

A NEW MODEL FOR THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY IN THE STATE

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One of the major problems that today worries the Church and religious communities is the crisis of the family, which has important consequences for society and its institutions.

As we know, the family is a domestic church. It is, equally, the cell of society. Cicero defined the family as 'the beginning of the city and almost the nursery of the state' (*principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae*) and St. Thomas Aquinas observed that the family and society arise '*ex ipsa natura rei*', from the very nature of man.

The social doctrine of the Church, indeed, centres around a recognition of man as a person taken in all his dimensions, a recognition from which emerges the principle of the 'subjectivity of society'.

How is it that this principle, even more than being not applied, is actually denied by contemporary society? A scientific analysis of the consumer society in which we live allows us to understand the causes of this phenomenon, which has had repercussions not only for man and society but also for the environment itself, creating the ecological problem at a world level.

Consumerism, which is an idea that underlies contemporary society, has broken down the dimensions of man. As a result, such dimensions have not been seen in a unitary way. In other words, man is seen in terms of his separate dimensions, of stagnant compartments. There are sociologists who have observed this separation and have argued that the family has ceased to be the cell of society and has become reduced to being merely a cell of the individual. The social functions that were previously performed by the family, or in some way were linked to the family, have in large measure been absorbed by the state and separated from the family itself.

The problem thus becomes a basic problem: what is the relationship between the family and the state? The problem is not only theoretical and abstract in character, but also practical and concrete. It is no longer the state that revolves around the family, but the family that revolves around the state.

A kind of Copernican revolution has taken place with consumer society where the state is the sun and the family is the earth. I might say that consumer society has introduced a state-centred approach that has taken the place of the family-centred approach. In other words, the state has gradually occupied the space which is specific to the family. This revolution has involved the denial of the principle of subsidiarity which was expounded by Pius XI in *Quadragesimo Anno*.

The higher society, that is to say the state, rather than helping the lower societies, conditions them or even replaces them.

From this point of view, the phenomenon that I have called '*the proletarianisation of families*' has grown up and become strengthened. Through high fiscal pressure, the state has in fact impeded the family from independently performing its functions, and, in any case, from being able to influence the social functions that the state has allocated to itself.

The welfare state is the state that has superimposed its organisation on the organisation of society, which has not been able to develop around the family. But by now the results are more than evident. The welfare state is in crisis throughout the industrialised West. Paradoxically, the family, afflicted and conditioned, has in some way to make up for the growing dysfunctions of those social services administered by the state. The phenomenon of voluntary work, and more in general of the third sector, which is spreading widely, are concrete proof of what has taken place and is taking place.

I could argue that voluntary work is based upon an inverted principle of subsidiarity. The lower society, which absolutely does not have to hand the means that the state does, and which in addition does not have a suitable organisation, must make up for the inefficiency and the gaps of the higher society – the state. This latter does not keep the promises that it makes, especially and above all else during electoral campaigns.

The real and authentic principle of subsidiarity, which by now has become fundamental, requires the hitherto denied recognition of the subjectivity of society. This is a point on which the social encyclicals of John Paul II lay great stress. A dual subjectivity springs from the nature of man: from his individual nature there arises individual subjectivity, and from his social nature there arises social subjectivity.

Social subjectivity can be recognised only if the social subjects are recognised, beginning with the first and most important social subject – the family. What John Paul II says in his *Letter to Families* on the subject is extremely important and significant: ‘the family is more a subject than any other social institution: more so than the nation or the State, more so than society and international organizations. These societies, especially nations, possess a proper subjectivity to the extent that they receive it from persons and their families’.

A question at this point becomes spontaneous and immediate: why has the family ceased to be seen as a subject? If, in fact, the family has ceased to be a subject, then society as well can no longer be seen as a subject. One thus explains, in an irrefutable way, why the state has occupied society by taking on tasks that could have been performed better by the so-called lower societies.

Let us try, therefore, to explain why and how the family has lost its subjectivity and thus why and how it has ceased to be the radiating centre of all the social fabric. If we analyse, albeit only in summarising form, the historical evolution that has marked the move from the extended family to the nuclear family, we realise what has taken place.

We can identify three stages in this historical process.¹ The first stage is that of the extended family, where the family as a productive unit exercised all its functions in its own context. For this reason, I term the extended family the multi-functional family. Within this family, in other words, most of its functions were carried out: the function of production, professional education and training (childhood overlapped with apprenticeship), and the various forms of care provided to the individual. For this reason, the extended family was seen as the cell of social organisation.

