour les pays en développement: à gauche (A), hypothèse moyenne, à droite (B), hypothèse basse.




Figure 18. Évolution depuis 1950 et projection jusqu'en 2050 de la proportion (%) de population de 20-59 ans dans quelques pays en développement à baisse de fécondité moins précoce, comparés au États-Unis, à l'Europe occid. et au Japon. NB: pour les pays développés: en trait continu, hypothèse moyenne, en pointillé, hypothèse haute; pour les pays en développement: à gauche (A), hypothèse moyenne, à droite (B), hypothèse basse.




Figure 19. Pyramide des âges de la population mondiale en 2050, 2100 et 2150 dans l'hypothèse d'un accomplissement de la transition démographique à 2,1 enfants par femme et 85 ans d'espérance de vie (effectifs en milliers). Source: Vallin *et al.*, 2004.




Figure 20. Évolution jusqu'à sa stabilisation de la pyramide des âges dans l'hypothèse du passage à l'enfant unique (effectifs en milliers), l'espérance de vie plafonnant à 85 ans  
*Source: Vallin et al., 2004.*




Figure 21. Pyramides d'âges en 2300: effet du passage à 150 ans d'espérance de vie selon le type de courbe de survie, combiné au passage à l'enfant unique (effectifs en millions).






Figure 22. Pyramides d'âges en 2150: effet du changement de rapport de masculinité à la naissance ( $r_m$ ) selon que la fécondité suit le modèle Nations unies à 2,1 enfants par femme ou le modèle de l'enfant unique, l'espérance de vie étant plafonnée à 85 ans (proportions %).




Figure 23. Pyramides d'âges en 2250: effet du changement de rapport de masculinité à la naissance ( $r_m$ ) selon que la fécondité suit le modèle Nations unies à 2,1 enfants par femme ou le modèle de l'enfant unique, l'espérance de vie s'élevant à 150 ans (survie rectangularisée) (proportions %).

DIVORCE



Figure I.

BIRTHS TO SINGLE MOTHERS




Figure II.

TOTAL FERTILITY




Figure III.

FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION




Figure IV.

VIOLENT CRIME



Figure V.

PROPERTY CRIME






Figure VI.

Figure 1.  
LIFE EXPECTANCY OF NEW-BORN CHILDREN IN SELECTED REGIONS, 1950-2050.  
PROJECTION 2002-2050




Source: UN Population Division: World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, Medium Variant.

Figure 2.  
 MEDIAN AGES IN SELECTED REGIONS, 1950-2050\*



Source: UN Population Division: World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, Medium Variant.


Figure 3.  
AGE QUOTIENTS IN SELECTED REGIONS, 1950-2050  
(RATIO OF THOSE AGED OVER 65 TO THE GROUP OF 15-64 YEAR OLDS)



Source: UN Population Division: World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, Medium Variant.



Figure 4.  
THE INFLATION-ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES/REGIONS



Source: OECD, Economic Outlook No 74, Paris 2003.

Table I. INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 1996-2002 <sup>(\*)</sup>

COUNTRY	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Austria	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.00	2.05	2.10
Belgium	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10
Denmark	2.00	2.05	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.05	1.90
Finland	2.35	2.20	2.15	2.25	2.20	2.15	1.95
France	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.00	2.00	2.70
Germany	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.20	2.20	2.10	2.10
Greece	2.80	2.50	2.85	2.85	2.75	2.70	2.90
Ireland	2.10	2.10	1.90	1.80	1.85	1.65	1.80
Italy	2.00	2.00	2.40	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.35
Luxembourg	2.00	2.00	1.80	1.85	1.80	1.75	1.80
Netherlands	1.80	1.85	2.10	2.05	2.05	1.85	1.80
Portugal	2.65	2.40	2.40	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30
Spain	2.70	2.75	2.45	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.30
Sweden	2.85	2.45	2.45	2.35	2.35	2.25	2.25
United Kingdom	1.80	1.50	1.85	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.85
United States	1.85	1.80	1.85	1.80	1.80	1.75	1.80
Japan	2.05	2.05	2.00	2.05	2.15	2.05	2.45

(\*) The Index of Economic Freedom measures how well different countries score on a list of 50 independent variables divided into 10 broad factors of economic freedom. The higher the score on a factor, the greater the level of government interference and the less economic freedom that country enjoys.

Source: J.T. Raga on the data of Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. Holmes, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, *2002 Index of Economic Freedom*. The Heritage Foundation & Dow Jones and Company, Inc. Washington and New York, 2002.

Figure I. INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 1996-2002




Table II. EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO  
 (% of persons aged 15+ not employed / persons employed)

EU Countries	2000	2020	2050
B	114	121	128
DK	58	77	76
D	82	93	105
EL	118	116	116
E	123	102	120
F	76	82	89
IRL	74	83	87
I	134	131	142
L	34	0	29
NL	83	96	102
A	94	105	111
P	70	78	86
FIN	79	99	104
S	74	80	86
UK	69	85	90
EU	90	99	106

Source: José T. Raga, on the data bases of *Budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations...* European Union-Economic Policy Committee. Brussels, 24 October 2001.

Figure II. EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO  
 (% of persons 15+ not employed / persons employed)




Table III. TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 1999-2004 (as % of GDP) <sup>(c)</sup>

COUNTRY	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	53.7	51.8	52.0	52.0	52.1	51.1
Belgium	50.7	50.0	48.4	50.1	48.7	49.3
Denmark	55.4	53.3	55.0	54.0	54.4	54.0
Finland	51.0	40.4	45.0	49.2	45.7	49.0
France	53.5	52.8	52.5	53.7	54.1	53.8
Germany	48.8	45.5	48.3	48.0	48.8	48.4
Greece	45.2	44.7	47.0	47.7	47.1	48.2
Ireland	35.7	35.8	34.1	33.7	34.0	33.6
Italy	48.0	48.5	48.5	47.5	47.4	47.2
Luxembourg	42.8	41.2	40.3	40.5	40.3	40.4
Netherlands	46.0	45.4	46.4	47.2	47.5	47.7
Portugal	44.8	44.5	45.3	45.3	47.0	46.8
Spain	40.6	39.9	39.3	39.6	39.8	39.6
Sweden	50.3	50.4	47.2	48.2	48.1	48.2
United Kingdom	40.1	37.7	38.8	40.7	41.5	42.2

<sup>(c)</sup> Spring 2003 economic forecasts.

Source: J.T. Raga on the data of “European Economy” n. 3/2001 *Public Finances in EMU-2001*, European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. European Communities, 2001; and all the same reference for the n. 3/ 2003.

Figure III. TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 1994-2004 (as % of GDP)




Table IV. PENSION EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2010-2050 (as % of GDP, before tax)

EU Countries	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
B	9,00	10,45	12,50	15,00	12,80
DK	12,70	14,00	14,70	13,90	13,20
D	9,50	10,60	13,20	14,40	14,00
EL	12,80	15,40	19,80	23,80	24,80
E	9,30	10,30	12,50	15,30	17,70
F	13,10	15,00	16,00	15,60	14,40
IRE	5,00	8,70	7,80	8,30	9,00
I	14,20	14,90	15,80	15,70	13,90
L	7,50	8,20	9,20	9,90	9,30
NL	9,10	11,10	13,10	14,10	13,80
A	14,50	16,70	17,80	17,00	15,10
P	12,00	14,40	16,00	15,80	14,20
FIN	11,80	14,00	15,70	16,00	15,00
S	9,20	10,20	10,70	10,70	10,00
LK	4,70	4,40	4,70	4,40	5,00

Source: José T. Raga on the data of *European Economy. Public Finances in EMU – 2001*, n. 3, 2001. European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. European Communities, 2001.

Figure IV. PENSION EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2010-2050 (as % of GDP, before tax)




Table V. RATIO: CONTRIBUTORS / PENSIONERS RATIO IN THE SPANISH SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (Statistical data until year 2000; forecast for the rest)

Year	Ratio
1965	2,03
1969	2,13
1980	1,78
2000	1,87
2005	1,86
2010	1,83
2015	1,81
2020	1,88
2025	1,48
2030	1,32
2035	1,16
2040	1,07
2045	1,01
2060	0,98

Source: José T. Raga on the data of: *Círculo de Empresarios, Una reforma integral del sistema de pensiones en España*. *Círculo de Empresarios*, Madrid, 2001, p. 127.

Figure V. CONTRIBUTORS / PENSIONERS RATIO IN THE SPANISH SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM




Table VI. PUBLIC PENSIONS IN SPAIN. REVENUES, EXPENDITURES AND NET BALANCE [P.A.Y.G. System (in % of GDP)] <sup>(c)</sup>

Years	Revenues	Expenditures	Net Balance
1990	8,0900	7,4100	0,6800
1995	8,1900	8,3200	-0,1420
2000	8,3400	8,4700	-0,0750
2005	8,4600	8,3800	0,0850
2010	8,3000	8,4300	-0,1270
2015	8,1100	8,7300	-0,6170
2020	7,5900	9,2700	-1,2750
2025	7,0900	9,5400	-2,2450
2030	7,1500	10,2900	-3,1150
2035	6,6100	10,4700	-3,8640
2040	6,0500	10,3100	-4,2670
2045	5,5700	9,8800	-4,3150
2050	5,2100	9,3500	-4,1350

<sup>(c)</sup> Statistical data until year 2000; forecast for the rest. It is assumed that a 2.5% rate of growth of GDP will take place in the period.

Source: José T. Raga on the data of *Círculo de Empresarios, Una reforma integral del sistema de pensiones en España*. *Círculo de Empresarios*. Madrid, 2001, p. 134.

Figure VI. PUBLIC PENSIONS IN SPAIN. REVENUES, EXPENDITURES AND NET BALANCE [P.A.Y.G. System (in % of GDP)]





Table VII. TECHNICAL PROVISIONS FOR THE SPANISH PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM

Type of Pension and G.D.P.	1992	1993	1994
Social Security System ( $10^{12}$ Pesetas)	50,73	62,76	67,53
Civil Servants System ( $10^{12}$ Pesetas)	-8,80	0,00	9,34
Total Public Pension System ( $10^{12}$ Pesetas)	65,12	71,85	76,67
Gross Domestic Product $_{t-1}$ ( $10^{12}$ Pesetas)	59,00	60,90	64,67
Total Provisions in per cent of G.D.P.	110,37	117,98	118,86

Figure VII. TECHNICAL PROVISIONS FOR THE SPANISH PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM







The President of the PASS addresses H.H. John Paul II on 30 April 2004.



President Mary Ann Glendon opens the tenth Plenary Session of the PASS (29 April 2004).



A few Participants of the tenth Plenary Session of the PASS.



Academician Prof. Zacher presents his paper.



H.Em. Card. Roger Etchegaray and H.E. Msgr. Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo celebrate Mass on Sunday, 2 May 2004.



Participants in the courtyard of the Casina Pio IV.



Former President Malinvaud and Prof. Richardson in the courtyard of the Casina Pio IV.

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