DEMOCRACY AS CIVIL SOCIETY:
THE MEDIATING STRUCTURES

KLAUS VON BEYME

SUMMARY

Civil society sometimes has been used as a neo-liberal anti-state concept, especially in Eastern Europe. In the Western tradition, however, it means rather a balance between functioning democratic institutions and the mediating structures, mainly interest groups.

Two developments have changed democracy and civil society in the last two decades:

(1) The regimes of central democratic decision-making have been changed by the development of many new by-institutions in which mediating interest groups have strengthened their influence on the policy output (corporatist negotiation, round tables, concertation).

(2) The rise of new social movements. In postmodern society the rise of new movements has not substituted, however, the old established institutions, but has complemented them and widened the arenas for influence of new social groups.

DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN POLITICS

Democracy in its radical tradition included a bias towards the individual citizens and their political behaviour. The social sciences soon discovered that political behaviour could not be studied without the *collective actors of citizens*, e.g. the parties. Only when the breakdown of democracy occurred was it recognized that democratic order frequently perishes when no mediating structures are developed which internalize democratic values. The Weimar Republic worried many researchers: according to the normal indicators regarding the prerequisites of democracy, Germany

should have been a high-scorer of democracy – a high level of education, high economic development, a differentiated intermediary system of associations. After Harry Eckstein and others it became a commonplace that the Weimar Republic collapsed because there was no *civil society* at the basis of the democratic regime. Most of the intermediary structures in society reflected the old regime and its authoritarian structures.

But even happier countries, which created representative government and democracy earlier than Germany, such as France and Britain, were originally biased against the "*pouvoirs intermédaires*". To fight the remnants of a feudal society they tried to keep the intermediary structures out of politics, if necessary by law, such as the "*loi Le Chapelier*" (1792) or the British "General Combination Act" (1799). Paradoxically enough, countries with stronger remnants of a society of estates, such as Germany, were more tolerant towards the intermediary structures. Parties have normally been recognized in constitutions since 1945. Interest groups and social movements are still very rarely a subject of constitutional regulation, unless there is an economic and social council as a kind of consultative by-chamber, deliberating legislation without deciding it.

From the legal point of view, the interference of mediating structures in the legislative process was undesirable for many students of democracy. The American term "*pressure group*", coined in a society which was more civil than any European state society, hinted at the fact that the influences were considered as a "strain" for the authorized decision-makers in parliament and government. Only after the Second World War were the "*cosy triangles*" of legislators, interest group representatives and bureaucrats discovered, and this term made it clear that this kind of co-operation was considered quite normal by all the three parts of the triangle. In pluralist theories of democracy the interference of mediating organizations in the decision-making process was accepted as an inevitable evil.

This kind of stalemate between the state and the associations of society changed when a wave of the *new social movements* altered the mediating structures. The state, and not only in corporatist systems, was seen as being too closely connected to vested organized interests. The mediating groups – following the parties – grew into a *semi-statal position* by taking over more and more functions of the state authorities and by "cartelizing" politics in the hands of élitist iron triangles. *Civil society* as a counter-weight against the power of state authorities was rediscovered as a basic concept of democracy. Civil society became a key notion in the works of the moderate left from the Frankfurt school to Communitarianism. Civil society to Habermas (1992: 443ff) consisted of all the *non-statal associations* and *non-economic interest groups*. Civil society became the missing link between the

"*sphere of life*" (Lebenswelt) and the *public sphere*. Habermas was, however, not an idealist. He recognized certain dangers in the new structure of communication in a modern society if this latter was not grounded in a living society of experienced citizens.

The new forms of action were perceived in terms of autopoietic variations of the system's theory. Habermas' theory developed a potential for self-transformation. He did not believe that they were nourished by a uniform structure of the "*Lebenswelt*". Habermas, moreover, recognized that the notion of civil society can be abused by right-wing populists. Ideological entrepreneurs among the new social movements could try to usurp the fragmented potential of new civil forms of communication. In Eastern Europe there was the danger of shrinking the concept of civil society to an early modern notion of civil society. Hegel once developed such a concept which he called the 'system of needs'. Postmodern hopes that degeneration of the concept of civil society could be avoided when the new social movements and advocate policy orientation prevailed over economic interests was hardly grounded in the context of Eastern transformation societies. They developed particularly brutal forms of capitalism which reminded them more of early capitalism in the sense described by Charles Dickens than the civilized forms which were accepted by those countries which had the privilege to be late-comers on the road to market society. The German tradition – strong in Eastern Europe and developed by intellectuals such as Hegel and Marx – had little understanding of the 'bourgeois' connotations of the Anglo-Saxon version of civil society.

