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SOCIAL INTEGRATION, SYSTEM INTEGRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

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Introduction

What differentiates globalisation from the world system, which developed after the sixteenth century?[1] Not every element of the new is necessarily novel nor does all that is solid always melt into air – as those keen to proclaim 'new ages' and to carve out 'new eras' like to suppose. Instead, the distinctive feature of the globalisation process is held to lie in its penetration and penetrative potential. The combined consequence of those economic, political and cultural changes, which constitute globalisation, is that they affect everyone on the planet. Progressive penetration means that we all become denizens of one world; the problem is that we have not become 'citizens' of it.

Specifically, the problem raised by globalisation concerns guidance and participation. The absence of guiding agencies has been highlighted by sociologists in terms of the 'runaway society'[2] or the 'risk society'. The lack of participatory mechanisms has been captured by the concept of 'exclusion'. If participation means 'having a say' and channels through which to say it, then the human family is worse off in these respects and becoming more so, although the costs are unequally distributed around the globe. To be affected by globalisation, without any ability to exert a counter-effect, is the lot of the vast majority of the world's population. It means that global

[1] As advanced most notably by Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 3 vols., Academic Press, New York and San Diego, 1974-89.

[2] A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990. Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, London, Sage, [1986] 1992.

penetration is negatively related to participation. Not only is it unaccompanied by new forms of government and governance, it systematically disempowers those previous and hard-won agencies for guidance and participation – representative democracy, the institutions of civil society, trade unionism, and citizenship – which, until now, were associated with 'development'. That is the truly novel consequence of early globalisation.

To some sociological commentators, all that had seemed solid had melted – into the ether. What globalisation left was a gaping void between free-floating global networks and the atomised individual – the two connected only by Internet. One of the results was an alarm call for the immediate generation of new sociological perspectives. Sociology, as a product of modernity, had followed its contours until the last few years. In particular, this meant that the nation state was equated with society, that different nation states constituted different societies, and that any international organisations (first of all the UN), alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) or supra-national organisations (EEC), the latter having some quasi-federal features, were quite properly studied inter-nationally. 'The global shift changed all that, and much of the theoretical alignment of sociology today flows from the challenge of globality to modernity'.[3] Too often, sound-bite concepts substituted for sustained analysis, and too frequently, a discursive *mésalliance* was forged with post-modernism – despite the irony of global commentators supplying the proponents of virtual reality with their repudiated meta-narrative. Although the two should not be elided, their joint impact was to inflate the hegemony of discourse, imagery and artistic license over *La Misère du Monde*.[4]

Analysis is indispensable; it cannot be replaced by epistemic 'takes' on reality, which accentuate only the most observable changes, to the detriment of underlying causal processes – and privilege the vantage point of academic elites in the Western world. Moreover, *generic* analytical concepts cannot be discarded in the same way as *substantive* concepts, linked to particular social formations at particular times (such as 'the deferential voter' or the 'affluent worker'). Instead, this paper is based upon harnessing one of the most fruitful *generic* frameworks to the analysis of globalisation, its impacts upon prior social configurations and its consequences for posterior ones.

[3] Martin Albrow, 'The Global Shift and its Consequences for Sociology', paper presented at the 13th World Congress of Sociology, Brisbane, July, 2002, p. 8.

[4] Pierre Bourdieu et al, Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1999.

This framework rests upon the distinction between 'system integration', the orderly or disorderly relations between the institutional parts of society, and 'social integration', the orderly or disorderly relations between members of society.[5] The point of sustaining this distinction is twofold. Firstly, these two elements of social reality possess different properties and powers from one another; 'systemic integration' can vary from contradiction to complementarity, whilst 'social integration' can vary from antagonism to solidarity. Secondly, they may vary independently of one another, and it is thus their combination that accounts for different patterns of stability and change in society. Social regularity results *caeteris paribus* when both are high, and societal transformation, when both are low. These are only two out of the four possible combinations, but they are the pair with the most strikingly different outcomes. This framework, which has been applied to pre-modern formations, like patrimonial bureaucracy, and to modern variants, like state socialism, should also be able to reveal what combination of 'social' and 'systemic' integration characterised the developed democracies in late modernity and what new combination of them is induced by globalisation. On the most macroscopic scale, it is maintained that two types of combinations between 'social' and 'system' integration do characterise successive phases of recent world history – although this is to use broad brush strokes that inevitably over-generalise.

Firstly, in the period that can be called Late Modernity, both forms of integration had slowly been rising because of their mutual dependence within the nation state. Such dependence underlay the growing responsiveness of the system to society and vice versa. When this reached the point of their *mutual regulation*, then *its* emergent causal power was simultaneously to foster further increments in social and systemic integration. Such societies were far from being fully good, fully fair or fully consensual. Nevertheless, their stability and regularity was an achievement; supplying plural and legitimate channels for their own re-shaping, a relatively stable context for institutional operations, and a relatively secure environment for individual life-projects. However, this configuration was intolerant of disturbance from outside. Thus, at the climacteric of the nation state in the twentieth century, the World Wars always entailed 'national reconstruction'. External disruption was precisely what

[5] David Lockwood, 'Social integration and system integration', in G.K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds.), *Explorations in Social Change,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1964, pp. 244-57.

globalisation represented, and it entirely undermined the configuration upon which the developed democracies depended for their existence. The emergence of what is termed Nascent Globality, meant that both forms of integration plummeted to such a low level that they were incapable of regulating one another – as key institutions moved beyond national confines, onto the world stage, after the 1980s.

