Intergenerational Solidarity

Edited by E. Malinvaud
INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY
INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

the PROCEEDINGS of

the Eighth Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences 8-13 April 2002
The opinions expressed with absolute freedom during the presentation of the papers of this meeting, although published by the Academy, represent only the points of view of the participants and not those of the Academy.

Editor of the Proceedings:
Prof. EDMOND MALINVAUD

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The Participants of the Eighth Plenary Session of 8-13 April 2002
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This volume of proceedings does not conform with the practice followed in the seven previous volumes which resulted from the plenary sessions of the Academy. It is not complete, in the sense that it does not publish all the papers discussed during the eighth session. Indeed, the programme of this last session was atypical: its scientific discussions belonged to the study of three distinct themes for the reason explained here in the Report of the President. Two days were devoted respectively to each theme: globalisation, democracy, intergenerational solidarity.

This volume presents only the papers delivered on the 12th and 13th of April at the roundtable on intergenerational solidarity. The colloquium on globalisation and inequalities is the object of a separate publication: The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences: Miscellanea 3. The roundtable on democracy, with three outside experts, was an intermediate stage in the implementation of the Academy programme on the theme of democracy, which was discussed in a seminar held in 1996 and in two plenary sessions (1998, 2000). In order to draw from this previous work the formulation of elements which the Church can use for the development of her Social Doctrine, written evaluations of the publications which resulted from these meetings were prepared by the three outside experts and discussed at the roundtable. The reports of these experts will be published next year when the report of the Academy will be issued.

The initial intentions of the Academy, as formulated at its first plenary session, were to give some priority, among other themes, to the study of intergenerational solidarity. Nothing could be done for this purpose during the first years. But at the end of 2000 it was decided to open a programme which would extend over several years and which began with the roundtable whose papers are published here. In this first meeting the main purpose was
to sort out the various issues that the Academy should investigate in depth. Already during the early discussions of 1994 there had been some uncertainty about the exact scope of the programme. In particular three questions had been raised to which answers will now have to be given.

How should the Academy delineate the contours of the family problems which it ought to tackle within the new programme? There are a number of aspects which definitely belong to the field of intergenerational solidarity and to which social scientists might usefully contribute: the role of families in the education of children and teenagers, in the support of parents and old-age members, in the provision of a better safety net than may be publicly provided, and last but not least, in contributing to building the cultural environment in which future generations will live. Too often on this last point, however, families enter into conflict with other social forces, and the state itself often disregards or misjudges effects on future generations. The roundtable devoted a good deal of attention to surveying a large part of this complex of problems, with in particular the contributions of Academicians Glendon, Ramirez, Villacorta and Zampetti.

Should the whole set of problems posed by the development and/or reform of the ‘welfare state’ be considered as belonging to the list of issues that the Academy ought to take up in the near future? These problems were occasionally approached in past years when ‘democracy’ or ‘work and employment’ were the main focus. But a clearer view of what the Academy wants to study about them is now needed. Here the paper of Academician Raga Gil surveys the main issues. It will play a central role in our tenth plenary session of 2004, which will be completely devoted to the welfare state, following the recommendation given in the general discussion at the end of the roundtable.

Should the list of problems to be investigated during the next few years also include those concerning behaviour and policies bearing upon the natural environment? Here Academician Dasgupta shows that indeed these problems are serious, particularly for developing countries. No doubt, they will have to be closely studied.

In conformity with what was decided in 1995 and applied in all three of the programmes undertaken earlier, a paper had to be prepared on the Social Doctrine of the Church, so as to serve as a reference in the forthcoming investigations of the Academy on intergenerational solidarity. The essay I wrote for the purpose is here published.

These proceedings contain two other contributions of a transversal nature, both written by Academician Donati. The first one, distributed a
year ago to a number of participants at the roundtable, is meant to cover the whole theme. It is entitled Intergenerational solidarity - a sociological and social policy issue. The second paper deals with the basic ethical principle of equity, in the same broad framework (Equity between generations - a new social norm). It is a pity that our colleague Donati had to cancel at the last moment his participation in the session, on medical instructions following serious health trouble. In his absence, his two papers were discussed, but unfortunately too briefly.
VIII Plenary Session: 8-13 April 2002

GENERAL PROGRAMME

COLLOQUIUM ON GLOBALISATION AND INEQUALITIES

ROUNDTABLE WITH OUTSIDE EXPERTS ON THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ON DEMOCRACY

ROUNDTABLE ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

COLLOQUIUM ON GLOBALISATION AND INEQUALITIES
MONDAY 8 APRIL

Word of Welcome: Professor Edmond Malinvaud, President of the Academy

The Subject of the Colloquium: Professor Louis Sabourin, Chairman of the Colloquium (Pontifical Academician, Montreal)

Inequalities in the Light of Globalisation
Professor Denis Goulet (Notre Dame University, USA)

Comments by Academicians and Experts

Globalisation and International Inequalities: Changing North-South Relations
Professor Juan Jose LLACH (Pontifical Academician, Argentina)

Comments by Academicians and Experts
The Impact of International Finance and Trade on Inequalities

Financing and Loans
Mr. Michel Camdessus (Former Director General of the IMF, France)

Trade
Mr. Ablasse Ouédraogo (Deputy Director General of the WTO, Burkina Faso)

Comments by Academicians and Experts

Tuesday 9 April

Globalisation, Religion and Poverty
Professor Andrea Riccardi (Founder of the Comunità di S. Egidio, Italy)
Dr. Stan D’Souza, S.J. (Co-ord., Int. Population Concerns, India)
Abbé Raymond B. Goudjo (Benin)
Professor Roberto Papini (Sec. Gen., Jacques Maritain Int. Inst., Italy)
Mr. Jean-Marie Fardeau (Sec. Gen., CCFD, France)

Comments by Academicians and Experts

General Discussion

Conclusions and Proposals for the General Assembly of 2003

Meeting of the Council

Roundtable with Three Outside Experts on Democracy

Wednesday 10 April

The Value and the Values of Democracy
Professor Sergio Bernal Restrepo (Pont. Univ. Gregoriana, Colombia)
Professor Michael Novak (American Enterprise Inst. For Public Policy Research, U.S.A.)
Professor Rudolf Weiler (Institut für Sozialethik, Austria)

General Discussion

Democracy and Civil Society
Professor Sergio Bernal Restrepo
Professor Michael Novak
Professor Rudolf Weiler
General Discussion
Democracy, Welfare and the International Community
Professor Sergio Bernal Restrepo
Professor Michael Novak
Professor Rudolf Weiler

THURSDAY 11 APRIL

General Discussion on Democracy, Welfare and the International Community
Papal Audience and Photograph with the Holy Father
The Message of the Academy: To Whom should it be Addressed and how should it be Propagated?
Professor Sergio Bernal Restrepo
Professor Michael Novak
Professor Rudolf Weiler
General Discussion
Closed Session for Academicians

ROUNDTABLE ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY
FRIDAY 12 APRIL

The Social Doctrine of the Church
Professor Edmond Malinvaud
Comments
H.E. Msgr. Giampaolo Crepaldi (Secretary of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Vatican City)
Msgr. Professor Roland Minnerath (Pontifical Academician, France)
Msgr. Professor Michel Schooyans (Pontifical Academician, Belgium)
Discussion
A New Model for the Role of the Family in the State
Professor Pierluigi Zampetti (Pontifical Academician, Genoa)
Comments
Professor Mary Ann Glendon (Pontifical Academician, Harvard)
Discussion
The Natural Environment
Professor Partha Dasgupta (Pontifical Academician, Cambridge)
Comments
Professor Bedřich Vymětalík (Pontifical Academician, the Czech Republic)
Professor Jerzy Zubrzycki (Pontifical Academician, Australia)
Discussion
Presentation of two contributions by Professor Pierpaolo Donati (Pontifical Academician, Bologna), unable to be present
Intergenerational Solidarity: a Sociological and Social Policy Issue presented by Professor Jerzy Zubrzycki (Pontifical Academician, Australia)
Intergenerational Equity presented by Professor Edmond Malinvaud (President of the Academy, France) and Professor Margaret Archer (Pontifical Academician, Warwick)
Discussion

Saturday 13 April

Duties to Teenagers and Young Adults
Professor Mina Ramirez (Pontifical Academician, Manila)
Duties of Children to the Elderly
Professor Wilfrido Villacorta (Pontifical Academician, Manila)
Comments: Professor Paulus M. Zulu (Pontifical Academician, South Africa)
Discussion
A New Shape for the Welfare State
Professor José T. Raga Gil (Pontifical Academician, Spain)
Comments: Professor Juan J. LLach (Pontifical Academician, Argentina)
Discussion
General Discussion on Future Activities
Meeting of the Council
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ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE HOLY FATHER

Holy Father,

This year the programme of our plenary session is atypical. For the first time since we began our work in 1994, we have not concentrated the proceedings of a plenary session on one single large subject. Our programme is made up of three consecutive workshops or seminars, dealing respectively with globalisation, democracy, and solidarity between generations. We realised that in all three cases, but for different reasons, our projects would now benefit from shorter meetings.

In your important address on globalisation last year, Your Holiness drew our attention in particular to the priority of ethics and to the two ethical principles that ought to be permanently kept in mind by all those involved in the globalisation process: the inalienable value of the human person and the value of human cultures. Our main concern in the Academy should be to bring out those scientific elements which can bear on the implementation of these principles. This is not an easy task, especially given the present conflict between different visions of globalisation.

After an initial seminar in February 2000, which sought to launch our programme on this subject, and the plenary session devoted to it last year, our seminar this week has focused on inequalities. A main concern has been to understand how changing North-South relations could contribute to alleviating the inhuman burden of poverty in the South.

Our roundtable on democracy this week had the purpose of approaching the final stage of the programme on democracy, which the Academy initiated in December 1996. We discussed the reports of three outside experts who were assigned the function of evaluating with fresh eyes the three publications of the Academy on democracy, and identifying the contribution they could make to the Social Doctrine of the Church. Thanks to these reports and to the discussions at the workshop, we are now reaching the stage when we should be able to draft a resolution of the Academy, which ought to be passed at our next plenary session.
The roundtable on solidarity between generations will keep us busy on Friday and Saturday morning. Its object is to examine how the Academy ought to proceed in order to follow the intention – approved at our first plenary session of November 1994 – of having a programme of work on this subject. No doubt studying this now is also timely.

Such are, Holy Father, the steps we are now taking in our attempt to serve the Church and thus to fulfil the objective you had in mind when you instituted our Academy,

Edmond Malinvaud
Mr. President, Your Excellency, Distinguished Academicians,

1. I am delighted to welcome you on the occasion of the Eighth General Assembly of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. In particular, I greet Prof. Edmond Malinvaud, your President, to whom I express my gratitude for his expression of respect on your behalf. I thank Bishop Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo and all who coordinate the work of your Academy. With your interdisciplinary richness, you have chosen to continue your reflection on the themes of democracy and globalisation, thus beginning your research on inter-generational relations. Such a step is valuable for developing the Church’s social teaching, for educating peoples and for the participation of Christians in public life in every kind of responsibility for social life.

2. Your analysis also aims at shedding light on the ethical dimension of the decisions that the leaders of civil society and every human being must make. The increasing interdependence among people, families, businesses and nations, as well as among economies and markets – known as globalisation – has revolutionised the system of social interactions and relations. If it has positive developments, it also harbours disturbing threats, notably the exacerbation of inequalities between the powerful economies and the dependent ones, between those who benefit from new opportunities, and those who are bypassed. This fact invites you to think about the subject of solidarity in a new way.

3. In this connection, with the progressive lengthening of the span of human life, solidarity between generations must receive greater attention, with special care for the weaker members of society, children and the elder-
ly. Formerly, in many places, solidarity between generations was a natural family attitude; it also was a duty of the community which had to exercise it in a spirit of justice and equity, making sure that each person has his just share in the fruits of work and in all circumstances lives with dignity. The industrial age saw States set up social welfare plans to assist families, giving special attention to the education of youth and to pension funds for retirees. It is fortunate that a sense of responsibility has developed in people thanks to a real national solidarity, so as not to exclude anyone and to give access to a social benefits coverage to all. One can only rejoice at this progress even though it benefits only a small portion of the world's population.

In this spirit, it is first of all the responsibility of the political and economic leaders to do everything possible to ensure that globalisation will not take place to the detriment of the least favoured and the weakest, widening the gap between rich and poor, between rich nations and poor nations. I invite people who have the responsibility of government and those who make the decisions that affect society to be particularly careful by reflecting on future long-term decisions and by thinking how to create economic and social balances, by putting in place systems of solidarity that take into account the changes caused by globalisation and by keeping these methods from further impoverishing substantial parts of peoples, or even, of whole countries.

4. At the global level, collective decisions must be taken and carried out in a process encouraging the responsible participation of all people, called to build their future together. In this perspective, the fostering of democratic models of government will allow the population as a whole to take part in the administration of the res publica, 'on the basis of a correct conception of the human person' (Centesimus annus, n. 46), and with respect for basic anthropological and spiritual values. Social solidarity implies putting aside the simple pursuit of particular interests, which must be evaluated and harmonized 'in keeping with a hierarchy of balanced values; ultimately, it demands a correct understanding of the dignity and the rights of the person' (ibid., n. 47). Thus it is only right to give great importance to educating the younger generations in a spirit of solidarity and a real culture of openness to the universal and attention to all people, regardless of their race, culture or religion.

5. The leaders of civil society fulfil their mission when they seek above all the common good with absolute respect for the dignity of the human person. The importance of the questions our societies have to face and the
challenges for the future should stimulate a common will to seek the common good for the harmonious and peaceful development of societies and the well being of all. I invite the administrative bodies that serve the human community, inter-governmental or international organisms, to support the work of the nations with rigour, justice and understanding, in view of the ‘universal common good’. Thus in a gradual way the modalities of a globalisation will be guaranteed that is no longer imposed but controlled. Actually, it corresponds to the political sphere to regulate the market, to subject market laws to solidarity, so that individuals and societies are not sacrificed by economic changes at all levels and are protected from the upheavals caused by the deregulation of the market. Once again, therefore, I encourage social, political and economic leaders to go further in the way of cooperation among persons, businesses and nations, so that the stewardship of our earth will be at the service of persons and peoples and not just of profit. Men and women are called to leave behind their selfishness and show each other greater solidarity. In its journey to greater unity, solidarity and peace, may today’s humanity pass on to the coming generations the goods of creation and the hope of a better future!

As once again I express my esteem and gratitude for your service to the Church and humanity, I invoke upon you the assistance of the risen Lord and wholeheartedly impart my Apostolic Blessing to you, your families and all your loved ones.
On 18 October 2001 Father Arthur Fridolin Utz passed away at the age of 93 after a life devoted in the main to studying and propagating the Social Doctrine of the Church. He was the oldest Academician, very much respected and appreciated by his colleagues, who now deeply feel his absence. In January 1990, four years before the creation of the Academy, he was already active and influential within the small group which persuaded Pope John Paul II to decide in favour of its creation. The Academy will always remember his contributions.

This report covers the period from the beginning of May 2001 to 14 April 2002. During this period the Holy Father appointed two new Academicians: Professor José Raga Gil of the University San Pablo, Madrid, on 17 May 2001, and Professor Paul Kirchhof of the University of Heidelberg, on 19 October 2001.

Born in 1938 in Valencia (Spain), Professor Raga Gil held chairs in ‘political economy and public finance’ at the Universities of Salamanca and Madrid (Autónoma and Complutense) before he became Rector of the University San Pablo (1994-99). He is the author of many publications in Spain and abroad, in particular on public sector economics, income distribution, economic ethics and the Social Doctrine of the Church. For more than twenty years he has been an active member of the International Institute of Public Finance, and was its Executive Vice-President for three years. In the Catholic Church he has accepted many appointments and since 1980 has served as President of the Spanish Social Weeks. He received the Great Cross of Saint Gregory the Great from John Paul II in 2000.

Born in 1943 in Osnabrück (Germany), Professor Paul Kirchhof taught public law at the Universities of Münster and Heidelberg, being in both cases the director of institutes of financial and fiscal law. He has published many books and articles on fiscal law and constitutional law. He is also President of the German Society of Fiscal Law. From 1987 to 1999 Professor Kirchhof was a member of the German Constitutional Court.
This was a very challenging responsibility because, in addition to the constitutional modernization imposed by the progress of science and medicine, and by social changes, Germany had to cope both with reunification and European integration. Recently, he has accepted the position of co-editor of a large encyclopedia on constitutional law, which will be compiled with scientific rigour from various points of view. Ten volumes will be written by some 130 authors.

During the years under review, the Council of the Academy held three meetings: on 15 December 2001, on 9 April 2002 and 13 April 2002. The tempo of activities during the twelve months under review was somewhat affected by the decision to give an original structure to the plenary session of 2002. The decision had been taken in the 2001 General Assembly, in response to a proposal of the Council, that the scientific work of the session would be organized around several main themes instead of just one. Because of the advance of the projects on the three themes which had been earlier selected, on ‘labour and employment’, ‘democracy’ and ‘globalisation’, and because of the launching of the study on the theme of ‘intergenerational solidarity’, it appeared that each one of them had to be discussed by the Academy for further progress, but that in no case was a full session required for what had to be achieved in the short run. As it turned out, only three of the four themes were examined during the Eighth Session, which however met for a full week. A brief survey of what was done during the year on each programme now follows.

Work and employment

The report published in the Proceedings of the Seventh Session presents the decision, taken by the Academy in April 2001, to try and organize, for the first time, a forum with high figures of the Church. The forum would examine a question, already approached by the Academy, which would be important in the elaboration of the Social Doctrine. The first step in the implementation of the project was for the President to obtain agreement from the Secretary of State of His Holiness on the precise assignment and organization of the first forum. After several exchanges of letters this was achieved in October.

The forum should be understood as a working meeting about future research. The authority of the Magisterium would not be pledged by the positions taken by representatives of the Holy See. For the Academy, the main outcome of the forum will be advice about the approaches it ought to
select in future studies of the subject discussed so that these studies can be useful to the reflections of the Church. The Secretary of State agreed with the choice of the question for the first forum by the Academy, namely 'the meaning of the priority of labour over capital in the present world'. He also accepted the names of personalities to be asked by the President to represent the Holy See.

Unfortunately, time ran short and the first invitations turned out, after several months, to be unsuccessful. In February 2002, wary of the fact that a too hastily prepared forum might jeopardize confidence in that type of dialogue between the Academy and the Church, the President decided to postpone the first forum to April 2003. This decision was accepted by the Secretary of State. The General Assembly, meeting in April 2002, also endorsed it.

The study of democracy

Last year's report explained how the Academy had decided to take advice from outside experts before writing a summary statement about the relevance of its earlier study of democracy for the social teaching of the Church. In the summer of 2001, three experts, who had not been participants in the Academy's programme on democracy, kindly agreed: to read the proceedings of the seminar held in 1996 and of the plenary sessions of 1998 and 2000; to write individual reports on their views about the value of this material for the Church; and finally to present and discuss their reports during a roundtable to be held on the 10th and 11th of April 2002, as part of the Eighth Plenary Session. They were: Professor Sergio Bernal Restrepo, the Gregorian University, Rome; Professor Michael Novak, the American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C.; and Professor Rudolf Wéler, Institut für Sozialethik, Vienna.

A special small meeting, chaired by Professor Zacher, was held with them at the Academy on the 29th and 30th of November, with the participation of Dr. Filibeck from the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. The purpose was to answer the questions of the experts about the background of the publications at their disposal and about the kind of contribution expected from their reports. It was also thought advisable to proceed to a first informal discussion about the likely contents of the respective reports as they were maturing.

The reports were available in February. The roundtable in April was very well attended and very useful. The subject was divided into three main
parts, respectively entitled: 'The value and the values of democracy', 'Democracy and civil society', and 'Democracy, welfare and the international community'. A fourth part of the discussion concerned the nature of the message that the Academy would issue and the form it would take: to whom should it be addressed and how should it be propagated?

With the material thus obtained, a small group of Academicians will first prepare a draft of the intended summary statement. Under the leadership of Professor Zacher, written comments and suggestions will be collected from other Academicians. A second version will be available for discussion and, hopefully, will be approved at the Ninth Plenary Session. The reports of the experts will be published at the same time as the message of the Academy.

The study of globalisation

After the workshop held on 21-22 February 2000, the plenary session of April 2001 and the colloquium of 8-9 April 2002, with the prospect of devoting still another plenary session in 2003 to the same broad theme, the Academy will certainly want to reflect on how to best take stock of this first round of activities on globalisation. This simple consideration was already present in the minds of Academicians during the twelve months under review, when they thought about what the direct outcome of this first phase ought to be. It was particularly present during the General Assembly of 11 April.