Thus the populist "*terribles simplicateurs*" benefited from the ideological vacuum which the idea of a civil society was not able to fill. The Western ideologues of civil society, who after 1989 hoped for a spill-over effect of civil society movements from the East to the West, were disappointed. They refused to jump on the bandwagon of the new nationalism. This was especially true in Germany where they had some difficulties in accepting the new, larger nation-state and compromised themselves by their attempt to support the preservation of as many institutions of the old socialist society as possible. The East-European intelligentsia, on the other hand, felt abandoned, and under the pressure of the new social and economic realities withdrew quickly from the political sphere. Technocrats were then able to take over. In the West the idea of civil society *was no longer directed against a strong state*, as was the case under the conditions of eroding state socialism in the East. It was sometimes used to *compensate state regulation*. Germany was a good example of this. When the first right-wing extremist wave of terror against

foreigners swept through the country, the state wavered. Civil society, which consisted of spontaneous chains of peaceful demonstrations to protect buildings inhabited by foreigners and to form chains of candles throughout the city, was a substitute for urgently needed state action and mobilized the state administration. But this kind of success had little effect on the every day functioning of bourgeois society, and moreover left little impact on Eastern Europe which was facing still more dangerous waves of new nationalism.

To develop a reasonable concept of civil society in Eastern Europe, the intelligentsia needed to escape from being integrated into the state apparatus and had to develop positive relations with new democratic institutions even if they, as a group, played only a marginal role in it. Moreover, the Eastern intelligentsia had to accept a rigorous self-critique during the time of Communist rule. The problem, however, was that the dissenters among the Eastern intelligentsia who had to accept a rigorous self-critique at the time of the erosion of socialism were devoted to the concept of '*anti-politics*', an idea quite alien to the traditional liberal concept of civil society in the West. The concept of civil society proved to be useful for democracy only when it did not stick to illusions of *anti-politics*, and in the case of the building market economy to *anti-economics*. The torchbearers of civil society were sometimes over confident that the new social movements might substitute the old machines of established interest groups. This proved, however, to be an illusion. The new social movements changed the competitive situation of mediating organizations in the decision-making process. But normally they were successful only when new and old groups co-operated.

INTEREST GROUPS AND REGIMES OF POLICY-DECISION

Democracy has not created uniform patterns of mediating structures. The traditions of conflict resolution between organized interests have been more stable than the institutions which – at least among the parliamentary democracies in Europe – have become more and more uniform.

As long as corporatism was a growth sector in the scientific debate, many attempts were made to define whole countries, such as Sweden or Austria, as corporatist. Germany never completely fitted the model but had important corporatist arenas. Corporatists and pluralists chose their favourite arenas and thus were able to demonstrate their favourite model of interest mediation – though only for a limited time and in a restricted field of decision. When network analysis moved from a methodological instrument to a theoretical

Matrix 1: *Typology of policy-networks.*

actors	dominance of the state			dominance of the society		
	I state agencies	II cartels of parties	III one great interest group	IV two con- flicting great interest groups	V moderate pluralism of groups	VI unlimited pluralism of groups
dominant model of interme- diation	pantouflage state corporatism	parentela relations	clientela relations	liberal corpora- tism	sponsored pluralism, sub- govern- ment	pressure pluralism

Sources: variation of Jordan/Schubert 1992: 25, van Waarden 1992: 50.

hypothesis the nation-wide dominance of certain patterns of decision-making were demystified. New typologies discovered the co-existence of several modes of interest representation situated between the extreme poles of "dominance of state" or "dominance of society" (matrix 1).

European systems showed a certain tendency to implement one of these models: France (I), Italy at the time of the DC-dominance II and III, Germany IV and V. But no country ever used one or two models exclusively.

Each country developed mediating regimes of its own. Deviating from the above model, the author in an empirical study of 150 key decisions of the German Parliament proposed another typology of six network structures in interest articulation which is closer to the political reality of the country (matrix 2).

The German parliamentary process is predominantly organized as a *limited pluralism*, limited via building cartels and oligopolistic arenas. This result is more implemented by great class and status organizations with a monopoly of representation in certain policy fields than by a deliberate illiberal policy of the state. State agencies and parliamentary decision-makers instead try to equalize the chances of access to decision-making, at least compared to the bureaucracy which favors large and powerful organizations. Half of the key decisions are pluralistic (51.8%). Policy does not always determine politics in a clear way, as Lowi (1964) suggested. Economic decisions are dominated by corporatist models and legal policy is