Following the Second World War, these successive phases represented the disjunctive transition from the mutual regulation between system and society in Late Modernity, to their precise opposite, a configuration working for mutual de-regulation, in Nascent Globality. It is the speed of their succession and their juxtapositioning that fuelled the call for a new sociological perspective to grasp this *rerum novarum*. There is no dispute here that a new phenomenon had come about with globalisation. However, I will defend the ability of our *generic* framework, with its ontological depth and distrust of observable surface features, to provide a better analytical purchase upon its causes and consequences than any of the current, popular forms of rhetorical impressionism.

This defence can be evaluated by the leverage it provides on the big question of governance – by its ability to answer the question, 'What made governance relatively unproblematic in Late Modernity and so very problematic within Nascent Globality?' Moreover, this framework enables the question about future governance to be posed with some analytical specificity, namely 'Can the process of mutual de-regulation between the systemic and the social be overcome at world level?'

Late Modernity – the mutual regulation of the systemic and the social

The predominance of the nation state made the national sub-system more important than the world system, whilst ever there were more internal institutional linkages and dependencies within the nation than ones outside it. For example, this social configuration was characterised by a national labour market, upon which the national economy was heavily dependent, a national legal system, whose definition of rights and duties constituted membership of the *pays légale*, a national educational system, the validity of whose credentials was largely restricted to the country (and its dependencies), and a national demarcation between the powers of state and church. Such was the magnitude of these differences that they fostered the development of comparative sociology as a comparison of nation states.

The developed democracies, which finally emerged in the mid-twentieth century, after two hundred years of struggle in the West and eighty years of consolidation in Japan, were distinctive societal configurations. These nation states were characterised by a relatively smooth dovetailing of their component institutions and the less smooth, but nevertheless successful, integration of their populations into a citizenship which took the revolutionary edge off enduring class divisions.[6] In short, they had achieved a rising level of system integration *in conjunction* with a growing level of social integration. This common, underlying configuration was attributable to internal processes, particular to each country – as is underlined by the fact that it did not preclude warfare between them. Certainly, the stress placed upon internal processes should not underplay the significance of colonialism or neo-colonialism as sources of wealth, means of off-loading surplus production and a method for controlling migration and immigration to national advantage. Nevertheless, there was never one uniform colonial adventure because patterns of external incursion were specific to each nation state and accommodated to nationally defined aims and objectives.[7]

Since the conjunction between rising systemic integration and growing social integration cannot be attributed to a hidden hand or to automatic functional adaptation, because the process itself was tense, conflict-ridden and haunted by the spectre of revolution, what accounted for it in such different countries? A causal mechanism needs to be identified because the Russian revolution *inter alia* shows that there are important instances where it was lacking.

The mechanism advanced here consists in the successful if stressful emergence of *mutual regulation between the systemic and the social*. Firstly, the necessary but not sufficient conditions for mutual regulation are rooted in the nation state itself. When state boundaries also defined the outer skin of society, then the necessary interplay between the systemic and the social, within the same territorial confines, ineluctably meant that *the state of the one mattered to the state of the other*. This is an ontological statement about inter-dependence, which is itself independent from either the institutional elites or the popular masses knowing it,

[6] T.H. Marshall, see 'Citizenship and Social Class' in his *Sociology at the Crossroads*, Heinemann, London, 1963.

[7] Hence, for example, the huge difference between British and French colonial rule – the one direct and the other indirect; the former structurally anti-assimilationist and the latter assimilating through the export and imposition of its educational and legal systems etc.

articulating it, let alone getting it right. Indeed, the case of Tsarist Russia illustrates the actuality of getting it wrong.

However, the sufficient, though nonetheless contingent, condition for the emergence of *mutual regulation* from *mutual dependence* was fundamentally cultural. It depended upon the vanguards of the system and of society *both* finding 'voice'. Historically, overwhelming emphasis has been placed on the systemic side of this equation, for institutional elites undoubtedly found their 'voice' first. Thus, burgeoning nationhood was presented as 'the great age of ideology'. What this 'age' fundamentally involved was the (attempted) legitimation of the system to society – entailing the crucial recognition that the state of society mattered to systemic stability. (A recognition signally lacking in Russia after the 'enlightened' attempts of Catherine the Great). However, the emergence of *mutual regulation* is not built upon protracted false consciousness. For such regulation to supersede mutual dependence, it was equally important that the 'third estates' should find their own 'voice', in the counter-ideologies of republicanism, political philosophy, socialism or the *volkgeist* – pressing for representation and redistribution within the system. Their common denominator was the simple message that the state of the system was intolerable to society – and the warning that this state of affairs mattered so much that society threatened to overthrow and recast the system.

In fact, such ideological conflict was the precursor of *mutual regulation* itself. This is because as ideology and counter-ideology lock horns, the predominant effect is not to promote extremism (or synthesis) but the progressive argumentative elaboration of both doctrines, and their successors.[8] Because charge was met by counter-charge and riposte by counter-riposte on both sides, the two increasingly defined one another's agendas. What emerged represented victory for neither, but rather much more sophisticated and refined versions of both, as I have illustrated elsewhere for classical political economy versus socialist economics in late nineteenth century England.[9] The unintended consequence was that two corpuses of ideas were elaborated *in opposition to one another* – unintentionally *mutual regulation* had been instituted. In this process, with nei-

[8] See Margaret S. Archer, *Culture and Agency*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, which takes up Imre Lakatos's notion of progressive and degenerating paradigm shifts and applies them, as he suggested was possible for any form of argumentation, to ideological elaboration. pp. 239-42.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 248-53.

ther winners nor losers, the result was that both sets of ideas became socially embedded and assured one another's continued salience in society, precisely because of their enduring opposition. This was their *effet pervers mais positif* for one another. In other words, *mutual regulation* depends neither upon a growing consensus between people nor upon compatibility between ideas. It is only a matter of co-presence and ideational engagement between the 'parties' involved. (Significantly, it is precisely the absence of co-presence that explains the efforts directed to *concientización* – in the old usage of the term – within Latin America, as a precondition of effective movements for justice and equality).

