

Discussion of the paper by S. Bartolini

ARCHER

Firstly there seems to be an important and non-zero-sum relationship between the development of supranational entities (as in the case of the EU) and its impact upon participants, such that the latter are actually strengthened both economically and politically (as in the case of the Republic of Ireland).

Secondly, we have discussed two waves of development. Firstly, the emergence of nation-states and then of supranational bodies like the EU. Is there now a need for a third wave of regulatory agencies controlling the unregulated but immensely powerful global finance markets and also protecting the mobile labour force which is often deprived of citizenship rights in receiving countries?

FLORIA

Se nos plantea, respecto de la democracia, una secuencia análoga a la que ocurrió con la nación en el siglo XIX y XX. Y la “cuestión nacional” persiste en una pregunta que se hace el hombre contemporáneo, distinta de la pregunta que se hacía el hombre de fines del siglo pasado, que resume Renán cuando se preguntaba qué es la nación. La pregunta de hoy es: ¿para qué la nación? Me parece que hay una cierta analogía que se puede proponer. Vamos a terminar el siglo con la “cuestión democrática”. La pregunta que sigue no es tanto ¿qué es la democracia? cuanto la “democracia, para qué? Y ésta es la que yo creo es la demanda profunda de muchas sociedades, pueblos y personas. Diría que lo que usted insinúa, en cuanto a la dialéctica, entre globalización y nación es perfectamente válido. Estamos en una transición, en un salto cualitativo, hacia un futuro que promete una nueva organización del mundo, formas de gobierno mundial a través de organizaciones transnacionales que de hecho comienzan a gobernar recursos. Me refiero al Fondo Monetario Internacional, al Banco Mundial en la dimensión sobre todo económica; ese mundo puede no ser necesariamente mejor para el hombre concreto que el de las democracias nacionales y el pensamiento político será desafiado en ese sentido. Hasta ahora la teoría política y las especulaciones políticas han partido del

supuesto implícito de que el ámbito natural de la ciudadanía y de la democracia es el estado nacional. De donde me parece que estamos en una época que evoca la que encontraron los griegos cuando estaban usando categorías para la “polis” y llegó el Imperio Romano. Gracias.

ZIOLKOWSKI

During the last visit of the Polish bishops *ad limina*, His Holiness said that European unity lies predominantly in the field of spirit. First, and foremost, in the unity of Christendom, which still underlies Europe's enduring shared values. Europe sends a message of its ability to successfully combine the elements of spiritual and material culture, to humanize technology, to introduce ethical imperatives into scientific research. It's a region which can transcend its quarrels and, after having twice this century steeped the world in blood, set to the world, to a large extent, an example of reconciliation. The order we seek is not just a customs union or a thin coating of technological uniformity; it is not a superficial cultural homogeneity produced by the media, or a supranational organism. We seek something more substantial, more effective and lasting. The moral spiritual guidance provides not a panacea, but a true perspective of how European unity can be achieved.

ELSHTAIN

One of the central themes classic theories of citizenship had to do with was citizenship as a thick identity. That is, there were elements that made citizenship very sturdy, including a sense of loyalty, a sense of what it means to be at home in a culture and committed to it, a sense of shared language and history, even civic affection for a place, a people, a particular way of life. That strong notion of citizenship assumed that the loyalty that the citizens felt, in the sense of being part of the sweep and scope of a particular history, involved a rooted citizen in such a way that he or she accepted responsibility for the civic body of which he or she was a part. Can you sustain a notion of citizenship when the bonds that were historically assumed as the source of citizenship get thinner and thinner?

What does it mean to be an alien living in a place but not part of it civically? What does it mean to be seen as a client of a bureaucracy, perhaps contributing to a place economically and being the beneficiary of social provisions but more as a client than as a citizen? Is it possible that we have, or will, so thinned out the ties that connect people to whatever political body of which they are a part, that loyalties to that place cannot be sustained, and that any meaningful notions of citizenship has been lost?