Its extension, therefore, did not involve solely the aggregation of the various nuclear families but also the performance of its functions within the context of the family itself.

The second stage took place with the formation of the nuclear family, which, however, should not be seen as being solely the fruit or the product of the process of industrialisation and urbanisation, even though it came into being with certain characteristics during that historical period. This family was no longer a productive unit, although it nonetheless main-

¹ For these questions and others addressed in this paper, see P.L. Zampetti, *La sovranità della famiglia e lo Stato delle autonomie. Un nuovo modello di sviluppo* (Rusconi, Milan, 2nd. edn. 1997).

tained an economic function. It was, in fact, a consumption unit. The choice of the consumption of goods took place freely and responsibly within the context of the family. In one way or another, the family conditioned the very production of goods, precisely because the choice and thus the consumption of the goods themselves were its responsibility, and this was a choice that was connected to its function, its culture and its style of life.

The market, indeed, is in large measure dominated by the choices made by families. Savings themselves are still today called 'family savings'.

The final stage in the evolution of the family was born with consumer society. In this kind of society, despite appearances to the contrary, the family ceased to exist as a unit of consumption. Society, as this appellation bears out, and no longer the family, became the real consumption unit.

The production and consumption of goods now take place outside an effective and authentic decision-making process of the family.

In consumer society, a radical overturning of the process of the consumption of produced goods takes place. It is no longer the families, through their choices, that freely and responsibly allocate their own income to savings or consumption. On the contrary, consumption comes before production. Before producing goods there is a prior decision about how much families should consume, thereby conditioning, if not indeed replacing, their very choices. The system replaces the family, gains possession of the interior of man and thus of the nuclear family, and exploits them. After a certain fashion, man loses his privacy, his autonomy. Privacy, which was considered a conquest of the modern family, is taken away from it. This is why the *family is a function of society. But it is precisely for this reason that as a family it breaks down.*

When the family has ceased to be a consumption unit it has also ceased to exercise its influence on the economic system and thus on society itself.

An authentic earthquake has taken place in the relationship between the family and society. Consumer society, through the manipulation of advertising in the mass media, has penetrated the family and changed its ways of living.

The culture of the family has ceased to be the culture of society.

It is the culture created by the structures of society that has been gradually transformed into the culture of the family. In this way, it is no longer the family that injects values into society but the structures of consumerist society that inject anti-values into the family.

The marriage unit itself has been negatively affected by the permissiveness that has been formed and spread within the whole of society. First

divorce and then abortion can be traced back to the process of secularisation produced by the consumerist approach.

The crisis that afflicts the contemporary family is thus a consequence of:

1. the transformation of society into consumer society;
2. the manipulation of the family effected by consumer society itself.

This manipulation has as its goal the expansion of consumption regardless of quality of life.

The family in consumer society thus marks the end of the family/unit of consumption tandem, an end that coincides with the power of society to absorb the family through the extension of the structures of consumer society to the family fabric.

It is interesting at a scientific level to analyse the socio-economic path that was followed to achieve this result. We must go back and analyse the way in which the United States of America overcame the depression of the 1930s, which could have meant the end of the whole capitalist system, thereby fulfilling the prediction of Marx, who had posited its collapse.

A reduction in consumption and a contemporaneous stagnation in production were registered at that time.

Now, it was the reduction of consumption caused by the family which marked the move from pre-consumerist capitalism to consumerist capitalism, thereby demonstrating clearly that the family cannot be reduced, as some sociologists would have it, to being the cell of the individual. The social and economic dimensions of the family were exploited and artificially transformed. In order to avoid this, the socio-economic dimensions of the family should be guaranteed and promoted in their naturalness.

The consumption and savings of the family in their naturalness must equally be connected with investments in a form that has still to be established. For example, through their allocation to pension funds or severance pay funds. This would allow families to influence the very system of the production of goods.

The family and the economy are interdependent because the dimensions of man are interdependent.

The taking away of choices about consumption from the family by the structures of society would not have taken place if the decisions about investments had not first been taken away, albeit within the limits allowed by capital formation on the part of families themselves.

Precisely when analysing the family and its structures, we realise that the economy and ethics are deeply connected. The ethics of capitalism are connected to a certain extent with the ethics of family virtues.