The same two elements – co-presence and engagement – also underpinned the emergence of *mutual regulation* between system and society at the institutional level. What is different is that these were explicit attempts at two-way regulation. This was most obvious in political institutions, with elites attempting to use restricted participation in order to be able to regulate the people and the popular classes seeking to extend democratic access and rights in order to regulate the elites. But the same scenario was enacted throughout the array of increasingly interconnected institutions and was largely responsible for their growing interconnectedness. Thus, in the British economy, the entrepreneurs sought to control wage rates, working conditions, working hours, housing, shopping and eventually the religious denomination and definition of appropriate instruction, in order to regulate their workforce. The workers responded with luddism, unionisation, direct and indirect political action, to regulate their bosses, and co-operative retailing as well as independent secularised education to offset the regulative incursions of capitalism. Again in the law, whilst the institutional elites sought to buttress social control through the workhouse, asylum, experimentation with imprisonment, and by linking legal participation tightly to property-holding, radical elements worked to undermine the legal privilege definitive of or associated with privilege itself.

The educational scenario is particularly revealing of how systemic interconnectedness grew out of the struggle over *mutual regulation*. If reform could be introduced from above, as with the Napoleonic *Université Impériale*, the new political elite could immediately make it an institution subserving State requirements, by dispossessing owners of previous networks of their schools, controlling their right to teach, and limiting *lycée* access to socially appropriate pupils. Yet the resistance of the traditional religious educators, combined with the insistence of the new industrialists, and also with resurgent republicanism, meant that in the second half of the

nineteenth century, the state educational monopoly was both cut and regulated by *liberté d'enseignement* (religious freedom to [re-]open schools), by *éducation spéciale* (geared to industry and commerce), and by *gratuité* (opening it to the people). Conversely, if reform was introduce from bottom-upwards, as in England, strong private networks were developed in a competition to serve their respective owners and regulate the rest of the population through spreading their particular definitions of instruction. First and foremost was the Anglican Church's network, secondly that of the alliance between entrepreneurs and religious dissenters (what we would now call the Free Churches), and lastly and least numerously by that of the working class – represented by secular Mechanics Institutes, in resistance to the first two networks. When this market competition in schooling ended in educational stalemate, by the mid-nineteenth century, the next fifty years witnessed the formation of a state educational system (1902) *through* the incorporation of these diverse institutions for regulation, counter-regulation and resistance to regulation.

Thus, in both counties, a hundred-year conflict had resulted in State Educational Systems[10] that also serviced diverse sectors of society – an unintended consequence in each case. The two educational systems epitomised *mutual regulation* between the State and civil society, which had given them their twentieth century form and content. Equally, both educational systems were now intimately interconnected with a plurality of other social institutions, thus increasing overall systemic integration, and both were approaching universal enrolment, thus simultaneously extending overall social integration.

This is not quite the end of the story in those countries where the analytical key has been held to lie in the *mutual regulation* achieved between high systemic and high social integration. In fact, the story line continues with their collective endorsement and enactment of the 'post-war formula' (social democracy + neo-capitalism + welfare state) – and runs on past it.

Firstly, systemic integration could be extended beyond the boundaries of the nation state, as the working of the European Union shows in various institutional domains. What is significant here is that the *mutual regulation* of system and society expanded correspondingly. For example, even individual nationals availed themselves of this new systemic apparatus for the

[10] For a detailed account of this protracted conflict, see Margaret S. Archer, *Social Origins of Educational Systems*, Sage, London and Beverly Hills, 1979.

regulation of national society. Cases of gender discrimination against female employees, initially dismissed at home, were often sustained at the European Court of Justice, whose rulings finally became established as 'good practice' back home in the national society.

Secondly, there remained considerable scope for increasing social integration within the nation state by incorporating a growing number of sectional interest groups, which were previously marginalised and subjected to discrimination. From the 1960s, the lead given earlier by the lower classes was passed like a baton to other interest groupings that had not engaged in large-scale collective action – developing neither articulate aims nor organising for their pursuit. Gender and ethnic groups became the new collective agents of the western world. Pursuant of their interests, each eventually made the political and institutional breakthroughs that spelt fuller social incorporation. In turn, increased civil rights, changes in social security entitlements, in terms of employment, and especially the variety of anti-discrimination laws, procedures and protocols introduced, also represented new modalities through which new sections of society could play a part in regulating the system.

In the quarter of a century following the Second World War, the developed democracies were characterised by the robust nature of *mutual regulation* prevailing between their institutional orders and social orders – between the parts of society and its members. These societies were far from being fair, egalitarian or fully democratic. Nevertheless, the two-way regulation established between system and society was better than it had been throughout modernity. This conjuncture held the promise of intensifying *mutual regulation*, such that fairer societies might be progressively and peacefully negotiated; ones where guidance and participation were increasingly inter-linked. All of that promise depended upon the nation state remaining co-extensive with society.

However, no final balance sheet can be presented because these remained unfinished stories. They were cut short by the structural and cultural transformations of the 1980s, which spelt nascent globalisation – slicing through national boundaries as the outer skins of societies and demolishing their hard-won, if cosy, internal settlements between the system and the social. The key structural dynamic was the rise of multi-national enterprises and finance markets, whose non-geocentric interests were epitomised in the abandonment of foreign exchange regulations in 1980. The central cultural dynamic was the invention of the World Wide Web in 1989, severing most of the link between intellectual property and its geo-local

ownership. It is common to add the fall of State Socialism to this list, in the sense that the end of the Cold War brought down the barriers between the first and second worlds, opened up new markets, enhanced free communication and fostered population movements. All of that was important and contributory. However, for the present argument, the significance of the ending of State Socialism also lay in showing the non-transferability of the formula for *mutual regulation* between systemic and social integration. Eastern European countries lacked both features and therefore the regulative relationship between them. With nascent globalisation, they could never even try to consolidate (unlikely as its prospects seemed) that which the developed democracies were themselves about to lose.