Here, what was described in the two previous President's reports will not be repeated. Attention will focus not only on the orientations chosen at the General Assembly but also, in the first place, on the papers discussed at the colloquium and independently published as the booklet Miscellanea 3 of the Academy.

Two papers dealt with social inequalities, which were the main subject of two earlier contributions by staff members of the United Nations Development Programme, Hakan Bjorkman in 2000 and more fully Zéphirin Diabré in 2001. This year Denis Goulet examined whether globalisation causes inequality. He developed an argument, summarized in ten points at the end of his paper. Distinguishing inequality from poverty, he focused attention on the perception that some inequalities are illegitimate; on the process of social and cultural change that brings about such a perception in times of globalisation; on the resulting disarticulation of social bounds; and on possible ways of counteracting this development. Juan
Llach took a long-run view in order to place the wave of globalisation of the last decades in perspective. He argued that the divergence between rich and poor countries coincided with the eve of modern economic growth in the early nineteenth century. He discussed a large body of evidence: first, on the relation between the initial divergence and absolute poverty; second, on the thesis that there have been forms of convergence during the last few decades; and then on various related phenomena. He ended with the presentation of some hypotheses about possible explanations for this lack of convergence.

Two papers dealt with the present international governance of globalisation and its effects on inequalities. Michel Camdessus, the former Director General of the International Monetary Fund, surveyed the large domain that falls under the competence of the Fund and dwelt on the events and problems experienced during the past decades up to the present. He selected three main issues: the financial architecture, with the rules and codes bearing on banking operations; international loans and gifts, with the conditions imposed, particularly regarding good governance; finally debts and debt relief, with their impact on social policies, notably in the poorest countries. Ablassé Ouédraogo, the deputy Director General of the World Trade Organization, first listed the flagrant disequilibria in the trends of world development. He then examined the possible or potential effects of trade liberalization on these trends. Overall, it appears that, up to now, a number of developing countries have not benefited from trade liberalization agreements. The main cause is that these countries suffer from serious obstacles to their exports.

Within the colloquium a large part was also given to testimonies from persons able to report direct evidence on the situation of religions or the fight against poverty in the globalised world. Professor Andrea Riccardi, founder of the Sant’Egidio Community, argued that the culture of ‘living together’ has now become inevitable, and he explained how the spirit of Sant’Egidio generates friendship with the poor and can even help to transform war into peace. Father Stan D’Souza, S.J., analysed the problems faced by religions and the trends in poverty in India, or more generally in Asia. Father Raymond Goudjo, from Benin, brought a similar testimony from Africa. He also stated that training an elite was the way to eradicate the fatalism of the poor. Roberto Papini, Secretary General of the International Jacques Maritain Institute, focused his presentation on episcopal teachings on the relations between globalisation and poverty. The main challenge faced by these teachings is how to stimulate the emergence,
acceptance, regard for, and promotion of, human values, notably justice and solidarity. This has to be achieved not in opposition to, or even in juxtaposition with, but rather in correlation and symbiosis with, the economic values of growth and efficiency. Jean-Marie Fardeau, the Secretary General of the French Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement, spoke about the role Catholic NGOs play in contributing to international solidarity. He considered, in particular, the cultural aspects of globalisation and asked whether Christians were doing enough to value not only material wealth but also other forms of riches found in the family, social relations, cultures, and so on.

The general discussion at the end of the colloquium, and the General Assembly of Academicians two days later, examined the main objective and the procedure for the preparation of the scientific programme of the Ninth Plenary Session. A consensus emerged on the idea that the governance of globalisation had to be the central subject. Since globalisation is a concern for all social sciences, the Academy thought that the next session offered a good opportunity for now experimenting with a new form of procedure. It then accepted a proposal of Professor Sabourin, which was made precise by the Council on 13 April 2002. Five groups were established, each specialized in a field. The chairpersons are: Prof. Archer for sociologists, Prof. Glendon for jurists, Prof. Llach for economists, Prof. Minnerath for experts on morality, Prof. Zulu and Prof. Villacorta jointly for political scientists. Each group will organize discussions lasting half a day. Professor Sabourin will coordinate the progress of the groups. In agreement with the President, he will find the proper balance for the whole programme of the 2003 session.

Intergenerational solidarity

In agreement with the decision reported a year ago, the main objective of the roundtable held on 12-13 April 2002 was to broadly survey the field of intergenerational solidarity and thus gather sufficient material to lead to decisions regarding future activities in this field. The nearest next meeting concerned was the Tenth Plenary Session of 2004. This main objective was achieved.

No presentation of the papers discussed at the roundtable will be attempted here, since they are published in these proceedings. Clearly they cover a wide range: the Social Doctrine of the Church; the ethics of equity between generations; the place of families in political organization; the nat-
ural environment; the sociological approach to intergenerational solidarity; close solidarity between the young and the elderly; and the welfare state. The Academy did not yet want to choose the sketch of a programme extending over a number of future years. But it expressed a clear priority in favour of devoting the 2004 session to the problems of the welfare state.

In any case, the committee in charge of intergenerational solidarity, from now on chaired by Professor Mary Ann Glendon, will have to assist the Academy, first in selecting a good programme on the welfare state to be discussed two years from now, and second in drawing up perspectives on when and how other aspects of intergenerational solidarity should be tackled.

Edmond Malinvaud
PART I

THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH
1. Introduction

How does the Social Doctrine of the Church apply to relations between generations? This is a timely question because, at the same time as globalization is transforming the geographical domain of the application of solidarity, the acceleration of the impact of human activity on the future of the earth and our societies, as well as scientific and technical progress in the control of long-run phenomena, are also transforming the inter-temporal domain of the application of solidarity.

From the early days of the Bible, revelation was understood as a message of hope that testified to God’s benevolence towards man, and this message was renewed by the presence of Jesus Christ on earth and his resurrection. But the expression and understanding of this message need to be developed if we want to adapt that message to the contemporary age. This was something that Gaudium et spes announced: “Today, the human race is involved in a new stage of history. Profound and rapid changes are spread-
ing by degrees around the whole world. ... Triggered by the intelligence and creative energies of man, these changes recoil upon him, upon his decisions and desires, both individual and collective... As happens in any crisis of growth, this transformation has brought serious difficulties in its wake. Hence we can already speak of a true cultural and social transformation, one which has repercussions on man's religious life as well" (4). ... “To a certain extent, the human intellect is also broadening its dominion over time: over the past by means of historical knowledge; over the future, by the art of projecting and by planning. ... Thus, the human race has passed from a rather static concept of reality to a more dynamic, evolutionary one. In consequence there has arisen a new series of problems, a series as numerous as can be, calling for efforts of analysis and synthesis” (5).

When celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Gaudium et spes, John Paul II did not just show that its announcement of life and hope remained perfectly timely notwithstanding the changes that occurred in the world since then. He also wanted to plead for the upholding of the spirit that had inspired its drafting, namely the “realism of hope”. We must keep this approach in mind in this review of the doctrinal writings.

Although the human community was always concerned about its future, it was ignorant of a number of elements that we now partly understand. Certainly, this does not remove the need for hope. But the enlargement of the field of our knowledge also means an enlargement of the field of our responsibilities. Each generation has more and more manifest and extended duties towards the next generations. Such is the context within which we must first recall what the Christian notion of solidarity is and then apply it to relations between generations.

2. The principle of solidarity

“In His preaching [Jesus Christ] clearly taught the sons of God to treat one another as brothers. In His prayers He pleaded that all His disciples might be one” (GS. 32).

“It is already possible to point to the positive and moral value of the growing awareness of interdependence among individuals. ... It is above all a question of interdependence, sensed as a system determining relationships in the contemporary world. ... When interdependence becomes rec-

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2See Gaudium et spes – Bilan de trente années, No 39 in the journal Laïcs Aujourd'hui, Vatican City, 1996.
ognized in this way, the correlative response as a moral and social attitude, as a “virtue,” is solidarity.3

The synopsis of social doctrine that the Magisterium will soon publish stresses the increasing importance of the principle of solidarity. It argues in particular that the present social context prompts us to deepen solidarity. Living persons are more and more debtors for all they have received (conditions which make possible and appreciable the quality of life, an indivisible and essential heritage of culture, scientific and technical knowledge, tangible and intangible welfare …). This debt, which is invaluable and indivisible, does not require what would be an impossible restitution but rather recognition in the form of sustained social actions thanks to which humanity will progress. Nothing should be allowed to hinder us in our attempts, motivated by solidarity, to provide present and future generations with their due.

3. The family as the main provider of intergenerational solidarity

In all human societies, families practice intergenerational solidarity. Indeed, this practice is highly praised in the social teaching of the Church. According to Gaudium et spes, “The family, in which the various generations come together and help one another grow wiser and harmonize personal rights with the other requirements of social life, is the foundation of society”(52). The route by which to enter the key and substantial parts of our subject is thus clear and precise. We cannot seek here to survey the whole of the Social Doctrine as it applies to the family – that would go beyond the confines of this essay. It would be possible in particular to show how social sciences contribute to supporting the vision of the Magisterium about the shadows that afflict the family in the present world and about the resulting evils. Instead we must focus on our specific subject and examine how the Doctrine is led to deal with intergenerational solidarity.

Let us refer to the Apostolical exhortation Familiaris consortio of John Paul II (November 1981). We see that our subject is examined in the third part, “The role of the Christian family”, after “Bright spots and shadows for the family today” and “The Plan of God for marriage and the family”, and before the last part “Pastoral care of the family: stages, structures, agents and situations”. In this third part let us first consider the sub-part “III.

3Sollicitudo rei socialis, n. 38. These sentences were written for the context of solidarity between more or less developed nations. But they perfectly apply to that of solidarity between generations.
Participating in the development of society", setting aside for our two following sections sub-part “II. Serving life”.

The family, states the apostolic text, is “the first and vital cell of society” (42). Let us note from the outset that this quotation explicitly refers to the family as a “conjugal community”. Many other passages speak of the father, the mother and the children. Thus reference is mostly made to the “family nucleus”. Of course the exhortation also recognizes the value of the concept of the extended family. It writes: “conjugal communion constitutes the foundation on which is built the broader communion of the family, of parents and children, of brothers and sisters with each other, of relatives and other members of the household” (21).

Does the apostolic text deliberately avoid mentioning the solidarity between remote generations of the same family lineage, bound by norms internal to the lineage, by the genetic heritage, by wealth and by behavioural traditions (according to which concerns for outsiders are more or less valued)? Should not this dimension be examined in a part entitled “The role of the Christian family”? What could the Academy propose on this point?

The nature of solidarity within the family is spelled out concisely but with perfect clarity: “The relationships between the members of the family community are inspired and guided by the law of ‘free giving’. By respecting and fostering personal dignity in each and every one as the only basis for value, this free giving takes the form of heartfelt acceptance, encounter and dialogue, disinterested availability, generous service and deep solidarity. Thus the fostering of authentic and mature communion between persons within the family is the first and irreplaceable school of social life. ... In this manner ... the family forms the most efficient cradle of humanization and personalization of society” (43).

Lastly, the family must be open to social solidarity: “Families therefore, either singly or in association, can and should devote themselves to manifold social service activities, especially in favor of the poor, or at any rate for the benefit of all people and situations that cannot be reached by the public authorities’ welfare organization. In a special way the Christian family is called to listen to the Apostle’s recommendation: ‘Practice hospitality’ (Rm 12, 13)” (44).

4. Procreation

The demography of future generations will matter for them. This, of course, depends on the birthrate of present generations. How do the latter
interpret their solidarity duty in this respect? At least since the writings of
Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) and with particularly acute force during the
second half of the XXth century, this question often opposed the teaching
of the Catholic Church to intellectual trends which were less confident about
divine solicitude for mankind and more worried about demographic per-
spectives. This note is meant to present the Social Doctrine of the Church.
However, it will not totally ignore the changing diagnoses drawn in the past
from demographic projections. It will recall the choice of the Church for
life, before turning attention, first, to the duties of the husband and wife,
prior to those of public authorities.

“The Church firmly believes that human life, even if weak and suffering,
is always a splendid gift of God's goodness. Against the pessimism and self-
ishness which cast a shadow over the world, the Church stands for life: in
each human life she sees the splendor of that “Yes”, that “Amen”, who is
Christ Himself. To the “No” which assails and afflicts the world, she replies
with this living “Yes”, thus defending the human person and the world from
all who plot against and harm life” (Apostolical exhortation of John Paul II,
Familiaris consortio, 30).

On these grounds our colleague, Michel Schooyans, established a dis-
turbing diagnosis of the present situation. I am quoting him, translating
from the French: “Why do women have fewer children? Why is the popula-
tion growth rate decreasing? Why is the population aging? These phenome-
na are observed practically everywhere in the world. In some places, such as
Europe, they have the features of a crash. ... Applied to population, the word
crash calls to mind the rapid fall in fertility and natality. The very clear
decline of these indicators is a fairly new phenomenon. It is explained most-
ly by increasingly numerous interventions designed to control the transmis-
sion of life. The demographic decline assumes the form of a downfall, of a
wreck: if man tends to disappear, what is the future for the world? Why this
decline? Why this collapse? What consequences will follow?” (Le crash
Although beyond the subject of this note and at times disputed, this diagno-
sis should not be neglected.

In 1965 Gaudium et spes stressed the duties of husbands and wives in
the following words: “Parents should regard as their proper mission the
task of transmitting human life and educating those to whom it has been
transmitted. They should realize that they are thereby cooperators with the
love of God the Creator, and are, so to speak, the interpreters of that love.
Thus they will fulfil their task with human and Christian responsibility,
and, with docile reverence toward God, will make decisions by common
counsel and effort. Let them thoughtfully take into account both their own
welfare and that of their children, those already born and those which the
future may bring. For this accounting they need to reckon with both the
material and the spiritual conditions of the times as well as of their state in
life. Finally, they should consult the interests of the family group, of tem-
poral society, and of the Church herself. The parents themselves and no one
else should ultimately make this judgment in the sight of God” (50).

This formulation was confirmed in 1980 by Familiaris consortio, which,
quoting the Synod of Bishops held shortly before its publication, states: “This
Sacred Synod, gathered together with the Successor of Peter in the unity of
faith, firmly holds what has been set forth in the Second Vatican Council (cf.
Gaudium et spes, 50) and afterwards in the encyclical Humanae vitae, par-
ticularly that love between husband and wife must be fully human, exclusive
and open to new life (Humanae vitae, 11; cf. 9, 12)” (29).

The fact that a husband and wife are fully and exclusively responsible
for giving life is stressed as follows in the same exhortation: “Thus the
Church condemns as a grave offense against human dignity and justice all
those activities of governments or other public authorities which attempt to
limit in any way the freedom of couples in deciding about children.
Consequently, any violence applied by such authorities in favor of contra-
ception or, still worse, of sterilization and procured abortion, must be alto-
gether condemned and forcefully rejected. Likewise to be denounced as
gravely unjust are cases where, in international relations, economic help
given for the advancement of peoples is made conditional on programs of
contraception, sterilization and procured abortion” (30).

5. Education

The Social Doctrine seems to be quite complete about education in the
family but almost silent about other institutions, which are in charge of
teaching or contribute (positively or negatively) to education. However,
future generations will benefit or suffer from what they will have received
or not from these other institutions, which are playing an increasing role.
As regards family education, here are the main points of the Doctrine, taken
from the encyclical Familiaris consortio.

Parents bring their sons and daughters into life. “Hence, parents must be
acknowledged as the first and foremost educators of their children. Their role
as educators is so decisive that scarcely anything can compensate for their fail-
For it devolves on parents to create a family atmosphere so animated with love and reverence for God and others that a well-rounded personal and social development will be fostered among the children. Hence, the family is the first school of those social virtues which every society needs” (36).

“Even amid the difficulties of the work of education, difficulties which are often greater today, parents must trustingly and courageously train their children in the essential values of human life. Children must grow up with a correct attitude of freedom with regard to material goods, by adopting a simple and austere life style and being fully convinced that “man is more precious for what he is than for what he has” (37).

“Children must be enriched not only with a sense of true justice, which alone leads to respect for the personal dignity of each individual, but also and more powerfully by a sense of true love, understood as sincere solicitude and disinterested service with regard to others, especially the poorest and those in most need” (37).

“Education in love as self-giving is also the indispensable premise for parents called to give their children a clear and delicate sex education. ... Sex education, which is a basic right and duty of parents, must always be carried out under their attentive guidance, whether at home or in educational centers chosen and controlled by them” (37).

“The mission to educate demands that Christian parents should present to their children all the topics that are necessary for the gradual maturing of their personality from a Christian and ecclesial point of view” (39).

“The family is the primary but not the only and exclusive educating community. Man’s community aspect itself – both civil and ecclesial – demands and leads to a broader and more articulated activity resulting from well-ordered collaboration between the various agents of education. All these agents are necessary, even though each can and should play its part in accordance with the special competence and contribution proper to itself. ... But corresponding to their right, parents have a serious duty to commit themselves totally to a cordial and active relationship with the teachers and the school authorities” (40).

6. Teenagers and young adults

They still have much to receive from the older generations. Depending on what they receive, they will be more or less able to pass on what is valuable to younger generations. Moreover, many of these teenagers and young people are suffering from the disorders of our modern societies. In addition
to parents, society itself has duties to them. I am therefore surprised to see that their case is so little mentioned in the texts of the Magisterium.

On two occasions the Holy Father has referred to the problem in his messages for the World Youth Days. In November 1991, announcing the theme of the VIIth Day (Go into the whole world and proclaim the Gospel), the Pope wrote: “Everyone knows the problems which plague the environment in which young people live: the collapse of values, doubt, consumerism, drugs, crime, eroticism, etc. But at the same time every young person has a great thirst for God, even if at times this thirst is hidden behind an attitude of indifference or even hostility”. In August 1992, announcing the theme of the VIIIth Day (I came that they might have life, and have it to the full), he wrote: “Human existence has its moments of crisis and weariness, despondency and gloom. Such a sense of dissatisfaction is clearly reflected in much of today's literature and films. In the light of this distress, it is easier to understand the particular difficulties of adolescents and young people stepping out with uncertainty to encounter all the fascinating promises and dark uncertainties which are part of life. ... There are false prophets and false teachers of how to live. First of all there are all those who teach people to leave the body, time and space in order to be able to enter into what they call ‘true life’. ... Seemingly at the other extreme, there are the teachers of the ‘fleeting moment’, who invite people to give free rein to every instinctive urge or longing, with the result that individuals fall prey to a sense of anguish and anxiety leading them to seek refuge in false, artificial paradises, such as that of drugs. There are also those who teach that the meaning of life lies solely in the quest for success, the accumulation of wealth, the development of personal abilities, without regard for the needs of others or respect for values, at times not even for the fundamental value of life itself”.

The substance of these extracts does not seem to have been further elaborated. Indeed, young people themselves have hardly any responsibility in the bad features of the human environment in which they grow up. The papal messages in question aim rather to strengthen youngsters in their faith. A link, of course, exists between these extracts and the subject of section 9 below. But should not the Magisterium stigmatize more fully the neglect of important duties of which many parents, educators, teachers, writers, or people working for the press or the world of entertainment are guilty? For want of being able to do better, I shall just suggest that the issue should be seriously studied by the Academy.
A substantial literature certainly exists in the social sciences on the problems experienced by teenagers and young adults. A part of this literature is certainly relevant for our subject. I happen to know that Professor Eugenia Scabini, who teaches social psychology at the Catholic University of Milan, has devoted a large part of her research during the last decade to the set of topics that I just discussed. She could probably advise us.

7. Care of the elderly

The teaching of the Church speaks of the elderly in their relations with their families but hardly at all of income redistribution in their favour. Speaking below of the human environment we shall see that the welfare state was referred to in Centesimus annus only in Chapter V, where it is recognized as having “responded better to many needs and demands”, but where “excesses and abuses” are also mentioned. Laborem exercens seems to contain just one sentence in this respect, at the end of section 19, when a list of the social benefits to which workers are entitled is given: “the right to a pension and to insurance for old age and in case of accidents of work”. Should not the Church be explicit about the duties of the “indirect employer” in countries where social transfers are still scanty? Should she not be prepared to take a stand on the choices that will have to be made in Europe about the respective welfare of adults and of old people, when accelerated ageing of the population will impose some sacrifice on one or the other?

Section 27 of Familiaris consortio addresses the problem of the elderly in their families. First, one should observe that: “There are cultures which manifest a unique veneration and great love for the elderly … They continue to be present and to take an active and responsible part in family life … They carry out the important mission of being a witness to the past and a source of wisdom for the young and for the future. Other cultures, however, especially in the wake of disordered industrial and urban development, have both in the past and in the present set the elderly aside in unacceptable ways”.