Matrix 2: *Typology of network structures in interest articulation.*

| | CORPORATIVE DUALISM | | CORPORATISM PLUS PLURALISM OF STATUS GROUP | STATUS-POLITICAL PLURALISM | | DOMINANCE OF PROMOTIONAL GROUPS |
	symmetrical dualism	asymmetrical dualism		Oligopol of status groups	Variety of status groups	
criteria of demarcation	dominance of class political dualism of economy and trade unions	dominance of a pole in the dualism of corporatism	cumulation of class political corporatism and status political pluralism	restricted pluralism of status groups ruling a policy field	extended access for many groups	pluralism of many groups. Promotional groups give the key. Status groups work as advocates in favor of third groups
focus in policy fields	economic policy 60% housing policy 20%	economic policy 69% environmental policy 16%	social policy 34% environmental policy 23%	social policy 28% legal policy 24%	legal policy 35% housing policy 35%	legal policy 76% environmental policy 11%
cases 110 (=100%)	9.1%	16.4%	23.6%	22.7%	12.7%	15.5%
attempts of interventions per law	37.9	16.0	60.9	6.6	36.7	21.2
focus in types of parliamentary decisions	protective 30% distributive 30%	distributive 27% protective 22%	distributive 38% protective 30%	distributive 48% regulative 19%	regulative 35% distributive 35%	protective 52% restrictive 29%

Source: Klaus von Beyme, *The Legislator. Parliament as the Center of Decision-Making. The Case of Germany* (Aldershot, Ashgate 1998), chapter 11 (forthcoming).

the domain of promotional groups. In all the other fields the situation has to be differentiated according to various issues. The affinities of policy arenas to certain interest group regimes do not exceed one third in some of the policy arenas.

The policy measures show only two strong determinations: oligopolistic status politics prevails in almost half of the distributive and redistributive

decisions (48%). Protective measures, on the other hand, seem to invite the dominance of promotional groups (52%).

The frequency of interventions is not tantamount to *influence* in all the arenas. In arenas of oligopolistic status politics, influence and intervention have a close connection. Corporatist intervention *ipso facto* limits influence because each intervention from one side causes a counter-reaction from the other side. Corporatism can be subdivided when sub-organizations of the major associations (employers, investors and trade unions) intervene. The more status organizations are present at the same time, the more divergent the statements of the suborganizations tend to be. In decisions on social policy with a high degree of polarization, the investors' organizations are frequently more divided than the trade unions because only the peak organizations have an all-round interest in the issue (cf. Pappi *et al.* 1995: 208).

In the USA the transformation of a *system of policy communities* has been discovered. The number and variety of views of the groups has increased. Former policy-sub-systems have broken down (Baumgartner/ Jones 1993: 179). There are certainly parallels in Europe as well. Nevertheless, the policy networks have differed in Germany from the Anglo-Saxon prototypes during the 1990s. The networks have been more decentralized in Germany, but vertical and horizontal interpenetrations have been comparatively high. Sectoralization has not excluded the integration of interests. The number of relevant associations has remained more limited than in the United States, though the fight for invitations to a public hearing is less hard in Germany because there are less prospective testifiers than in the USA. *Pluralist self-regulation* and *corporatist concertation* have combined in arenas where in the United States a *pluralist lobbying-model* has continued to dominate (Döhler 1990: 184). European systems were deeply influenced by American neo-liberalist ideas. But in spite of the hailing of the market in Europe, Thatcherism never prevailed on the Continent and was not even able to completely weaken the British National Health System.

Interest group research in America has rediscovered the "*legislative leviathan*" and the role of the parties behind the calculation of individual decisions of parliamentarians and their links with interest groups. In Germany the discovery that parties matter would be a truism. The *cosy triangles* in the American Congress (legislators, bureaucrats and interest group representatives) were always an "*uncosy pentangle*", involving parties and the state agencies of the Laender in a system of vertical intergovernmental decision-making alien to the American federal system. The influence of interest groups in such a system ultimately depends much more on their capacity to penetrate the party organizations and the establishments of

parliamentary groups than their ability to influence the legislators in the committees *via* interventions. These are more an indicator of influence than the cause of direct causality between intervention and decision.

THE NEW PARADIGM OF MEDIATING ASSOCIATIONS: THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Until 1983 the German system of interest articulation and conflict resolution in international comparisons was said to be legalistic, state-oriented, bureaucratic and not very conflict-oriented. When the Green Party entered parliament Germany unexpectedly became the "Mecca" of unconventional political behaviour. The easy victory of the new social movements was explained by the fragmentation of the institutions in German federalism and by the legal opportunities opened up by an administrative court system which was among the most accessible in the whole world (Nelkin 1982). A Bavarian farmer's wife for five years prevented the construction of an atomic power station – this was hardly conceivable in more centralized states! Another cause of the strength of alternative movements in Germany was the *cognitive mobilization* caused by the student protest movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Improved education strengthened the individualism of voters. Mobilization by hierarchical parties and bosses found less acceptance than before. The high *quantity of mobilized participation* was transformed into a new *quality of participation*: the newer mode of participation was capable of expressing the individual's preferences with greater precision than the old. This is a more *issue-oriented participation* based less on established bureaucratic organizations than on *ad hoc groups*. New forms of participation among growing Western mass publics – including (Inglehart 1977: 300) unconventional behaviour – turned out to be dependent on education, cognitive skills and postmaterialist attitudes. Participation was no longer ritual (Barnes/Kaase 1979: 524), nor considered as a value *per se*, but something which serves a purpose.