SCHAMBECK

Mir geht es um die Beziehung der europäischen Integration zur Demokratie. Die europäische Integration ist nach Beendigung des Zweiten Weltkrieges ein Friedensgebot gewesen, weil die Nationalstaaten diese Friedenssicherung nicht bieten konnten. Sie ist gelungen! Sie begann aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen — nämlich mit der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl — und ließ eine Friedenszone entstehen.

Die Entwicklung der europäischen Integration ist so schnell mit dem alten Demokratiemodell nicht realisierbar gewesen, sondern verlangte eine Exekutivlastigkeit, die mit unseren bisherigen Vorstellungen des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates nicht vereinbar ist.

Die Europäische Union ermöglicht keine Demokratie als Mitbestimmung des Volkes, wie das in unseren Staaten in den Parlamenten der Fall ist. Es ist eine andere Form der demokratischen Mitbestimmung in der europäischen Integration. Ich verweise auf die Verantwortung der staatlichen Regierungsvertreter im Rat der Europäischen Union, welche wieder für ihr Wirken in der Europäischen Union ihren nationalen Parlamenten verantwortlich sind.

Unabhängig von allem Institutionellen ist die Erziehungsarbeit zum demokratischen Bewußtsein in den einzelnen EU-Ländern wichtig. Dazu gehört, daß man die Wahlentscheidungen zum Europäischen Parlament nicht immer auf die politischen Verhältnisse in den einzelnen EU-Mitgliedstaaten überträgt.

Aus der Sicht der katholischen Soziallehre ist es erfreulich, daß das Subsidiaritätsprinzip, welches schon in der Konferenz von Maastricht betont wurde, seine geistigen Wurzeln in eben dieser katholischen Soziallehre hat und mit ein Lebensprinzip innerhalb der europäischen Integration sein soll.

Dabei darf man nicht übersehen, daß das Subsidiaritätsprinzip nur auf die Beziehung der Europäischen Union zu den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten und nicht auf die innerstaatliche Ordnung der einzelnen Mitgliedsländer der Europäischen Union gerichtet ist. Die Europäische Union hat übrigens primär eine wirtschaftliche Kompetenz, aber viel weniger eine soziale Kompetenz; die liegt mehr bei den Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Union und weniger bei der Europäischen Union selbst.

Was diese neue Ordnung Europas betrifft, möge man nicht den Fehler begehen, die Europäische Union mit Europa überhaupt gleichzusetzen. Weiters wäre es falsch, wenn man die Teilung, die es einst zwischen dem freien und dem unfreien Europa gegeben hat, heute auf eine Teilung zwischen EU-Ländern und Nicht-EU-Ländern in Europa überträgt, und was noch trauriger wäre, in reiche europäische Länder und arme europäische Länder.

Wir sollten vielmehr den Weg zur europäischen Integration als einen Aufruf zur europäischen Solidarität ansehen, denn Europa sollte auch, was Papst Johannes Paul II. immer wieder betonte, eine Wertegemeinschaft sein.

LLACH

Gracias, presidente. Me quedó la preocupación de que puedan aparecer los procesos de la integración europea o americana como si fueran una imposición de alguien. Mi lectura que de por qué los pueblos democráticamente han decidido ceder parte de la soberanía, es por las grandes tragedias del siglo XX. Por ejemplo hablemos de la Argentina. La Argentina en el año 1978 estuvo al borde de la guerra con Chile. En la Argentina durante muchas décadas no se construían caminos, hacia el Brasil, por el temor de una guerra y una posible invasión. Es decir, una “locura geopolítica” fenomenal. En el campo de la economía, y esto es muy relevante también para la unión monetaria europea, podemos ver también graves desatinos en el siglo XX. La Europa del siglo XX ha conocido, lo mismo que América del Sur, experimentos de robo, que yo creo que no son otra cosa, de los estados a los ciudadanos a través del impuesto inflacionario o de políticas fiscales completamente excéntricas, de gigantescos endeudamientos públicos que han sido muy negativos para las sociedades. No por causalidad el Reino Unido, que es el país de Europa menos propenso a estos experimentos, es el que por el momento no desea entrar en la unión monetaria. Una lectura de este tipo es importante porque estamos frente a un fenómeno nuevo, pero creo que para entenderlo bien tenemos que tener más claro que es un ejercicio hondamente democrático y profundamente anclado en razones históricas.