Nascent Globality – reducing systemic and social integration

The socio-cultural effects of globalisation were registered as a *simultaneous decline* in the relatively high levels of systemic and social integration that had slowly and quite recently been achieved in the developed democracies. The simultaneity of their decline served to reinforce the fragmentation of each other. As this occurred, their *mutually regulatory* relationship was a necessary casualty. The process of its demise repays attention, because pin-pointing what was lost enables us to question the prospects of it being regained on a world scale.

Where systemic integration is concerned, the downsizing of the nation state's powers was the prime consequence of economic and financial operations bursting through national boundaries, at the same time and in synergy with the means of communication and cultural distribution. Specifically, 'its regulatory ability is challenged and reduced'.[11] The challenge to the state is obvious; so many economic activities, previously subject to government controls, now escaped governmental jurisdiction, and so many information flows, previously amenable to national restriction, now floated free in the ether. But the reduction in the regulatory ability of the nation state is more complex. When leading elements of the structural and cultural systems re-(or de-)located themselves globally, then other institutions could no longer operate primarily within national confines. To take education as an example; 'transferable skills' then became more important than learning national history, professional training for law or

[11] David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 267.

accountancy surpassed mastery of the local 'black letter' or competence in dealing with the IRS or Inland Revenue, and in academia, Mannheim's free-floating intelligentsia was finally in its element. All of this was readily observable in Britain and, ironically, at precisely the time that government (both parties) attempted to exert unprecedented control over curriculum, teaching and research.

At its simplest, such institutions were confronted by new 'markets' and by pressure from their clients to prepare them for these new outlets, which precluded supine responsiveness to governmental regulation. Instead, institutional leaders had to respond with innovation – as it were making their best guesses about best new practice, where national guidelines no longer constituted the best information. As they did so, each in a real sense went its own way, no longer constrained by old institutional interrelations and interdependencies. In sum, 'once culture, economy, even politics were de-linked from the nation state, there followed more general de-linkage of each from the other, and of all from society'.[12]

The de-linking of system from national society is vital. It has been argued that the ultimate source of *mutual regulation* used to be grounded in the fact that the state of society mattered to the working of the system and vice versa. This was decreasingly the case as can be seen most clearly for the economic elites. Because they are no longer dependent upon one (largely) national population, their concern vanishes about whether or not multi-national practices receive endorsement from within any nation, which in the past had meant accepting conciliatory regulation. Instead, enterprises move parts of their operations to employ 'suitable' personnel throughout the world. Thus, corporate management looses itself from the constraint that the need for legitimation had previously imposed upon it – because now there is no determinate population of employees, indispensable to its activities, who are also its national legitimators. Social consensus therefore becomes irrelevant to the exercise of institutional power. Institutional power has less and less need to seek to transform itself into authority. Instead, what is important is temporary local amenability, which, if wanting, is not met by durable concessions but by the transfer of operations. Although most marked in the multinational corporations, non-legitimation and unconcern about it is the new institutional rule; our Universities are largely indifferent to where

[12] Martin Albrow, 'The Global Shift and its Consequences', *Ibid.*, p. 8.

their students come from or what they study, so long as they come in growing, fee-paying numbers. Of course, the one institution that cannot be indifferent to legitimacy (and cannot substitute amongst its subjects) is the downsized state itself. Yet, the de-legitimation of the state is also a victim of the loss of *mutual regulation* between system and society.

This is because, *where social integration is concerned*, the state of the national system matters less and less to the national population. As public recognition grows that national institutions, but especially the state, are incapable of regulating the major players and issues, thus having a shrinking role in determining the life-chances of the nation's people, they are progressively deserted. This is indexed by the progressive drop in voter turnout across Europe, especially among the young, the fall in political Party membership, and the rapid shrinkage in Trade Union members. The message is simple; 'If these institutions can no longer perform their regulatory role on behalf of society, then why bother with them?' But it is compounded by the fall in social integration itself.

Sociologists have accentuated two features as responsible for a reduction in social integration, whose impacts fall upon distinct sections of the population, generating different responses to the state of the national system. Respectively, these pick out those *unconcerned* about and those *impotent* in relation to systemic regulation by the social at the national level.

In the first place, the effect of increasing affluence in the developed democracies – one which reached down to benefit a substantial proportion of working class males in steady employment – has long been held to be associated with their 'privatisation'.[13] This phenomenon pre-dated Nascent Globality. The 'affluent worker' takes an instrumental orientation to his work, as merely a source of pay, rather than a relation to production defining his social identity. Affluence enables his family unit to focus upon privatised concerns – upon home ownership, house improvement, holidays and material acquisitions. In some interpretations, it heralded an '*embourgeoisement*' that would actually foster social integration by diminishing class antagonism and neutralising the workplace as the prime site for the expression of class conflict. At the time, that thesis proved contentious, but new forms of 'privatisation' have advanced under Nascent Globality whose accompanying de-politicisation and self-preoccupation augment indifference to the systemic and the social alike.

[13] Goldthorpe et al., *The Affluent Worker; Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour*, Cambridge, 1968.

In an important book, Teune and Mlinar[14] maintained that as sources of innovative ideas became concentrated within the (cultural) system, rather than distributed across different parts of society (as with early industrial inventions and the technological innovations of modernity), this induced a different pattern for their assimilation. Instead of a process of collective social *interaction* (between management and unions, for example) being necessary for the appropriation and application of 'variety', its concentration within a single system, free from local gatekeepers, prompted *transaction* between the systemic source and those units who saw benefits to be derived from it.[15] This abstract analysis became more vivid when concretised in the new quotidian transactions taking place between the 'net' and its users.