The encyclical then declares that “the pastoral activity of the Church must help everyone to discover and to make good use of the role of the elderly within the civil and ecclesial community, in particular within the family”. It further quotes a speech by the Holy Father to the participants at the “International Forum of Active Aging” (5 September 1980, n. 5): “The life of the elderly … is a marvellous proof of the interdependence of the people of God. Old persons often possess the charisma to fill in the
generation gaps before they are created. ... How many among them have eagerly endorsed these divine words: ‘The crown of grand-parents is their grand-children’ (Pr 17, 6)!”.

8. Solidarity towards future generations – the physical environment

Centesimus annus (37) wanted to express the concern that the Church shares these days with many of our contemporaries about ecological questions. In order to address them the Church locates her diagnosis in her teaching on creation. “Man, who discovers his capacity to transform and in a certain sense create the world through his own work, forgets that this is always based on God's prior and original gift of the things that are. In this regard, humanity today must be conscious of its duties and obligations towards future generations”. Let us look more precisely at these teachings.

Genesis announces not only that nature was the result of divine action but also that man is the preferred agent of God for carrying forward creation (Gn 1, 26-31). It would be out of place to trace here the long history of human action in the transformation of nature. We shall rather acknowledge that acceleration in scientific and technical progress in modern times has made us overly confident about our capabilities and overly greedy, up to the point of making us seriously shortsighted.

“Man thinks that he can make arbitrary use of the earth, subjecting it without restraint to his will, as though it did not have its own requisites and a prior God-given purpose, which man can indeed develop but must not betray. Instead of carrying out his role as a co-operator with God in the work of creation, man sets himself up in place of God and thus ends up provoking a rebellion on the part of nature, which is more tyrannized than governed by him” (CA 37).

This aberration appears in particular when we consider changes in consumption habits, in relation to which the teaching of the Church has other reasons to be concerned: “A direct appeal is made to [man’s] instincts – while ignoring in various ways the reality of the person as intelligent and free – then consumer attitudes and lifestyles can be created which are objectively improper and often damaging to his physical and spiritual health” (36). And, as regards our present subject: “In his desire to have and to enjoy rather than to be and to grow, man consumes the resources of the earth and his own life in an excessive and disordered way” (37). Indeed, it is more and more clear that “natural resources are limited; some are not, as it is said, renewable. Using them as if they were inexhaustible, with absolute domin-
ion, seriously endangers their availability not only for the present generation but above all for generations to come” (SRS 34).

In addressing the ecological question, which duties should Christians feel bound to embrace? First, everybody should question their own behaviour and adopt a correct attitude: “that disinterested, unselfish and aesthetic attitude that is born of wonder in the presence of being and of the beauty which enables one to see in visible things the message of the invisible God who created them” (37).

The Church, moreover, asserts the principles which should underlie the pursuit of the common good. She has done this mostly when dealing with international questions – interdependence between nations appearing more and more in the most significant problems involved. She did this particularly in the encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis, where environmental questions appear as subsidiaries to those involving development. Section 35 states: “when the scientific and technical resources are available which, with the necessary concrete political decisions, ought to help lead peoples to true development, the main obstacles to development will be overcome only by means of essentially moral decisions”. Section 38 adds: “On the path toward the desired conversion, toward the overcoming of the moral obstacles to development, it is already possible to point to the positive and moral value of the growing awareness of interdependence among individuals and nations. ... It is above all a question of interdependence, sensed as a system determining relationships in the contemporary world ... accepted as a moral category. When interdependence becomes recognized in this way, the correlative response as a moral and social attitude, as a “virtue”, is solidarity. ... It is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all”.

Our Academy might, I believe, consider whether it might not introduce elements which could make the teaching of the Church more precise in relation to the choice of environmental policies, whether local, national or international. I mean those policies which, by their positive intervention or their neglect, will most affect the fate of future generations. Which “scientific and technical resources are available which ... ought to help lead people to” live in a satisfactory environment? And thanks to which “necessary concrete political decisions”?

Signs suggest that the Church would see no difficulty in explicitly placing this search in the continuation of some principles which are fair-
ly generally accepted today. Thus Father René Coste brings out eight principles which, according to him, should serve as “landmarks for an ethics of ecology (within the framework of the ethics of creation)” (pages 506 to 511). I quote in particular ethics of the future formulated as follows: “If we want that tomorrow will not always be already too late, anticipation must prevail over adaptation, the ethics of the future must get the better of the tyranny of urgency”. Likewise, he proposes the acceptance of two principles stated in the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (Rio, June 1994). The principle of precaution stipulates that in case of a risk of serious or irreversible damages the lack of absolute scientific certainty should not serve as a pretext for delaying effective measures aimed at preventing environment degradation (we might hesitate about the question of whether the principle should not rather say “in case of risk of serious and irreversible damages”). The polluter-payer principle stipulates that the polluter must, in principle, bear the cost of the pollution, with a concern for the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment (the meaning and intent of the last clause might be discussed).

9. Solidarity towards future generations – the social environment

Immediately after the paragraphs on ecology, Centesimus annus (38) stresses the importance of the social environment. “In addition to the irrational destruction of the natural environment, we must also mention the more serious destruction of the human environment, something which is by no means receiving the attention it deserves. ... Man is also conditioned by the social structure in which he lives, by the education he has received and by his environment. These elements can either help or hinder his living in accordance with the truth. The decisions which create a human environment can give rise to specific structures of sin which impede the full realization of those who are in any way oppressed by them. To destroy such structures and replace them with more authentic forms of living in community is a task which demands courage and patience”. Clearly the objective is a matter for intergenerational solidarity. Without repeating what was earlier said of the questions concerning the family, to which the encyclical directly turns, we shall consider here other teachings of the Church, which also bear on the slow construction of the social environment.

Gaudium et spes well defined the objective to be assigned to this construction. Section 63 states: “Man is the source, the center, and the purpose of all economic and social life”. Section 64 specifies: “Economic activity is to be carried on according to its own methods and laws within the limits of the moral order, so that God's plan for mankind may be realized”. Section 65 adds: “Economic development must remain under man's determination and must not be left to the judgment of a few men or groups possessing too much economic power or of the political community alone. ... Citizens, on the other hand, should remember that it is their right and duty, which is also to be recognized by the civil authority, to contribute to the true progress of their own community according to their ability”. Section 66 further specifies: “To satisfy the demands of justice and equity ... an end must be put to the tremendous economico-social disparities”.

In 1965 this objective already appeared rather demanding. Many in 2002 find it even more demanding. Hence the unescapable question: in what way are the economic and social structures of this world responsible for the fact that our societies find it so difficult to move toward an objective to which so many women and men seem to adhere? And this question was already posed before Rerum novarum. Fifty years ago a fairly large consensus prevailed in favour of structures which, while leaving ample room to the market economy, also gave important social responsibilities to the state. Those were the days of the construction of the welfare state, whose adequacy is today often questioned, at least as regards its methods. What is now the social doctrine of the Church on this issue?

Again, Centesimus annus provides the most embracing and recent formulation. I am not going to follow it closely here but rather to recall its main propositions. So doing I shall best exhibit the tensions between the terms of which decisions have to be taken by those who want to apply the Social Doctrine. Indeed, it is precisely in relation to these tensions that the elements brought by our disciplines could be most useful to the Church. Our attention must be geared mainly toward chapter IV, dealing with private property and the universal destination of goods, and chapter V, on the state and the culture.

Sections 30 to 35 mainly recall the principles set out in Rerum novarum about the natural character of the right to private property, subject, however, to the constraint of having regard for the common destination of goods (“God gave the earth to the whole human race for the sustenance of all its members, without excluding or favouring anyone” 31). These sections add two meaningful complements. The first emphasizes the value of the entre-
preneurial spirit and states that "the modern business economy has positive aspects" (32), but also points out "the risks and problems connected with this kind of process" with in particular new forms of inhuman exploitation (33). Secondly, the text later states: "Profit is a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not the only one; other human and moral factors must also be considered which, in the long term, are at least equally important for the life of a business" (35).

Section 42 takes a stand on capitalism. It poses the question: "Can it perhaps be said that capitalism is the victorious social system? ... Is this the model which ought to be proposed?" To which the answer is: "If by 'capitalism' is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative. ... But if by 'capitalism' is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality, and which sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and religious, then the reply is certainly negative".

After section 40, which states "It is the task of the State to provide for the defence and preservation of common goods such as the natural and human environments, which cannot be safeguarded simply by market forces", section 48 considers the role of the state in the economic sector: "Economic activity, especially the activity of a market economy, cannot be conducted in an institutional, juridical or political vacuum. ... The State has the further right to intervene when particular monopolies create delays or obstacles to development. ... In recent years the range of such interventions has vastly expanded, to the point of creating a new type of State, the so-called 'Welfare State'. This has happened in some countries in order to respond better to many needs and demands, by remedying forms of poverty and deprivation unworthy of the human person. However, excesses and abuses, especially in recent years, have provoked very harsh criticisms of the Welfare State, dubbed the 'Social Assistance State' '. The following texts in the encyclical partly accepts this criticism.

"The Church values the democratic system. ... Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of a correct conception of the human person" (46). "The Church respects the legitimate autonomy of the democratic order and is not entitled to express preferences for this or that institutional or constitutional solution. Her contribution to the
political order is precisely her vision of the dignity of the person revealed in all its fullness in the mystery of the Incarnate Word” (47).

Lastly, the social environment will depend on the culture that we pass on to future generations. Will we have contributed to valuing and enriching all the cultural wealth that we have received? Asking the question suffices to reveal its importance. Centesimus annus reminds us of this: “All human activity takes place within a culture and interacts with culture. For an adequate formation of a culture, the involvement of the whole man is required. ... Thus the first and most important task is accomplished within man’s heart. The way in which he is involved in building his own future depends on the understanding he has of himself and of his own destiny. It is on this level that the Church’s specific and decisive contribution to true culture is to be found. ... The Church renders this service to human society by preaching the truth about the creation of the world, which God has placed in human hands so that people may make it fruitful and more perfect through their work; and by preaching the truth about the Redemption, whereby the Son of God has saved mankind and at the same time has united all people, making them responsible for one another” (51). “For [peace] to happen, a great effort must be made to enhance mutual understanding and knowledge, and to increase the sensitivity of consciences. ... The poor – be they individuals or nations – need to be provided with realistic opportunities. Creating such conditions calls for a concerted worldwide effort to promote development, an effort which also involves sacrificing the positions of income and of power enjoyed by the more developed economies” (52).
PART II

A SOCIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
“INTER-GENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY”: A SOCIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE

PIERPAOLO DONATI

1. INTER-GENERATIONAL RELATIONS AS A GLOBAL CHALLENGE

1.1. The inter-generational challenge

At the beginning of the XXIst century, in many countries all over the world, families and children have come to face new dilemmas related to the lack of inter-generational solidarity and equity. While many old issues (such as family poverty, multi-problem families, etc.) persist, a new scenario of difficulties has appeared: the ceaseless worsening of generational relations. In what does this scenario consist?

“Generational issues” is a broad label under which it is common to subsume many interconnected social problems in the relations among generations. In what ways are they different today from in the past? Let me summarize them briefly:

- families are less and less committed to having children to an extent that overshadows the demographic transition from a traditional to a modern society; today, in some countries (e.g. Europe) even the model of the typical nuclear family with two children is at stake;
- owing to the socio-demographic shifts, more and more resources (in terms of social protection expenses) are devoted to older generations, while shares available to children are in danger; the present patterns of social expenditures among different age groups are confronted with a vicious circle syndrome: the more they give to the older, the less they leave to the younger;
- the fraction of the national income distributed to households with children, and thus the fraction of that income available for the raising of children, has declined quickly as the percentage of households with no children increases;
the cultural transmission from one generation to the other is losing ground; children and youth are increasingly isolated from the adults who constitute their principal socializing agents; primary social ties become more and more problematic in everyday life; families split up and are dispersed; children are confronted with a more dangerous social environment since risks of isolation, neglect, poverty, and even abuse are multiplied;

- national welfare states have set up many educational, social and health schemes for children, but at the same time it has become even more apparent that collective welfare arrangements, besides not being able to substitute the family, quite often do not work properly in favour of better exchanges between generations; in other words, social welfare systems have shown themselves as lacking a real orientation to the links between generations.

Put bluntly, in many countries it becomes apparent that children and younger generations appear as victims of adults and older generations under many social, economic, and cultural respects.

1.2. A new stage

It is not my task to analyse the above mentioned phenomena in detail here. I take them for granted. My aim is to suggest that we should have a careful look at what is happening between and within generations in the different countries taking into account the relations between families and governments.

In order to understand the historical discontinuities I am referring to, we can recollect that, generally speaking, the relations between families and governments have followed two typical patterns or stages.

a. In the first half of the twentieth century, national welfare states used to address families and children mainly in terms of social control: families were granted economic, legal and material provisions in exchange for men's control over women and children. Family rights embodied individual rights so that people (in particular children) suffered from bonds which were too compelling. Children's rights were greatly restricted: they were almost completely subsumed under the family coverage. In case of family failure, total institutions were delegated to pick up the children.

b. Since the second world war, national welfare states have, in a sense, reversed the previous pattern: they have acknowledged an increasing number of social rights and provisions for individuals and social categories (in particular women, handicapped people, old people, and children), but have left the family apart. The rights of the family as a social group and institu-
The evaluation of the positive and negative outcomes of these policies cannot be elaborated here, both because I have not enough room here and because this subject is already well documented (e.g. Dumon ed., 1989).

c. Nowadays many countries (particularly western countries) are entering a stage (or pattern) which is very different from the previous ones under many aspects.

On the one hand, the new trends contradict the old pattern (which used to be dominant until the end of the XX century) in so far as the family cannot be considered and handled as a social control agency which acts on behalf of the state: the family has acquired an increasing autonomy (autopoiesis) and is oriented towards managing its generational problems even more privately.

On the other hand, the new trends must differ from the old patterns in so far as it becomes clear that the multiplication of individual rights is only a partial solution. If we want to have a social environment which is more sensitive to children's needs, then we must give proper consideration to the repercussions that the lack of social support for families has on children.

1.3. In the perspective of the development of citizenship rights, the new issues revolve around the need for a better compatibility between individual and family rights: both kinds of entitlements must be secured, and the pursuit of this target should be done in such a way as to foster relations of social solidarity and equity between generations. If societies really want to pursue this goal, then families should become valid interlocutors of societal institutions and governments, at every level (regional, national, and supernational). This is, I believe, our topic. From the point of view of the development of families and children rights, the last decade has been one of lost opportunities. But, at the same time, it has been fruitful, since a new “generational” awareness has arisen and grown up.

1.4. This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I intend to sketch a profile of the main social needs of families and children emerging all over the world today in terms of intergenerational issues (pr. 2, 3).
The argument is that sociological research must recognize that families are a sub-system of society. In the second part, I argue that family needs can and should be solved with reference to the issue of “intergenerational solidarity (or equity)”, which has to be defined accurately (pr. 4, 5). In the conclusions (pr. 6), I contend that the present agenda and strategies of nation-States are not well suited to confront the issue of intergenerational equity, and I make some suggestions about the ways to overcome these deficiencies.

2. Where is the family going? Emerging social needs of families and children and the undertaking of political replies

2.1. What do families need?

It is of course impossible to synthesize here the very many empirical surveys and statistical research projects done on this broad subject matter (some of the most recent reports are listed in the final bibliography: Chouraqui, 1986; EEC Documents; Cornia ed., 1992; Donati & Matteini eds., 1991; Dumon, 1990; Moss, 1988; Oepfn, 1990; Qvortrup et al., 1991). What I can say, without going into detail here, is that societal changes occurring throughout the world are deeply affecting family structures and children conditions along with the following main trends:

- families go on splitting up (increasing the number of singles and one-parent families);
- families show a decreasing average size (mainly due to the decline in the birth rate);
- families are ageing (rise in the average age of households);
- families display worrying signs of psycho-social pathologies, both within the couple (separation and divorces) and towards children (violence, abuse, maltreatment, abandonment);
- families stick to a cultural process of privatization in their choices, feelings, and expectations, so that narcissistic and selfish orientations prevail on behaviours of internal solidarity and civic participation;
- the continuing existence of poor families is also striking; we can distinguish them into poor working families (low income strata) and under-class families (stemming from unemployment, lack of professional training - e.g. unskilled women -, irregular immigration and other factors excluding people from the regular labour market); but what is more
important is to observe that poverty is generally associated with particular family structures (such as one parent families and large families with many children).

By putting the emphasis on these trends I do not mean to claim that there have been no social advancements and no positive achievements. As a matter of fact a general and remarkable improvement of material living conditions has taken place in most countries in the last few decades. What I want to stress and thematise here is something which can be expressed in the form of the following questions: is the above depicted picture satisfactory in order to understand the deeper meaning of present changes? is this picture a plausible basis for a reliable sociological understanding of the situation and for a sound social policy?

On balance, I am afraid, the answers to these questions are negative. If one sticks with the above sketched portrait of the social conditions of families, then the list of needs becomes only an endless cahier de doléances which refer to:

- socially weak families (e.g. one parent families; families below the poverty line; underclass families with handicapped children, with unemployed or unskilled members, especially women; immigrant, socially isolated or non integrated families);
- and pathological families (e.g. severely ill, educationally inadequate or abusing families),

where children are stigmatised or are exposed to a wide range of risks.

If policies follow the logic of addressing single issues, they end up by formulating a long list of needs and priorities in which the family almost disappears, or at least is reduced only to a problematic object. This has been the dominant pattern followed until today.

The main shortcoming of this approach lies in the fact that the needs of families and children are formulated in a disconnected and patchy way. So are the replies, in terms of policies. One cannot clearly see the links between different wants and different persons as a malfunction in the exchanges between generations.

The descriptive approach I am referring to tells us only that, on the whole, societal changes have created deep imbalances among generations. It ends up by saying that many families find themselves in such a situation that they cannot deal with issues of generational solidarity and equity through the private sphere alone. This is of course true, but it is only one side of the coin. The other side says that families and societies have to mobilise in order to solve their problems.
The question: “what do families need?” should be given a reply which is very simple and extremely complex at the same time: families need to be fully recognised as families.

This perspective leads us to new observations. In particular it suggests that:

- (i) the living conditions of families depend on the complex of exchanges among generations: as we know that there are social bonds between genders that penalise women, so it is also now apparent that there are bonds between generations that penalise those who have children in respect to childless people;

- (ii) our society cannot discharge the filial debt (the aid of younger people to the older) on generations that are not generated; if the replacement of the population should go on at the depressed levels which have occurred in the last two decades, around the middle of the next century only a few social security systems will be able to assure a fairly good income level for the older generations;

- (iii) the social needs of families and children should be given new attention not only from the material point of view (lack of income, lodging, health) but especially from the relational point of view. The social needs of children cannot be managed either within the family alone nor by addressing them as a social category per se; they must be met by looking at the adequacy of the relationships between children and their everyday social environment. Welfare systems must operate on the network of social ties in which children live rather than on individuals.

If we want to have a more integrated and global picture of the issues at stake, we must consider the fact that most of the social problems arise when families do not perform their tasks as mediating structures linking together needs and persons in a proper way. This is the core issue at stake. One is led to the idea that it could be more productive to look at present social problems through a re-interpretation of family functions, and that such a perspective could also be more equitable and effective from the point of view of practical solutions, provided that families are helped by society to help themselves.

But is there something like “the family”? Is it not true that the family is seriously in crisis and that in many areas it is almost disappearing?

As a matter of fact the trends described above are, as a rule, decoded in that way. The most diffuse interpretations of the family condition all over the world quite often reveal two basic biases.

1. First, they contain an evolutionist reading of the family, as if it were bound to disappear, which is at least dubious (Lévi-Strauss, 1983).
II. Second, they reduce the family life cycle to the life course approach, treating families only as a provisional set of contingent individual careers, which is also an improper operation (Aldous, 1990). Of course the life span approach is a useful tool for looking at the dynamics of households, but it cannot substitute the family life cycle perspective.

2.2. After the crisis of the family

At this point, it becomes clear that we cannot give a significant answer to the issue of families’ and children’s needs unless we have a more precise idea of where the family is going.

Most literature on the so-called “crisis of the family” has made serious mistakes or has incurred plain misunderstandings: on the one hand it has overestimated the crisis, on the other hand it has underestimated it. The last decades have demonstrated that neither the theories asserting the “death of the family” nor the theories supporting the view of a supposed dominance of the “nuclear family model” have proved right. Neither theory fits empirical reality, nor are they useful for social policies.

Today it should be more evident than yesterday that the family has indeed faced a deep crisis, but this crisis must be interpreted adequately. Family changes have certainly been radical, but not in the sense that the family is going to disappear or lose its most relevant social functions. On the contrary, the family has proved to be an active subject: under many respects it is still a “latent” actor of society in so far as it precedes and exceeds it, i.e. “goes beyond it”.