The capacity to absorb new demands has decreased since the days of the students' movement. In Germany, during the true of Brandt's Cabinet, the government was able to *absorb parts of the protest potential via mobilization and élite co-optation*. The new movements are more difficult to handle, because some groups among them do not want co-optation. Sometimes they do not even want participation at the centre. The more radical parties of the new movement demand *autonomy instead of representation*. It has turned out, however, to be premature to predict a growing decline of territorial representation by parliaments and parties

(Offe 1983: 233). The older movements fought against *exclusion from participation*. Some of the new social movements do not ask for *inclusion* – they exclude themselves at least from conventional participation.

The new organizational paradigm has made mobilization as an upward process less and less predictable. Frustration and crisis *per se* do not necessarily prepare the ground for new social movements. In the older theories of social movements conflict seemed to be a given assumption. An aggrieved population provided the necessary resources. The environment of movements was said to entail mobilization. That the movement's organizations and their leaders can use the environment for their own purposes was largely ignored (McCarthy/Zald 1977: 1277). With the help of ideologies people react to grievances via mobilization. The *potential group* in these theories was transformed into a mobilized group ready for action. In most studies it was overlooked that the *by-standing public* was always much larger than the proportion of citizens afflicted by grievances and ready to organize and to counteract.

How do individual dispositions transform themselves into democratic action, and how do individual actions eventually merge into a social movement? Hardly any topic has caused more disagreement than have these questions of fundamental importance in the field of mobilization and participation. Many of the theories offered worked in the unideological American environment, but lost much of their explanatory power in non-American field situations. Scholars who compared social movements transnationally were much more modest and kept their distance from grand theories (Marsh 1977: 215). *Traditional social-psychological theories* explained the new forms of mobilization with reference to the growing importance of short-term grievances which create structural strains under conditions of rapid social change (Gusfield 1968).

Long-range studies of social unrest have found that there are always grievances. Their number is relatively constant over time (Tilly 1978). Why do certain grievances lead to social movements and others not? The explanation was found in a challenge to traditional *theories of collective action*. Recent research has discovered that groups and movements do not develop in a nicely symmetrical way to interest articulation, as was suggested by the traditional views of the Bentley-Truman school. Traditional group theory in political science frequently saw participation in social movements as a kind of "unconventional" and fairly irrational behavior (Schwartz 1976). The theory of collective action by Mancur Olson (1977), which proved to be so fruitful for institutionalized groups, was also called into question with regard to its validity for the explanation of the success of new social movements. The *rational choice approach* in Olson's work never meant

to imply that emotions and non-rational motives do not play a role in determining who participates. But the highly sophisticated calculation of individuals this theory is based on, who were said to react more to selective individual benefits than to collective goods, was challenged when it was confronted with new movements. Here a rational calculation of benefits for active individuals was sometimes hard to discover, especially in *advocacy groups*.

Structural and political factors seemed to determine the fate of the new forms of participation. *Resource theory* emphasized the availability of resources, such as cadres and organizational facilities (McCarthy/Zald 1977). The older ideological *Weltanschauung* groups and *promotional groups* never completely fitted into either the theory of Truman or that of Olson. Two-thirds of modern *public interest movements*, proliferating in the aftermath of the students' movement and the anti-Vietnam campaigns, were run by powerful entrepreneurs without having significant disturbances as additional stimuli (Berry 1977: 24). The *entrepreneur model* also proved to be of great relevance for deprived groups and disorganized collectivities. Entrepreneurs were typically generated by the factionalization of previously existing movements (Jenkins 1983: 531).

Olson's theory of collective action was not completely falsified, however. Empirical studies on anti-nuclear movements showed that Olson's free rider problem was present even under conditions of objectively extreme risk, such as the Three Mile Island plant disaster. In this case only 13% of the opponents were ready to act. Ignorance and apathy were wide-spread (Walsh 1981).

Media coverage was frequently mentioned as a mobilizing factor (Molotch 1979). But this proved to be an asset for new movements only during an initial phase. No permanent mobilization can be built on "parasitic" media coverage, though Schönhuber's Republicans exploit this argument claiming that anti-fascist protests against Republican rallies are the best propaganda for their movement.

Sometimes it has even been argued that the *participatory revolution* of the 1970s did not really exist. It is said to have been the artificial result of improved access and the pervasive mass media which provided individual entrepreneurs with the pre-conditions for an easily won success. *Mobilization for routine politics* had declined and *non-institutionalized politics* had attained greater attention. If this assumption was correct, the proliferation of these movements should have been a linear one. But it is obviously not. Ideological movements, cultural climates and the vicissitudes of success in conventional politics play a greater role than has been imagined. Part of the success of new social movements is due to the fact that they do not only

apply presure to state agencies. On the one hand, they no longer act on ideological lines criticizing capitalist society wholesale. On the other hand, they rather efficiently select private firms and put them under pressure and thus by way of acting mobilize ideological support from society and secure incentives to intervene on the part of state agencies (Dyllick 1989).

Traditional social-psychological theories tended to classify motives for participation as irrational, or concentrated on the psychological process of weighing the costs and benefits of participation. Recent theories have tried to reconcile the social psychological theories and resources mobilization approaches by making a distinction between *consensus mobilization*, which reaches a great variety of individuals, and the highly selective *action mobilization*, which can be only explained in terms of a more political mobilization theory (Klandermans 1984).

Authors sympathizing with new social movements have used the theory of social movements to show how traditional participation has been challenged by them and how institutional politics have been challenged in modern society. Recent theoretical attempts have, however, tried to complement these studies with theories of restricted participation, such as *neocorporatism*. Neo-corporatist arrangements do not only bind conventional group behaviour to a great extent. They sometimes also integrate new social movements which attack the system. This is even true for environmental movements where citizens' action groups are involved in bargaining tolerable limits for pollution or working on compromises to minimize the damage caused by new construction projects.

Consensus mobilization of upward mobilizers has become more difficult because of an ever increasing fragmentation of society and the fact that the focus of public attention is shifting between various issues. Consensus mobilization has, however, also been facilitated, because the communication between social strata and the direct interaction of individuals from all social backgrounds – which is strengthened by the "parasitic publicity" the media provide – has become easier. Issues are more rapidly painted in dark colours, even if the objective threat connected with the issue at stake is less evident. Because of today's more open pluralist society (Nedelmann 1986), new social movements have a less reliable *social milieu* to count on. Some of the Green movements state with joy that the traditional parties have lost their milieu, and they hope that the Greens are the only relevant political group based on a social environment which can serve as a conveyer organization. Conservative critics of these new social movements have called the Greens a "*milieu party*", not leart because of their manifold links with the alternative scene (Veen 1987). It can, indeed, be shown that certain conflicts condense in a

kind of "moral milieu". The emotional milieu can be polarized by acute conflicts. *Consensus mobilization* is only a first stage (Klandermans 1984: 586). The ecology movement has mobilized numerous decentralized milieus which already existed to its own advantage (Bergman 1987: 377). But the second stage, *mobilization for action*, is mostly restricted to the hard-core of a specialized movement.

Usually social movements remain *fuzzy systems* with great fluctuations and rarely develop clear-cut boundary lines. Their networks of action are often of a short duration. Sometimes even the term movement is an exaggeration. Some authors prefer the term "mobilization" for these types of short-lived action groups (Melucci 1985: 802).

Even when the movement creates a party there are no permanent links between organization and milieu. The German Greens have experienced this dilemma. Abrupt changes in the definition of their central issue from ecology to peace and feminism have eroded their agenda and alienated parts of the movement coalition. No permanent *conveyer organizations* have developed as was the case between the old parties and their organizations in the nineteenth century. Many individuals refuse to be permanently integrated. They take part in various activities. The leadership of the movements turned out to be a kind of "self-contracting élite" because the same leading figures were active in the ecological movement, in regional citizens' action groups against new industrial settlements, and participated in peace rallies at Easter. Moreover, many of the individuals did not confine their activities to the "milieu". Contradictions were always possible. An individual could one day fight the trade unions' position on industrial settlements and the next join a union-led initiative in favour of foreign workers. The electoral support for a Green Party has been even less stable than in the case of traditional parties. Increasingly young people are inclined to use their vote strategically: Green and deviant in *municipal elections* and *elections for the European parliament*. When during a *national election* rather more clear-cut bread and butter issues seem to be at stake the same people might grudgingly vote for "good old aunt SPD" (von Beyme 1988).

On the one hand, new social movements mobilize individuals belonging to different subsystems; on the other hand every social movement as a social system is self-referential because it defines its own goals of action, its system boundaries. Individuals initiating and joining new social movements have a greater autonomy and self-confidence than was the case with former movements. They are not easily permanently mobilized for a goal by an outside organization. Therefore it seems (Nedelmann 1984) hardly correct to assume that there is only one social movement and not

several movements which ask for participation in various policy arenas. The first assumption is correct only in so far (Schmitt 1987: 136) as it contradicts the *coalition hypothesis*, which assumes that the peace and ecology movements are a broad coalition of various social forces. Their scope of support is clearly limited to the political Left in Germany. In other countries, however, – especially in France, where the new Green party was revitalized during the election campaign for the European parliament in 1989 – the leftist leaning of the new social movements is less obvious. The instability of the new forms of mobilization and participation is supported by a *diffuse cultural milieu*, which is increasingly replacing the *old social milieus* which were organized by ideological parties via conveyer organizations. In the propaganda of many social movements the central notion is "*to be personally affected by something*" *(persönliche betroffenheit)*. But in most cases it can be shown that objective deprivation is only weakly correlated with the successes of mobilization. At elections the ecological movement had its strongholds not in those constituencies which host dangerous nuclear power stations, but in those areas where it had mobilization forces available.

This seems to confirm the more politically-orientated resources theory. Cultural variables, such as life-styles (*lebensweise*), seem to have a greater explanatory power than direct personal "affectedness". The new mobilizing movements do not always behave in the way old interest groups did – by concentrating on new *demands*. They lay greater stress on offering a new *life-style* – even if they hardly know how this can be organized in the future. Many conflicts thus shift from the *political* to the *cultural sphere* and do not circle around *new forms of institutional politics* but rather *remain in the field of non-institutional politics*. New social movements do not expect the state to be able to decree a new life-style, they only ask for a degree of autonomy which will allow them to organize their life according to their own views (Nelles 1984: 429).

The new movements are *postmodern* in so far as they do not offer a new holistic ideology. This does not mean that they are free of ideology. It is more that they have too many ideologies, from new age to alternative socialism. These ideologies remain the *private affair* (*privatsache*) of individuals and particular groups. They are neither willing nor capable of transforming themselves into a new generally binding ideology. The groups are individualistic in their outlook – holistic ideas about the salvation of humankind are advocated only by minorities (Horx 1983). Postmodern theory, with its hailing of the "*patchwork of minorities*", does not always accept majority rule and advocates *itio in partes*. Not even unanimity is accepted. In his written work Lyotard even rules out the smooth strategy of

a Habermasian discourse. But other postmodern thinkers who challenge majority rule advocate a veto for new movements until all experts have agreed, in the form of giving any outsider a *liberum veto*. This position (Spaemann 1984) might, however, – under the guise of the enlightened advocates of the public good – create a new "*demobureaucracy*" in the field of technology. *Counter-mobilization* might be the result.

The highly individualistic approach of many postmodern theorists even endangers the goals of these movements, if veto-politics tends to be too successful. Social movements with the best intentions should never forget that more people can be mobilized for the *status quo* in non-revolutionary times than for rapid change. To play on "*stimmungsdemokratie*" (Oberreuter 1987: 12) in an emotionalized cultural milieu can turn out to be a boomerang. The system has more time to wait. Their shifting foci of attention and their shifting alliances give new social movements an organizational advantage over the organized forces. Many citizens' action groups would never have been invited to a hearing if the establishment had known how few people the group would be able to mobilize. In the phase of *consensus mobilization* even small groups have a mobilizational bonus. It vanishes rapidly, however, as soon as the movement enters into the second phase of *mobilization for action*. In this phase the system has serious advantages over the outbursts of the *Lebenswelt*.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF NEW CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRACY

(1) *Mobilization from above is getting rarer.* Issues, crises and catastrophies force the political system to react, but gives it hardly any time to anticipate and to plan.

(2) *Mobilization from below is no longer streamlined by one movement* or even one party as was the case with most historical conflicts. In former times new issues created new milieus, and new parties – from agrarian protest and the call for self-determination by ethnic minorities to the working-class movement or the Christian-social movement aiming at defense in an increasingly secular world.

(3) *Participation is more diffuse* and less confined to one cultural milieu. Culture as a sub-system is growing in importance in relation to other sub-systems such as politics and economics. The objects of social conflict are differentiated. Each issue can mobilize various adjacent interests. A classical example is the feminist movement. The device "equal

pay for the same type of work" can mobilize both sides of labour. Abortion mobilizes churches as well as human rights organizations. The scope of the cultural milieu is broadened, but the shifting alliances have little chance to organize permanent coalitions. Differentiation, moralization and emotionalization of conflict contain the germs of destabilization (Nedelmann 1986). Because of these shortcomings of the new movements, old institutional politics receive an important opportunity for regeneration. Parties play down conflicts and transform issues into manageable detailed programs. Social compromise in the non-fundamentalist old organizations is reached by log rolling arrangements and other forms of bargaining, despised by the fundamentalist social movements (Smith 1976).

Though the political game which was developed in the era of classical modernity was not seriously disturbed by the new forms participation and mobilization, recent research in theory mainly discusses the question of whether the new movements are an indicator of the development of a new theoretical paradigm or even a new type of society. Theories of postmodernism in particular, claim a change of paradigm on grounds of both theory and social reality. These, sticking to the definition of the term "paradigm" offered by Thomas Kuhn, would prefer to restrict the change they recognize to the level of theory.

This author is inclined to believe that it is too early to claim that a new paradigm of society has been developed. But there is undoubtedly a new theoretical paradigm. This involves very different vistas of society and the power of movements within society. If we accept for heuristic purposes the three stages of pre-modern, modern and postmodern theory we can find the equivalent in terms of explanation of the new movements. There are even certain types of corresponding activity. In the light of our dichotomy I would argue that *mobilization* by ideological leadership was a pre-modern paradigm. *Participation* corresponded more to the stage of classical modern theories and developed a certain balance between mobilization from above and participation from below. Ideally the new social movements in the postmodern stage no longer fight for participation – which means integration into the existing structure – but they ask for self-determination instead of "co-determination". Their aim is no longer *seizure* of *power* as in the premodern movements or *sharing power* as in the model of classic modern pluralism, but autonomy (matrix 3).

The main task of forthcoming research will be to ask whether the postmodern paradigm of an autopoietic development of participatory structures is compatible with empirical findings or only wishful thinking, something which has developed as a result of the self-perception of new social movements and their forms of participation.

Matrix 3: *Theories on social movement. Participation and mobilization.*

Types of theories	Pattern of explanation	types of activities	Aims of the movement
premodern	objectivist approach: where there is a cleavage, there will develop a movement	mobilization by ideological leaders	Seizure of power
modern	cleavages are pre-conditions. For the rise of a movement additional resources must be available (élites, strategies, funds)	balance between participation from below and mobilization from above	Co-determination, share in power
postmodern	movement develops on its own. Cleavage is unnecessary. Protests rise when there are single issues.	self-realization	autonomy

(4) Parliamentary democracy is similar in most Continental countries, nevertheless it has developed in difficult directions according to the *organization of policy-networks* and policy arenas. The German Bundestag developed in the direction of a parliamentary system where majorities and committees are decisive, whereas Italy, in spite of the development of a party state as in Germany, remained at the traditional level of an *entrepreneurial parliament* where parties and interest groups streamline their *parentela* and *clientela* relations. But the network organization is not stable over time. After the consolidation of democracy in the Adenauer era, corporatist elements were strengthened during the fifth legislature under the Grand Coalition (1966-69). But Germany was never so fully corporatist that parties no longer mattered. Concentration functioned best under the conditions of the Grand Coalition and this shows that the control capacity of parties is decisive for the functioning of corporatist relations among interest groups. Compared with the United States, the German system of decision-making is less polarized (Pappi 1995: 400). The steering capacity of parties is greater than in America. Vertical intergovernmental decision-making in the German system of federalism, from combination with corporatism, is absent from the American system.

The efficiency of legislation in terms of the number of laws was deduced after Mancur Olson from the character of interest group regimes in various systems. Overregulation, in this perception, is the result of the growing influence of interest groups and leads to *parliamentary sclerosis.* But in spite of the growing number of interest groups and new social systems, the number of laws did not grow. Theories such as Wagner's law of growing state expenditures and the hypothesis of growing bureaucracies or shares of state ownership proved to be wrong. The genesis of a theory legislation at the time of the Enlightenment (Bentham 1789, Filanieri 1798) inclined towards perceiving legislation as a rational machine. In postmodern times legislation has been compared to "a garden rather than a product manufactured by a machine" (Richard Rose). In order to use this metaphor we could compare legislation with a park at the time of Romanticism. Originally it was designed as a symmetric rational French garden, but time distorted the design with a wild organic growth which transformed it into a Romantic English park. The rational design is still in the statute books and in the co-operation of those institutions entitled by the constitution to decide. But by-gardens grew in the parliamentary park: concertations, round tables, negotiations between the federation and the Laender have created a by- and para-parliamentarianism which has grown up over the constitutional machinery of legislation. Conservative formalists from time to time cry out for the cutting all this wild growth, but they overlook the fact that without it the constitutional machinery would no longer work.

The classical division of functions: leadership (government and parliament) and implementation (bureaucracy) is no longer valid. By spreading reflective law and conceptions of non-hierarchical self-control, new parastatal and private actors have gained influence over the decision-making process. Even among the non-statal social actors, the weight of actors is not constant over time. The corporatist social partners have lost in influence. A sometimes anarchical neo-pluralism has staged a comeback after the alleged death of the pluralist model of interest mediation.

REFERENCES

BARNES S. - MAX KAASE (1979): *Political Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (London, Sage).

BAUMGARTNER F. - JONES B. (1993): *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago, University Press).

BERGMANN W. (1987): 'Was bewegt die soziale Bewegung?' in Baecker, Dirk et al. (eds.), *Theorie als Passion* (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp), pp. 362-393.

VON BEYME K. (1988): 'Neue soziale Bewegungen und politische Parteien', in idem, *Der Vergleich in der Politikwissenschaft* (Munich, Piper), pp. 247-269.

JEFFREY J.M. (1977): *Lobbying for the People* (Princeton UP).

DÖHLER M. (1990): *Gesundheitspolitik nach der "Wende"* (Berlin, Sigma).

GUSFIELD J. (1968): *The Study of Social Movements*, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, Macmillan), pp. 445-452.

HABERMAS K. (1992): *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats* (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp).

HORX M. et al. (1983): *Infrarot* (Berlin, Rotbuchverlag).

INGLEHART R. (1977): *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton UP).

JAPP K.P. (1986): 'Neue soziale Bewegungen und die Kontinuität der Moderne', in J. Berger (ed.): *Die Moderne - Kontinuitäten und Zäsuren* (Göttingen, Schwartz), pp. 311-333.

JENKINS J.C. (1983): 'Resource Mobilization. Theory and the Study of Social Movements', *Am. Soc. Review*, pp. 527-553.

JORDAN K. - SCHUBERT K. (1992): 'A Preliminary Ordering of Policy Network Labels', *EJPR*, pp. 7-27.

KLANDERMANS B. (1984): 'Mobilization and Participation: Social-psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory', *Am. Soc. Review*, pp. 583-600.

LOWI T. (1964): *American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory* (World Politics), pp. 677-715.

MARSH A. (1977): *Protest and Political Consciousness* (London, Sage).

MCCARTHY J.D. - ZALD M.N. (1977): 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements', *Am. Journal of Sociology*, pp. 1212-1241.

MELUCCI A. (1985): 'The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements', *Social Research*, pp. 779-816.

MOLOTCH H. (1979): 'Media and Movements', in McCarthy-Zald, pp. 71-93.

NEDELMANN B. (1984): 'New Political Movements and Changes in the Process of Intermediation', *Social Science Information*, pp. 1029-1048.

NEDELMANN B. (1986): 'Das kulturelle Milieu sozialer Konflikte', *KZfSS, Special Issue 27*, pp. 397-412.

NELKIN D. - POLLAK M. (1982): *The Atom Besieged. Antinuclear Movements in France and Germany* (Cambridge/Mass., MIT Press).

NELLES W. (1984): 'Kollektive Identität und Politisches Handeln in Neuen Sozialen Bewegungen', *PVS*, pp. 425-440.

OBERREUTER H. (1987): *Stimmungsdemokratie* (Zürich, Interfrom).

OFFE C. (1983): 'Competitive Party Democracy and the Keynesian Welfare State', *Policy Sciences*, pp. 225-246.

OFFE C. (1985): 'New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics', *Social Research*, pp. 817-868.

OLSON M. (1977): *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge/Mass., Harvard UP).

PAPPI F.-U. et al. (1995): *Entscheidungsprozesse in der Arbeits- und Sozialpolitik* (Frankfurt, Campus).

PIVEN F. - CLOWARD R. (1977): *Poor People's Movements* (New York, Pantheon).

SCHWARTZ M. (1976): *Radical Protest and Social Structure* (New York, Academy Press).

SMITH G. (1976): 'Social Movements and Party Systems in Western Europe', in Kolinsky, Martin and Paterson, William E. (eds.): *Social and Political Movements in Western Europe* (London, Croom Helm), pp. 331-354.

SPAEMANN R. (1984): 'Technische Eingriffe in die Natur als Problem der politischen Ethik', in Guggenberger, Bernd/Offe, Claus (eds.): *An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie* (Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag), pp. 240-253.

TILLY CH. (1978): *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading/Mass., Addison-Wesley).

VAN WAARDEN F. (1992): 'Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks', *EJPR*, pp. 29-52.

WALSH E.J. (1981): 'Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island', *Soc. Probl.*, pp. 1-26.