The 'privatisation thesis' was recast as (an exaggerated) 'individualisation' and explicitly accentuated the reduction in social integration involved. In Beck's version, because 'individualisation' was induced by the free flow of information and media representation, traditional categories for self-direction, such as class and status or norms and values were superseded by new notions of 'living a life of one's own', personal reinvention, familial experimentation and biographical revision.[16] This preoccupation with the individualised 'life of one's own', negotiated and renegotiated amongst our new 'precarious freedoms', was held to underpin various strands that contributed to the major reduction in social integration. For example, the loss of inter-generational solidarity, demise of the traditional family, the reduced salience of class, indifference to party politics and the absenting of normative consensus.

In the second place, the growing social 'exclusion' of significant tracts of the population pointed to another source of plummeting social integration. In this case, it arises from the *impotence* rather than the *indifference* of this collectivity, who can make common cause neither vertically, with employed workers, nor horizontally with one another. Whether or not this collectivity is correctly identified as the 'underclass', its members are rightly termed the subjects of social exclusion; this highlights their radical displacement from the hierarchies of remuneration, representation and repute, rather than placing them at the bottom of the old continuum of

[14] H. Teune and Z. Mlinar, *The Developmental Logic of Social Systems*, Sage, London and Beverly Hills, 1978.

[15] For discussion of this concept, see Margaret S. Archer, *Culture and Agency*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 242-5.

[16] See Ulrich Beck, *Individualization*, Sage, London, 2002.

social stratification. Moreover, their very heterogeneity as a collectivity – single mothers, the homeless, asylum seekers, unemployed youth, drug users, the handicapped and the old – is a diversity that divides, precluding social solidarity and collective action alike.

As such, the 'excluded' are passive agents, incapable of combination, which might allow them some regulative role in the system. Instead, they are people to whom things happen, rather than those who can assume some say over their own lives or the systemic structures that exclude them. Moreover, members of this collectivity, the new poor of Nascent Globality, are more reflexively concerned with their differences than their similarities. And these differences generate social antagonism. Generational differences divide the young unemployed from the old-aged, as two of the largest portions of the new poor. The old live in fear of street mugging and barricade themselves indoors, thus intensifying their isolation. Ethnocentrism raises another barrier to cohesion, as racism scapegoats as the cause of 'poor white' grievances. Simultaneously, the inner cities are minutely partitioned by the turf wars of the street-corner drug barons.

The disintegrative consequences, for system and society alike, of the loss of *mutual regulation* between them are not confined to the developed democracies. Were these effects predominantly internal, then concern about them could be restricted to them. Instead, these disintegrative dynamics are exported into the global arena, with the same repercussions for all parts of the world. What is now being witnessed is how the de-regulated system, in assuming world proportions, simultaneously undermines the conditions for its own regulation by world society.

Disintegrative dynamics at world level

The main argument about the developed democracies was that the decline in *mutual regulation* between system and society entailed reduced integration for both system and society – thus weakening the conditions for any re-establishment of two-way regulation between them. It is now argued that precisely the same scenario has been precipitated at world level. In general, this new configuration of low systemic and low social integration is ripe for radical transformation – often entailing violent disruptions.

In part, the global structural consequences derive from neo-liberalism succeeding where traditional liberalism had failed. In the birthplaces of capitalism, liberal political economy had strenuously repudiated state intervention or any other institutionalised interference with the free play of

market forces. Yet in precisely those countries, society had progressively been able to enforce greater accountability because economic enterprise could not remain indifferent to the populations upon whom it depended. Globalised neo-liberalism was under no such constraint. It shifted from being merely a strong proponent of non-interventionism to itself becoming a strong and active de-regulator.

Specifically, the multi-nationals could seek out cheap labour markets and weak states, unable to impose regulation as the price for external investment. Because enterprises were indifferent to any given population, the global possibilities of substitution meant that any attempted regulation was met by moving on. Both prospectively and retrospectively, the effect was to amplify de-regulation. Countries seeking to attract the multi-nationals knew the terms of the deal; those deserted by them, or increasingly in hock to them, inherited a debt-burden whose servicing weakened their already frail powers of state guidance over societal development. Equally, un-regulated labour markets deprived civil society of the main agency whose participation could temper the state. The unreeling of institutionalised corruption in government and the (almost inevitable) extension of the informal sector in society were the consequences of conjoint reductions in systemic and social integration. This is, of course, a combination that is mutually reinforcing – carrying these societies ever further away from the possibility of *mutual regulation* between them. Prospects for the effective internal governance of these countries declined accordingly. The inane and corrupt populism of Mugabe represents only a particularly extreme case of more general consequences.

In part, the disintegrative effects are as much cultural as structural, although the two tend to amplify one another. However, whilst the impact of the globalised economy and finance markets were registered locally as damage to whatever fragile systemic integration existed, the impact of global information technology was more deleterious for indigenous social integration. This works in several distinct ways.

Firstly, the other face of the consolidation of cheap, de-regulated labour markets throughout the world is the emergence of a 'cosmopolitan elite' drawn from everywhere. The very rich kids from the very poor countries are its mainstay. The minority of extremely wealthy parents in the Third World readily exchanges its local monetary capital for a globally convertible cultural capital embodied in its offspring – where it becomes immune from seizure. Hence the emergence of the 'globobrat' – the multilingual, cybersmart, frequent flyer, who is typically educated in three countries and

often emerges with that emblematic qualification, the MBA. In Britain, our independent boarding schools could not survive without them and they can represent half of a University's post-graduate enrolment. Take 'Raphael', the charmingly urbane son of a Thai judge: schooled privately in England, first degree in law from Bangkok, followed by another from the UK; vacations spent in Japan acquiring the language to extend the family firm's clientele and currently surfing the net for American law schools. He can tell a real from a fake Rolex at a glance, carries multiple international phone cards, and is the campus guru on software. His proudest achievement is teaching his father that highland malt is superior to the most expensive blended whisky. 'Raphael' is a cosmopolitan; he has much less in common with the people of Thailand than is the case for his father, let alone his mother.

Thus, the emergence of this hi-tech 'cosmopolitan elite' depresses indigenous social integration by increasing the cultural gulf within the home country. UNDP statistics show that whilst the OECD countries had 19% of the world population, they accounted for 91% of Internet users;[17] what 'Raphael' stands for is one embodiment of that small but influential 9%. Others overtly damage social integration. The expansion of cyber-crime and the application of information technology to drug-dealing and arms-trading serves to consolidate a globalised criminal elite whose activities augment the 'underclass' in the First World and increase corruption in the Third World.

Finally, the global divide induces social antagonism from areas retaining pre-global sources of social integration, especially religion and ethnic 'tribalism'. The effects of intensified religious fundamentalism are often registered as terrorism that dangerously increases social antagonism at world level. 'There is ... an explosion of fundamentalist movements that take up the Qu'ran, the Bible, or any holy text, to interpret it and use it, as a banner of their despair and a weapon of their rage. Fundamentalisms of different kinds and from different sources will represent the most daring, uncompromising challenge to one-sided domination of informational, global capitalism. Their potential access to weapons of mass extermination casts a giant shadow on the optimistic prospects of the Information Age'.[18] However, the inward effects of religious fundamentalism also amplify internal social antagonism. This is because its accentuation exacerbates indige-

[17] UNDP, *Human Development Report 1999*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, inside front cover.

[18] Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1998, p. 355.

nous ethnic divisions, which could otherwise have slowly lost their social salience – Bosnia and Afghanistan being the most recent examples.

Global Order or Divided World?

The dynamics of Nascent Globaility have been analysed to account for the precipitous world-wide decline in both systemic and social integration. It follows that overcoming this divisive scenario, which now affects us all, without our being able to effect it, ultimately depends upon the prospects of establishing a completely new relationship of *mutual regulation* between the systemic and the social at world level.

The major systemic barrier consists in the lack of a single agency for global governance. The absence of any framework for accountability means that no shift from growing dependence to growing regulation can take place, which would parallel the histories of the developed democracies. Pessimistic commentators accentuate two negative factors. Firstly, existing inter-national institutions (the UN, NATO, the IMF and WTO) are de-centred and de-linked, working independently of one another in a manner which simultaneously epitomises and intensifies low systemic integration – and most would resist the introduction of any tighter linkage between them. Secondly, the feasibility of increasing global governance is also cast in doubt by the resilient nationalism of the world's sole superpower. Instances include the USA's recent repudiation of international agreements (for example, Kyoto), insistent pursuit of its own Star Wars programme, and its latest willingness to dispense with a UN mandate before declaring war.

Optimism hangs on a single thread, but one that can only become stronger, unless burnt through by world conflagration. This is the fact that, like it or not, globalised *dependence* has already come about, indeed been brought about by the very de-centred nature of world-wide institutional operations. Its name is *global finitude*;[19] resources are finite, ecological ruin has begun and nuclear proliferation can complete it. Nothing prevents the end of the world as (and because) the vultures fight over its dying spoils. However, the hope remains that nascent forms of globalised social integration can overcome systemic mal-integration, transforming *dependency* into *mutual regulation*. Here, the ethical face of global finitude is the secular

[19] This was first elaborated upon by Martin Albrow, *The Global Age*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1996 and carries increasing conviction.

recognition of one people in one world – of 'humanity' and our common interests, rights and obligations (contra those sociologists whose gaze is riveted upon the process and practices of 'individualisation').

In the new social movements – new because they do not originate in the institutions of national civil society – rests the frail hope of a global networking which could counter-balance resilient nationalism, resurgent fundamentalism, multi-national malpractice and the de-regulative force of international finance markets. Certainly, some of these movements hold up the wrong banner, reading 'anti-globalisation', but they can also be seen as an ideological expression of and search for a global society. Thus, those 'seeking to advance greater equity throughout the world's regions, peaceful dispute settlement and demilitarization, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, sutainability across generations, the mutual acknowledgement of cultures, the reciprocal recognition of political and religious identities, and political stability across political institutions are all laying down elements essential to a cosmopolitan democratic community'.[20] Two factors distinguish this notion of resurgent social integration from optimistic idealism.

On the one hand, information technology facilitates new forms of social integration just as it enables the unregulated expansion of institutional activities. The co-ordination of protest is no longer confined to the slow building-up of international organisations, as was the case with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and its late development as a European organisation. The swift build-up of the new movements is ironically because they are, at least initially, 'post-organisational'. On the other hand, it is possible to point to concrete instances of their regulative impact, although their contribution defies quantification. For example, the anti-apartheid movement received some credit for Mandela's victory (and the Western Universities fell-over one another to shower him with honorary degrees). Equally, Greenpeace claims credit for inducing greater responsiveness to calls for nuclear restraint and the responsible disposal of nuclear waste. Perhaps, more significant – because *mutual regulation* has clearly engaged when it becomes self-reflexive – multi-national enterprises have begun to take much more seriously the issues of sustainable development, environmental protection and contribution to the local communities housing their installations. Correspondingly, the supermar-

[20] David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, *Ibid*., p. 281.

ket chains and local authorities have responded by the voluntary provision of re-cycling facilities.

However, what does seem grossly over-optimistic is the *laissez-faire* approach that appears to hold that the transition from *mutual dependence* to *mutual regulation* can be left to the cultural influence of the new social movements. This appears to rest on two fallacies; that unorganised social protest can properly master de-centred institutions, still operating as forces for de-regulation, and the fallacy of aggregate individualism, namely that changes in public opinion alone spell the control of the social over the system. I believe these to be fallacious in relation to free-floating social movements for four reasons.

Firstly, these movements frequently provide no sustained critique or follow-through, given their reliance upon media attention, (their effect is ephemeral). For example, 'humanitarian crises' are forgotten as soon as their photographic immediacy fades – does world society still show active concern for those Romanian teenagers who made headlines as orphaned babies in the early 1990s? Secondly, the movements' responses tend to be mainly expressive, rather than furnishing in-depth analyses (their effect is superficial). For example, the anti-capitalist demonstrations grew in participants but became increasingly fixated on the 'quick fix' of debt remission for the poorest countries. Thirdly, the inspiration fuelling some movements is highly vulnerable to systemic take-over (their effect is undermined by incorporation). For example, marketing products as 'green', 'organic', or 'vegetarian' has simply become profitable big business – in what way does the bold sticker on my box of muesli, proclaiming 'green' and 'suitable for vegetarians', do anything for either ecology or animal rights? Fourthly, these movements are often impotent when resilient nationalism deliberately mobilises and maximises enduring sources of social antagonism (their effect is limited). For example, resurgent racism was harnessed by the EU at Seville to press through its depressing prime concern – the collective restriction of immigration.

In short, these diverse movements do witness to genuine global concerns that transcend localised or sectional vested interests, but to be effective in exerting consistent regulative pressure on world affairs they need to be re-linked to the processes of decision-making. Yet there is no cosmopolitan democracy in which their members can participate. They are self-conscious members of the new global order, who cannot yet be 'citizens' of it. As such, they are like the *sans culottes* prior to the formation (and experimentation) of the Revolutionary Assemblies. At most, they can be seen as

laying down new building blocks as components of a new civil society. In their most institutionalised forms, agencies like OXFAM, Amnesty and *Médecins sans Frontières*, represent a new humanitarian consciousness engaged in cosmopolitan action. Nevertheless, they are not the basis upon which the social can regulate the world system. This is because other, equally novel, components of the global civil society in formation – the cosmopolitan elites, management of the multi-nationals, finance-market players, protagonists of fundamentalism – do not collectively stand in anything approximating to a state of social integration. And, without that, 'the social' can play no concerted regulatory role in relation to 'the system'.

Therefore, the alternative is attractive, namely to hope that the existing quasi-global organisations can develop an institutional framework which increases systemic integration at world level. Here, the equivalent building blocks are the new institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, the proliferating NGOs, and encouragingly effective bodies like FIFA, institutionalising world football. Nevertheless, like every proposal to extend the governance of the UN, the stumbling block is that these are all inter-national organisations. They are at the mercy of enduring national and regional interests, and whose authority can be repudiated by the strongest remaining power of the nation state – legitimate command over its armed forces.

That, Weber regarded as definitive of the nation state. Since we confront low systemic and low social integration at the global level, perhaps the key to moving from *mutual dependence* to *mutual regulation* between system and society lies precisely there – in controlled national de-militarisation. This would be good in itself and the process would result in necessary global institution-building for world peace-keeping, control of arms dealing, and of the drug trade. Yet, is there not something contrary in identifying the main current stumbling block to regulation of the world system with the engine that could begin the upward spiral towards increased systemic integration? Moreover, from where is the impetus for de-militarisation to come? Paradoxically, a possible answer seems to be 'from war itself'.

With the war in Iraq, for the first time, huge sections of world society were more concerned to express outrage at this non-mandated act than to take sides in it. The six classic conditions for a just war, which were not met in this case, appear to be acquiring a seventh, that 'justness' must be determined by a world forum, rather than unilaterally by a protagonist. With this, heightened social integration makes its diffuse protest against the mal-integration of the international system and lodges its first significant plea for increased systemic regulation. Of equal importance is that the majority

of nation states endorsed it. Even the (shifting) rhetoric of the war started to be heedful; we heard less and less about 'liberating a people' and more about provisions to avoid 'humanitarian crises'. The superpower knew its Achilles' heel; it was aware that even September 11th would not exculpate it from another Mai Lai – and that is a completely new regulative tug, however inchoate it may be.

Conclusion

If there is anything in the broad-brush analysis presented, it has an important implication for the diagnoses and prognoses for globalisation that have been proffered by political science. The foregoing discussion has highlighted the relatively sudden and *conjoint* development of low social and low systemic integration at global level – always a combination with explosive potential, but never one whose outcome can laconically be regarded as necessarily issuing in a higher and beneficial level of 'adaptation'. Indeed, despite the tendency for political concepts to be endlessly recycled and represented, the one belief that seems beyond resuscitation is in any form of 'hidden hand' that would automatically foster global adjustment.

Instead, two distinct tendencies can be detected in the avalanche of literature forthcoming from political science. Significantly, these two trends focus respectively upon the problems of low global social integration and of low global systemic integration, examined above. What is significant about this is that neither tendency gives a sustained analysis of the other side of the equation. In consequence, these two predominant strands of thought both necessarily fail to address the question of how the restoration of *mutual regulation* between the social and the systemic might come about.

On the one hand, there are the advocates-cum-apologists of 'global civil society', whose pre-occupation is fundamentally with 'the social'. Basically, their message is that the state of global social integration is really much better than I have painted it, if only we can be imaginative enough to (re) conceptualise its new fluid, dynamic, distanciated, syncretic and elaborative forms. Here, John Keane's recent *Global Civil Society?*[21] is emblematic. Basically, it is a rhetorical peon to the character I called 'Raphael', to his mobility, associations, networks and especially to his contribution to global plurality and his 'new found' ethical tolerance of pluralism. Yet,

[21] John Keane, *Global Civil Society?*, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

'Raphael', whose existence is indubitable, symbolises the new globalised elite – what of the rest of the world's population and their state of social integration? Again and again, the cat is let out of the bag – everyone else is *affected* by the global institutional complex, but they are not integrated with it. This is quite overt in Keane's ideal type of global civil society, which, he states, 'properly refers to a *dynamic non-governmental system of interconnected socio-economic institutions that straddle the whole earth, and that have complex effects that are felt in its four corners*'.[22] Being affected without having a reciprocal say in the matter is exactly where we came in.

Yet, if we turn to this author's discussion of 'systemic integration', particularly the development of what he calls 'cosmocracy', as a new type of polity, we find that those very features associated with all 'having a say' are admittedly absent. This is equally the case for public accountability, universal access, effective steering mechanisms, regular forums, recognised channels for the expression of opinion and any basis for citizenship. Keane himself is quite ready to acknowledge these profound shortcomings of 'global systemic integration': 'cosmocracy also chronically lets global civil society down. It does not bring peace and harmony and good government to the world, let alone usher in calm order. Its hotch-potch of rules and institutions produce negative – disabling and destabilising effects'.[23] Precisely; the whole argument hangs upon a perceived increase in 'global social integration' – underpinning the burgeoning 'global civil society' as presented – whilst the other side of the equation is admitted to be disastrous and to hold within it the potential for nuclear disaster. The book is honest in its conclusions; the two forms of integration can and indeed do vary independently of one another. Yet, in the absence of *mutual regulation* 'cosmocracy' does not merely 'let global society down', it has the potential to annihilate it, along with the rest of the world.

On the other hand, does the second strand of political science thinking grasp both sides of the equation any better than the first? This is the approach which *foregrounds* the problems of 'global systemic integration' by its exploration and advocacy of some version of 'cosmopolitan democracy'. Here, David Held's book, *Democracy and the Global Order*[24] can serve as a good representative, especially given its sub-title, *From the Modern*

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 112.
[24] David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1995.

State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Unlike the first tendency just examined, this approach to 'embedded utopianism' is indeed pre-occupied with defining the institutional conditions under which 'all can have a say'. Held painstakingly redesigns existing political organisations into a new multi-level polity – operating at trans-national, regional, national and local levels and involving political actors such as INGOs, NGOs, and social movements – which would inaugurate a new form of 'high systemic integration'. He is greatly exercised, unlike the first approach, that those social forms having effects upon everyone should correspondingly be open to being affected by all. Consequently, for example, the extensive 'use of referenda, and the establishment of the democratic accountability of international organizations, would involve citizens in issues which profoundly affect them but which – in the context of the current lacunae and fragmentation of international organizations – seem remote. These mechanisms would help contribute, thereby, to the preservation of the ideal of a rightful share in the process of governance...'[25]

What would turn this ideal into a new working form of governance? Fundamentally, the answer given is the implementation of cosmopolitan democratic law, whose Kantian categorical imperative would be to ensure the rights of all to autonomy. Yet, how is this lynch-pin of the new 'Global Order' compatible with the existing low level of 'social integration'? At one point, Held acknowledges this problem: 'the notion that 'rights' advance universal values and are, accordingly, human rights – *intrinsically* applicable to all – is open to doubt. It is clear, for example, that many nations and peoples do not necessarily choose or endorse the rights that are proclaimed often as universal ... The tension between the claims of national identity, religious affiliation, state sovereignty and international law is marked, and it is by no means clear how it will be resolved'.[26] This seems indisputable.

If it is beyond dispute, one would then expect Held to produce a sustained analysis of the problems presented to cosmopolitan democracy by the (contra Keane) manifestly low level of social integration – and a discussion of how it might be overcome. On the contrary, the whole question of 'the social' receives remarkably short shrift throughout the book. Perhaps that should have alerted one to his otherwise amazing conclusion – 'a cosmopolitan democratic community does not require political and cul-

[25] *Ibid*., p. 273.
[26] *Ibid*., p. 223.

tural integration in the form of a consensus on a wide range of beliefs, values and norms'.[27] Why not? The answer is because democracy is *about* the public settlement of differences within the (world) community. That is its attraction, the possibility of pursuing various notions of the 'good life' as defined under free and equal conditions of participation. Then, 'the resolution of value conflicts becomes a matter of participating in public deliberation and negotiation'[28] and the whole problem surrounding the absence of global social integration evaporates. The drawback, as Held does recognise, is that his whole argument is premised upon (developing) value-consensus throughout the world on the value of democracy itself. In fact, social integration in this vital respect is the predicate of increased systemic integration – represented by cosmopolitan democratic law and leading to 'global order'. Yet the predicate is lacking; democracy is not valued the world over. The high level of global systemic integration envisaged is simply incompatible with the prevalent low level of social integration.

I do not presume to have any solution to offer to the dangers presented to the world by the existence and endurance of the conjunction between low social integration and low systemic integration. What I would conclude from the above argument is that no solution can be proffered which effectively eliminates *either* the 'systemic' *or* the 'social' from consideration, in relation to the other. If this paper has contributed anything at all, it is the suggestion that the key to global order is more likely to be found by exploring the conditions under which the 'social' and the 'systemic' might once again come to stand in a *mutually regulatory* relationship, at world level. What increases the likelihood of this possibility, without in any way guaranteeing its outcome, is the objective fact and growing subjective recognition of the forces of finitude.

I started by arguing that the development of mutual regulation between the system and the social had taken two hundred years of struggle to accomplish in the western democracies. Throughout this discussion, the only certainty is that we do not have another two hundred years in which to achieve cosmopolitan solidarity in a global system.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 282.
[28] *Idem*.