With the disappearance of family virtues because of permissiveness, capitalism itself as an economic system went into crisis. The capitalism that arose with the virtue of savings went into crisis with the permissiveness of consumer society, which, indeed, undermined the very foundation of capitalism. This is why the subject of the relationship between ethics and the economy has once again come to the fore.

We should, however, observe that ethics can re-enter the economy, above all else through the defence of the institution of the family. With permissiveness and the denial of the commandments, the family cannot regain its lost role. We must, therefore, change those mechanisms of the economy that have brought about this fall in values. Specifically beginning with family structures, new economic structures can be born which will radically change both the structure of the economy and the organisation of society, thereby creating a model for development that is totally new.

We must first of all stress that in the consumerist model of development, society ends up by being considered a part of the economy, rather than the economy being seen as a part of society.

Economic mechanisms, in symbiosis with socio-political mechanisms, have worked deeply for the decay of the family, and with devastating effects that will be extended to other economies given the globalisation of the economy.

It is on the model of development that we must therefore concentrate our attention. The following question has been raised at all levels for some time: 'is development sustainable?' A conference of the United Nations was held on this subject in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, a conference concerned with the development of the environment. The right to development and the right to the environment even came to be seen as human rights.

'Human beings', declared the first principle of the declaration that was drawn up at the end of the proceedings of the conference, 'are at the centre of sustainable development'.

The analysis that I have carried out on this problem has clearly demonstrated that the opposite is the case. Thus, how can one place human beings at the centre of development and at the same time declare that the right to development and the right to the protection of the environment are *human rights* of a kind such as to ensure 'a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature'?

Before addressing these problems, it seems to me advisable to emphasise that one cannot speak about the *rights of man* without first talking about the *man of rights*.

The separation of the dimensions of man perpetrated by the contemporary model of development, understood solely as economic development, has hindered, and still hinders, man in his ontic nature from becoming a subject of development.

This can come about only if man can be considered in the totality and uniqueness of his dimensions, from which spring human rights themselves. In other words, development can become *complete* only if man is considered in the *completeness* of his dimensions.

Now, such completeness is manifested only in the family, in which the unity of the dimensions of man is realised – the economic, ethical, social, religious, political and biological dimensions. It is for this reason that John Paul II has argued that every social and political institution ‘possesses a proper subjectivity precisely to the extent that it receives it from persons and their families’.

From the subjectivity of the family follows the recognition of the autonomy of the family and the restitution of the economic and social functions that have been taken away from it.

From this point of view, the family demonstrates that it is a real and true producer of wealth that is not only material wealth but also moral wealth.

This is also because the transformation now underway in capitalism requires an enlargement rather than a narrowing of the ethical basis on which capitalism itself rests. In other words, the relationship between ethics and capitalism takes place on new and different bases.

Such capitalism shares only its name with traditional capitalism. This is a capitalism linked to man as such – it does not concern only his material resources, but also, and even more, his intellectual and moral resources.²

At this point there is a deep interaction between the formation of man within the context of the family and the formation and accumulation of the knowledge of man within the context of school institutions. This interaction requires an organic connection between the family, schools, work and companies. In particular, there must be deep co-operation between the family and schools in order to achieve an integral formation of human capital.

For these reasons, the domestic virtues of savings are no longer enough to create the ethical foundation of capitalism, as happened during the period of its initial formation. These are virtues, for that matter, which have in the main

² On this point I refer the reader to my recently published volume: *Partecipazione e Democrazia completa. La nuova vera via*, chapter VIII: ‘La trasformazione del capitalismo e la valorizzazione dell’uomo e della società’.

disappeared or have been even penalised by consumerism, which privileges consumption for consumption's sake, thereby corroding the virtues and manipulating the interior of the family. Today, all the family virtues are directed towards creating the foundation of the new capitalism, which is able to overturn the structures of consumerist capitalism, which, in turn, breaks down the family. To conclude, the new model of development centres around the integration of the family, the economy and ethics, which allows the unification of all the dimensions of man who has become a subject. This unification takes place within the context of the family community.

It is evident that such a community becomes the driving motor of civil society, which is thus transformed into an organised community.