Extrapolating the current phenomena within and around the family as if they were to move forward in a linear way over time could be not only wrong but also damaging. As Roussel rightly points out, if the “uncertain” family of the present age should become the dominant type, and if the family should therefore give up its institutional dimensions, then for the new generations there shall remain nothing more than a mere incitement to egotistical desires or to overt violence (Roussel, 1989).

From this angle, it becomes more and more urgent to re-read the meaning of family changes not only in a socio-cultural perspective (as a question of fashion, opinions, psychological feelings), but also as a social and political issue. The family must again and again be interpreted as a difference which makes a difference: in what ways is a family different from other social relationships and in what ways this difference is relevant today in comparison with the past?
If we place ourselves in such a perspective, the distinction between familiar/non-familiar becomes more and more, not less and less, relevant and meaningful: to have a family or not, to have a family which is competent or malfunctioning, to have a family with a certain living style or another, all these factors become more and more determinant in the life of children. The family as a social relation discloses itself as increasingly discriminating in respect to non-family relations.

Why, then, have many come to believe that just the opposite is true? The fact is that the family is exposed to a (seeming) paradox: it becomes less relevant and more relevant at the same time. This happens, of course, in different domains: the family becomes less important from the point of view of social order and control (it loses ground particularly in its relationships with the political-administrative system), while it increases its importance in the sphere of daily informal relations, particularly those which concern the health of children and their primary socialization.

If we adopt this perspective, it becomes clearer how and why governments have treated the family in an ambiguous way. For instance: many national reforms appeal to the family as a socializing agency of minors who are deviant or drop out, just when the family displays its deep difficulties in the education of children. The fact is that in order to understand these paradoxes we must avoid thinking of the family either in traditional terms or in terms of sheer subjective feelings.

These considerations do not lead us to an easy evaluation of the crisis of the family. Where is the family going? For a plausible answer, I believe, we are led to a perspective according to which we are witnessing a qualitative change (morphogenesis) in the forms of the family as a social group and as a social institution at the same time. In what does this morphogenesis consist? Briefly, I would like to describe it as follows.

2.3. How families change

The new needs of families and children must be spelled out and coped with in the context of two fundamental tendencies, which are ambivalent in themselves: (a) on the one hand they ask for more freedom, (b) on the other hand they need new regulations for the common good. Let us look at the two sides of the coin.

a) On the one hand the family is inclined to constitute itself on the grounds of more and more autonomous and individualised behaviours. As a social group the family is made up of people who are holders of individ-
ual rights (it can be called the “auto-poietic family”). This means that families tend to become normative for themselves; they tend to create their own structures by themselves. Seemingly this occurs on the basis of very individualistic behaviours. One says: the family becomes an interlacing of highly contingent individual life courses. In reality it is a new social order which emerges. Within it the family is at the same time looked for (as a sphere of humanization) and repressed (as a sphere of solidarity). The family, now conceived as a mere household, demands more autonomy from society, but if such autonomy does not encounter reasonable forms of co-ordination and social regulation it runs the risk of converting into isolation, breakdowns, and/or emargination of people.

b) On the other hand, the family activates new social demands which become a basic referral for welfare policies. From this point of view families manifest the exigency of assuming a new institutional role. They ask for many interventions which concretely regard:
- the need, for the couple, to live freely their fertility behaviours: they discover that our society limits the freedom of procreation only downward, i.e. only in a restrictive sense;
- the need to harmonise family life and work, and to solve this difficult issue through a legal, economic, and social equality between the sexes;
- the need for more social protection of socially weak people living in the family, as a consequence both of conjugal breakdowns and of critical events (illness, handicap, etc.);
- the need to reconcile family life and social services, leisure time, and civic participation (the schedule of shops, social facilities, schools for children, TV programs, and so on);
- the need for a fiscal treatment which can be equitable on the part of the state, and be arranged so as not to penalise those who willingly assume more responsibilities in favour of rearing children, and taking care of old and handicapped people;
- the need to strive against poverty without stigmatising the family itself, or its individual members;
- the need for welfare interventions which can take into full consideration the quanti-qualitative structure of family wants;
- the need for more support for those families who engage in enterprises of mutual help, self-help, volunteering, and cooperation, especially in the field of personal social services: this relates to the topic of the role of the family in community care;
- the need to have political representation in order to promote the rights of families as consumers and clients.
At the heart of all these new needs we find the fact that social policies have not addressed properly families’ and children’s conditions in so far as welfare policies:

- have stockpiled individual rights without upholding the family system as a solidarity network for the support of the person, as it is in reality (Dumon in Shamgar & Palomba eds., 1987);
- social security systems have not been designed according to the family life cycle (Gilliand, 1988);
- welfare expenditures do not take into account the need for a “logic of compatibility” between generations: generally speaking, they have devoted too much to the elderly and too little to children (Pampel & Stryker, 1990; Preston, 1984; Sgritta, 1991).

In synthesis: all over the world, on the one hand civil society has created a deep lack of continuity and even breaks among generations, and on the other hand both global markets (globalization processes) and public welfare policies have complied with these trends rather than trying to balance their inherent contradictions.

The main issue concerns the pursuit of a new, dynamic equilibrium between families and the other spheres of society (work; school; leisure; civic activities) taking into account the “generational variable”. We need a new dialogue between families and other social institutions inspired by full reciprocity and equity vis-à-vis the new generations.

This is particularly important in the so called “divided families”. It has been increasingly noticed that divorce is detrimental to children, particularly because of the fathers’ absence. At the same time, it is more and more recognised that large-scale changes in fathers’ behaviour is not likely to occur by simple modification of custody orders or improvements in child-support enforcement - or, really, by any measures addressed solely to absent fathers. Rather, what is required is a deeper and quite radical change in the way all fathers relate to their children. What is needed is a greater sense of shared responsibility and partnership in childrearing. Furstenberg and Cherlin (1991, p. 119) ask us: “can it happen?” They continue: “If women’s wages in the labour market approach men’s, women may have more leverage in negotiating shared parenthood in exchange for pooling incomes. But equality in earnings will also make it easier to be a single parent... Perhaps the best that we can expect is a family system with unions that are more egalitarian but less stable. Such a system might provide an improvement in family life for adults, but it would not be a clear improvement for children”.


I take this as an example of the fact that the new needs of families lead us to a new interpretation of its social role: families need first of all to be recognised as social subjects in themselves, as systems which provide their children with fully shared protection even in the case of family breakdown.

On a larger scale, this means that society should consider more carefully alternative ways of operating on the family: can society increase individual rights as mere individual entitlements or has it to treat individual rights in a relational manner, which implies structuring rights and entitlements so as to push people into being willingly co-operative with each other?

It is more and more evident that national welfare states (including the European countries) have not taken into account the generational unbalances and their long-term effects. Today there are many empirical evidences that public policies must now engage in this re-orientation.

3. Is there something like a "society of families"? Are families a subsystem of society?

3.1. Let me introduce quite a simple idea

In order to pass on from social needs to policy replies we must conceptualise the global issue at stake in a suitable manner. Whatever the definition of "the family" and of "family policy" (Dumon, 1987; Aldous & Dumon, 1990; Wisensale, 1990), one cannot speak of policies for families and children without having in mind an adequate representation of the role and functions that families as a whole perform for the entire society. In order to be effective, this representation should be based on a wide consensus.

Now, it is a legacy of the modern era to have differentiated our society into four fundamental sub-systems: the economy (with its markets), the political government (with its public administration), the associations (with their autonomous organisations) and families (with what? as far as I can see, I would like to reply: a specific welfare network linking formal and informal provisions and services).

Each one of these spheres has developed on the basis of its own symbolic code, with its own means, and has built up its own institutions, through a proper codification of rights and duties. When we speak of "national states" we refer to complex societal systems which are articulated on the premises of specific forms of social differentiation and integration among these four sub-systems.
From analogy, the construction of an integrated society must also make reference to the theory and practice included in such a representation. It has a long-standing and consolidated sociological tradition (fig. 1).

As many sociological studies have elucidated, the two sub-systems of the economic market (A) and the political government (G) have been the hinge of global modernization in the last two centuries. They are built upon their specific generalised means of exchange, namely money and law. The other two sub-systems, associations (I) and families (L), on the contrary, have been penalised. So has their own role in society, which is to foster social solidarity, reciprocity, and trust in what sociologists call the “daily life-worlds”.

A lot has been written about economy and governments; entire libraries. As a matter of fact, political and integration across countries, dif-
difficult as it may be, seems to be anyway easier than social and cultural integration between them. Given for granted that we can pursue to a certain degree the economic and integration of societies, what about the integration of the other two sub-systems (associations and families)?

The European Union is a good example. Within the above depicted framework, in Europe families run the risk of being treated as a mere reference for consumption and social assistance. European Social Charter, in fact, does not mention widely and explicitly the social rights of families, in particular with reference to the generational dilemmas. As we all know, the national governments have different attitudes in relation to family policies, and the principle of subsidiarity has been recognised and institutionalised – in a quite reductive way – as a principle which afford each nation-State to do its own family ad generational policies. At the beginning of the '90s, the setting up of a European Observatory on national family policies clearly indicated that the EU acknowledged the importance of the family as a social institution, while various measures and initiatives (particularly concerning child care facilities, adolescents commencing work life, poor children and migrant families) were forming the beginnings of a common framework for young generations' rights. It seemed, at that time, that social regulations in these field were becoming more and more inevitable. But the situation has deeply changed during the '90s. The European Observatory on national family policies has been reduced both in its ends and in its activities, while social regulations common to the national countries have been dismissed.

Now a question arises as to the latter two sub-systems (associations and families): what are their rights and duties? what is the citizenship accorded to them? To pursue a sound project of intergenerational solidarity means to accord a new strategic role to associations and families (Donati, 1987). As a matter of fact, we must admit that the “fourth sub-system” (families) is, in many regards, the least clear. It is not by chance that the sociological theory identifies it as the “latent sub-system” of the whole society (Donati, 1991, ch. 4). If governments can easily observe and guide the NGOs (Kaufmann et al. eds., 1986), this is much more difficult for families. But this is precisely why the challenge is interesting.

There is much rhetoric about families. They are mentioned in many documents, recommendations, laws, conventions, but we can hardly say that they are really recognised as a sub-system of society. On the contrary they are more often addressed as passive consumers, clients of social assistance, social “cells” which perform or do not perform the tasks that society
“delegates” to them. The appeals from the international associations speaking on behalf of families (see for instance the COFACE documents at the European level), clearly indicate all of this.

It is therefore an interesting theme to begin thinking in what sense and with what consequences families could and should be treated as a sub-system of the whole society.

3.2. What does it mean?

Families are a sub-system for the following main reasons.

a. Families perform a huge quantity of social functions which no state, no public administration, no market can “socialise”. Neither can these functions be “privatised”, in the sense of being considered a mere responsibility of private subjects, as sometimes governments do in order to reduce social expenses devoted to collective services.

b. Families certainly use the means of the other sub-systems (money, law, etc.), but they have their own means of communication and social exchange. We can think of social reciprocity within and between generations. Without such reciprocity there cannot exist trust and equity in society. It is the cultural basis of all our institutions. And it grows up inside the family before anywhere else.

c. In the end, families are the social location of those dimensions of generational equity which cannot be assumed by any other actor in society. It does not admit any functional equivalent.

3.3. What does it imply?

Recognising that families are a sub-system of society implies the need for more social regulations, but at the same time a peculiar form of regulation which can allow families to become a social movement and act as a “social subjectivity”. Present advanced industrial societies cannot avoid creating a more attentive policy towards the sub-system of families for the simple reason that what happens within it has many deep repercussions in all the other sub-systems (the labour market, the social security system, the organisation of social services at large) (Donati, 1990/b).

It is a traditional attitude of national governments not to enter into the private sphere of the family. One must certainly respect this stance, which guarantees a legitimate sphere of autonomy for people. But, on the other hand, society cannot abstain from regulating those social structures
and behaviours from which many social problems stem, such as child neglect and abuse, the abandonment of the elderly, and so on (Hantrais & Letablier, 1996).

The problem is: how do governments intervene within the family domain? After policies are decided, who will implement them? What is the role of public bureaucracies vis-à-vis family networks and associations? Do public agencies behave as intruders or enablers?

It is certainly true that families, as I have already said, are accentuating their private features. But if our analysis stops here it will be incomplete and biased. In reality, families are also subject to an increasing process of “publicisation”, which is inevitable and necessary to ensure social justice in the public realm. The seeming paradox of a double process of “privatisation” and “publicisation” of the family is yet to be understood (Donati, 1990/a). But we cannot have any doubt about the fact that it is happening. The crisscrossing of what is considered to be private and what is public in the family grows inevitably.

The main problem is not to recognise that families are more and more important at the public level, but to understand why this importance expands in a latent, unrecognised way. Thinking that families are only a “cultural survival” or mere “private business” is a big mistake, both from a sociological and from a social policy point of view.

Briefly, to contend that, in society at large, families constitute a sub-system means making it clear that they have something in common, and that this commonwealth has precise societal functions which do not admit any functional equivalent. If this is true, then this sub-system should get - as such - an adequate symbolic representation and an explicit full citizenship for itself and for its members. It is of the utmost importance that such recognition be in line with the solution of what is mostly at stake: generational equity.

4. A NEW FRONTIER: THE STRUGGLE FOR INTER-GENERATIONAL EQUITY

If the arguments presented so far are reasonable, then it is right to claim that policies for family and children are becoming more and more a question of equity between and within generations. It is therefore particularly important to clarify what “generational equity” means. To my mind, generational equity has different meanings, and also different spheres in which it may or may not be achieved.
a) There are at least three different dimensions to be distinguished.

(i) Equity between generations in the use of resources available to copresent different age groups at a given time.

Strictly speaking, generational equity means allocating the available resources according to criteria of justice in the way that the shares are distributed to the various age groups. For instance: how much is given to children in comparison with what is given to adults and the elderly?

For the best solution of these issues it is necessary to adopt two basic criteria: first, the adoption of rules of compatibility (what is given to one generation, e.g. old people, must be in balance with what is given to another, e.g. children); second, the adoption of measures that can result in non-zero sum games: in other words, measures which can create other resources by stimulating help, solidarity, and co-operation given by one generation to another.

Inherent to this concept is the fact that it concerns not only the present time, but also the future. What we do now to the younger generations has repercussions on what they will be able to do in the near future.

(ii) Equity between generations in the transfer of resources from one generation to the next.

We have to analyse the generational impact: what a generation leaves to the following one and how it affects its life chances. The impact has, of course, cultural aspects (in terms of values, norms, and styles of life which are transmitted to the younger generation), psychological aspects (adults can give more or less trust and sense of security to their children), economic aspects (older generations can leave a greater or lesser share of work, greater or lesser resources of social security, larger or smaller shares of assets), ecological aspects (one generation can leave a more or less polluted environment, and more or less natural resources).

In a broader sense, then, generational equity means investing in the new generations so as to equip them adequately in order to meet the challenges they will have to cope with, taking into account how much the preceding generation has consumed and therefore the problems of scarcity which are transferred to the future.

For the solution of these problems it is necessary that the ratio between what is presently produced and consumed be positive.
(iii) Equity within a newborn generation.

It concerns the treatment of newborn people in relation to the generational “charge” assumed by their own family of orientation. Since each family contributes in a different way to the reproduction of society, *coeteris paribus*, there is a difference between growing up in a family as an only child and growing up as the brother or sister of another child or other children. This factor means different opportunities for any social achievement.

In this sense, generational equity concerns the exigency of eliminating or compensating for the disadvantages which derive from the fact of being reared in a family which has a different generational load in respect to other age peers.

If we do not take this dimension into consideration, then the public and private transfers end up by heavily discriminating on children: some of them will be privileged while others will be condemned to the so-called cycle of deprivation as a result of their parents' generational choices.

Public policies must be inspired here by two main guiding criteria. Firstly, minors should all have the same opportunities of access to social entitlements independently of their family composition and standard of living. Secondly, childless families (childless people, and even firms) should pay something more for families who have children. At least taxation systems should benefit families with children in respect to childless families more than occurs today.

b) Beside the three dimensions sketched above, one must consider the different social spheres where the issues of generational equity are (or should be) managed: the private sphere (families and “social private” networks) and the public sphere (state and markets).

In the past, most of the transfers were handled within the kinship, a fact which has contributed to a high degree of social inequality. Today, society mediates these transfers to a greater extent. But are these operations really in line with the pursuit of generational equity?

Many research results say that this is not the case. The redistribution operated by the state can be, sometimes, even worse. Or, in any case, it might well be that it does not reach the goals of a real generational equity in the three above specified dimensions.

Usually this happens because public redistribution (to poorer families) and transfers (schemes of social security) are not tuned to the family composition and its position in its life cycle.
In order to see the whole picture of the generational equity issue, I will sketch a figure (fig. 2) which we should consider carefully.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of generational equity as:</th>
<th>Spheres for the management of intergenerational solidarity (equity):</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. redistribution of resources between co-present generations</td>
<td>public (1. family and 2. primary networks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>private (3. state and 4. regulated markets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. ratio between present consumption and investment in future generations</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>iii. equality of opportunity for the newborn in relation to the generational charge assumed by the families in which children are born</td>
<td>b</td>
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Fig. 2. Dimensions and relational spheres which define the issues of intergenerational solidarity (equity).

If we pay attention to the six cells of fig. 2, many interesting questions arise. At the present state of social research we can answer only a few of them.

a. How efficient are families in the redistribution of resources between co-present generations? It seems that this is the most important function
that families perform, and there is evidence that they still do it quite well when they stay intact. This becomes an issue where families split up.

b. How efficient are states and markets in the redistribution of resources among copresent generations? We do not have good research findings on these topics. They must be left to future investigations.

c. What is the present ratio between consumptions and investments in future generations within the family? Recent research shows that, in most countries, families save less and less money. But, due to the restrictions in fertility, in the short run they can invest more on fewer children. In this way, anyhow, they transfer to the collectivity the costs of a private gain, since they have contributed less than others to the reproduction of society.

d. What is the present ratio between consumptions and investments in the future generations on the part of state and markets? This is a very complex question which cannot have a well-documented answer. We need more investigation.

e. Do families succeed in assuring equality of chances to their children vis-à-vis their different composition (number of children)? Empirical surveys show that this is not the case.

f. Does the state succeed in assuring equality of chances to children vis-à-vis the different composition (number of children) of their families? Some success has been achieved, but a lot has still to be accomplished. The last question: “do markets succeed in assuring equality of opportunities for children vis-à-vis the different composition (number of children) of their families?” has a clearly negative reply.

The conceptual framework I have put forward here can at least be useful in assessing the issues at stake and in promoting new investigations which can help in pushing the envisaged change towards more equity.

5. SOCIAL POLICIES: UP-DATING THE AGENDA AND LOOKING FOR SOUNDER AND MORE EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES

5.1. Up-dating the agenda

Only very recently national governments have put families and children on its agenda. The spirit of this agenda is clearly to help families in performing their functions. Most governments today explicitly recognise the need for new interventions in order to improve family life. These interventions are devised in many different and well articulated fields, in particular:
women’s condition and motherhood; income and social security, particularly in cases of broken and at risk families; child-care services and provisions.

In the light of what I have claimed so far, all of these goals are certainly very important and relevant. However, one can wonder whether there is a global design and adequate strategies behind them. The envisaged measures are undoubtedly needed, but they could be insufficient in the long run for managing the issue of generational equity. We are always exposed to the risk of being behind the times. Up-dating the agenda means, in fact, to grasp the novelty of a situation, its discontinuities and the wider scenario it reveals.

5.2. In the long run, the global design to be pursued must aim at creating those social conditions which can allow families and children to master an increasingly risky environment. This design can be sketched in terms of general goals to be pursued and of the strategies they require.

5.3. As to the general goals, they can be devised as follows

- The reform of social security systems according to the family life cycle. As it has been shown by many national experiences (see Vella ed., 1990), social security systems are never indifferent to family and child needs: they always reward or penalise them. Social security schemes must be designed with more flexibility so as to adapt to the differential load families have in the different stages of their life cycle, with respect to the number and social conditions of their members.

- A bigger investment in new generations. Families seem to invest less and less in new generations. Some nation-states have picked up this task increasingly, but without an explicit policy. It is nowadays more and more evident that, if they want to survive, governments must assume more responsibility for what one generation leaves to the next in terms of public resources, taking into account not only the economic, but also the cultural, social, and ecological dimensions of generational transfers. So far a few researches have been done on this topic (Modell, 1989).

- Real freedom of choice in having babies. To rebalance the ratio among generations means putting families in the condition to have a number of children close to the replacement level. The point is not to adopt pro-natalist policies in the spirit of incrementing the population, but to take up policies oriented towards more social justice. Apart from the fact that incentives in favour of pro-natalist policies would have min-
imal effects, the problem is basically to fill the gap between the number of children that couples really have and the number of children they would like. With high probability, this means bringing the fertility ratio up to about 2.1 children per woman; but this is not easy. For instance, in Italy, to elevate the fertility rate from the present level (1.2 children per woman) up to 1.8 would mean that about 30% of all women should have a third child, which is a very difficult and costly target.

5.4. In order to pursue these goals it is necessary to develop consistent public strategies. The latter can be outlined as follows.

- The structuration of welfare interventions along family lines. If we recognise that the welfare state cannot substitute parents' responsibilities, then its main task is to sustain them through collective arrangements which are adequate for the peculiarities of family life. In a sense, the whole social organisation should not only pay attention to family needs, but be structured according to them. Consequently, we need strategies which are able to enhance time-to-care measures (e.g. parental leave, etc.), family designed services in educational settings, personal social services and health settlements, and more generally the familisation of welfare packages (home care, etc.) even when the request for help comes from an individual alone.

- The interplay between formal and informal services through a community care policy. Statutory and informal aid are not to be seen as opposites or substitutes, but, on the contrary, as complementary and operating together: the key idea is to foster networks linking together primary groups and public services according to co-operative styles of intervention.

- The development of social organisations (NGOs) mediating the linkages between families and political authorities (local/regional, national, supranational). This means the fostering of family-based voluntary organisations, cooperatives, mutual and self-help groups, associations, and so on, provided that they are able to perform intergenerational solidarity.

- Intersectorality in social policies. Policy measures should link together different sectors of intervention in meeting different needs (economic, social, educational, health, etc.).

- The adoption of policy styles inspired by what as been called “relational guidance”, which means involving families, both as individual entities and as collective (i.e. associated) bodies, in designing plans of intervention.

The emerging idea is that social policy is not integrated simply because it has its “centre” in the state, but because it is able to grasp the needs of
people's life-worlds and to cope with them by focusing on the family as a unit of primary services in the community.

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1. In the last few decades, most countries have adopted policies for families and children which have been largely implicit, indirect and fragmented (sectorialised). The result has been a deep worsening of intergenerational relations.

Today national welfare states cannot get any improvement if they do not recognize that families must be helped to understand and cope with the problems of intergenerational solidarity and equity on a large scale and in the long run. We are in need of a new global rationality for the whole society.

Social policies aimed at solving the social problems of particular family forms (socially weak, at risk, and pathological families) are missing this perspective. It becomes therefore more and more relevant to design and implement a framework for social policies addressing all families, i.e. the family conceived as a social relationship of full reciprocity between genders and between generations. This approach does not deny the necessity of supporting, through specific additional regulations, people who choose different living arrangements.

6.2. This idea implies what I would like to call the search for a new post-industrial citizenship.

a. A new citizenship for children (rights and duties). Children must be recognised as active subjects who become more and more aware of their social condition and must be given earlier and earlier the opportunity to speak with their own voices, and assume their own responsibilities, in the family as well as in schools and welfare institutions (personal social services, courts, and so on).

b. A new citizenship for families (rights and duties). We must recognise that the family has its own rights to be and act as a solidarity group linking generations over time (P. Donati 1998). Such a recognition should be inspired by values of equity between generations. This implies, among other things, that governments shall aid all couples willing to have babies to have them effectively, to enjoy the social rights connected with this goal (lodging, minimum income, education, health, social security) and to see
these rights as human and political rights, and not as charity or political “grants”.

The shifting from industrial to post-industrial citizenship means that our societies must recognise that, for children and families, social entitlements are a question of human dignity and social solidarity, not a consequence of their position with reference to the labour market or a result of political lobbying or the actions of pressure groups.

The building up of modern societies has so far been based upon an interplay between the state and the economic market. Such an interplay has favoured a process of modernisation which has contributed to the betterment of material and living conditions, but it has at the same time strongly penalised local communities, primary social networks, and also family life. Today it is important to acknowledge that such a project needs a cultural basis. The argument I have tried to present is that this basis may consist in a caring culture oriented towards the fulfilment of people’s rights as they concretise in their daily life-worlds.

The premise for this fundamental shift of focus lies in the acknowledgement that human well-being is not an individual or collective condition abstracted from the concrete community we live in, but a relational process of mutual reciprocity between Ego and Alter in any field and at any level of social interventions. It starts in the family. “Intergenerational solidarity” signifies all of this.

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PART III

THE FAMILY AND THE STATE
One of the major problems that today worries the Church and religious communities is the crisis of the family, which has important consequences for society and its institutions.

As we know, the family is a domestic church. It is, equally, the cell of society. Cicero defined the family as ‘the beginning of the city and almost the nursery of the state’ (‘principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae’) and St. Thomas Aquinas observed that the family and society arise ‘ex ipsa natura rei’, from the very nature of man.

The social doctrine of the Church, indeed, centres around a recognition of man as a person taken in all his dimensions, a recognition from which emerges the principle of the ‘subjectivity of society’.

How is it that this principle, even more than being not applied, is actually denied by contemporary society? A scientific analysis of the consumer society in which we live allows us to understand the causes of this phenomenon, which has had repercussions not only for man and society but also for the environment itself, creating the ecological problem at a world level.

Consumerism, which is an idea that underlies contemporary society, has broken down the dimensions of man. As a result, such dimensions have not been seen in a unitary way. In other words, man is seen in terms of his separate dimensions, of stagnant compartments. There are sociologists who have observed this separation and have argued that the family has ceased to be the cell of society and has become reduced to being merely a cell of the individual. The social functions that were previously performed by the family, or in some way were linked to the family, have in large measure been absorbed by the state and separated from the family itself.
The problem thus becomes a basic problem: what is the relationship between the family and the state? The problem is not only theoretical and abstract in character, but also practical and concrete. It is no longer the state that revolves around the family, but the family that revolves around the state.

A kind of Copernican revolution has taken place with consumer society where the state is the sun and the family is the earth. I might say that consumer society has introduced a state-centred approach that has taken the place of the family-centred approach. In other words, the state has gradually occupied the space which is specific to the family. This revolution has involved the denial of the principle of subsidiarity which was expounded by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno.

The higher society, that is to say the state, rather than helping the lower societies, conditions them or even replaces them.

From this point of view, the phenomenon that I have called ‘the proletarianisation of families’ has grown up and become strengthened. Through high fiscal pressure, the state has in fact impeded the family from independently performing its functions, and, in any case, from being able to influence the social functions that the state has allocated to itself.

The welfare state is the state that has superimposed its organisation on the organisation of society, which has not been able to develop around the family. But by now the results are more than evident. The welfare state is in crisis throughout the industrialised West. Paradoxically, the family, afflicted and conditioned, has in some way to make up for the growing dysfunctions of those social services administered by the state. The phenomenon of voluntary work, and more in general of the third sector, which is spreading widely, are concrete proof of what has taken place and is taking place.

I could argue that voluntary work is based upon an inverted principle of subsidiarity. The lower society, which absolutely does not have to hand the means that the state does, and which in addition does not have a suitable organisation, must make up for the inefficiency and the gaps of the higher society – the state. This latter does not keep the promises that it makes, especially and above all else during electoral campaigns.

The real and authentic principle of subsidiarity, which by now has become fundamental, requires the hitherto denied recognition of the subjectivity of society. This is a point on which the social encyclicals of John Paul II lay great stress. A dual subjectivity springs from the nature of man: from his individual nature there arises individual subjectivity, and from his social nature there arises social subjectivity.
Social subjectivity can be recognised only if the social subjects are recognised, beginning with the first and most important social subject—the family. What John Paul II says in his Letter to Families on the subject is extremely important and significant: 'the family is more a subject than any other social institution: more so than the nation or the State, more so than society and international organizations. These societies, especially nations, possess a proper subjectivity to the extent that they receive it from persons and their families'.

A question at this point becomes spontaneous and immediate: why has the family ceased to be seen as a subject? If, in fact, the family has ceased to be a subject, then society as well can no longer be seen as a subject. One thus explains, in an irrefutable way, why the state has occupied society by taking on tasks that could have been performed better by the so-called lower societies.

Let us try, therefore, to explain why and how the family has lost its subjectivity and thus why and how it has ceased to be the radiating centre of all the social fabric. If we analyse, albeit only in summarising from, the historical evolution that has marked the move from the extended family to the nuclear family, we realise what has taken place.

We can identify three stages in this historical process. The first stage is that of the extended family, where the family as a productive unit exercised all its functions in its own context. For this reason, I term the extended family the multi-functional family. Within this family, in other words, most of its functions were carried out: the function of production, professional education and training (childhood overlapped with apprenticeship), and the various forms of care provided to the individual. For this reason, the extended family was seen as the cell of social organisation.

Its extension, therefore, did not involve solely the aggregation of the various nuclear families but also the performance of its functions within the context of the family itself.

The second stage took place with the formation of the nuclear family, which, however, should not been seen as being solely the fruit or the product of the process of industrialisation and urbanisation, even though it came into being with certain characteristics during that historical period. This family was no longer a productive unit, although it nonetheless main-

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Footnote: 
1 For these questions and others addressed in this paper, see P.L. Zampetti, La sovranità della famiglia e lo Stato delle autonomie. Un nuovo modello di sviluppo (Rusconi, Milan, 2nd. edn. 1997).
tained an economic function. It was, in fact, a consumption unit. The choice of the consumption of goods took place freely and responsibly within the context of the family. In one way or another, the family conditioned the very production of goods, precisely because the choice and thus the consumption of the goods themselves were its responsibility, and this was a choice that was connected to its function, its culture and its style of life.

The market, indeed, is in large measure dominated by the choices made by families. Savings themselves are still today called ‘family savings’.

The final stage in the evolution of the family was born with consumer society. In this kind of society, despite appearances to the contrary, the family ceased to exist as a unit of consumption. Society, as this appellation bears out, and no longer the family, became the real consumption unit.

The production and consumption of goods now take place outside an effective and authentic decision-making process of the family.

In consumer society, a radical overturning of the process of the consumption of produced goods takes place. It is no longer the families, through their choices, that freely and responsibly allocate their own income to savings or consumption. On the contrary, consumption comes before production. Before producing goods there is a prior decision about how much families should consume, thereby conditioning, if not indeed replacing, their very choices. The system replaces the family, gains possession of the interior of man and thus of the nuclear family, and exploits them. After a certain fashion, man loses his privacy, his autonomy. Privacy, which was considered a conquest of the modern family, is taken away from it. This is why the family is a function of society. But it is precisely for this reason that as a family it breaks down.

When the family has ceased to be a consumption unit it has also ceased to exercise its influence on the economic system and thus on society itself.

An authentic earthquake has taken place in the relationship between the family and society. Consumer society, through the manipulation of advertising in the mass media, has penetrated the family and changed its ways of living.

The culture of the family has ceased to be the culture of society.

It is the culture created by the structures of society that has been gradually transformed into the culture of the family. In this way, it is no longer the family that injects values into society but the structures of consumerist society that inject anti-values into the family.

The marriage unit itself has been negatively affected by the permissiveness that has been formed and spread within the whole of society. First
divorce and then abortion can be traced back to the process of secularisation produced by the consumerist approach.

The crisis that afflicts the contemporary family is thus a consequence of:
1. the transformation of society into consumer society;
2. the manipulation of the family effected by consumer society itself.
This manipulation has as its goal the expansion of consumption regardless of quality of life.

The family in consumer society thus marks the end of the family/unit of consumption tandem, an end that coincides with the power of society to absorb the family through the extension of the structures of consumer society to the family fabric.

It is interesting at a scientific level to analyse the socio-economic path that was followed to achieve this result. We must go back and analyse the way in which the United States of America overcame the depression of the 1930s, which could have meant the end of the whole capitalist system, thereby fulfilling the prediction of Marx, who had posited its collapse.

A reduction in consumption and a contemporaneous stagnation in production were registered at that time.

Now, it was the reduction of consumption caused by the family which marked the move from pre-consumerist capitalism to consumerist capitalism, thereby demonstrating clearly that the family cannot be reduced, as some sociologists would have it, to being the cell of the individual. The social and economic dimensions of the family were exploited and artificially transformed. In order to avoid this, the socio-economic dimensions of the family should be guaranteed and promoted in their naturalness.

The consumption and savings of the family in their naturalness must equally be connected with investments in a form that has still to be established. For example, through their allocation to pension funds or severance pay funds. This would allow families to influence the very system of the production of goods.

The family and the economy are interdependent because the dimensions of man are interdependent.

The taking away of choices about consumption from the family by the structures of society would not have taken place if the decisions about investments had not first been taken away, albeit within the limits allowed by capital formation on the part of families themselves.

Precisely when analysing the family and its structures, we realise that the economy and ethics are deeply connected. The ethics of capitalism are connected to a certain extent with the ethics of family virtues.
With the disappearance of family virtues because of permissiveness, capitalism itself as an economic system went into crisis. The capitalism that arose with the virtue of savings went into crisis with the permissiveness of consumer society, which, indeed, undermined the very foundation of capitalism. This is why the subject of the relationship between ethics and the economy has once again come to the fore.

We should, however, observe that ethics can re-enter the economy, above all else through the defence of the institution of the family. With permissiveness and the denial of the commandments, the family cannot regain its lost role. We must, therefore, change those mechanisms of the economy that have brought about this fall in values. Specifically beginning with family structures, new economic structures can be born which will radically change both the structure of the economy and the organisation of society, thereby creating a model for development that is totally new.

We must first of all stress that in the consumerist model of development, society ends up by being considered a part of the economy, rather than the economy being seen as a part of society.

Economic mechanisms, in symbiosis with socio-political mechanisms, have worked deeply for the decay of the family, and with devastating effects that will be extended to other economies given the globalisation of the economy.

It is on the model of development that we must therefore concentrate our attention. The following question has been raised at all levels for some time: ‘is development sustainable?’ A conference of the United Nations was held on this subject in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, a conference concerned with the development of the environment. The right to development and the right to the environment even came to be seen as human rights.

‘Human beings’, declared the first principle of the declaration that was drawn up at the end of the proceedings of the conference, ‘are at the centre of sustainable development’.

The analysis that I have carried out on this problem has clearly demonstrated that the opposite is the case. Thus, how can one place human beings at the centre of development and at the same time declare that the right to development and the right to the protection of the environment are human rights of a kind such as to ensure ‘a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature’?

Before addressing these problems, it seems to me advisable to emphasise that one cannot speak about the rights of man without first talking about the man of rights.
The separation of the dimensions of man perpetrated by the contemporary model of development, understood solely as economic development, has hindered, and still hinders, man in his ontic nature from becoming a subject of development.

This can come about only if man can be considered in the totality and uniqueness of his dimensions, from which spring human rights themselves. In other words, development can become complete only if man is considered in the completeness of his dimensions.

Now, such completeness is manifested only in the family, in which the unity of the dimensions of man is realised – the economic, ethical, social, religious, political and biological dimensions. It is for this reason that John Paul II has argued that every social and political institution ‘possesses a proper subjectivity precisely to the extent that it receives it from persons and their families’.

From the subjectivity of the family follows the recognition of the autonomy of the family and the restitution of the economic and social functions that have been taken away from it.

From this point of view, the family demonstrates that it is a real and true producer of wealth that is not only material wealth but also moral wealth.

This is also because the transformation now underway in capitalism requires an enlargement rather than a narrowing of the ethical basis on which capitalism itself rests. In other words, the relationship between ethics and capitalism takes place on new and different bases.

Such capitalism shares only its name with traditional capitalism. This is a capitalism linked to man as such – it does not concern only his material resources, but also, and even more, his intellectual and moral resources.2

At this point there is a deep interaction between the formation of man within the context of the family and the formation and accumulation of the knowledge of man within the context of school institutions. This interaction requires an organic connection between the family, schools, work and companies. In particular, there must be deep co-operation between the family and schools in order to achieve an integral formation of human capital.

For these reasons, the domestic virtues of savings are no longer enough to create the ethical foundation of capitalism, as happened during the period of its initial formation. These are virtues, for that matter, which have in the main

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2 On this point I refer the reader to my recently published volume: Partecipazione e Democrazia completa. La nuova vera via, chapter VIII: 'La trasformazione del capitalismo e la valorizzazione dell'uomo e della società'.
disappeared or have been even penalised by consumerism, which privileges consumption for consumption's sake, thereby corroding the virtues and manipulating the interior of the family. Today, all the family virtues are directed towards creating the foundation of the new capitalism, which is able to overturn the structures of consumerist capitalism, which, in turn, breaks down the family. To conclude, the new model of development centres around the integration of the family, the economy and ethics, which allows the unification of all the dimensions of man who has become a subject. This unification takes place within the context of the family community.

It is evident that such a community becomes the driving motor of civil society, which is thus transformed into an organised community.

In this new perspective, the role of the mother of a family in the formation of the human person is of determining importance. I would say that specifically in the new society, with its needs which are today growing, man in his complex personality is becoming increasingly relevant. The term 'personality', obviously enough, refers to the concept of person. And the first formation of the person, and thus of his personality, takes place precisely within the domestic walls. Let us consider the concepts of work and capital. They are not abstract notions. They cannot even exist on their own. They must be referred to man. We thus need to speak in the new society of the man of work and the man of capital. Work and capital find their synthesis in interiore homine, specifically because they have as a basis the educational and moral, intellectual and spiritual, formative process.3

In other words, productivity itself is connected to the formation of human capital and to the dedication of man, which are due to his personality, which is formed in the family.

Hence the role of the woman in the home who is the soul of family life and must see herself, as has been observed, as the lady of the home itself, emerges in all its importance. She has the role of an educator, a teacher, and if she so thinks fit, even of an evangeliser.

The work of women, which is expressed in the concept of 'domestic education', also has an economic meaning because it allows the performance of work by the husband outside the family. Domestic work, quite apart from the activity that a woman may perform outside the family, without, however, abandoning her role, is also a part of the economic

3 I would like to observe that in his Encyclical Laborem exercens, John Paul II speaks about Christ as a 'man of work' and this allows us to see 'work as a participation in the work of the Creator' (see nn. 25-26).
function of the family. The family is increasingly called upon – as has been demonstrated – to engage in bureaucratic activities which connect the family and its component parts to other social institutions (from schools to the state) which are necessary to the sound working of the overall forms of economic organisation.

Schools, which provide instruction, can achieve more valid results if adolescents and young people are followed in their choice of institutions and in the constancy of their commitment by their own families. In particular, the mother of the family must be placed in a condition to be the lady of the family who forms the interiors of her children and follows them in a discreet way in their school activity as well. Women have an essential function in the nuclear family, a function that has repercussions for society itself. They contributes, in fact, to forming human capital in a determining way.

It seems to me evident that the work performed by the mothers of families is productive work. In an organised community, therefore, their work must be paid.

A German economist argued during the last century that while the raising of pigs is a productive form of upbringing, the upbringing of children is not productive. Nothing could be more false. Today, society, with its needs, demonstrates exactly the opposite. A specific consequence follows. For the mothers of families who wish to dedicate themselves to domestic work, a suitable payment for their valuable activity should be envisaged. A recognition of the productiveness of such work involves a revision of the statistics which refer to the number of employed and unemployed people. Mothers of families are excluded from these data because of their decision to dedicate themselves to both part-time and full-time domestic work.

Work thus acquires a much larger spectrum than the existing one because such work springs from the very person of man in his unity, a unity of the person that is also projected onto the unity of capital and work. This thesis that I am advancing and developing here is all the more important when one thinks that it is favoured by the new economy, which is centred around intellectual capital. Let us not forget that the intellect is a faculty of the human spirit, that it defines man as man. We cannot, therefore, conceive of the extrapolation of the intellect from man, in whom it is deeply rooted. And this thesis also demonstrates the determining role of the family, not only in the context of the economy and society but also in the context of the state.

And now we come to consider the key problem raised at the beginning of this paper. How should we understand the relationship between the fami-
ily and the state? This is a problem that is still open and which should therefore be carefully analysed. We need to identify the concept of ‘people’, which is of fundamental importance in understanding democracy as government by the people.

And here the role of the family and the role of the state, or to be more precise the role of the family within the context of the state, is manifested in all its breadth. I will say even more. In this context, the dignity of the family-subject, which is at the basis of the whole community, is emerging in all its majesty and dignity. A phenomenon of most welcome importance is thus encountered which allows a real understanding of the concept of ‘people’, which hitherto has been understood in a reductive way as being a people of individuals and not a people of men-persons.

It thus has an ephemeral life: it manifests itself only at times of voting. I am referring here to what Jean Jacques Rousseau argued in his social contract before the French Revolution exploded. ‘The English people’, he argued, ‘believe that they are free because they vote. In reality, they are free only when they vote, after this they are more slaves than before’.

The reductive notion of ‘people’ has thus become a reductive notion of man. He is considered in an abstract way, as an individual. In this approach his social nature is neglected. Man understood as an individual is a man, who is I would say reduced by 50%, almost cut in half. This cut impedes him from becoming a man in the real sense of the term. This individualistic philosophical approach has allowed an exploitation of the family and thus its proletarianisation.

We must take a necessary step in order to understand the reforms of the family and the state that should be promoted. The people of families must be put in a position where it can build a new community-subject around the family, which I call an organised community.

From this point of view, I think that I can interpret the concepts expressed by the Pope in his Letter to Families. In this letter there are two important statements that should be taken into consideration with reference to the subject I am addressing in this paper. The first concerns the subjectivity of the family and thus the very subjectivity of the state as well as that of international communities and organisations. The second concerns the sovereignty of the family, that is to say its effectiveness, its sharing in the exercise of power.

These two statements support each other, just as the being of man supports the action of man. ‘Operari sequitur esse’. One is dealing here with a people not as an abstraction but as a concrete reality. A Spanish scholar, Pedro Juan Viladrich (Jus canonico XXXIV, n. 68, p. 437), says that the sec-
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The statement of the Pope is a time bomb which will radically change the social order. And in truth the people of families determines the birth and the development of the new concept of participatory democracy which directly involves the formation and the organisation of society; it is different from representative democracy which involves the formation and the organisation of the state.

The introduction of this new democracy reduces the tasks of the state, which for that matter it is today no longer able to perform, as the crisis of the welfare state demonstrates. From this point of view, the reform of the welfare state becomes the reform of the state 'tout court' and allows a move from the welfare state to the welfare society, whose fulcrum is specifically the families and the organisations that lead back to it.

This new social organisation, which brings together social subjects, is the structure of a society animated by the values of man as a person.

With participatory society, which then becomes an organised community, the rights of the family acquire connotations that are new and different. The rights of parents, for example, can no longer be considered only in relation to the state but first and foremost must be seen in a cultural frame that centres around the subjectivity of the family and the subjectivity of society. This is a family that precedes the state and which the state must serve and not be served by. A state understood in these terms is a state that promotes and defends the autonomy of social subjects beginning with the natural and primary subject of the family, whereas in the contemporary situation it is the family that revolves, as we said at the beginning of this paper, at least in large measure, around the state.

But let us now see how the family subject is to be placed in the participatory society that becomes transformed into an organised community. Participatory democracy is the instrument that allows us to achieve this result. It is a democracy that begins from the base and finds its point of departure in the family understood as the cell of society and in the municipality, which is understood as the cell of the state. It is from the union of these two cells, I would say from their fertilisation, that the trunk of the new society and the new state is born.

Such fertilisation marks the beginning of a new and fruitful process that is destined to change human history itself.

The sovereignty of the family in this perspective needs a state that is different from the contemporary state, what I call the state of autonomies.

We should now make clear what we understand by a state of autonomies. I would observe, first of all, that we are dealing here with a
dual autonomy: a territorial political autonomy and a social autonomy. Recognition of this dual autonomy allows the integration of the people, of which the family is a component part, in the territory in which the family lives and operates.

The organised community is achieved specifically through this integration which is gradually extended to the whole territory of the state, beginning with the cell of the state, which is the municipality, to reach through the autonomies of the various intermediate territorial authorities (the provinces and the regions) to the central powers of the state itself. Through the social subjects that go to make it up, the people give life to and animate the institutions themselves.

The authentic sovereignty of the people is realised when the family, society and the territory can be integrated. The integration of these two autonomies leads to a new conception of federalism, which is both political and social at the same time, with the recognition and the development of participatory democracy and its connection with representative democracy.4

Now it is precisely in this link between political federalism and social federalism that the autonomy both of the subjectivity of the family and the subjectivity of society or of the community, which are to be traced back to the family itself, is to be placed. In other words, it is from the small territorial communities that we must begin to arrive at the summit of the economic and political social system in a singular intertwining of the horizontal and vertical relationships of the state at all levels. For that matter, the tasks of the municipality have greatly grown, bringing about the birth of municipal law, which in practical terms must meet the new needs of the family in contemporary society.

With the recognition of the autonomy of society and the political autonomy of the local authorities there ends the opposition between the autonomy and the sovereignty of the state understood as the opposition of different powers. Autonomy, indeed, becomes the indispensable instrument by which an ordered popular will is realised which is then transformed into a state will. And the contrast between the local and central powers disappears because with participation power itself has at its basis the will of those who see it not as a brake but as a very effective means by which to expand their own individuality and personality.

4 On this point I refer the reader to my volume: La sovranità della famiglia e lo Stato delle autonomie, chapter XI: ‘Lo Stato partecipativo e il federalismo. Sussidiarietà e solidarietà'.

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In any case, the aim is to allow the integration of the local communities with the territorial institutions. And it is specifically from an analysis of such relationships (of integration) that a new concept of sovereignty is born which allows us to understand the concept of the sovereignty of the family in all its importance and breadth.

The point should be well understood: the sovereignty of the family is not in the least an alternative to the sovereignty of the state, but it is an essential element in its transformation.

We are thus face to face with two new concepts of sovereignty, according to whether one sees man as an individual or as a person, and as a result, with two different concepts of the people as a set of individuals seen in atomistic terms or as a community of persons integrated into society, to which the concept of the people of families is connected.

Certainly, we should understand what is being proposed here. The family is not to be identified with society but is to be seen as its axis. Equally, we can say that the territorial local authority, the commune, is not the state but a constituent element of the state.

The concept of sovereignty, therefore, is a complex concept because both society and the state from this point of view are complex. Once the connection has been established, the concept of sovereignty must be extended to both.

The election of representatives is only a stage in the process of the formation of the will of the state, and thus of its sovereignty. It is no longer enough to declare that sovereignty belongs to the people quoad titulum from the moment that the people delegate the exercise of power to their representatives. This was the approach of Enlightenment individualism, which excluded sharing in the exercise of power after the election of representatives.

The social subjects are thus participants in the process of the formation of the popular will because they are organised around the concept of the family-institution, which thus becomes the driving motor of popular sovereignty.

Sovereignty is thus to be understood as an arrangement of the powers of the state into which society is inserted. The state of autonomies specifically performs these functions. We can now understand the reasons why the two central pillars of the state are the family and the commune. This is the deep meaning of the sovereignty of the family.

To defend and promote the autonomy of the family in relation to the structures of the state means to unite the concept of autonomy with the
concept of sovereignty. Now autonomy means self-determination, and self-determination is the foundation of democracy.

Linking the sovereignty of the family with a new conception of the state means the building of a new and authentic democratic regime.

An articulated and organised community is thus constituted, which has as its basis man as a person, whose dimensions are activated and developed by participatory democracy, which is the soul of society and of its continuous and constant development.

A state based upon the principle of participation can also be called the participatory state, which does not replace but integrates the representation of the various territorial local authorities. The representatives must cooperate with the family and the lesser societies in order to ensure that society has a continuous and autonomous development.

After the reflections that have been made so far in this paper, one can outline the concept of the participatory state and federalism. I could identify federalism with the state of autonomies, but perhaps today this concept, for that matter present in many Constitutions, is too reductive in character.

This is because, in general, we are not yet used to seeing the state in this new way. Indeed, by autonomy one refers solely to the local territorial authorities and not to society as a whole and man as a person. Real federalism has still to be invented and elaborated. We must bear in mind that today it is society itself that is in revolt and no longer sees the members of the political class as its referents. We could also speak about the evolution of the social subjects that today are also represented by the third sector but who have as yet not acquired an awareness of their role and their function in relation to existing political institutions.

Real federalism, what I call participatory federalism, is called upon to link the two key elements that today are in the eye of the storm: the family and society on the one hand, and the state on the other. Whereas the family and the state require an effective recognition of social rights and the rights to development and the environment, the state, imprisoned as it is by the mechanisms of the consumerist economy, is incapable through its structures of meeting the insistent and dramatic needs that begin with them.

And so we pose the question: how can the state allow society to regain its autonomy? The answer is: through a relationship of promotion and integration. The role of the family in the development of society is of primary importance. The state, through the communes, carries out the work of the promotion of the family as an autonomous social subject which helps to build the new fabric of society.
Family and society; society and the state. These are the key constituent elements of the new conception of the state that envisages integration through the principle of the subsidiarity of the family and of society within the state. Subsidiarity does not in the least mean subordination – the principle of subsidiarity solicits help provided by the state to communities so that they can be autonomous and thereby develop all their potential, which, otherwise, would become dispersed.

There must be, in other words, a reciprocal cooperation between the subjectivity of society and the subjectivity of the state in order to allow the state to work at all levels.

In this paper I have confined myself to outlining principles without identifying the different stages linked to concrete data and problems. These principles must be placed in historical reality in order to direct them to ends that match the ends and the needs of man as a person.

We have now reached the point in this paper where it is possible to draw a conclusion from the analysis that has been made. Two different models of development have been compared and contrasted which have two different ways of understanding man, freedom, society, the economy, democracy, nature and the environment, the state and international relations. These two models express two cultures that are totally different. And in truth the consumerist model of development begins with the structures of society and the state and then comes to man. The second model, in different fashion, begins with man in the unity of his dimensions to come to the structures of society and the structures of the state. Consumer society and the welfare state use man. Participatory society and the state of autonomies are at the service of man.

Statism has been of determining importance in the creation of a culture that has been rooting itself in the culture in which we live. Without statism, consumerism would not have existed, and consumerism has managed to penetrate the formation of the inner motivations of man. Socio-economic and political structures have influenced the consciousness of men. Hedonistic materialism, which is the philosophy of consumer society, is the result of this slow process.

This is a philosophy that expresses the way of thinking and of acting of men who are manipulated by the structures of society, which, indeed, manage to impose themselves within men and at times to take the place – through the sophisticated instruments that advertising can count on – of the very choices of men.

Permissiveness is a consequence but not the cause of this process. The same may be said of secularisation (which in this perspective I identify
with secularism), which has marked the collapse of all values because it has impeded man from being a truly free subject and responsible for his own behaviour. He is a man who is a prisoner of the system, who indeed has frozen many inner resources, since his motivational and decision-making iter has been deformed.

I would like to refer to an important article in the Italian Constitution, namely article 2, which constitutionalised the concept of the human person and his relations with the state by recognising the spiritual nature of man, and, in the same way, his social nature. On the recognition of the spiritual nature of man, which is expressly enunciated in the actual formulation of this article, depends the priority of the family over the state; on the recognition of the social nature of man depends the recognition of social subjects.

The statism of the welfare state has overturned the contents and the dynamics of this article. It is the state that is now higher than man, thereby allowing the system of production to infiltrate the sacred realm of his conscience and to promote a materialistic approach to life, which is exactly the opposite to the contents and goals of this article 2.

Without statism, the culture of hedonistic materialism, which has fatally afflicted the family and broken down the structures of society, would not have been born and would not have been formed.

With the outer walls of the welfare state breached, the doors of the prison (which are invisible because they are internal) in which man has been shut up, are gradually opening. This is a real and authentic process of the liberation of man, to whom should be restored the integrity of a conscience which has been subjected to the snares of manipulation and distortion. This is a distortion which certainly does not take man's responsibility away from him, even though he is influenced or conditioned by the structures of the society in which we live.

Just as the consumerist model of development marked the beginning of the decline of man, so the personalist model of development marks the beginning of the recovery of values by man and society, beginning with the family.

The new model of development is born precisely after it has dismantled, piece by piece, the welfare model of development. It is the culture of man as a person that will give a new countenance to the family and society, and in different ways, which perhaps we are still not able to imagine.

Today, it is certainly the case that we are far from the results that the proposed model seeks to achieve. But in my opinion this is not the problem. When one begins from certain premises, one cannot but reach certain
conclusions. As, indeed, for that matter has happened in an inverted way in the case of consumer society. When that society was born, the results that we now encounter, after the various subsequent stages that have taken place, were unimaginable.

In any case, I have to emphasise that participatory society is the only society that is an alternative to consumer society. The scientific analysis that I have carried out in my various areas of research demonstrates this with great clarity. It has allowed me to establish:

1. why the welfare state can no longer be kept going;
2. why we must begin from the family and not from the state in order to create a new model of development;
3. why there cannot be a sovereignty of the people without the key support of the family and a society which is arranged around the family;
4. why we can reach the unity of capital and labour through the family and an organised community;
5. why work centred around the structure of the family has motivations, objectives and ends which are completely different from the work of a man who is seen in atomistic terms, that is to say detached from the social fabric.

When the family is the subject of development, the full integration between the family and society takes place. Through this integration a phenomenon takes place that seems contradictory but in reality is not so at all. On the one hand, society frees itself from the state; on the other hand, it strengthens it.

The welfare state is weak because it is an infrastructure of the system of production. When I speak about the strengthening of the state I am certainly not referring to the representative state; I am referring, instead, to the participatory state. Because this state is at the service of man it is able to promote the allocation of its energies (which in large part have been frozen) so as to vivify and enrich the whole of the fabric of society.

In this cultural perspective, the importance of the fundamental role of the family – the real and authentic animator of economic, social and political institutions – emerges in its entirety. It is from the family, understood in these terms, that there springs a participatory model of society which has at its base, and is vivified by, the values of the human person.

(Translation by Matthew Fforde)
Professor Zampetti’s paper on “A New Role for the Family in the State”, when considered together with President Malinvaud’s overview of the social teaching of the Church on the topic of Inter-Generational Solidarity, brings out the close relationships among all four projects undertaken thus far by the Pontifical Academy. For globalization has been accompanied by the disruption everywhere of age-old patterns of work and family organization, while the weakening of inter-generational solidarity has jeopardized the health both of national economies and the world’s democratic experiments.

In each of our four areas of concern, a major challenge for the social sciences (and for politics) is to become more attentive to the long-term costs and implications of decisions and behaviors that offer short-term advantages or attractions. Catholic social thought does, in fact, take a long view of social problems, but culturally entrenched habits of present-mindedness are difficult to overcome. As Tocqueville warned long ago, conditions in modern secular societies foster a “brutish indifference to the future, an attitude all too well suited to certain propensities in human nature”. Noting that religions foster enduring accomplishments by promoting habits of behaving with a view toward the long run, he predicted that in times of religious skepticism men would be more inclined to “give themselves over to the satisfaction of their least desires without delay”. The present would grow so large in their minds that it would hide the future from their view. In republics where secularism and skepticism prevailed, he wrote, the “great business” of statesmen and philosophers would be to demonstrate to their fellow citizens that it is both necessary and possible to conceive and execute long-term under-

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No one can accuse Professor Zampetti of present-mindedness: his visionary paper calls for nothing less than a fundamental transformation of the relations among families, the state, and the economy. It is as though he has taken us to a mountain top from which, looking backward along the path we have traveled up to now, we see a landscape scarred by earthquakes – social upheavals that have destroyed many of our familiar landmarks. On the other side of the mountain, however, he offers a view of where we might go – a view, so to speak, of a promised land with a “new role for the family” in a new type of state with a new sort of economy.

In these comments on Professor Zampetti’s vision, I will begin at the bottom of the mountain, where twenty-first century men and women move among the ruins of many traditional signposts, gathering strength and seeking guidance for an arduous journey toward what we hope will be a civilization of life and love. First, I will briefly second his view of the gravity of the situation in which we find ourselves. Next, I will consider certain dilemmas that arise when one tries to imagine how his vision of a better arrangement might be brought to life. And finally, I will offer some observations on the more “ecological” way of thinking about persons, family, civil society, and the state that Malinvaud and Zampetti recommend.

The Perils of Ignoring Changes in Family Behavior

With the spread of various sorts of democratic regimes in recent years, there has been much rejoicing over the symbolism and reality of free elections. But as Zampetti reminds us, there is more to self-government than voting for representatives. A fundamental prerequisite for a healthy republic with democratic elements is a continuing supply of citizens who possess certain kinds of habits and attitudes.2 History and experience have taught us that there are conditions that are more, or less, favorable to the maintenance of freedom and self-government – and that

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2 According to the authors of The Federalist Papers, democratic self-government requires a higher degree of virtue in the citizenry than any other form of government, Federalist No. 55 (Madison).
those conditions involve the character and competence of citizens and public servants. But character and competence, too, have conditions – conditions residing in nurture and education.

It seems obvious therefore that friends of democracy must be vitally concerned about everything that affects the family's ability to nurture and educate. It is primarily the family setting that determines whether or not people develop such qualities as: self-restraint, respect for others, honesty, ability to cooperate, independence of mind, concern for the vulnerable, and attentiveness to the natural and probable consequences of one's actions. Changes in the family's capacity to instill those habits and attitudes cannot help but affect the prospects for a regime of ordered liberty. Yet the family's role in teaching and transmitting republican virtues from one generation to the next has generally been taken for granted.

The time is now long overdue to take stock of the social, economic and political effects of the upheavals in family behavior that occurred in the late twentieth century. These changes have not only impaired the family's ability to nurture and educate children, but its role as a support institution. In the more affluent countries, declining birth rates, with the consequent narrowing ratio of workers to retirees, are putting severe pressure on health care systems, and on public and private pension plans. Equally ominous is the fact that no society has yet come up with an adequate solution to the problem of loss of caretakers for the very young, the sick, and the frail elderly that took place when women moved en masse into the paid labor force.

3 Or indeed the prospects for any strong, healthy polity. Consider the following passage from a popular history of Rome: "Augustus could not conceive a strong Rome without the character, courage and political ability that had marked the old Roman, above all, the old aristocracy. The decay of the ancient faith among the upper classes had washed away the supernatural supports of marriage, fidelity and parentage; the passage from farm to city had made children less of an asset and more of a liability and a toy; women wished to be sexually rather than maternally beautiful; in general the desire for individual freedom seemed to be running counter to the needs of the race... A large number of native-stock Romans avoided parenthood altogether, preferring prostitutes or concubines even to a varied succession of wives. Of those who married, a majority appear to have limited their families by abortion, infanticide, coitus interruptus, and contraception". Will Durant, Caesar and Christ (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), 222.

4 The literature is vast. For useful surveys, see Marie-Thérèse Meulders-Klein, La personne, la famille, le droit: trois décennies de mutations en occident (Brussels: Bruylant, 1999), and James Q. Wilson, The Marriage Problem (New York: Harper Collins, 2002). For discussion of the changing relationships among family, state and employment as determinants of status and economic security, see M. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981).
Dilemmas of Imagining a New Role for the Family in the State

Faced with this state of affairs, many have called for a renewed sense of solidarity among the generations. But it is not easy to imagine how that might be fostered. Many of the developments that produced changes in family behavior – and in ideas about family life – seem practically irreversible. Many of the developments that have weakened family ties, moreover, are widely believed to represent advances for individuals and society.

Consider the following instances of attenuation of inter-generational bonds:

- Fathers and children. With the rise in divorce and births to single women, an unprecedented proportion of children are now being raised in fatherless homes. What will be the effect on the social environment of increasing numbers of children coming to child-bearing age with little idea of what a father does, what it means to be a “good family man”, or how men and women can surmount the difficulties that arise in any marriage?

- Mothers and children. Reacting in part to the increasing unreliability of marriage as a support institution, women are having fewer children, and many are maintaining at least a foothold in the labor force even when their children are very young. (That strategy, however, still does not protect mothers and children very effectively against what I call the four deadly Ds: divorce, disrespect for nonmarket work, disadvantages in the workplace for anyone who takes time out for family responsibilities, and the destitution that afflicts so many female-headed families).

- Parental role in the education of children. With the modern state’s virtual monopoly on schooling, the family has lost much of its ability to transmit values. Its powerful competitors – the government schools and the entertainment industry – often promote values that undermine the values of the family, especially religious and moral teachings.

- Inter-generational solidarity with weak and dependent family members. With the acceptance of abortion as a woman’s right has emerged a mentality that treats inconvenient or defective unborn children as disposable. How will men and women raised with that mentality deal with their elderly parents when those parents become inconvenient, incapacitated, and expensive? Ironically, just as we have begun to congratulate ourselves on having reached the point where our societies are more attentive to the needs of their weakest and most vulnerable members, we begin to see how fragile that achievement has become.
(E.g.: Consider the following excerpt from a December 2001 New Yorker magazine interview with one of America’s most influential judges: “When his father grew very frail and sick, Posner asked the gerontologist what the point of keeping him alive with all these procedures was; the doctor informed him that termination of care had to be voluntary. ‘Because my father was more or less compos mentis and wanted treatment, you couldn’t deny it’, Posner says. ‘I loved my parents when I was growing up and they were really the sort of parents you should be grateful to. But my thoughts about them are dominated by their old age. When I think about them there’s no affection....So many people have these decrepit, horrible old parents, and then they’re so upset when they die at ninety. My father was even annoyed when my mother died – he thought the doctors hadn’t tended her carefully enough – though by the time she died she couldn’t speak or use her hands, she wasn’t human....I hope my generation can be a little more rational about this’”.

(Even ten years ago, it would have been difficult to imagine a prominent jurist expressing such sentiments in a national magazine).

- Manufacture of children. With the advent of new bio-technologies, the link between sexual relations and procreation has been broken, a new eugenics has become possible, and the “consumerist” mentality decried by Zampetti threatens even to affect attitudes toward children. The increasing ability to exercise human control over the processes and “products” of human reproduction will affect the very meaning of having children in ways that are difficult to foresee. What are the implications of allowing reproductive activities to become increasingly technological and commercialized? What will it mean for one generation to design, redesign, “improve” or select the genetic characteristics of the next generation?

- The deconstruction of “the family”. With the proliferation and increasing acceptability of alternative life-styles, marriage-based, child-raising families have lost their privileged position in many legal systems. The definition of “the family” is highly contested.

6 Many scientists claim that these developments are both imminent and inevitable. E.g., Gregory Stock, Redesigning Humans: Our Inevitable Genetic Future (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 2002) (“As scientists rapidly improve their ability to identify and manipulate genes, people will want to protect their future children from diseases, help them live longer, and even influence their looks and their abilities. Neither governments nor religious groups will be able to stop the coming trend of choosing an embryo’s genes”).
The causes of these developments are much disputed, but that they are affecting the bonds among generations is undeniable. To list the factors that are usually implicated is to realize that Zampetti's call for the state to "defend the human environment" poses enormous difficulties: geographic mobility, the separation of home and business, the rise and decay of great cities, the atrophy of local government, the loss of the unpaid work of women in the home and the voluntary sector, individualism, consumerism, divorce, the contraceptive mentality, and (in some places) shortages of marriageable males. As suggested above, many of the threats to family stability are unintended consequences of goods and freedoms that modern men and women prize.

Zampetti has placed before us an attractive vision of a society where the dignity of the human person is the highest value; a society where the family has priority over the state; a society where all legitimate types of work are respected; a society where families, local communities and the mediating structures enjoy an appropriate autonomy – in short, a society that would be a showcase for the personalist vision of subsidiarity and solidarity that is embodied in Catholic Social Thought.

But how could such a society be brought into being? Zampetti deplores that many roles that formerly belonged to the family have now been assumed by the state. He notes that the state is less and less capable of fulfilling the roles it has assumed, but at the same time the family has lost much of its capacity to care for its own members. Hence a major dilemma: It seems that we would need a certain kind of family to have better social and political organizations, but we would need a certain kind of social and political organization to have this kind of family. Good institutions set the conditions for good habits to take root, but good institutions depend on good habits and attitudes. How and where to begin?

Implications for the Social Sciences

That conundrum should spur us toward a more interdisciplinary and "ecological" way of thinking about social, economic and political questions. Here, for example, are a few questions that come to mind in anticipation of the discussions we will have on the Academy's inter-generational solidarity project:

1. Should we not think in terms of setting conditions and shifting probabilities, as well as about finding solutions and compelling outcomes?
2. Should we pay as much attention to the immediate environments of families – the “mediating structures of civil society” – as to families themselves, considering that the mediating structures have lost much of their ability to support and sustain families in periods of stress?

3. Should we investigate the impact on families of programs and policies in other areas (labor, tax, social assistance) – by analogy to environment impact studies in the natural sciences?

4. Should we encourage political decision-makers to pay more conscious attention to family policy? After all, a nation without a conscious family policy has a family policy made by chance, by the operation of policies and programs in other areas that have an impact on families.

5. Should we encourage political decision-makers to initiate pilot programs to find out what works and what doesn’t, with a view toward building on what works? What about experiments with using the mediating structures of civil society to perform some of the tasks that government has assumed over the years (not only because this would likely result in more efficient and humane delivery of services like health care and education, but because the mediating structures themselves – an endangered element of the human environment – might well be strengthened)?

6. Should we encourage political decision-makers to reinforce parental control over the education of their children and to end governmental monopolies on the education of children?

7. Should we encourage political decision-makers to recognize the importance of the home economy, and the costs of raising children? How can we respond to Professor Zampetti’s call for giving mothers a real choice about staying home with young children? How can we make it more feasible for those who are most motivated and best qualified to care for the sick, the elderly and the very young to do so? (After all, those who make the necessary sacrifices to raise children well do not just benefit themselves, but confer a benefit on society as a whole).

8. What can be done about the loss of social opprobrium for those who neglect family responsibilities, or the culture of immediate gratification fostered by the entertainment industry?

Finally, it should be said that perhaps the greatest challenge for a more ecological approach to the topic of inter-generational solidarity arises from a conflict of solidarities: how does solidarity with future generations fit with our responsibility to those among us who are most in need right now?
How can we develop an adequate response to the immediate distress of many families while attempting to shift probabilities so that fewer families will find themselves in such distress in the future? That problem was nicely symbolized by the well-intentioned efforts of President Jimmy Carter in the 1970s to develop a family policy for the United States. Carter convened a White House Conference on Families and appointed as its head a white, married, father of five. That step was angrily criticized by welfare rights advocates and others who argued that poor, female-headed families were the ones that needed the most urgent attention. Carter then appointed a black, divorced, single mother as co-chair of the Conference. That prompted the original chairman to resign, and the White House Conference became one of many casualties of the culture wars.

The matter is obviously one that requires the utmost intelligence, good judgment and political wisdom. In a time when inter-generational bonds are widely disrupted, the resulting human situations must be addressed with compassion and generosity. The casualties of broken families must not be ignored, and persons engaged in various forms of cohabitation should not be subjected to unjust discrimination. At the same time, however, care must be taken to assure that the marriage-based, child-raising family is not treated as just another “life-style”.

In his highly useful background document, Professor Malinvaud has called attention to a number of changing areas where the Church’s social teaching might be amplified and where the Academy’s investigations and deliberations might prove helpful: the particular difficulties encountered by teenagers and young adults, education, the welfare state, and the natural and social environments. As the Academy moves into this new and challenging area of inter-generational solidarity, there is no better guide for the spirit of our endeavors than Centesimus Annus which reminds us that, where transformation of culture is sought, “the first and most important task is accomplished within man’s heart” (51). The way out of the dilemmas posed above begins with the recognition that we are not helplessly trapped in institutions. Human beings are capable of reflecting upon their existence and of making judgments concerning whether the society they live in is the kind of society they wish for their children and future generations. Those judgments, of course, can be powerfully influenced by the settings in which we find ourselves, but those settings in turn can be influenced to some extent by reflection and choice.

The “specific and decisive contribution of the Church”, according to Centesimus Annus, will be at the level of formation, helping to shape the
understanding we have of ourselves and our destiny in the world (51). True, formation has suffered with the impairment of the value-transmitting capacities of families and the mediating structures of civil society. But even that downward cycle could be reversed. At least that was what Tocqueville thought, when he speculated that if statesmen and philosophers in times of irreligion could habituate citizens to think of the future, they “would bring them little by little and without their noticing it toward religious beliefs”.

When men have become accustomed to foreseeing from very far what is likely to befall them in this world, and to nourishing themselves on hopes for it, they can hardly keep their thoughts always confined within the precise limits of this life, and will be ready to break out through those limits and consider what is beyond....Thus the means that permit men up to a certain point to do without religion are perhaps, after all, the only means we still possess for bringing mankind back, by a long and roundabout path, to a state of faith.
PART IV

INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY
WITHIN THE FAMILY
I was invited by Prof. Wilfrido Villacorta to join him in doing a paper on this topic which I understand is to be related to the theme, “Intergenerational Solidarity and Equity”. It is my contention that this topic has grown out of a concern contained in the working paper of Prof. Pierpaolo Donati titled, “Intergenerational Solidarity - A Sociological and Social Policy Issue”.

Intergenerational Solidarity and Equity is a concern and at the same time an imperative in this modern and post-modern age given the “generative issues” confronting the world. As a concern, the duty of parents or elders to teenagers and young adults is to heighten their consciousness to their contribution in sustaining our life support system which includes “human ecology” – to guarantee the future of upcoming generations. (cf. President Malinvaud). Indeed while the world’s natural resources are getting depleted, also that which should constitute a vital part of our world – the world’s children and youth seem to be declining in number especially of the North. And many believe that this will sooner or later become the trend also in “developing countries” that are striving to modernize themselves.

I was especially intrigued by the “generational issues” cited by Prof. Donati in his working paper: 1) families are less and less committed to having children, 2) the fraction of the national income distributed to children has been declining as the percentage of households with no children increases, 3) the cultural transmission from one generation to the other is losing ground, children and youth are increasingly isolated from the adults who constitute their principal socializing agents; primary social ties become more and more problematic in everyday life; families split up and are dispersed, children are confronted with a more dangerous social envi-
ronment since risks of isolation, neglect, poverty, and even abuse are multiplied; 4) national welfare states have set up many educational, social and health schemes for children, but at the same time it has become even more apparent that collective welfare arrangements, besides not being able to substitute the family, quite often do not work properly in favor of better exchanges between generations; in other words, social welfare systems have shown themselves as lacking a real orientation to the links between generations”. He then concludes that “children and younger generations appear as victims of adults and older generations under many social, economic and cultural respects”.

Based on Prof. Villacorta’s synthesis of empirical studies in Asia, I believe with him, that Prof. Donati’s paper has been written within the socio-cultural context of countries of the North. Thus, I would think that the nature of “generative issues” in countries of the South will understandably be different yet very much connected with those of the North.

In my desire as an elder to contribute my share in this duty of making the youth understand “Intergenerational Issues” in our country, I devised a questionnaire that could lead to the heightening and a deepening of consciousness with regard to this issue. As a phenomenologist, I consider research, together with two other components of learning – namely: education and action – as integral components of a transformational process both for the researcher and the subjects of research. Research in this sense is participatory, educational, and action-oriented. The assumption of this process is a sociological principle, “when people see things as real, they are real in their consequences” (W.I. Thomas). Indeed, the course of human events is the way people think about them. Another experiential insight: A new way of seeing leads to a new way of feeling, doing, acting and being. This is, I believe, the process of personal transformation and collectively undertaken leads to social transformation.

The instrument I devised wishes to gauge people’s observation of and eventually a consciousness for the need of intergenerational solidarity. It is confronting people with the phenomenon in order that the subjects of the research with the help of a research-facilitator will reflect on their answers and contribute to a plan and/or program of action. For the purpose of this meeting, I administered the questionnaire to subjects within the sphere of my work environment and Prof. Villacorta’s in the hope that I answer to the challenge of Prof. Donati, “to have a careful look at what is happening between and within generations in the different countries taking into account the relations between families and governments”.
Highly involved in a social science institute for transformative praxis towards justice, peace and integrity of creation, I hope that youth and young adults develop a collective self-understanding about this issue and in dialectics with the research-facilitators expand on the meaning, if not validate, intersubjectively the quantitative responses to the statements in the questionnaire. What I will report here is just the beginning of this process of a “conscientizing inquiry”, a process of transformation of both the research-facilitator and his/her “co-researchers” (the subjects of the research study).

The Instrument. It contains a set of 50 statements. To each statement, the respondent is supposed to strongly disagree (SD), moderately disagree (MD), moderately agree (MA), and strongly agree (SA) [See Appendix 1: The Questionnaire]. Since the questionnaire is to be administered to Filipinos, each statement is translated in the national language. The statements are premised on the generative issues cited by Prof. Donati.

The assumption is that unlike in countries of the North, the people in the Philippines are still committed to having children. However, this does not mean that there are no intergenerational issues. The depletion of natural resources and the lack of the discipline associated with the monetary system leads to monetary poverty which is generative of the issues in question. The monetized economy whereby money means life-chance in contrast to the “barter” system, a system of reciprocity and exchange without the mediation of money and thus an unmediated economics is still what is alive in the people’s sub-consciousness. When people are related by blood or ritual ties, they will help each other is the premise of traditional social life. The popular/traditional/indigenous system and culture (characterized by small group orientation, particularism and personalism where every economic and social transaction is governed by a face-to-face interaction) promote intergenerational solidarity as against the dominant culture which is western-based and taught in the private and public secondary and tertiary levels (a culture that is society-oriented, universalistic, and impersonalistic where transactions are normally governed by the monetized economy).

The statements in the questionnaire are negatively or positively expressed in relation to intergenerational solidarity. One statement is balanced with another statement. For instance:

The statement, “parents do not want to have children” (#1) is balanced with “Families practice family planning” (#2). The former is a negative statement for intergenerational solidarity (IS); the latter is a positive statement for IS.
Another set of statements such as: “Time and money of the family are devoted more to the care of the elderly” (#5) as well as the statement, “Families are biased for the education and care more of children rather than of the elderly” (#6) are both negative for IS. However these statements are balanced with the following positive statements for IS - “There is a spirit of solidarity among family members in the care of the elderly” (#18) and “There is a spirit of solidarity among family members in the upbringing of children” (#19).

Thus there is a set of statements dealing with situation of the family and with family solidarity horizontally, i.e. family members helping each other (Statements # 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39) and vertically across generations (Statements # 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 38, 40, 41, 48, 49) There are statements which refer to relationship of families and external environments. An external environment created by the State and by NGOs that give support to the family or help to resolve crises in the family promotes IS (Statements # 3, 11, 12, 14, 15, 29, 37, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50).

The Subjects/Participants/Co-researchers: There are four samples to which the facilitator-researcher could get back to in order to validate with them the findings of the study: A) Sample 1: Filipino Adults (FA). These are 35 full-time faculty, staff and personnel of the Asian Social Institute, a social science graduate school for transformative praxis towards justice, peace and integrity of creation. B) Sample 2: Non-Filipino Adult Asians (NFAA). They are adult non-Filipino Asian graduate students numbering 23 from Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, East Timor and Japan. C) Sample C: Urban and Rurban Lower Income Youth (URLIY), 37 in number. They are members (young people from a squatter and a fisher-folk community) of a youth movement. Sample D: These are Urban High Income Youth (UHIY) numbering 30 college students of three prestigious universities – Ateneo de Manila University, De La Salle University, and University of the Philippines.

The Treatment of Data. The set of statements is a scale for Intergenerational Solidarity (IS). A response to each item is scored numerically in descending (4, 3, 2, 1) or ascending order (1, 2, 3, 4) depending on whether or not it is a negative or a positive statement for IS. Thus, the summation of scores vertically (of responses of all respondents) for each item represents to what extent the item is considered favorably or unfavorably by all respondents responding to that item. The higher the score for each item, the more positive the respondents are for IS. The higher the score of the Group Mean, the more positive for IS (Tables 1-4 appearing in pages II-IX at the end of this volume).
The summation of scores horizontally represents a respondent's score. A summation of scores divided by the number of respondents represents the Group Mean of a specific sample. All the samples can be compared by their respective Group Means.

While the set of statements is supposed to be a scale in itself, a gauge and measure of IS, albeit a very limited one (but which can be improved) as participatory action research continues, it can also be analyzed by question or sets of question.

The Results

1. In a scale from 1-4, the Group Means per Sample as a rough estimate of IS are as follows:

   Sample A: Filipino Adults (FA)  
   Sample B: Non-Filipino Adult Asians (NFAA)  
   Sample C: Urban/Rurban Low-Income Youth (URLIY)  
   Sample D: Urban High Income Youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Group Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filipino Adults (FA)</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Filipino Adult Asians (NFAA)</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rurban Low-Income Youth</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban High Income Youth</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Items that Score Highest are shown in Table 5, p. 134.

   Statements that garnered the highest scores translated into an item mean scores are:

   Item #2: Parents now practice family planning (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
   Item #49: The indigenous/popular/traditional culture promote values for intergenerational solidarity (FA, ANA, URLIY, except for UHIY)
   Item #24: Youth have respect for their grandparents (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
   Item #13: Adults care for the safety and survival of the children (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
   Item #18: There is a spirit of solidarity among family members in the upbringing of children (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
   Item #19: There is a spirit of solidarity among family members in the care of the elderly (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
   Item #17: Grandparents have a significant role in the family especially with regard to the youth's upbringing (FA, URLIY, UHIY, except for NFAA)
   Item #44: Young adults who help support their families are not hindered from getting established in their status in life (AF, URLIY, UHIY)
Item #36: Working youth help support the family especially in the education of younger brothers and sisters (FA, NFAA, URLIY and UHIY)
Item #29: There are agencies in the country that take care of youth in crisis (Only FA)
Item #38: Parents do not abort fetus of unwanted pregnancies (FA and UHIY)
Item #22: Many grandparents facilitate the communication gap between parents and children (FA, NFAA, URLIY except for UHIY)
Item #40: Poor parents do not encourage their children to be child prostitutes (Only NFAA)
Item #1: Families want to have children (NFAA, URLIY, UHIY except for FA)
Item #25: There is solidarity in the extended family in our country (NFAA and UHIY)
Item #30: Young people do not become temporary orphans because their parents are working abroad (NFAA only)
Item #16: Youth are given the opportunities by their families to exercise their creativity (NFAA and URLIY)
Item #33: Family members do not compete for the kind of TV programs they like to enjoy (Only NFAA)
Item #35: Family celebrations are appreciated by the young (Only NFAA)
Item #46: Social security systems are adequate for the many needs of the Family in different stages of the life cycle (URLIY)
Item #5: Time and money of the family are devoted more to the care of the elderly (Only UHIY)
Item #9: Youth teach their parents Information Technology (Only UHIY)

The foregoing items have been identified by taking 25% of the items of the highest score items (13 items for each sample)

3. The items that garnered the lowest scores (Table 6, p.135) are the following:

Item #3: High cost of living does not make it difficult to bring up children (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
Item #21: Majority of the families have the provision for their crisis needs. (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
Item #4: Education and care for children do not make up most of family expenses (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
Item #34: Families are together in prayer (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
Item #15: Many good laws for the welfare of the youth are implemented (FA, NFAA, URLIY, UHIY)
Item #26: There are not many solo parents in the country (FA, URLIY, UHIY except for NFAA)
Item #48: Young adults who help support the family are not hindered from getting established in their status in life (FA, URLIY, UHIY except for NFAA)
Item #31: Families are together at meals (FA, NFAA, URLIY, and UHIY)
Item #50: The prevailing economic monetized economy destroys relationships (FA, NFAA)
Item #30: Young people are not temporary orphans (NFAA and URLIY)
Item #37: There is a low market demand among youth and children for commercial products (FA, NFAA)
Item #27: Many young people do not suffer verbal abuse from their parents (FA and URLIY)
Item #33: Family members do not compete for the kind of TV programs they like to enjoy (AF and URLIY)
Item #41: Propertied parents do not sue their children on inheritance claims (Only FA)
Item #46: Social security systems are adequate for the many needs of the family in different stages of the life cycle (Only NFAA)
Item #42: Families trust their governments to take care of the common good (Only NFAA)
Item #12: The standard of schools for the great majority of youth is satisfactory (Only NFAA)
Item #6: Families are not biased for the education and care more of children rather than of the elderly (Only NFAA)
Item #20: Many young people do not come from broken homes (NFAA and URLIY)
Item #28: Many young people do not suffer from physical violence (Only URLIY)
Item #49: The indigenous/traditional popular culture promote values for intergenerational solidarity (Only UHIY)
Item #37: There is not a high market demand among youth and children for commercial products (Only UHIY)
Item #50: The prevailing economic monetized economy does not destroy relationships (Only UHIY)
Item #8: Young people think that their parents understand them (Only UHIY)

The foregoing items have been identified by taking 25% of the items with the lowest scores.
A Reflection of the Result

There is some basis in saying that based on the observations of the participants in this research study, intergenerational solidarity is to some extent still being promoted by the popular/traditional/indigenous culture. Indicators of this thesis are the observations that youth have respect for grandparents who still play a significant role in the upbringing of children and also help in facilitating the communication gap between parents and children. Adults care for the safety and survival of the children. There is a spirit of solidarity among family members in the care both of the elderly and children. Working youth help support their families especially in the education of younger brothers and sisters. Understandably, it is also the UHIY who scored highest in the observation that children teach their parents information technology.

While there is the observation that families do family planning, the parents are still committed to having children and do not easily abort fetus of unwanted pregnancies.

It is also significant that while Urban High Income Youth (UHIY) observes the practice of family and intergenerational solidarity like in all the other samples, there is the observation on their part that “indigenous/traditional popular culture does not promote values for intergenerational solidarity”. It is also this item that garnered for this sample one of the lowest scores. Are these high income youth alienated from an understanding of their cultural rootedness? This is something to clarify with them when the finding is fed back to them.

While the Filipinos increase by 1.7 million annually and the average family size is still 6, they seem to be aware of family planning as a practice (in fact, it is the item that scored the highest in all samples). Or is it more aware of the need for family planning since they know that this is a government program which is disseminated in schools and through media.

The Non-Filipino Asian Adults (NFAA) have the highest group mean in intergenerational solidarity scale. However, there is less differentiation in the item scores. Among Filipinos, items dealing with family solidarity (horizontal and vertical) attain high scores.

The item that Filipinos trust their government is not one of the highest scorers in any of the samples and also not in the items with the lowest scores. This may mean Filipinos’ ambivalence towards government.

There is only one of the items dealing with the relation between the family and the external environment that obtained a high score - ‘There
are agencies in the country that take care of youth in crisis”. Although this was only cited by Filipino Adults (FA). Understandably, quite a number of the participants in this sample, involved in some social and community work, are more aware of the agencies that help people in times of crisis.

The participants of all samples seem to indicate that there are not too many striking observations of the participants regarding the support given by the external society to intergenerational solidarity.

It is recommended that the findings of this survey be fed back to those who participated in the study as has been the intention of the research-facilitator for a deeper consciousness of the need of elders to be aware of international solidarity and equity for an action plan towards a sustainable future.

For lack of time, I have not been able to examine critically other aspects revealed by the study.

REFERENCES


Porio, Emma N.D. The Filipino Family, Community and Nation: The same yesterday, today and tomorrow. Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press.


A QUESTIONNAIRE ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

A.

1. Nationality: __________________________
2. Religion: ____________________________
3. Age: _________________________________
4. Occupation: __________________________
5. Educational Attainment: ________________________
6. Sex: 6.1 ___/ Female 6.2 ____/ Male
7. Civil Status: 7.1 ___/ Single 7.2 ____/ Married
    7.3_____/ Living with Spouse 7.5 Separated
    7.6 ____/ Widow/Widower
8. Number of Children: _____
   Ages of Children: 
   (Separate with Commas)

Kindly give your observations and perceptions by checking the appropriate box which represents the agreement or disagreement to the following statements.

Legend: SD – Strongly Disagree LDP – Lubusang Di-Pagsangayon
MD – Moderately Disagree KDP – Katamtamang Di-pagsangayon
MA – Moderately Agree KP – Katamtamang Pagsangayon
SA – Strongly Agree LP – Lubusang Pagsangayon

B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>SD (LDP)</th>
<th>MD (KDP)</th>
<th>MA (KP)</th>
<th>SA (LP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Parents do not want to have children. (Ayaw magka-anak ng mga magulang).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Parents now practice family planning. (Ngayon ang mga magulang ay nagplaplano ng pamilya).</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. High cost of living makes it difficult to bring up children. (Napakamahal ang magpalaki ng mga anak).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Education and care for children make up most of family expenses. (Ang edukasyon at pag-aaruga ng mga anak ang pinakamalaking gastos ng pamilya).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
5. Time and money of the family are devoted more to the care of the elderly. (Panahon at pera ay masnilalaan ng pamilya sa mga matatanda sakay sa mga bata/anak).

6. Families are biased for the education and care more of children rather than of the elderly. (Ang mga pamilya ay binibigyan ng mas mahalaga ang edukasyon at pag-aaruga ng mga anak sa kay sa pag-aaruga o pagkalinga sa mga matatanda).

7. Parents do not understand young people. (Ang mga magulang ay hindi nakakaunawa sa mga kabataan).

8. Young people think that their parents do not understand them. (Ayon sa mga kabataan ang mga magulang ay hindi nakakaunawa sa kanila).

9. Youth teach their parents Information Technology. (Ang kabataan ay nagtuturo ng Information Technology – ng 'computer' sa kanilang magulang).

10. Parents do not listen to the deepest aspirations of their children. (Ang mga magulang ay hindi nakikinig sa mga malalim na mithiin ng kanilang mga anak).

11. Young people are protected by the State. (Ang mga bata ay pinoprotektahan ng Bansa/ng gobyerno).

12. The standard of schools for the great majority of youth is satisfactory. (Ang antas ng mga paaralan ay sapat ang kahusayan para sa mga kabataan).

13. Adults do not care about the safety and survival of the children. (Ang mga nakakahanda ay walang pakialam sa kaligtasan at kapanatagan ng mga kabataan).

14. There is a good set of laws to preserve the rights of the youth. (Maraming batas ang nagalalayong mangalaga sa kapakaran ng mga kabataan).

15. Many good laws for the welfare of the youth are not being implemented. (Maraming magagandang batas para sa kapakaran ng mga kabataan ay hindi naisasakatuparan).

16. Youth are given the opportunities by their families to exercise their creativity. (Ang mga kabataan ay binibigyan ng pagkakataong ng kanilang mga pamilya sa pagiging malikhain).
17. Grandparents have a significant role in the family especially with regard to the youth's upbringing. (Ang mga lola at lolo ay may mahalagang papel sa paghubog ng mga kabataan).

18. There is a spirit of solidarity among family members in the up-bringing of children. (May damayan at bayanihan sa mga kasapi sa pamilya patungkol sa pag-aaruga ng mga kabataan).

19. There is a spirit of solidarity among family members in the care of the elderly. (May damayan at bayanihan ng mga kasapi ng pamilya patungkol sa pag-aaruga ng mga matatanda).

20. Many young people come from broken families. (Maraming mga kabataan na nanggagaling sa mga pamilyang hiwalay ang mga magulang).

21. Majority of families do not have the provision for their crisis (sickness, accidents, death, etc) needs. (Maraming mga pamilya alang-alang para matugunan ang kanilang crises kay ng pagkakasakit, kamatayan, aksidente, atbp).

22. Many grandparents facilitate the communication gap between parents and children. (Mga lola at lolo ay nagpapadaloy o samahan ng mga magulang at anak).

23. Young people know how to listen to their parents. (Ang mga kabataan ay marunong makinig sa kani-kanilang mga magulang).

24. Youth have no respect for their grandparents. (Ang mga kabataan ay wala ng respeto sa kanilang mga lola at lolo).

25. There is solidarity in the extended family in our country. (May damayan at pagtutulungan sa ating sambahayan o pamilya sa ating bayan).

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41. Propertied parents are sometimes sued by their children on inheritance claims. (Ang ibang maykayang mga magulang ay naihahabla ng mga anak patungkol sa mga pagmamanahin).

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50. The prevailing economic monetized economy destroys relationships. (Ang ekonomiya ng pera ay nakasisira ng samahan).

Kindly write your additional comments on any of the above responses. (Kung mayroong kayong nais idagdag sa inyong mga sagot, paiksulat lamang).

Thank You!!!
Mraming salamat!!!
1. Parents do not want to have children. (Ayaw magka-anak ng mga magulang).

2. Parents now practice family planning. (Ngayon ang mga magulang ay nagduplano ng pamilya).

3. High cost of living makes it difficult to bring up children. (Napakamahal ang magpalaki ng mga anak).

4. Education and care for children make up most of family expenses. (Ang edukasyon at pag-aaruga ng mga anak ang pinakamalaking gastos ng pamilya).

5. Time and money of the family are devoted more to the care of the elderly. (Panahon at pera ay masnilalaan ng pamilya sa mga matatanda sakay sa mga bata/anak).

6. Families are biased for the education and care more of children rather than of the elderly. (Ang mga pamilya ay binibigyan ng mas mahalaga ang educasyon at pag-aaruga ng mga anak sa kay sa pag-aaruga o pag-kalinga sa mga matatanda).

7. Parents do not understand young people. (Ang mga magulang ay hindi nakakaunawa sa mga kabataan).

8. Young people think that their parents do not understand them. (Ayon sa mga kabataan ang mga magulang ay hindi nakakaunawa sa kanila).

9. Youth teach their parents Information Technology. (Ang kabataan ay nagtuturo ng Information Technology – ng ‘computer’ sa kanilang magulang).

10. Parents do not listen to the deepest aspirations of their children. (Ang mga magulang ay hindi nakikinig sa mga malalim na mithiin ng kanilang mga anak).

**APPENDIX 2**

A QUESTIONNAIRE ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY (WITH SCORING SYSTEM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Scoring Per Item</th>
<th>SD (LDP)</th>
<th>MD (KDP)</th>
<th>MA (KP)</th>
<th>SA (LP)</th>
</tr>
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<td>11. Young people are protected by the State. (Ang mga bata ay pinoprotektahan ng Bansang gobyerno).</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. The standard of schools for the great majority of youth is satisfactory. (Ang antas ng mga paaralan ay sapat ang kahusayan para sa mga kabataan).</td>
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<td>13. Adults do not care about the safety and survival of the children. (Ang mga nakakatanda ay walang pakialam sa kaligtasan at kapanatagan ng mga kabataan).</td>
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<td>14. There is a good set of laws to preserve the rights of the youth. (Maraming batas ang nagalayong mangalaga sa kapakanan ng mga kabataan).</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Many good laws for the welfare of the youth are not being implemented. (Maraming magagandang batas para sa kapakanan ng mga kabataan ay hindi naisasakatuparan).</td>
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<td>16. Youth are given the opportunities by their families to exercise their creativity. (Ang mga kabataan ay bini-bigyan ng pagkakataong ng kanilang mga pamilya sa pagiging malikhain).</td>
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<td>17. Grandparents have a significant role in the family especially with regard to the youth’s upbringing. (Ang mga lola at lolo ay mahalagang papad sa paghubog ng mga kabataan).</td>
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<td>18. There is a spirit of solidarity among family members in the up-bringing of children. (May damayan at bayanihan sa mga kasapi sa pamayang patungkol sa pagaaruga ng mga kabataan).</td>
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<td>20. Many young people come from broken families. (Maraming mga kabataan na nangpapalibing sa mga pamilyang hiwalay ang mga magulang).</td>
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<td>21. Majority of families do not have the provision for their crisis (sickness, accidents, death, etc) needs. (Maraming mga pamilyang alang-alang para matugunan ang kanilang crises kagaya ng pagkakasakit, kamatayan, aksidente, abp).</td>
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<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.40</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.30</td>
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<td>2.87</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Working youth help support the family especially in the education of younger brothers and sisters</td>
<td>3.14</td>
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<td>There are agencies in the country that take care of youth in crisis</td>
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<td>Parents do not abort fetas of unwanted pregnancies</td>
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<td>Young people do not become temporary orphans because their parents are working abroad</td>
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<td>Family members do not compete for the kind of TV programs they like to enjoy</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Family celebrations are appreciated by the young</td>
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<td>46</td>
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<td>Time and money of the family are devoted more to the care of the elderly</td>
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<td>Youth teach their parents Information Technology</td>
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<td>High cost of living does not make it difficult to bring up children</td>
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<td>Many good laws for the welfare of the youth are implemented</td>
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<td>Families are together at meals</td>
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<td>Young people are not temporary orphans</td>
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<td>Many young people do not suffer verbal abuse from their parents</td>
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<td>Families trust their governments to take care of the common good</td>
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<td>The indigenous/traditional popular culture promote values for intergenerational solidarity</td>
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<td>The prevailing economic monetized economy does not destroy relationships</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Young people think that their parents understand them</td>
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Table 6. Items with Lowest Scores.
DUTIES OF CHILDREN TOWARDS THE ELDERLY:  
EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES  
ON INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

WILFRIDO VILLACORTA

Introduction

In the context of East Asian cultures, duties of children to their parents are as important as the duties of parents to their children. Issues on intergenerational solidarity in East Asia are not identical with those that most Western societies confront.

First of all, an aging population is not faced by the majority of countries in the region. It is only Japan and Hong Kong which have significant “graying” populations. Almost 17% of the Japanese population are 65 years old and above; in Hong Kong, they comprise 11% (see Appendix A).

Secondly, East Asian beliefs and practices on generational relationships do not approximate the egalitarian, individualist model of Western families. Philippe Aries, in his classic work, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (1962), wrote that Western societies themselves underwent transformation in their attitudes towards childhood and family life, as a result of economic and technological changes. In the Middle Ages, the child was well integrated into the adult community. Upon reaching the age of seven, they were regarded as having the mental and emotional capacities of adults. With the advent of capitalism in the seventeenth century, the child was segregated as a person that required education to prepare him for integration in society. Because the child’s nature was considered different from that of an adult, his family saw the need to coddle him (Hutter, 1997:312). Children and the nuclear family assumed greater importance.

Aries found that the industrial era of the 19th century resulted in the increased division of labor among family members and the confinement in the home of the “non-productive” women and children (Ibid.).
Margaret Mead (1970) also wrote about generational roles and relationships that vary by culture. In postfigurative cultures, children are socialised by their forebears so that the former behave in accordance with the mores and values of the latter. Mead contrasts this pattern found in traditional societies, with that which is found in configurative cultures, where social changes render the experience of the young as significantly different from those of the older generation. This situation, which exists in most industrial societies, results in a break from the individual’s link with the past (Hutter, 1988:393-395). The reduction in the elders’ authority generates tension and conflict within the family.

In different societies, there are varying modes of transition from childhood to adolescent adulthood. Ruth Benedict (1973) found that there is less continuity in the development of age roles in industrial societies like the United States. More traditional societies employ the small-adult conception of the adolescent, where there is less dichotomization of values desired for a child, on the one hand, and those desired for an adult, on the other. These societies provide more support to individuals as they progress from one life stage to the next. This framework applies more to the East Asian approach to intergenerational continuity and equity.

Foundations of East Asian Generational Relationships

A brief review of the cultural, political and economic profile of East Asia may be necessary to provide the context of intergenerational solidarity in the region.

East Asia consists of the five countries of Northeast Asia: China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan, as well as the ten countries of Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

Except for the Philippines, Christians compose the minority in all these countries. Islam is the religion of the majority in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, and of the minority in Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand. China has also a significant Muslim minority. The Confucian and Northern Buddhist (Mahayana) traditions are strong in China, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Vietnam. Southern Buddhism (Theravada/Hinayana) is dominant in Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia (see Appendix B).

The socialist ideology holds sway among middle-aged generations in China, which has been governed by the Communist Party for 53 years. Communist governments ruled Cambodia from 1975-1991, as well as
Vietnam and Laos from 1975 to the present. A military junta reigns in Myanmar, while a unique form of socialist government with theocratic and millenialist elements controls North Korea. Brunei is a monarchy headed by a sultan.

The new democracies in the region are Indonesia, Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand, while the older democracies established after World War II are the Philippines (interrupted by the Marcos dictatorship from 1972-1986) and Japan. Singapore and Malaysia have elective parliaments with ruling parties that have dominated the political system for the past 37 years. The entrenchment of these ruling parties have made strongman rule possible in these two countries, which have an encompassing Internal Security Act often used to stifle dissent.

The market economies in East Asia are Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand. The “markets in transition” are China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Socialist countries prefer to call themselves “social market economies”. North Korea remains an autarkic economy.

Regardless of religious and ideological traditions, as well as political and economic systems, filial piety dominates generational relationships in all East Asian countries. Responsible for sustaining and reinforcing respect for parental authority are indigenous customs which are rooted in their pre-industrial past. Despite the fact that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have attained a high level of capitalist development, they have maintained their Confucian beliefs and practices.

In Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, respect for authority is likewise deep rooted in their cultures. Their folklore, temple teachings and popular literature are filled with moral lessons derived from obedience to parents and respect for elders and the king. In the Malay countries - Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines, the sultans and village chieftains epitomize the paternalism that pervades Malay culture. Islam – and in the case of the majority in the Philippines, Christianity – has institutionalized filial piety in these countries.

Filial Piety as the Core of East Asian Family Values

Kyu Taik Sung (1998) wrote that the peoples of East Asia regard families as “systems of responsibilities”. Foremost is the tradition of filial piety, which involves the obligation of adult children “to respect and care for the elderly with affection, responsibility and gratitude”.

Sung provides six major categories: respect for the parent, filial responsibility, harmonization of the family, repayment of debts to the parent, affection to the parent, and sacrifice for the parent. Respecting parents requires bringing no dishonor to parents and family, and “taking care of parents with good food, soft clothes, a warm room, comfort and peace”. Disrespectful behavior is reprehensible and severely criticized, and “the mere material support of one’s parents without the expression of reverence, respect and spiritual consolation can not even be called filial piety”. He quotes Confucius who admonished, “Filial piety today is taken to mean providing nourishment for parents, but even dogs and horses are provided with nourishment. If it is not done with reverence for parents, what’s the difference between people and animals?”.

In turn, filial responsibility requires that one pay attention to one’s own health and relieve parents of this anxiety, in the same manner that parents were most concerned about the health of their children. Sung refers to the reminder of Confucius: “While his parents are alive, the son may not go abroad to a distance. If he goes abroad, he must have a fixed place to which he goes”.

Actual Practice of Filial Piety

According to Piaget (1932), an authoritarian relationship between parent and child impedes the latter’s moral development because such relationship instills a morality of constraint and sanctions. However, the experience of families in East Asia indicates that the seemingly authoritarian and hierarchical tradition in the region does not necessarily pose a constraint to the moral development of children in their relationships with their parents.

Janet Salaff (2000) conducted a survey of literature on the practice of filial piety in Northeast Asian countries. She observes that co-residence is a guide to children’s willingness to support the elderly. Most older folk live with their children. Even in the advanced economies of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, the percentage of elderly people living with their children is around 75 to 85 percent. Despite Singapore’s small size, the overwhelming majority of the aged live in a family setting (92% women; 8% men). Only 5.7% live alone with their spouses; 73.1% live with senior children, and the “three-tier” family accounts for 21.2%.

In Hong Kong, despite small living spaces, Salaff found that the majority of elderly also live with, or near, their children. In 1991, 58.2% of the elderly people in Japan were living with their children (42% with married, 16% with unmarried children). She observed that there is a gradual decline in
co-residence among the Japanese. Patrilocal coresidency has likewise decreased in China, as more parents prefer to live independently.

Asian parents still expect their children to be filial. Most Hong Kong respondents of the Salaff study support filial piety, including caring for the elderly. Over half the respondents to a Shanghai study thought that elderly people were respected in their homes. Three-fifths of Singaporeans polled confirm that they listen to the advice of their elders. Even university and postgraduates claim that they listen to their elders.

Salaff described another study that examined exchanges between adult couples and their parents in Singapore Chinese middle-class families over different life cycles. Newlyweds mostly rely on parents for financial support, while adults with preschoolers especially need child care services. Eventually, adults become caregivers to aged parents.

The elderly who expect filial obligations are generally those with low income, poor health, widowed or divorced. They have low levels of educational attainment and do not receive pensions. They count on their daughters’ as well as their sons’ financial support.

Salaff concluded that need is relative and is socially constructed: “There are intergenerational comparisons: children that earn more than the parents are more likely to support their parents and give more. Studies on Malaysia, Taiwan and China point out that daughters with more education are both able to and willing to contribute more to their parents. This motivates parents to invest more in their daughter’s education. Parents base the amount of investment in their children’s education on the probability of their child’s success rather than, as had been the case in the traditional family of the past, the child’s gender”.

The study indicated that the supporting relationship between parents and children is reciprocal: the more the parents give to their children, the more children repay as the parents advance in age and become needy. It also found that what assures the continuity of intergenerational support is the parents’ paying for their children’s education.

Among the countries in East Asia, the Philippines is regarded as a country most influenced by the West. But despite its having been colonized by Spain from 1565-1898 and by the United States from 1901-1946, the primary values of the Filipino are very much East Asian in character. Filial piety is a legacy not only of indigenous cultures but also of China that has had an extensive influence on Filipino customs.

The study of Lilia Domingo et al., The Filipino Elderly (1994:20-45) concludes that “the family has taken on the care and provisions for the
needs of the elderly in the Philippines”. There is a very low proportion of the aged living alone or living without relatives. These findings confirm the results of the earlier survey conducted by the Social Research Center of the University of Santo Tomas (1989).

In the Philippines, people are classified according to age, and each age category has corresponding social responsibilities and expectations (Domingo et al., 1994). Society is, therefore, divided into generations, which operate under a subordination-superordination relationship (Ibid.). The older the generation, the higher the position in the hierarchy; the younger generations are expected to obey and respect them (Jocano, 1969).

The Philippine Constitution has provisions that directly relate to the family. The Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article II) stipulates that “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government (Sec. 12)”.

Moreover, the fundamental law is perhaps the only constitution in the world that has a whole, separate article on “The Family” (Article XV):

Section 1: The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2: Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3: The State shall defend: 1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; 2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; 3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and 4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

Section 4: The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social security.
Altruism or Exchange – Demands of Social Change

While filial piety remains a dominant feature of family life in East Asia, new tensions are visible in countries that are afflicted by mass poverty. Three-generation homes create inevitable problems in cramped dwellings. In countries like the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand which have large numbers of overseas workers, traditional generational roles are undermined by the long absence of one or both of the parents. Likewise, families that have settled in countries like the United States, