

# INTEGRATING THE HISTORICALLY DISADVANTAGED INTO THE WORLD OF WORK

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**SUMMARY** - This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I describe the nature of social and economic inequality as it exists now between Blacks and Whites in the United States. I also give some attention to the trends over time, asking how the nature of the historic disadvantage suffered by blacks has changed in the last generation.

In the second part, I discuss the question of Affirmative Action. My view is that this policy has not worked well in the United States, with some notable exceptions. However, I believe that it can play a useful, though modest, role in facilitating the integration of blacks into the world of work. I attempt to explain and defend this position in Part Two.

Throughout this paper, my attention is fixed on the question of racial inequality in the U.S. This is the matter which I know best, but I believe it has relevance to the experience in other countries as well.

## I.

### 25 YEARS OF BLACK AMERICA: TWO STEPS FORWARD AND ONE STEP BACK?

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The data concerning the state of America, black and white, over the past 25 years is both disheartening and encouraging. Disheartening are many measures of the opportunities and difficulties faced by black children and, to a lesser extent, white children. Infant mortality has declined, but black children are less and less likely to be raised by both of their parents.

Many objective measures of achievement — exam scores (national proficiency exams as well as SAT exams), levels of education, and income — are more encouraging. Even as scores on several national exams have

remained roughly constant for white children and young adults, scores for blacks have increased. More remarkable is the fact that these increases seem to have occurred largely while the black exam-taking population has *increased*.

So, looking at black America over the past quarter century, there is much for both optimists and pessimists.

## II. CHILDREN

Birth is much safer today than it was 25 years ago (Figure 1), but arriving in this world is still more hazardous for black children than for white ones. The infant mortality rate<sup>1</sup> for black children was 17.0 in 1990, while for white children it was only 7.3. This difference has persisted over time even though substantial progress has been made. In 1970, rates for both were considerably higher: 32.6 for black children and 17.8 for white ones.

### A. *Family structure*

The families into which these children are born are fairly different than the ones of their counterparts of 25 years ago. Among black women, unmarried mothers accounted for 68% of all births in 1992 (Figure 2), while in 1960 they accounted for only 22%. For white mothers, the increase has been even more dramatic, although from a smaller base: from 2% in 1960 to 23% in 1992.

Not surprisingly, as fewer children are born to married mothers, fewer live with both of their parents. The decline has been steady for both black and white children, but black children face a much larger problem: less than 40% of black children lived with both of their parents in 1994. Children of educated parents are more likely to live with two parents (Table 1). There remain significant differences between whites and blacks at all education levels, but the most dramatic differences are for those children whose parents have a high school education or less.

### B. *Poverty*

Poverty rates for both black and white children have increased slightly,<sup>2</sup> but most of the increase has been among white children. Although poverty

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<sup>1</sup> Infants are less than one year of age; rates are per 1000 live births and are based on the race of the child. See [National Center for Health Statistics, Public Service. 1996].

<sup>2</sup> Does this depend on measurement of in-kind benefits and changes in the CPI? Paper by Jencks & Mayer?




Figure 1.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.

Table 1: *Children under 18 living with both parents* (% in 1995).

Parent's Education	Black	White
Less than 12	35.0	73.8
Grades 9-12 (no diploma)	18.1	62.1
High school graduate	38.8	74.1
College: Associates degree or none	40.0	77.6
Bachelor's degree	62.8	90.3
Graduate or professional degree	66.9	92.6




Figure 4.

rates for black children have not changed much over the past 20 years, the rates are strikingly high: 42% in 1995 (Figure 4). Rates for white children *have* increased: from 10.5% in 1970 to 15.5% in 1995.

For children, a major factor associated with living in poverty is living in a family headed by a woman. The poverty rate for these families is quite high: roughly 60% for families headed by black women and roughly 40% for families headed by white women (Figure 5). Although the risk has improved somewhat for black families over the past 20 years, it is still larger than the comparable risk for families headed by white women. For married couple families, the risk is much lower. Black families still face higher risks than white ones, but the gap has narrowed.

### C. School enrollment

Preschool enrollment rates for 3 to 4 year old black children increased from 18.7% in 1973 to 29.8% in 1993. For white children, enrollment rates increased more: from 17.8% to 38.0% (Figure 6). By the early 1990s, enrollment of 5 year olds in kindergarten had increased slightly while enrollment in first grade decreased slightly (Figure 7). Both kindergarten and first grade enrollment rates are similar for black and white 5 year olds.





Figure 5. Poverty of families with children.





Figure 6. School enrollment of 3-4 year olds.




Figure 7.

#### D. School progress

National assessment tests of proficiency in reading and mathematics have shown fairly steady improvements since 1970 (1973 for mathematics). Increases in average scores for black students aged 9, 13, and 17 have been fairly impressive, particularly relative to increases in average scores for white students (Table 2). In 1973, the average mathematics score for black students aged 17 was 270 (out of 500); by 1994 it had increased to 286.

Average reading scores for both white and black students fell in the 1980s. For black students, the decrease came later (between 1988 and 1990 instead of between 1980 and 1984) and was larger. The scores of black 13 year olds reached a peak of 243 in 1988 and fell to 234 by 1994; the scores of white 13 year olds fell from 264 in 1980 to 261 in 1988.

The distribution of scores suggests that improvements were widespread: the scores of black students at the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile all climbed (relative to those of white students) from 1978 to 1994 (Table 3). Unfortunately, the gaps between black and white students seem to have been smallest in the 1986 to 1990 period (for the older students) and appear to have increased again after that.



Table 2: *Average proficiency scores.*

<i>Mathematics</i>						
	Age 9	Black Age 13	Age 17	Age 9	White Age 13	Age 17
1973	190	228	270	225	274	310
1978	192	230	268	224	272	306
1982	195	240	272	224	274	304
1986	202	249	279	227	274	308
1990	208	249	288	235	276	310
1992	208	250	286	235	279	312
1994	212	252	286	237	281	312

Scale from 0 to 500:

150 - Simple arithmetic facts

200 - Beginning skills and understanding

250 - Numerical operations; beginning problem solving

300 - Moderately complex procedures and reasoning

350 - Multi-step problem solving and algebra

<i>Reading</i>						
	Age 9	Black Age 13	Age 17	Age 9	White Age 13	Age 17
1971	170	222	239	214	261	291
1975	181	226	241	217	262	293
1980	189	233	243	221	264	293
1984	186	236	264	218	263	295
1988	189	243	274	218	261	295
1990	182	242	267	217	262	297
1992	185	238	261	218	266	297
1994	185	234	266	218	265	296

Scale from 0 to 500:

150 - Simple, discrete reading levels

200 - Partial skills and understanding

250 - Interrelate ideas and make generalizations

300 - Understand complicated information

350 - Learn from specialized reading materials

Table 3: *Differences in percentile scores (black-white).*

		<i>Mathematics</i>					
Percentile		1978	1982	1986	1990	1992	1994
Age 9:							
	5	-32	-31	-25	-26	-27	-22
	50	-32	-28	-25	-28	-27	-25
	95	-20	-29	-27	-26	-25	-24
Age 13:							
	5	-42	-34	-24	-26	-31	-29
	50	-43	-34	-24	-28	-28	-31
	95	-42	-34	-27	-27	-28	-25
Age 17:							
	5	-35	-28	-24	-15	-26	-24
	50	-39	-33	-28	-23	-26	-26
	95	-37	-32	-31	-19	-26	-33
		<i>Reading</i>					
Percentile		1980	1984	1988	1990	1992	1994
Age 9:							
	5	-38	-31	-25	-29	-34	-33
	50	-31	-33	-31	-36	-36	-35
	95	-29	-32	-29	-34	-27	-27
Age 13:							
	5	-30	-25	-13	-22	-34	-30
	50	-33	-27	-20	-20	-29	-31
	95	-31	-24	-17	-19	-27	-29
Age 17:							
	5	-50	-18	-19	-28	-41	-30
	50	-50	-27	-21	-30	-31	-30
	95	-50	-32	-19	-29	-26	-26

### E. Conclusion

The story of American childhoods is a mixed one. In some respects, black children face large and growing deficits compared to white children:

- the likelihood of being born to an unmarried mother;
- the likelihood of *not* living with both parents;
- the likelihood of living in poverty.

However, not all is bleak:

- the poverty rate for black children in married couple households has fallen (even while that for their white counterparts has increased);
- school enrollment rates for young children have increased;
- national measures of mathematics and reading proficiency show both absolute and relative progress for black children at all ages;
- the proficiency gains are widespread: they are *not* limited to only high or only low achieving students.

## III. TEENS

### A. Educational choices

Up through the age of 17, the school enrollment rates of black and white teens are roughly equivalent (Table 4). Rates are also similar for those over the age of 25, with black enrollment rates often slightly higher than white ones. For the late teens and early twenties, however, black enrollment rates have tended to be lower than white ones. Over the 20 years since 1975, the gaps between black and white young adults aged 18-19 and 20-21 have grown. In 1975, black and white 18-19 year olds had almost identical school enrollment rates (46.8% and 46.9%). By 1994, however, the rate for white 18-19 year olds had risen to 62.6% while the rate for black 18-19 year olds had risen to only 53.4%. Similarly, while black 20-21 year olds were only 5.4 points less likely to be enrolled than their white counterparts in 1975, by 1994, the gap had grown to 14.8 points.

High school dropout rates have varied from year to year for both black and white teens (Figure 8). While the single year event dropout rate (proportion of those in grades 10-12 dropping out within a given year) has fallen slightly for white students (from 5.7% in 1973 to 4.1% in 1993) it has fallen sharply for black students (from 10.1% in 1973 to 5.4% in 1993). Status dropout rates (all of those aged 18-24 who are neither in high school nor have completed high school) have also fallen significantly for black students while rates for white students have remained roughly constant. The rate for young black adults is now (1991) only slightly higher than that for young whites, while in 1973 it was more than 85% higher.

Table 4: *Enrollment rates* (% of population group).

		16-17	18-19	20-21	22-24	25-29	30-34
1975	B	86.8	46.9	26.7	13.9	9.4	7.1
	W	89.5	46.8	32.1	16.4	10.1	6.6
1980	B	90.7	45.8	23.3	13.6	8.8	6.9
	W	89.2	47.0	33.0	16.8	9.4	6.4
1985	B	91.8	43.5	27.7	13.8	7.4	5.2
	W	92.5	53.7	37.2	17.5	9.6	6.2
1990	B	91.7	55.0	28.3	19.7	6.1	4.5
	W	93.5	59.1	43.1	21.9	10.4	6.2
1994	B	95.3	53.4	35.3	22.8	10.5	7.3
	W	95.1	62.6	50.1	24.9	10.8	6.7




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


Figure 9.

### B. Labor force

The employment rates for teens have fluctuated up and down without much apparent trend. However, the rate for black teens has generally been about 20 points lower than that for white teens (Figure 9).

### C. Dropouts and the labor force

Dropping out of high school seems to be an increasingly bad signal about one's future prospects. Between 1973 and 1993, employment rates (and labor force participation rates — both relative to population) for recent high school dropouts<sup>3</sup> (as proportions of the 16-24 year old population) dropped (Figure 10). For young black adults, the declines have been relatively large: the participation rate fell from 59.4% to 43.6% while the employment rate fell from 43.9% to 26.9%. For young white adults, the declines were much smaller: from 71.0% to 68.0% in participation and from 55.1% to 52.8% in employment. As the labor market prospects of dropouts has worsened, the likelihood of their calling upon government transfer programs has increased (Figure 10). For young (25-34 year old)

<sup>3</sup> Those who were neither enrolled nor high school graduates, but were enrolled 12 months earlier.





Figure 10.

black adults with 9-11 years of education, the use of AFDC or public assistance has increased by almost 50%: from 23.2% to 35.6%. For similarly situated whites, use has almost doubled: from 6.0% to 11.3%.

#### D. High School graduates and the labor force

The overall labor market experiences of recent high school graduates who do not enter college have remained fairly constant over the past 20 years. The labor force participation rate for recent (within the year) black and white graduates has remained roughly constant, perhaps declining a little for black graduates. Employment rates for recent graduates have declined somewhat for both black and white graduates (Figure 11). Both participation and employment rates for black graduates remain significantly lower than for their white counterparts. Use of government transfer programs among both black and white high school graduates (individuals aged 25-34 with exactly 12 years of schooling) has been relatively low and constant, although the rate for white graduates has been increasing slowly (Figure 11).

#### E. College

SAT scores suggest a pattern similar to that of high school dropout rates: both the dropout rates of white high school students and the SAT scores of white college-bound seniors have remained roughly constant over the 1976-1994 period (before re-norming). However, the dropout rates of black high school students have dropped *and* the SAT scores of black college-bound seniors have steadily increased (Figure 12). Mean scores of black seniors remain below those of white seniors, however. The total score<sup>4</sup> for black college-bound seniors was 78.9% of the total score for white college-bound seniors in 1994, up from 72.7% in 1976. Over this period, the proportion of all SAT test-takers who were classified as members of a minority group increased from 15.0% in 1976 to 31.0% in 1994. The overall mean score has declined as the share of minority students in the test-taking population has increased. However, black students taking the SAT have done *better* over time — even as the pool of black test-takers expanded.

Higher education has expanded dramatically over the past 35 years and the expansion has been most dramatic for black Americans. White

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<sup>4</sup> Mean verbal plus mean math.




Figure 11.






Figure 12.

enrollment (full-time) in 1993 was 6.7 million, an increase of 64% over its 1965 level. For blacks, enrollment in 1993 was 0.9 million, an increase of 319% over its 1965 level. While black students represented only 4.9% of total enrollment in 1965 and 7.4% in 1970, by the mid-1970s, they reached 11.4%.

#### F. *Teen pregnancy*

Teen age (15-19 years old) black women are more than twice as likely to give birth than are white teens (Figure 13). Both in relative and in absolute terms, this is an improvement over the early 1970s. In 1970, black teens had a birth rate almost 2.5 times as large as white teens (140.7 per 1000 versus 57.4). By 1992, the rate for black teens had dropped to 112.2 while the rate for white teens had only fallen to 51.8. For both black and white teens, rates dropped by the mid-1980s to even lower rates (94.1 for blacks and 42.9 for whites in 1984). By 1988 the rates were rising again. Part of the difference between black and white teen birth rates arises from the increased likelihood of more than one birth for black teens. The first birth rates of black and white teens are closer than are the total birth rates: 74.3 per 1000 for black teens in 1992 versus 40.5 for white teens.




Figure 13.

#### IV. ADULTS

##### A. Educational attainment

Both the white and black populations are increasingly well educated (Figure 14). The proportions of those with at least 4 years of high school or at least 4 years of college have increased dramatically for whites as well as for blacks, but the increases for blacks have been larger — both in absolute and in relative terms.

##### B. Employment

Employment rates for women have risen considerably over the past 25 years for both blacks and whites (Figure 15). For men, rates have fallen slightly. Employment rates for black men were only slightly lower than rates for white men in 1972, but the gap widened in through the mid-1980s. After 1985, the gap tended to narrow, with a small retreat in the early 1990s. Black and white women have almost identical employment rates.

Black men and women tend to work in different occupations than do white men and women (Table 5). Black men are more heavily represented in the *Service and Operators, fabricators, and laborers* categories than are white men (51% vs. 29%). White men are more represented particularly in




Figure 14.




Figure 15.

Table 5: *Employed Men and Women 16+ (%)*.

Occupation	Men		Women	
	Black	White	Black	White
Managerial and professional specialty	14.7	27.5	20.1	29.9
Technical, sales, and administrative support	17.6	20.6	39.4	43.2
Service	20.0	9.8	26.9	16.8
Farming, forestry, and fishing	2.0	4.3	0.2	1.2
Precision production, craft, and repair	15.0	18.5	2.5	2.1
Operators, fabricators, and laborers	30.7	19.3	10.8	6.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

the *Managerial and professional specialty* but also the *Technical, sales, and administrative support* and *Precision production, craft, and repair* occupations than are black men. Black women are also more heavily represented in the *Service* and *Operators, fabricators, and laborers* categories than are white women.

Employment status has a significant effect on the likelihood an individual will face poverty. Among individuals employed year-round, poverty rates are generally less than 10%, although not for teens (Table 6). The poverty rate for blacks employed full time is slightly higher (roughly 2 points) than for whites. Among those who did not work, not only are poverty rates much higher (37% for white 25-34 year olds), but the rates for blacks relative to whites are also higher (59% vs. 37% for 25-34 year olds).

### C. *Economic well-being*

Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient,<sup>5</sup> has increased over the past 25 years (Figure 16). Among black families, inequality has been

<sup>5</sup> A measure of concentration of income that varies between 0 and 1; larger values indicate more concentration. The measure sums up — over each level of the income distribution — the difference between the group's population fraction and its income fraction. If income is perfectly evenly distributed — i.e.  $x\%$  of the population has  $x\%$  of the income, then the differences will be 0 and the Gini coefficient will be 0 as well.

Table 6: *Below Poverty Level (%)*.

	Black			White		
	Worked Full time	Worked Part time	Did Not Work	Worked Full time	Worked Part time	Did Not Work
16-17 years	NA	29.3	40.8	18.7	7.3	19.3
18-24	6.7	24.7	48.2	4.4	15.0	36.2
25-34	6.7	34.5	59.0	2.8	16.6	36.7
35-54	4.5	26.3	52.2	2.3	10.7	26.5
55-64	4.1	18.6	44.8	1.7	8.1	18.0
65 and over	0.0	12.8	30.5	1.5	2.6	11.6




Figure 16.




Figure 17.

generally higher than among white households and this has persisted over time. At the same time, official measurements of poverty status show some year to year variation. The poverty rates for blacks is roughly where it was 25 years ago while the rate for whites is somewhat higher than it was (Figure 17).

Non-family households have lower incomes, in general, than do family households. Over the past 15 years, however, the median income in non-family households has increased by more (proportionally) than has the median income in family households (Figure 18).

Among year-round, full time workers, the gap between whites and blacks is narrower, particularly for workers with similar levels of education (Table 7). Median earnings for black men with at least a bachelor's degree were 76% of median earnings for their white counterparts. For black men with less than a high school education, the ratio was higher: 85%. The increase in earnings associated with moving from the less than high school group to the high school group is significantly lower for black men than for any other group (11% vs. 26% for black women). Moving from a high school education to some college is associated with large gains for black men and women; for white men and women, the gains are a third to a half smaller. All groups have large gains associated with moving from some college to at least a bachelor's degree, although the gain for black men is smaller.

For educated workers in the same age group, the difference between





Figure 18.

Table 7: *Median earnings - 1993; Year-round full time workers.*

		Less than High School	High School	Some College	Bachelor's or more	Total
<i>Thousands of \$</i>						
Men	- Black	18.6	20.6	26.6	35.9	24.1
	- White	22.0	28.4	32.4	47.2	33.8
Women	- Black	13.1	16.5	21.1	31.2	20.3
	- White	14.7	19.8	23.4	32.9	23.5
<i>Black/White ratio:</i>						
Men		0.85	0.73	0.82	0.76	0.71
Women		0.89	0.83	0.90	0.95	0.86
<i>% Increase over next lower educational level:</i>						
Men	- Black	-	11	29	35	
	- White	-	29	14	46	
Women	- Black	-	26	28	48	
	- White	-	35	18	41	

blacks and whites is narrower still. Among college educated workers who are employed one year after graduation (year-round, full time), the ratio of black to white salaries was 0.96 in 1990, up from 0.92 in 1977. As a comparison, the similar ratio of women's salaries to men's was 0.87 in 1990 (up from 0.77 in 1977).

Black households tend to have fewer assets than do white ones. Even by income quintile (quintiles defined for all households), households headed by blacks tend to be poorer (Table 9). Furthermore, black households are more heavily represented at the lower income quintiles.

#### D. Household and family formation

Marriage is declining in the United States (Figure 19). Among black women over age 15, less than 30% were married in 1994; in 1970, more



Table 8: *Median salaries: college graduates employed full-time, 1 year after graduation (1992 \$).*

	Black	White	Men	Women
1977	23,018	24,975	28,108	21,649
1978				
1979				
1980	21,515	23,105	26,334	20,318
1981				
1982				
1983				
1984	20,955	23,556	25,974	21,387
1985				
1986	22,653	25,021	27,153	23,054
1987				
1988				
1989				
1990	22,676	23,637	25,825	22,343

Table 9: *Asset ownership by Income Quintile.*

	Median net worth (1993 \$)				Households (000s)			
	1991		1993		1991		1993	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	Wh
1st Quintile	0	10,743	250	7,605	4,041	14,480	4,066	14,6
2nd Quintile	3,466	26,665	3,406	27,057	2,436	16,006	2,663	16,1
3rd Quintile	8,302	35,510	8,480	36,341	2,124	16,388	2,126	16,5
4th Quintile	21,852	55,950	20,745	54,040	1,353	17,043	1,454	17,2
5th Quintile	56,922	128,298	45,023	123,350	814	17,492	937	17,5
All Households	4,844	47,075	4,418	45,740	10,768	81,409	11,248	82,1




Figure 19.

than 40% were.<sup>6</sup> Among white women, the decline has been just as steady, although not quite as fast. The corresponding figures for black and white men are similar to those for blacks and white women, although the proportions of men married tend to be several points higher than for women (roughly 7 points higher for black men and 5 points higher for white men).

Interracial marriage has increased significantly over the past few decades. Although still only a tiny fraction of all marriage (0.41% of all married couples in 1990), black-white interracial marriages were still more than 3 times as likely in 1990 as in 1960 (0.41% vs. 0.13% [?]).

Fertility has also declined over the past 25 years among American women; births per 1,000 women aged 15-44 declined sharply in the early 1970s (Figure 20). Since 1975, fertility has fluctuated a little, but has been largely constant. Black and white women have become more similar in their overall child bearing: in 1994 the rate for black women was roughly 12 births higher than for white women, while in 1970, the rate for black women was roughly 31 births higher.

Abortion rates remain fairly high for both black and white women;

<sup>6</sup> From 1970 to 1979, the figures are for people over age 14; from 1980, the figures are for those over age 15. [Saluter, 1994] [and earlier issues].




Figure 20.

roughly one quarter of the pregnancies<sup>7</sup> of white women end in abortion and roughly 40% of the pregnancies of black women do as well<sup>8</sup> (Figure 21). Crude estimates based on these frequencies and other Centers for Disease Control data suggest that, over time, significant fractions of both black and white women may have abortions. Among white women, perhaps more than a third will have at least one abortion by the age of 44; for black women the fraction may be considerably larger — well over one half.

### E. Health

Maternal mortality, the rate at which mothers die in child-birth, has improved dramatically during the 20th century. In the early years of this century, more than 700 women died for each 100,000 live births. By 1940, the overall rate had dropped to 376 per 100,000 births, but the rate for the mothers of black children was 782 (for mothers of white children it was 320 [National Center for Health Statistics, Public]). Considering those levels, the current figures — less than 20 per 100,000 for both blacks and whites — are almost miraculous, although the rate for black mothers is still more than twice that for white mothers (Figure 22).

<sup>7</sup> Measured pregnancies — live births and abortions — but not miscarriages.

<sup>8</sup> 1991 estimates: 303 abortions per 1,000 live births for white women; 661 per 1,000 live births for black women.




Figure 21.




Figure 22.

### F. *Victimization*

Men are more likely than women and blacks more likely than whites to be homicide victims. Black men in particular face homicide rates well in excess of those faced by other demographic groups (Figure 23). In the first half of the 1980s, homicide rates for black men dropped sharply; the rate for white men fell simultaneously, but from a smaller base. Unfortunately, the rates climbed again after 1985. The rate of less serious violent crime (rapes, robberies, or assaults) has been relatively steady, with a slight decline through 1990 for both blacks and whites. During the 1990s, however, the rate faced by black men and women rose sharply.

Victimization rates for violent crimes other than murder (Table 10) suggest that black men and women along with white men are particularly likely to be victims at young ages (through age 25). After 25, victimization for women, black and white, falls rapidly, from 127 per 1,000 black women age 20-24 to 44.5 per 1,000 age 25-34. For white men, the victimization rates fall quickly among the older groups as well. For black men, victimization rates do not fall as far and more importantly, the rates remain high even among older age groups (75 per 1,000 for black men age 35-49).

### G. *Incarceration*

Adults, men and women, are increasingly facing the criminal justice system as adversaries (Table 11). Relative to population sizes, black men and women have been more likely to be imprisoned. In 1994, the rate of imprisonment for white men was 1.6 times the 1985 value; for black men the 1994 rates was 1.9 times its 1985 value. For black women, the 1994 imprisonment rate was 2.4 times the 1985 rate, while for white women the 1994 rate was 2.2 times the 1985 rate.

### H. *Health and life expectancy*

Life expectancy at birth has increased fairly dramatically over the past few decades. Since 1940, the expected life for a black man has increased<sup>9</sup> by almost 14 years and for a black woman, it has increased by almost 20 years. For whites, the increases have been slightly less dramatic, but still impressive: roughly 11 years for white men and 13 for white women. The increases have continued over the past 25 years (Figure 24), although for black men, life expectancy seems to have plateaued shortly after 1980 at

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<sup>9</sup> For 1940, the figure is for *All other races*; for 1970 and later, figures are for *Black*.




Figure 23. Victimization Rates

Table 10: *Violent crime (not murder): victimization rate per 1,000 population (1993).*

Victim's Age	Men		Women	
	Black	White	Black	White
12-15	146.0	148.4	112.3	93.2
16-19	91.9	144.5	145.6	90.4
20-24	99.2	104.3	127.0	79.0
25-34	74.5	69.6	44.5	49.0
35-49	75.4	43.0	43.4	39.1
50-64	33.1	21.1	3.8	13.8
65+	14.3	5.4	12.2	4.5

Table 11: *Adults per 100,000 population held in local jails, state or federal prisons (1993).*

	Men		Women	
	Black	White	Black	White
1985	3,544	528	183	27
1986	3,850	570	189	29
1987	3,943	594	216	35
1988	4,441	629	257	41
1989	5,066	685	321	47
1990	5,365	718	338	48
1991	5,717	740	356	51
1992	6,014	774	365	53
1993	6,259	805	403	56
1994	6,753	860	435	60




Figure 24.

Table 12: *Life Expectancy.*

	Men		Women	
	Black	White	Black	White
<i>At birth:</i>				
1969-71	60.0	67.9	68.3	75.5
1979-81	64.1	70.8	73.9	78.2
1991	64.6	72.9	73.8	79.6
<i>At age 1:</i>				
1969-71	61.2	68.3	69.4	75.7
1979-81	64.6	70.7	73.3	78.0
1991	64.9	72.5	73.9	79.1
<i>At age 20:</i>				
1969-71	43.5	50.2	51.2	57.2
1979-81	46.5	52.5	54.9	59.4
1991	46.9	54.1	55.4	60.4
<i>At age 65:</i>				
1969-71	12.5	13.0	15.7	16.9
1979-81	13.3	14.3	17.1	18.6
1991	13.4	15.4	17.2	19.2



roughly 65 years. Life expectancy at different ages shows generally the same patterns, although the differences between black men and white men and between black women and white women are less pronounced at age 65 than at younger ages.

## II.

### HOW TO MEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

My scholarly work on the problem of race relations began with a general inquiry into the theory of economic inequality. Specifically, my 1981 paper, "Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings", which appeared in the journal *Econometrica*, introduced a model of economic achievement in which a person's earnings depended on a random endowment of innate ability and on skills acquired from formal training. The key feature of this theory was that individuals had to rely on their families to pay for their training. In this way, a person's economic opportunities were influenced by his inherited social position. I showed how, under these circumstances, the distribution of income in each generation could be determined by an examination of what had been obtained by the previous generation. My objective with the model was to illustrate how, in the long run, when people depend on resources available within families to finance their acquisition of skills, economic inequality comes to reflect the inherited advantages of birth. A disparity among persons in economic attainment would bear no necessary connection to differences in their innate abilities.

In other research, I applied this mode of reasoning to the problem of group, as distinct from individual, inequality. That analysis began with two observations. First, all societies exhibit significant *social segmentation*. People make choices about whom to befriend, whom to marry, where to live, to which schools to send their children, and so on. Factors like race, ethnicity, social class, and religious affiliation influence these choices of association. Second, the processes through which individuals develop their productive capacities are shaped by custom, convention, and social norms, and are not fully responsive to market forces, or reflective of the innate abilities of persons. Networks of social affiliation are not usually the result of calculated economic decisions. They nevertheless help determine how resources important to the development of the productive capacities of human beings are made available to individuals.

More concretely, one can say that an adult worker with a given degree

of personal efficacy has been “produced” from the “inputs” of education, parenting skills, acculturation, nutrition, and socialization to which he was exposed in his formative years. While some of these “inputs” can be bought and sold, some of the most crucial “factors of production” are only available as by-products from activities of social affiliation. Parenting services are not to be had for purchase on the market, but accrue as the consequence of the social relations between the custodial parents and the child. The allocation of parenting services among a prospective generation of adults is thus the indirect consequence of social activities undertaken by members of the preceding generation. An adolescent’s peer group is similarly a derivative consequence of processes of social networking.

I concede that this is an artificial way of thinking about human development, but the artifice is quite useful. For it calls attention to the critical role played by social and cultural resources in the production and reproduction of economic inequality. The relevance of such factors, as an empirical matter, is beyond doubt. The importance of networks, contacts, social background, family connections, and informal associations of all kinds has been amply documented by students of social stratification. In addition, values, attitudes, and beliefs of central import for the attainment of success in life are shaped by the cultural milieu in which a person develops. Whom one knows affects what one comes to know and, ultimately, what one can do with one’s God-given talents.

#### SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INEQUALITY

While all of this may seem obvious, the fact is that, prior to my work, formal theories of economic inequality had said little about the role of social background. I was the first economist to use the term “social capital” in reference to these processes by which the social relationships that occur among persons promote or retard their acquisition of traits valued in the market place. A large and growing literature has since emerged in which allowance is taken of the myriad ways that a person’s opportunities to develop his natural gifts depend upon the economic achievements of those with whom he is socially affiliated. This literature suggests that unqualified confidence in the equity and efficiency of the income distribution produced by the market is not justified.

In particular, this analysis has an important ethical implication: because the creation of a skilled work force is a social process, the meritocratic ideal should take into account that no one travels the road to economic and social success alone. The facts that generations overlap, that much of social

life lies outside the reach of public regulation, and that prevailing social affiliations influence the development of the intellectual and personal skills of the young, imply that present patterns of inequality — among individuals and between groups — must embody, to some degree, social and economic disparities that have existed in the past. To the extent that past disparities are illegitimate, the propriety of the contemporary order is called into question.

I have employed this framework to explore the legitimacy question with respect to inequality between blacks and whites in America.<sup>10</sup> In a theoretical example, I showed that, notwithstanding the establishment of a legal regime of equal opportunity, historically engendered economic differences between racial groups could well persist into the indefinite future. I concluded that the pronounced racial disparities to be observed in American cities are particularly problematic, since they are, at least in part, the product of an unjust history, propagated across the generations by the segmented social structures of our race-conscious society.

Thus I would argue, as a matter of social ethics, that the government should undertake policies to mitigate the economic marginality of those languishing in the ghettos of America. This is not a reparations argument. When the developmental prospects of an individual depend on the circumstances of those with whom he is socially affiliated, even a minimal commitment to equality of opportunity requires such a policy. In our divided society, and given our tragic past, this implies that public efforts intended to counter the effects of historical disadvantage among blacks are not only consistent with, but indeed are required by, widely embraced democratic ideals.

#### COLOUR-BLIND EXTREMISTS

This argument leads naturally to the question of whether affirmative-action policies are necessary and justified. To emphasize that racial group disparities can be transmitted across generations through subtle and complex social processes is not necessarily to endorse employment or educational preferences based on race. (I will offer in due course a number of reasons to think that these policies should be curtailed). But recognizing the importance of social segmentation does cause one to doubt the ethical viability, and indeed the logical coherence, of "colour-blind absolutism" —

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<sup>10</sup> See my paper (1977), "A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences", in *Women, Minorities and Employment Discrimination*, P.A. Wallace (ed.), Lexington Books, DC Heath.

the notion that the Constitution requires government agents to ignore the racial identity of citizens. Ironically, recent claims by some conservatives to this effect bear an eerie resemblance, in form and in substance, to the similarly absolute claims of some card-carrying civil libertarians on behalf of a “wall of separation” between church and state.

Consider that, as a practical matter, the government cannot enforce laws against employment discrimination without taking note of a gross demographic imbalance in an employer’s work force. Yet the government’s requiring that employment data be reported by race is already a departure from pure colour-blind behaviour. So too is the practice, nearly universal in the public and private sectors, of targeted outreach efforts designed to increase the representation of blacks in the pool of persons considered for an employment opportunity. Accordingly, the more intellectually consistent of the colour-blind absolutists now recommend, as logic would require, that we repeal the civil-rights laws and abandon even those efforts to achieve racial diversity which do not involve preferential treatment. But is that stance consistent with fairness?

More subtly, how can a college educator convey to students the lesson that “not all blacks think alike”, with too few blacks on campus for this truth to become evident? Were an American president to assemble a cabinet devoid of racial minority representation, would not the legitimacy of his administration rightly be called into question? What prison warden could afford to ignore the possibility that racial friction among his inmates might threaten the maintenance of order within his institution? Perhaps this is why presidents, prison wardens, and college educators do not behave in a purely colour-blind fashion in our divided society.