In this new perspective, the role of the mother of a family in the formation of the human person is of determining importance. I would say that specifically in the new society, with its needs which are today growing, man in his complex personality is becoming increasingly relevant. The term 'personality', obviously enough, refers to the concept of person. And the first formation of the person, and thus of his personality, takes place precisely within the domestic walls. Let us consider the concepts of work and capital. They are not abstract notions. They cannot even exist on their own. They must be referred to man. We thus need to speak in the new society of the *man of work* and the *man of capital*. Work and capital find their synthesis in *interiore homine*, specifically because they have as a basis the educational and moral, intellectual and spiritual, formative process.³

In other words, productivity itself is connected to the formation of human capital and to the dedication of man, which are due to his personality, which is formed in the family.

Hence the role of the *woman in the home* who is the soul of family life and must see herself, as has been observed, as the lady of the home itself, emerges in all its importance. She has the role of an educator, a teacher, and if she so thinks fit, even of an evangeliser.

The work of women, which is expressed in the concept of 'domestic education', also has an economic meaning because it allows the performance of work by the husband outside the family. Domestic work, quite apart from the activity that a woman may perform outside the family, without, however, abandoning her role, is also a part of the economic

³ I would like to observe that in his Encyclical *Laborem exercens*, John Paul II speaks about Christ as a 'man of work' and this allows us to see 'work as a participation in the work of the Creator' (see nn. 25-26).

function of the family. The family is increasingly called upon – as has been demonstrated – to engage in bureaucratic activities which connect the family and its component parts to other social institutions (from schools to the state) which are necessary to the sound working of the overall forms of economic organisation.

Schools, which provide instruction, can achieve more valid results if adolescents and young people are followed in their choice of institutions and in the constancy of their commitment by their own families. In particular, the mother of the family must be placed in a condition to be the lady of the family who forms the interiors of her children and follows them in a discreet way in their school activity as well. Women have an essential function in the nuclear family, a function that has repercussions for society itself. They contribute, in fact, to forming human capital in a determining way.

It seems to me evident that the work performed by the mothers of families is productive work. In an organised community, therefore, their work must be paid.

A German economist argued during the last century that while the raising of pigs is a productive form of upbringing, the upbringing of children is not productive. Nothing could be more false. Today, society, with its needs, demonstrates exactly the opposite. A specific consequence follows. For the mothers of families who wish to dedicate themselves to domestic work, a suitable payment for their valuable activity should be envisaged. A recognition of the productiveness of such work involves a revision of the statistics which refer to the number of employed and unemployed people. Mothers of families are excluded from these data because of their decision to dedicate themselves to both part-time and full-time domestic work.

Work thus acquires a much larger spectrum than the existing one because such work springs from the very person of man in his unity, a unity of the person that is also projected onto the unity of capital and work. This thesis that I am advancing and developing here is all the more important when one thinks that it is favoured by the new economy, which is centred around intellectual capital. Let us not forget that the intellect is a faculty of the human spirit, that it defines man as man. We cannot, therefore, conceive of the extrapolation of the intellect from man, in whom it is deeply rooted. And this thesis also demonstrates the determining role of the family, not only in the context of the economy and society but also in the context of the state.

And now we come to consider the key problem raised at the beginning of this paper. How should we understand the relationship between the fam-

ily and the state? This is a problem that is still open and which should therefore be carefully analysed. We need to identify the concept of 'people', which is of fundamental importance in understanding democracy as government by the people.

And here the role of the family and the role of the state, or to be more precise the role of the family within the context of the state, is manifested in all its breadth. I will say even more. In this context, the dignity of the family-subject, which is at the basis of the whole community, is emerging in all its majesty and dignity. A phenomenon of most welcome importance is thus encountered which allows a real understanding of the concept of 'people', which hitherto has been understood in a *reductive* way as being a *people of individuals* and not a *people of men-persons*.

It thus has an ephemeral life: it manifests itself only at times of voting. I am referring here to what Jean Jacques Rousseau argued in his social contract before the French Revolution exploded. 'The English people', he argued, 'believe that they are free because they vote. In reality, they are free only when they vote, after this they are more slaves than before'.

The reductive notion of 'people' has thus become a reductive notion of man. He is considered in an abstract way, as an individual. In this approach his *social nature* is neglected. Man understood as an individual is a man, who is I would say reduced by 50%, almost cut in half. This cut impedes him from becoming a man in the real sense of the term. This individualistic philosophical approach has allowed an exploitation of the family and thus its *proletarianisation*.

We must take a necessary step in order to understand the reforms of the family and the state that should be promoted. The *people of families* must be put in a position where it can build a new community-subject around the family, which I call an organised community.

From this point of view, I think that I can interpret the concepts expressed by the Pope in his *Letter to Families*. In this letter there are two important statements that should be taken into consideration with reference to the subject I am addressing in this paper. The first concerns the subjectivity of the family and thus the very subjectivity of the state as well as that of international communities and organisations. The second concerns the sovereignty of the family, that is to say its effectiveness, its sharing in the exercise of power.

These two statements support each other, just as the being of man supports the action of man. '*Operari sequitur esse*'. One is dealing here with a people not as an abstraction but as a concrete reality. A Spanish scholar, Pedro Juan Viladrich (*Jus canonico* XXXIV, n. 68, p. 437), says that the sec-

ond statement of the Pope is a time bomb which will radically change the social order. And in truth the people of families determines the birth and the development of the new concept of participatory democracy which directly involves the formation and the organisation of society; it is different from representative democracy which involves the formation and the organisation of the state.

The introduction of this new democracy reduces the tasks of the state, which for that matter it is today no longer able to perform, as the crisis of the welfare state demonstrates. From this point of view, the reform of the welfare state becomes the reform of the state '*tout court*' and allows a move from the welfare state to the welfare society, whose fulcrum is specifically the families and the organisations that lead back to it.

This new social organisation, which brings together social subjects, is the structure of a society animated by the values of man as a person.

With participatory society, which then becomes an organised community, the rights of the family acquire connotations that are new and different. The rights of parents, for example, can no longer be considered only in relation to the state but first and foremost must be seen in a cultural frame that centres around the subjectivity of the family and the subjectivity of society. This is a family that precedes the state and which the state must serve and not be served by. A state understood in these terms is a state that promotes and defends the autonomy of social subjects beginning with the natural and primary subject of the family, whereas in the contemporary situation it is the family that revolves, as we said at the beginning of this paper, at least in large measure, around the state.

But let us now see how the family subject is to be placed in the participatory society that becomes transformed into an organised community. Participatory democracy is the instrument that allows us to achieve this result. It is a democracy that begins from the base and finds its point of departure in the family understood as the cell of society and in the municipality, which is understood as the cell of the state. It is from the union of these two cells, I would say from their fertilisation, that the trunk of the new society and the new state is born.

Such fertilisation marks the beginning of a new and fruitful process that is destined to change human history itself.

The sovereignty of the family in this perspective needs a state that is different from the contemporary state, what I call the *state of autonomies*.

We should now make clear what we understand by a state of autonomies. I would observe, first of all, that we are dealing here with a

dual autonomy: a *territorial political* autonomy and a *social* autonomy. Recognition of this dual autonomy allows the integration of the people, of which the family is a component part, in the territory in which the family lives and operates.

The organised community is achieved specifically through this integration which is gradually extended to the whole territory of the state, beginning with the cell of the state, which is the municipality, to reach through the autonomies of the various intermediate territorial authorities (the provinces and the regions) to the central powers of the state itself. Through the social subjects that go to make it up, the people give life to and animate the institutions themselves.

The authentic sovereignty of the people is realised when the family, society and the territory can be integrated. The integration of these two autonomies leads to a new conception of federalism, which is both political and social at the same time, with the recognition and the development of participatory democracy and its connection with representative democracy.⁴

Now it is precisely in this link between *political federalism* and *social federalism* that the autonomy both of the subjectivity of the family and the subjectivity of society or of the community, which are to be traced back to the family itself, is to be placed. In other words, it is from the small territorial communities that we must begin to arrive at the summit of the economic and political social system in a singular intertwining of the horizontal and vertical relationships of the state at all levels. For that matter, the tasks of the municipality have greatly grown, bringing about the birth of municipal law, which in practical terms must meet the new needs of the family in contemporary society.

With the recognition of the autonomy of society and the political autonomy of the local authorities there ends the opposition between the autonomy and the sovereignty of the state understood as the opposition of different powers. Autonomy, indeed, becomes the indispensable instrument by which an ordered popular will is realised which is then transformed into a state will. And the contrast between the local and central powers disappears because with participation power itself has at its basis the will of those who see it not as a brake but as a very effective means by which to expand their own individuality and personality.

⁴ On this point I refer the reader to my volume: *La sovranità della famiglia e lo Stato delle autonomie*, chapter XI: 'Lo Stato partecipativo e il federalismo. Sussidiarietà e solidarietà'.