VILLACORTA

I found this very instructive and interesting, because I've always thought that, given the common Greco-Roman Judeo-Christian tradition in Europe, integration in terms of developing a European patriotism, as you call it, would be less complicated than in South-East Asia. It seems to me that a regional civil consciousness would perhaps be easier in South-East Asia under the Association of South-East Asian Nations than it would be under the European Union. We are less bothered about cultural identity, because we're perhaps more relaxed about it. Regardless of what Europeans claim, I think Europeans remain very nationalistic. That is from an outsider's point of view. Moreover, within our region there is an absence of a dominant power. We have no Germany nor the counterpart of the U.K.

or France in South-East Asia. The dominant powers come from outside: the United States and Japan. There seems to be more compatibility in cultural values in the way we look at things. And there is the preponderance of one international language in South-East Asia: English. However, it is not a perfect situation, we still have bones of contention, such as the South China Sea controversy and other territorial issues. But it's very manageable, and we prefer to shelve these issues. Our main concern is another outside power, which is China, but among ourselves we've postponed quarrelling with each other. In terms of economic competition, there's competition for foreign investment, for trade, but still, it is not as much as one would expect. The ASEAN free trade area is moving faster and is ahead of its original targets. AFTA has been a model for APEC. I just wanted to share that observation for whatever its worth.

NOJIRI

Thank you. One minute is enough. Yes, in the modern age advanced nations have had nation-states and developing nations are now constructing their nation-states. So, one can say that the modern age has been an era of nation-states, in the economy and in politics alike. So, democracy, too, has been a national democracy of advanced nations, that is European and North American, and also Japanese nations. Then, if so, in Europe maybe such a modern age is already passing now. So, the building of a European Union means that a modern national democracy, i.e. a democracy in one nation-state, is ending now. What do you think about this? Thank you.

BARTOLINI

First, some of the questions could be answered if I clarify that in this speech I took democracy seriously. That is, meaning that political decisions are taken by elected and therefore accountable people, I don't exclude that some sort of European benevolent techno-bureaucratic rule – but I don't call that democracy – might be acceptable to European citizens. It has been argued that the Council of Ministers is a responsible body. Indeed, each individual member of the Council is responsible to his own parliament, but collectively the decision-taking might deviate enormously from what his own parliament and his own citizens wanted. Moreover, the Council's members are responsible to national parliaments. But then, what about the European Parliament which claims a totally different democratic legitimacy? If EU legislation were to be controlled by the European Parliament, how can the Council be unaccountable? In addition to this somehow contradictory and partial mechanisms of political representation

(Council and Parliament) there is the “corporative decision-making” in the “comitology” structures around the Community. Finally, we have the recent development of territorial regional representation. Now, in none of these representation channels oppositions and conflicts emerge or are solved. The only level at which one sees conflicts and oppositions is the Council, the intergovernmental level. The other channels seem more mechanisms of legitimation than mechanisms of representation. We are far away from representation, any sort of representation. A speaker mentioned Ireland, which has recently become a European success story and model country. My question was, however, different: is Ireland becoming more democratic while being more economically efficient? Ireland is a good example of how you can attract resources but fundamentally predefining the range of economic policy you want to follow. It’s a good example of how institutional competition and territorial competition could come to dominate within the European Union, moving toward a different model of democracy. Let’s imagine that states set up a policy package and they sell it on the market, and they buy citizens and firms rather than satisfying those they have. This would imply a completely different model of polity in which consensus is measured by exiting or staying rather than voicing and voting. In conclusion, territories and countries can be more or less successful economically, can become more or less significant and powerful, but I don’t see a close connection between this and democracy. I apologize for not having done justice to all the speakers.