Coming up with cases that challenge the absolutest claim is not difficult. Can the police consider race when making undercover assignments? Can a black public employee use health insurance benefits to choose a black therapist with whom to discuss race-related anxieties? Can units in a public housing project be let with an eye to sustaining a racially integrated environment? What about a National Science Foundation effort that encourages gifted blacks to pursue careers in fields where few now study? Clearly, there is no general rule that can resolve all of these cases reasonably.

I would venture to say that the study of affirmative action has been too much the preserve of lawyers and philosophers, and has too little engaged the interests of economists and other social scientists. It is as if, for this policy, unlike all others, we could determine a priori the wisdom of its application — as if its practice were always either “right” or “wrong”, never simply “prudent” or “unwise”. However, although departures from colour-blind absolutism are both legitimate and desirable in some circumstances,

there are compelling reasons to question the wisdom of relying as heavily as we now do on racial preferences to bring about civic inclusion for black Americans.

#### LOGICAL STEREOTYPING

One such reason for questioning the wisdom of affirmative action is that the widespread use of preferences can logically be expected to erode the perception of black competence. This point is often misunderstood, so it is worth spelling out in some detail. The argument is not a speculation about the feelings of persons who may or may not be the beneficiaries of affirmative action. Rather, it turns on the rational, statistical inferences that neutral observers are entitled to make about the unknown qualifications of persons who may have been preferred, or rejected, in a selection process.

The main insight is not difficult to grasp. Let some employer use a lower threshold of assessed productivity for the hiring of blacks than whites. The preferential hiring policy defines three categories of individuals within each of the two racial groups which I will call “marginals”, “successes”, and “failures”. Marginals are those whose hiring status is altered by the policy — either whites not hired who otherwise would have been, or blacks hired who otherwise would not have been. Successes are those who would be hired with or without the policy, and failures are those who would be passed over with or without the preferential policy. Let us consider how an outsider who can observe the hiring decision, but not the employer’s productivity assessment, would estimate the productivity of those subject to this hiring process.

Notice that a lower hiring threshold for blacks causes the outside market to reduce its estimate of the productivity of black successes, since, on average, less is required to achieve that status. In addition, black failures, seen to have been passed over despite a lower hiring threshold, are thereby revealed as especially unproductive. On the other hand, a hiring process favouring blacks must enhance the reputations of white failures, as seen by outsiders, since they may have been artificially held back. And white successes, who are hired despite being disfavoured in selection, have thereby been shown to be especially productive.

We have thus reached the result that, among blacks, only marginals gain from the establishment of a preferential hiring program — they do so because the outside observer lumps them together with their superiors, black successes. They thus gain a job and a better reputation than they objectively deserve. Moreover, among whites, only marginals are harmed by

the program, for only they lose the chance of securing a job and only they see their reputations harmed by virtue of being placed in the same category as white failures. In practical terms, since marginals are typically a minority of all workers, the outside reputations of most blacks will be lowered, and that of most whites enhanced, by preferential hiring. The inferential logic that leads to this arresting conclusion is particularly insidious, in that it can serve to legitimate otherwise indefensible negative stereotypes about blacks.

#### A NEW MODEL OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Another reason for being sceptical about the practice of affirmative action is that it can undercut the incentives for blacks to develop their competitive abilities. For instance, preferential treatment can lead to the patronization of black workers and students. By "patronization", I mean the setting of a lower standard of expected accomplishment for blacks than for whites because of the belief that blacks are not as capable of meeting a higher, common standard. In the 1993 article "Will Affirmative Action Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?" that appeared in the *American Economic Review*, Stephen Coate and I show how behaviour of this kind can be based on a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, observed performance among blacks may be lower precisely because blacks are being patronized, a policy that is undertaken because of the need for an employer or admissions officer to meet affirmative-action guide-lines.

Consider a workplace in which a supervisor operating under some affirmative-action guidelines must recommend subordinate workers for promotion. Suppose further that he is keen to promote blacks where possible, and that he monitors his subordinates' performance and bases his recommendations on these observations. Pressure to promote blacks might lead him to de-emphasize deficiencies in the performance of black subordinates, recommending them for promotion when he would not have done so for whites. But his behaviour could undermine the ability of black workers to identify and correct their deficiencies. They are denied honest feedback from their supervisor on their performance and are encouraged to think that one can get ahead without attaining the same degree of proficiency as whites.

Alternatively, consider a population of students applying to professional schools for admissions. The schools, due to affirmative-action concerns, are eager to admit a certain percentage of blacks. They believe that to do so they must accept black applicants with test scores and grades below those of some whites whom they reject. If most schools follow this

policy, the message sent out to black students is that the level of performance needed to gain admission is lower than that which white students know they must attain. If black and white students are, at least to some extent, responsive to these differing expectations, they might, as a result, achieve grades and test scores reflective of the expectation gap. In this way, the schools' belief that different admissions standards are necessary becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The common theme in these two examples is that the desire to see greater black representation is pursued by using different criteria for the promotion or admission of black and white candidates. But the use of different criteria reduces the incentives that blacks have for developing needed skills. This argument does not presume that blacks are less capable than whites; it is based on the fact that an individual's need to make use of his abilities is undermined when that individual is patronized by the employer or the admissions committee.

This problem could be avoided if, instead of using different criteria of selection, the employers and schools in question sought to meet their desired level of black participation through a concerted effort to enhance performance, while maintaining common standards of evaluation. Call it "developmental", as opposed to "preferential", affirmative action. Such a targeted effort at performance enhancement among black employees or students is definitely not colour-blind behaviour. It presumes a direct concern about racial inequality and involves allocating benefits to people on the basis of race. What distinguishes it from preferential hiring or admissions, though, is that it takes seriously the fact of differential performance and seeks to reverse it directly, rather than trying to hide from that fact by setting a different threshold of expectation for the performance of blacks.

For example, given that black students are far scarcer than white and Asian students in the fields of math and science, encouraging their entry into these areas without lowering standards — through summer workshops, support for curriculum development at historically black colleges, or the financing of research assistantships for promising graduate students — would be consistent with my distinction between "preferential" and "developmental" affirmative action. Also consistent would be the provision of management assistance to new black-owned businesses, which would then be expected to bid competitively for government contracts, or the provisional admission of black students to the state university, conditional on their raising their academic scores to competitive levels after a year or two of study at a local community college. The key is that the racially targeted assistance be short-lived and preparatory to the entry of its recipients into an arena of competition where they would be assessed in the same way as everyone else.

## RACISM AND RESPONSIBILITY

Unfortunately, economists seem to be the only people persuaded by, or even interested in, this kind of technical argument about affirmative action. Therefore, I turn now, in my capacity as an intellectual and a citizen, to a range of moral and political considerations that may be of broader interest but that still point in the same direction. Begin with an obvious point: The plight of the inner-city underclass — the most intractable aspect of the racial inequality problem today — is not mitigated by affirmative-action policies. Defenders of racial preferences answer by claiming this was never the intent of such policies. But this only leads to my second point: The persistent demand for preferential treatment as necessary to black achievement amounts, over a period of time, to a concession of defeat by middle-class blacks in our struggle for civic equality.

The political discourse over affirmative action harbours a paradoxical subtext: Middle-class blacks seek equality of status with whites by calling attention to their own limited achievements, thereby establishing the need for preferential policies. At the same time, sympathetic white elites, by granting black demands, thereby acknowledge that, without their patronage, black penetration of the upper reaches of American society would be impossible. The paradox is that, although equality is the goal of the enterprise, this manifestly is not an exchange among equals, and it never can be.

Members of the black middle class who stress that, without some special dispensation, they cannot compete with whites are really flattering those whites, while exhibiting their own weakness. And whites who think that, because of societal wrongs, blacks are owed the benefit of the doubt about their qualifications are exercising a noblesse oblige available only to the powerful. This exchange between black weakness and white power has become a basic paradigm for “progressive” race relations in contemporary America. Blacks from privileged backgrounds now routinely engage in a kind of exhibitionism of non-achievement, mournfully citing the higher success rates of whites in one endeavour or another in order to gain leverage for their advocacy on behalf of preferential treatment. That Asians from more modest backgrounds often achieve higher rates of success is not mentioned. But the limited ability of these more fortunate blacks to make inroads on their own can hardly go unnoticed.

It is morally unjustified — and to this African American, humiliating — that preferential treatment based on race should become institutionalized for those of us now enjoying all of the advantages of middle-class life. The thought that my sons would come to see themselves as presumptively disadvantaged because of their race is unbearable to me. They



are, in fact, among the richest young people of African descent anywhere on the globe. There is no achievement to which they cannot legitimately aspire. Whatever degree of success they attain in life, the fact that some of their ancestors were slaves and others faced outrageous bigotry will have little to do with it.

Indeed, those ancestors, with only a fraction of the opportunity, and with much of the power structure of the society arrayed against them, managed to educate their children, acquire land, found communal institutions, and mount a successful struggle for equal rights. The generation coming of age during the 1960s, now ensconced in the burgeoning black middle class, enjoy their status primarily because their parents and grandparents faithfully discharged their responsibilities. The benefits of affirmative action, whatever they may have been, pale in comparison to this inheritance.

My grandparents, with their siblings and cousins, left rural Mississippi for Chicago's mean streets in the years after World War I. Facing incredible racial hostility, they nevertheless carved out a place for their children, who went on to acquire property and gain a toe-hold in the professions. For most middle-class blacks this is a familiar story. Our forebears, from slavery onward, performed magnificently under harsh circumstances. It is time now that we and our children begin to do the same. It desecrates the memory of our enslaved ancestors to assert that, with our far greater freedoms, we middle-class blacks should now look to whites, of whatever political persuasion, to ensure that our dreams are realized.

The children of today's black middle class will live their lives in an era of equal opportunity. I recognize that merely by stating this simple fact I will enrage many people; and I do not mean to assert that racial discrimination has disappeared. But I insist that the historic barriers to black participation in the political, social, and economic life of the nation have been lowered dramatically over the past four decades, especially for the wealthiest 20 percent of the black population. Arguably, the time has now come for us to let go of the ready-made excuse that racism provides. And so too, it is time to accept responsibility for what we and our children do, and do not, achieve.

## APPENDIX

Table 13: *Sources for figures and tables.*

	<i>Source</i>
Figure 1	[National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1996], Table 2-2; race of the child.
Figure 2	[National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1995], Table 1-76; race of the child through 1980, race of the mother 1981-1992.
Figure 3	[Saluter, 1994] and previous years.
Table 1	[U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996], Table No. 82.
Figure 4	[Stubbs, 1996], Table C147B01.
Figure 5	[Stubbs, 1996], Table C147B01.
Figure 6	[Stubbs, 1996], Table C002D01; Pre-school enrollment is full- and half-day enrollment in nursery school.
Figure 7	[Stubbs, 1996], Table C002D02.
Table 2	[Stubbs, 1996], Tables C013B02 and C015B02.
Table 3	Calculations from data in [Stubbs, 1996], Tables C015D03 and C013D03.
Table 4	[Stubbs, 1996], Table DTAB007.
Figure 8	Kas N. table TABA-3 (Statistical Abstract of the United States).
Figure 9	BLS data on-line; Series LFS1600830, LFS1600810.
Figure 10	[Stubbs, 1996], Tables C028D04 and C032D02.
Figure 11	[Stubbs, 1996], Tables C028D03 and C032D02.
Figure 12	[Stubbs, 1996], Table C020D02.
Figure 13	[National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1995], Tables 1-9, 1-10.
Figure 14	[Stubbs, 1996], Table DTAB008.
Figure 15	BLS data on-line; Series LFS1601731, LFS1601732, LFS1601711, LFS1601712.
Table 5	[Current Population Reports, 1995] Table 2.
Table 6	[Current Population Reports, 1996] Table 10.
Figure 16	Current Population Reports, Series P-60; (WWW: Historical Income Tables-Households, Families).
Figure 17	Kas N. table TAB-B61.
Figure 18	Current Population Reports, Series P-60, (WWW: Historical Income Tables-Households, Table H-12C).
Table 7	[Current Population Reports, 1995], Table 12.
Table 8	[Stubbs, 1996], Table C233D02.
Table 9	Census <a href="http://www.census.gov/hhes/wealth/wlth93f">http://www.census.gov/hhes/wealth/wlth93f</a> .
Figure 19	[Saluter, 1994].
Figure 20	CDC; <a href="http://[?]/4411st1h.txt">http://[?]/4411st1h.txt</a> .
Figure 21	[U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996] Table No. 115.
Figure 22	[National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1996].
Figure 23	Kas N. table? and [Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994].
Figure 24	[National Center for Health Statistics, Public Health Service, 1996]. Table 6-5.
Table 12	citevital-ii:91, Section 6, Table A.

Table 14: *Infant Mortality.*

---

	Black	White
1970	32.6	17.8
1971	30.3	17.1
1972	29.6	16.4
1973	28.1	15.8
1974	26.8	14.8
1975	26.2	14.2
1976	25.5	13.3
1977	23.6	12.3
1978	23.1	12.0
1979	21.8	11.4
1980	21.4	11.0
1981	20.0	10.5
1982	19.6	10.1
1983	19.2	9.7
1984	18.4	9.4
1985	18.2	9.3
1986	18.0	8.9
1987	17.9	8.6
1988	17.6	8.5
1989	17.7	8.2
1990	17.0	7.7

---

Table 15: *Births to unmarried women* (% of all births).

	Black	White
1970	37.6	5.7
1971	40.5	5.6
1972	43.9	6.0
1973	45.8	6.4
1974	47.1	6.5
1975	48.8	7.3
1976	50.3	7.7
1977	51.7	8.2
1978	53.2	8.7
1979	54.7	9.4
1980	55.5	10.2
1981	56.9	11.8
1982	57.7	12.3
1983	59.2	12.9
1984	60.3	13.6
1985	61.2	14.7
1986	62.4	15.9
1987	63.4	16.9
1988	64.7	18.0
1989	65.7	19.2
1990	66.5	20.4
1991	67.9	29.5
1992	68.1	22.6

Table 16: *Children under 18 living with both parents (%)*.

---

	Black	White
1970	58.2	89.1
1971	54.1	87.9
1972	54.3	87.9
1973	51.5	87.4
1974	50.7	86.7
1976	49.6	85.2
1977	46.8	84.8
1978	43.6	83.8
1979	43.4	83.5
1980	42.2	82.7
1981	42.7	82.3
1982	42.4	80.8
1983	40.7	81.0
1984	41.0	81.0
1985	39.5	80.0
1986	40.6	79.9
1987	40.1	79.1
1988	38.5	78.9
1989	38.0	79.6
1990	37.7	79.0
1991	35.9	78.5
1992	35.6	77.4
1993	35.6	77.2
1994	33.3	76.2

---

Table 17: *Child poverty rates* (% of children under 18).

---

	Black	White
1970	41.5	10.5
1975	41.4	12.5
1980	42.1	13.4
1981	44.2	14.7
1982	47.3	16.5
1983	46.2	17.0
1984	46.2	16.1
1985	43.1	15.6
1986	42.6	15.3
1987	44.4	14.7
1988	42.8	14.0
1989	43.2	14.1
1990	44.2	15.1
1991	45.6	16.1
1992	46.3	16.0
1993	45.9	17.0

---

Table 18: *Child poverty rates female head households (% of children under 18).*

---

	Black	White
1970	60.8	36.6
1975	70.1	41.7
1980	75.4	41.3
1981	74.3	42.0
1982		
1983	74.5	39.3
1984	74.9	41.8
1985	78.4	43.0
1986	80.5	45.7
1987	80.2	47.0
1988	79.6	50.0
1989	78.1	46.3
1990	80.3	46.9
1991	83.1	47.4
1992	81.8	45.4

---

Table 19: *Child poverty rates in non-female head households*  
(% of children under 18).

---

	Black	White
1970	25.9	7.3
1975	22.1	8.3
1980	20.3	9.1
1985	18.8	10.4
1986		
1987	18.4	9.2
1988	22.0	8.7
1989	21.4	8.9
1990	19.3	9.5
1991	17.3	10.1
1992	19.4	10.4
1993	19.6	11.2

---



Table 20: *Preschool: 3 to 4 year olds* (% enrolled).

---

	Black	White
1973	18.7	17.8
1974	19.6	22.5
1975	25.1	24.8
1976	22.1	23.6
1977	24.4	25.8
1978	31.0	28.8
1979	NA	NA
1980	28.3	31.8
1981	28.2	31.7
1982	28.7	33.2
1983	29.1	33.3
1984	29.0	32.3
1985	27.9	35.2
1986	28.8	36.2
1987	25.5	35.0
1988	23.6	37.1
1989	31.1	38.3
1990	NA	NA
1991	26.7	38.5
1992	28.8	37.6
1993	29.8	38.0

---

Table 21: *Kindergarten: 3-4 year olds* (% enrolled).

	Black	White
1973	10.0	5.8
1974	9.2	6.5
1975	9.3	6.2
1976	12.3	7.5
1977	10.8	6.4
1978	9.7	5.1
1979	NA	NA
1980	9.9	5.6
1981	8.8	5.4
1982	9.8	4.4
1983	7.1	6.1
1984	9.5	5.0
1985	14.8	5.1
1986	9.8	4.5
1987	11.4	4.5
1988	9.8	4.1
1989	7.5	3.8
1990	5.0	3.0
1991	10.2	4.9
1992	8.9	4.7
1993	10.3	5.1

Table 22: *5 year olds* (% enrolled).

	Kindergarten		Grades 1 or 2	
	Black	White	Black	White
1973	68.3	74.8	8.8	10.6
1974	68.8	78.2	13.9	9.9
1975	70.3	80.1	14.3	7.8
1976	75.0	79.7	13.8	10.2
1977	76.1	80.1	12.2	9.1
1978	72.6	79.9	12.7	8.9
1979	NA	NA	NA	NA
1980	76.3	83.6	11.5	6.3
1981	75.0	80.9	14.7	5.5
1982	76.9	81.3	11.3	6.8
1983	73.4	80.3	13.9	6.1
1984	77.5	80.5	9.2	5.6
1985	78.4	83.5	10.5	5.9
1986	82.0	83.6	7.9	3.5
1987	85.5	77.8	7.1	4.3
1988	74.0	81.7	14.1	3.8
1989	77.6	80.8	9.6	3.6
1990	81.0	79.7	5.6	3.2
1991	78.7	80.2	8.4	4.6
1992	81.0	80.5	5.9	3.8
1993	77.4	80.0	8.1	4.8

Table 23: *Dropout rates: single year (grades 10-12) and ever (ages 18-24).*

	Event Dropouts		Status Dropouts	
	Black	White	Black	White
1973	10.1	5.7	26.5	14.2
1974	11.6	6.0	25.1	14.5
1975	8.7	5.4	27.3	13.9
1976	7.2	5.7	24.2	14.7
1977	8.4	6.2	23.9	14.7
1978	10.4	6.1	24.6	14.6
1979	9.6	6.2	25.5	14.9
1980	8.3	5.6	23.5	14.4
1981	9.6	5.3	21.7	14.7
1982	7.8	5.1	22.0	14.6
1983	6.9	4.8	21.5	14.3
1984	5.8	5.0	18.4	14.1
1985	7.7	4.8	17.6	13.5
1986	4.7	4.2	16.6	13.5
1987	6.4	3.7	17.0	14.2
1988	6.3	4.7	17.7	14.2
1989	7.7	3.9	16.4	14.1
1990	5.1	3.8	15.1	13.5
1991	6.2	3.7	15.6	14.2
1992	4.9	4.1		
1993	5.4	4.1		

Table 24: *High school dropouts and the labor force.*

	Black		White	
	Labor force participation	Employment	Labor force participation	Employment
1973	59.4	43.9	71.0	55.1
1974	58.1	35.9	73.8	53.9
1975	56.1	22.0	65.4	46.2
1976	44.8	20.8	68.9	49.7
1977	58.6	34.5	74.8	56.6
1978	59.5	41.1	75.2	54.2
1979	51.7	27.6	70.5	54.2
1980	51.5	20.8	69.8	51.2
1981	46.8	11.5	71.2	51.2
1982	58.2	16.4	69.5	44.5
1983	59.8	26.5	65.4	49.4
1984	55.4	23.8	71.9	51.3
1985	53.7	29.3	74.4	50.0
1986	60.5	31.6	69.6	50.5
1987	61.3	26.1	69.9	48.1
1988	35.7	17.3	65.1	47.6
1989	51.8	26.3	74.4	57.6
1990	65.9	30.5	74.8	56.2
1991	52.7	24.7	61.6	38.4
1992	50.8	NA	62.6	43.2
1993	43.6	26.9	68.0	52.8

Table 25: % Using AFDC or public assistance: 25-34 year olds with less than 12 years of education.

	Black		White	
	Less than 9	9-11	Less than 9	9-11
1972	24.1	23.2	7.3	6.0
1973	23.1	25.9	9.3	5.6
1974	27.5	25.0	12.2	8.0
1975	24.3	27.8	7.7	7.0
1976	22.8	27.0	6.9	7.5
1977	24.0	26.4	8.5	8.0
1978	23.2	28.1	8.5	7.7
1979	26.3	26.8	9.1	7.9
1980	24.7	25.3	9.1	8.5
1981	27.2	29.1	7.7	9.5
1982	14.6	25.8	7.3	10.3
1983	19.2	26.8	9.8	10.7
1984	27.3	30.3	10.2	10.6
1985	15.0	30.7	10.8	9.5
1986	21.5	25.7	10.6	11.2
1987	30.1	28.5	9.3	7.8
1988	32.2	28.9	11.0	9.2
1989	16.9	30.3	9.1	8.5
1990	15.8	30.9	9.6	10.6
1991	18.9	28.6	12.5	11.9
1992	18.3	35.6	11.3	11.3

Table 26: *High school graduates and the labor force.*

	Black		White	
	Labor force participation	Employment	Labor force participation	Employment
1973	69.9	49.8	83.2	74.9
1974	75.0	45.9	84.8	72.9
1975	69.3	36.9	82.4	68.9
1976	72.7	38.5	86.4	73.2
1977	74.4	43.3	87.3	76.1
1978	75.7	45.9	88.0	79.1
1979	71.8	44.1	88.9	76.4
1980	72.0	35.0	87.6	74.6
1981	69.0	31.5	87.4	73.0
1982	69.4	29.4	85.5	68.5
1983	75.9	34.9	85.9	69.8
1984	73.2	44.8	86.2	70.7
1985	76.6	34.4	85.0	71.0
1986	67.4	41.0	85.3	71.5
1987	73.8	46.9	87.8	75.3
1988	73.5	55.5	88.1	78.2
1989	71.0	53.5	88.3	77.6
1990	69.9	44.9	88.2	75.1
1991	67.5	32.5	84.4	67.1
1992	61.2	37.2	83.1	71.9
1993	64.4	42.2	90.0	71.9

Table 27: % Using AFDC or public assistance: 25-34 year olds with  
12 year of education.

	Black	White
1972	12.2	2.2
1973	12.1	2.1
1974	10.7	2.4
1975	10.0	2.4
1976	11.4	2.3
1977	12.4	2.6
1978	12.4	2.3
1979	12.0	2.5
1980	12.9	3.2
1981	14.9	2.9
1982	13.6	2.6
1983	13.4	2.6
1984	12.6	2.7
1985	11.7	3.1
1986	11.8	2.9
1987	12.4	2.9
1988	11.6	2.8
1989	10.9	2.9
1990	13.0	3.2
1991	13.1	4.0
1992	13.2	4.0



Table 28: *Mean SAT scores.*

	Black		White	
	Verbal	Math	Verbal	Math
1976	332	354	451	493
1977	330	357	448	489
1978	332	354	446	485
1979	330	358	444	483
1980	330	360	442	482
1981	332	362	442	483
1982	341	366	444	483
1983	339	369	443	484
1984	342	373	445	487
1985	346	376	449	490
1986	NA	NA	NA	NA
1987	351	377	447	489
1988	353	384	445	490
1989	351	386	446	491
1990	352	385	442	491
1991	351	385	441	489
1992	352	385	442	491
1993	353	388	444	494
1994	352	388	443	49

Table 29: *SAT Test-Takers.*

	As a % of HS Graduates	% Minority	Total Mean
1972	34.1	NA	937
1973	33.4	NA	926
1974	32.1	NA	924
1975	31.8	NA	906
1976	31.8	15.0	903
1977	31.0	16.1	899
1978	31.6	17.0	897
1979	31.8	17.1	894
1980	32.6	17.9	890
1981	32.9	18.1	890
1982	33.0	18.3	893
1983	33.3	18.9	893
1984	34.9	19.7	897
1985	36.5	20.0	906
1986	37.9	NA	906
1987	40.1	21.8	906
1988	40.9	23.0	904
1989	39.9	25.3	903
1990	39.7	26.6	900
1991	41.2	28.0	896
1992	41.8	28.5	899
1993	41.6	30.0	902
1994	41.8	31.0	902

Table 30: *College enrollment.*

---

	Black	White	Black as % of total
1970	427	5221	7.4
1971	534	5560	8.6
1972	525	5678	8.3
1973	536	5408	8.8
1974	589	5575	9.3
1975	742	6183	10.4
1976	817	6170	11.4
1977	803	6165	11.2
1978	753	5974	10.8
1979	748	6058	10.7
1980	723	6212	10.1
1981	815	6452	10.8
1982	800	6579	10.3
1983	806	6532	10.5
1984	810	6672	10.4
1985	767	6597	9.9
1986	860	6235	11.5
1987	852	6275	11.3
1988	801	6488	10.3
1989	833	6658	10.5
1990	869	6778	10.7
1991	900	6919	10.6
1992	904	6985	10.6
1993	914	6739	11.0

---

Table 31: *Births per 1000; women aged 15-19.*

	Black		White	
	First births	All births	First births	All births
1970	92.6	140.7	47.1	57.4
1971	94.4	134.5	43.9	53.6
1972	93.6	129.8	42.1	51.0
1973	89.2	123.1	40.6	49.0
1974	84.4	116.5	39.2	47.9
1975	80.8	111.8	37.8	46.4
1976	75.5	104.9	35.7	44.1
1977	75.5	104.7	35.5	44.1
1978	72.4	100.9	34.6	42.9
1979	73.3	101.7	35.2	43.7
1980	71.8	100.0	36.0	44.7
1981	67.3	94.5	36.2	44.9
1982	67.3	94.3	36.0	45.0
1983	67.5	93.9	35.1	43.9
1984	67.4	94.1	34.2	42.9
1985	68.1	95.4	34.6	43.3
1986	68.3	95.8	33.9	42.3
1987	69.0	97.6	33.9	42.5
1988	71.6	102.7	35.3	44.4
1989	76.6	111.5	38.0	47.9
1990	75.7	112.8	40.1	50.8
1991	76.6	115.5	41.5	52.8
1992	74.3	112.4	40.5	51.8

Table 32: *Adults 25+: % with at least given level of education and median levels.*

At least 4 years of ...	High School		College		Median Years	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
1970	36.1	57.4	6.1	11.6	10.1	12.2
1975	46.4	64.5	9.2	14.5	11.4	12.4
1980	54.6	70.5	11.1	17.8	12.2	12.5
1982	58.1	72.8	12.4	18.5	12.3	12.6
1985	63.2	75.5	15.4	20.0	12.4	12.7
1986	65.3	76.2	15.2	20.1	12.4	12.7
1987	66.7	77.0	15.7	20.5	12.4	12.7
1988	66.7	77.7	16.4	20.9	12.5	12.7
1989	67.3	78.4	16.9	21.8	12.5	12.7
1990	68.7	79.1	16.5	22.0	12.5	12.7
1991	69.6	79.9	16.7	22.2	12.5	12.8
1992	72.9	82.2	17.2	22.1	12.6	12.9
1993	74.7	82.7	17.7	22.6	12.7	12.9
1994	74.5	82.0	18.1	22.9	NA	NA

Table 33: *Gini coefficients.*

	Households		Families	
	Black	White	Black	White
1970	0.422	0.387	0.388	0.345
1971	0.419	0.389	0.385	0.347
1972	0.427	0.393	0.398	0.350
1973	0.419	0.389	0.394	0.346
1974	0.414	0.387	0.388	0.346
1975	0.419	0.390	0.386	0.349
1976	0.421	0.391	0.394	0.348
1977	0.425	0.394	0.404	0.352
1978	0.431	0.394	0.406	0.353
1979	0.433	0.396	0.410	0.354
1980	0.439	0.394	0.410	0.353
1981	0.440	0.397	0.414	0.358
1982	0.442	0.403	0.422	0.368
1983	0.448	0.404	0.428	0.370
1984	0.450	0.405	0.434	0.371
1985	0.450	0.411	0.430	0.378
1986	0.464	0.415	0.442	0.380
1987	0.468	0.415	0.447	0.380
1988	0.468	0.416	0.450	0.382
1989	0.461	0.422	0.442	0.389
1990	0.464	0.419	0.445	0.384
1991	0.464	0.418	0.448	0.384
1992	0.470	0.423	0.462	0.390
1993	0.484	0.444	0.482	0.416
1994	0.477	0.448	0.458	0.416
1995	0.468	0.442	0.457	0.409

Table 34: *Poverty Status of Persons* (% below poverty level).

	Black	White
1970	33.5	9.9
1971		
1972		
1973		
1974		
1975	31.3	9.7
1976	31.1	9.1
1977	31.3	8.9
1978	30.6	8.7
1979	31.0	9.0
1980	32.5	10.2
1981	34.2	11.1
1982	35.6	12.0
1983	35.7	12.1
1984	33.8	11.5
1985	31.3	11.4
1986	31.1	11.0
1987	32.4	10.4
1988	31.3	10.1
1989	30.7	10.0
1990	31.9	10.7
1991	32.7	11.3
1992	33.4	11.9
1993	33.1	12.2

Tabel 35: *Income of Non-family households* (1995 \$).

	Black		White	
	Median	Mean	Median	Mean
1980	11,249	16,442	18,279	24,477
1981	11,223	16,213	18,461	24,771
1982	12,414	17,518	18,900	25,481
1983	12,010	17,075	19,093	25,877
1984	13,068	18,614	19,934	26,499
1985	13,556	19,415	20,383	27,176
1986	12,203	17,782	20,656	27,944
1987	12,969	18,630	21,057	28,511
1988	12,658	19,228	21,813	29,613
1989	13,757	20,714	21,772	29,752
1990	13,746	20,095	21,512	28,953
1991	13,653	20,075	20,657	28,015
1992	13,325	19,638	20,026	27,748
1993	14,615	20,097	20,713	28,807
1994	13,697	20,198	20,344	29,293
1995	15,007	20,551	20,585	29,563



Table 36: *Income of Family households (1995 \$).*

	Black		White	
	Median	Mean	Median	Mean
1980	24,069	29,647	40,783	46,431
1981	23,055	28,670	40,049	45,813
1982	22,186	27,875	39,476	45,854
1983	22,575	28,448	39,670	46,014
1984	23,071	29,440	40,943	47,888
1985	24,153	30,697	41,647	49,013
1986	25,256	32,253	43,167	50,998
1987	25,255	32,440	43,839	52,067
1988	25,537	33,094	44,086	52,307
1989	25,700	33,033	44,645	53,835
1990	25,535	32,720	43,398	52,358
1991	24,844	31,488	42,776	51,149
1992	23,582	30,943	42,457	50,934
1993	23,436	32,271	42,019	52,788
1994	26,197	34,441	42,505	53,677
1995	26,838	34,706	43,265	54,207

Table 37: *Abortion.*

	Rate per 1,000 Black	Women White	Ratio per 1,000 live births Black	White
1975	49.3	17.2	565	276
1976				
1977				
1978				
1979	56.2	24.0	625	373
1980	56.5	24.3	642	376
1981	55.9	24.3	645	377
1982	55.5	23.8	646	373
1983	55.5	23.3	670	376
1984	54.3	23.1	646	366
1985	55.5	22.6	659	360
1986	55.9	21.8	661	350
1987	56.0	21.1	648	338
1988	57.3	21.2	638	333
1989	54.7	20.9	650	309
1990	54.4	21.5	655	318
1991	53.8	20.3	661	303

Tabele 38: *Homicide rates per 1,000 resident population.*

	Male		Female	
	Black	White	Black	White
1970	67.6	6.8	13.3	2.1
1971				
1972				
1973				
1974				
1975				
1976				
1977				
1978				
1979				
1980	66.6	10.9	13.5	3.2
1981	64.8	10.4	12.7	3.1
1982	59.1	9.6	12.0	3.1
1983	51.4	8.6	11.3	2.8
1984	48.7	8.3	11.2	2.9
1985	48.4	8.2	11.0	2.9
1986	55.0	8.6	12.1	3.0
1987	53.3	7.9	12.6	3.0
1988	58.0	7.9	13.2	2.9
1989	61.1	8.2	12.9	2.8
1990	69.2	9.0	13.5	2.8
1991	72.0	9.3	14.2	3.0
1992	67.5	9.1	13.1	2.8

Table 39: *Adults per 100,000 population held in local jails, state or federal prisons.*

	Men		Women	
	Black	White	Black	White
1985	3544	528	183	27
1986	3850	570	189	29
1987	3943	594	216	35
1988	4441	629	257	41
1989	5066	685	321	47
1990	5365	718	338	48
1991	5717	740	356	51
1992	6014	774	365	53
1993	6259	805	403	56
1994	6753	860	435	60

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