In any case, the aim is to allow the integration of the local communities with the territorial institutions. And it is specifically from an analysis of such relationships (of integration) that a new concept of sovereignty is born which allows us to understand the concept of the *sovereignty of the family* in all its importance and breadth.

The point should be well understood: the sovereignty of the family is not in the least an alternative to the sovereignty of the state, but it is an essential element in its transformation.

We are thus face to face with two new concepts of sovereignty, according to whether one sees man as an *individual* or as a *person*, and as a result, with two different concepts of the people as a set of individuals seen in atomistic terms or as a community of persons integrated into society, to which the concept of the people of families is connected.

Certainly, we should understand what is being proposed here. The family is not to be identified with society but is to be seen as its axis. Equally, we can say that the territorial local authority, the commune, is not the state but a constituent element of the state.

The concept of sovereignty, therefore, is a complex concept because both society and the state from this point of view are complex. Once the connection has been established, the concept of sovereignty must be extended to both.

The election of representatives is only a stage in the process of the formation of the will of the state, and thus of its sovereignty. It is no longer enough to declare that sovereignty belongs to the people *quoad titulum* from the moment that the people delegate the exercise of power to their representatives. This was the approach of Enlightenment individualism, which excluded sharing in the exercise of power after the election of representatives.

The social subjects are thus participants in the process of the formation of the popular will because they are organised around the concept of the family-institution, which thus becomes the driving motor of popular sovereignty.

Sovereignty is thus to be understood as an arrangement of the powers of the state into which society is inserted. The state of autonomies specifically performs these functions. We can now understand the reasons why the two central pillars of the state are the family and the commune. This is the deep meaning of the sovereignty of the family.

To defend and promote the autonomy of the family in relation to the structures of the state means to unite the concept of autonomy with the

concept of sovereignty. Now autonomy means self-determination, and self-determination is the foundation of democracy.

Linking the sovereignty of the family with a new conception of the state means the building of a new and authentic democratic regime.

An articulated and organised community is thus constituted, which has as its basis man as a person, whose dimensions are activated and developed by participatory democracy, which is the soul of society and of its continuous and constant development.

A state based upon the principle of participation can also be called the participatory state, which does not replace but integrates the representation of the various territorial local authorities. The representatives must cooperate with the family and the lesser societies in order to ensure that society has a continuous and autonomous development.

After the reflections that have been made so far in this paper, one can outline the concept of the participatory state and federalism. I could identify federalism with the state of autonomies, but perhaps today this concept, for that matter present in many Constitutions, is too reductive in character.

This is because, in general, we are not yet used to seeing the state in this new way. Indeed, by autonomy one refers solely to the local territorial authorities and not to society as a whole and man as a person. Real federalism has still to be invented and elaborated. We must bear in mind that today it is society itself that is in revolt and no longer sees the members of the political class as its referents. We could also speak about the evolution of the social subjects that today are also represented by the third sector but who have as yet not acquired an awareness of their role and their function in relation to existing political institutions.

Real federalism, what I call participatory federalism, is called upon to link the two key elements that today are in the eye of the storm: the family and society on the one hand, and the state on the other. Whereas the family and the state require an effective recognition of social rights and the rights to development and the environment, the state, imprisoned as it is by the mechanisms of the consumerist economy, is incapable through its structures of meeting the insistent and dramatic needs that begin with them.

And so we pose the question: how can the state allow society to regain its autonomy? The answer is: through a relationship of promotion and integration. The role of the family in the development of society is of primary importance. The state, through the communes, carries out the work of the promotion of the family as an autonomous social subject which helps to build the new fabric of society.

Family and society; society and the state. These are the key constituent elements of the new conception of the state that envisages integration through the principle of the subsidiarity of the family and of society within the state. Subsidiarity does not in the least mean subordination – the principle of subsidiarity solicits help provided by the state to communities so that they can be autonomous and thereby develop all their potential, which, otherwise, would become dispersed.

There must be, in other words, a reciprocal co-operation between the subjectivity of society and the subjectivity of the state in order to allow the state to work at all levels.

In this paper I have confined myself to outlining principles without identifying the different stages linked to concrete data and problems. These principles must be placed in historical reality in order to direct them to ends that match the ends and the needs of man as a person.

We have now reached the point in this paper where it is possible to draw a conclusion from the analysis that has been made. Two different models of development have been compared and contrasted which have two different ways of understanding man, freedom, society, the economy, democracy, nature and the environment, the state and international relations. These two models express two cultures that are totally different. And in truth the consumerist model of development begins with the structures of society and the state and then comes to man. The second model, in different fashion, begins with man in the unity of his dimensions to come to the structures of society and the structures of the state. Consumer society and the welfare state use man. Participatory society and the state of autonomies are at the service of man.

Statism has been of determining importance in the creation of a culture that has been rooting itself in the culture in which we live. Without statism, consumerism would not have existed, and consumerism has managed to penetrate the formation of the inner motivations of man. Socio-economic and political structures have influenced the consciousness of men. Hedonistic materialism, which is the philosophy of consumer society, is the result of this slow process.

This is a philosophy that expresses the way of thinking and of acting of men who are manipulated by the structures of society, which, indeed, manage to impose themselves within men and at times to take the place – through the sophisticated instruments that advertising can count on – of the very choices of men.

Permissiveness is a consequence but not the cause of this process. The same may be said of secularisation (which in this perspective I identify

with secularism), which has marked the collapse of all values because it has impeded man from being a truly free subject and responsible for his own behaviour. He is a man who is a prisoner of the system, who indeed has frozen many inner resources, since his motivational and decision-making *iter* has been deformed.

I would like to refer to an important article in the Italian Constitution, namely article 2, which constitutionalised the concept of the human person and his relations with the state by recognising the spiritual nature of man, and, in the same way, his social nature. On the recognition of the spiritual nature of man, which is expressly enunciated in the actual formulation of this article, depends the priority of the family over the state; on the recognition of the social nature of man depends the recognition of social subjects.

The statism of the welfare state has overturned the contents and the dynamics of this article. It is the state that is now higher than man, thereby allowing the system of production to infiltrate the sacred realm of his conscience and to promote a materialistic approach to life, which is exactly the opposite to the contents and goals of this article 2.

Without statism, the culture of hedonistic materialism, which has fatally afflicted the family and broken down the structures of society, would not have been born and would not have been formed.

With the outer walls of the welfare state breached, the doors of the prison (which are invisible because they are internal) in which man has been shut up, are gradually opening. This is a real and authentic process of the liberation of man, to whom should be restored the integrity of a conscience which has been subjected to the snares of manipulation and distortion. This is a distortion which certainly does not take man's responsibility away from him, even though he is influenced or conditioned by the structures of the society in which we live.

Just as the consumerist model of development marked the beginning of the decline of man, so the personalist model of development marks the beginning of the recovery of values by man and society, beginning with the family.

The new model of development is born precisely after it has dismantled, piece by piece, the welfare model of development. It is the culture of man as a person that will give a new countenance to the family and society, and in different ways, which perhaps we are still not able to imagine.

Today, it is certainly the case that we are far from the results that the proposed model seeks to achieve. But in my opinion this is not the problem. When one begins from certain premises, one cannot but reach certain

conclusions. As, indeed, for that matter has happened in an inverted way in the case of consumer society. When that society was born, the results that we now encounter, after the various subsequent stages that have taken place, were unimaginable.

In any case, I have to emphasise that participatory society is the only society that is an alternative to consumer society. The scientific analysis that I have carried out in my various areas of research demonstrates this with great clarity. It has allowed me to establish:

1. why the welfare state can no longer be kept going;
2. why we must begin from the family and not from the state in order to create a new model of development;
3. why there cannot be a sovereignty of the people without the key support of the family and a society which is arranged around the family;
4. why we can reach the unity of capital and labour through the family and an organised community;
5. why work centred around the structure of the family has motivations, objectives and ends which are completely different from the work of a man who is seen in atomistic terms, that is to say detached from the social fabric.

When the family is the subject of development, the full integration between the family and society takes place. Through this integration a phenomenon takes place that seems contradictory but in reality is not so at all. On the one hand, society frees itself from the state; on the other hand, it strengthens it.

The welfare state is weak because it is an infrastructure of the system of production. When I speak about the strengthening of the state I am certainly not referring to the representative state; I am referring, instead, to the participatory state. Because this state is at the service of man it is able to promote the allocation of its energies (which in large part have been frozen) so as to vivify and enrich the whole of the fabric of society.

In this cultural perspective, the importance of the fundamental role of the family – the real and authentic animator of economic, social and political institutions – emerges in its entirety. It is from the family, understood in these terms, that there springs a participatory model of society which has at its base, and is vivified by, the values of the human person.

(Translation by Matthew Fforde)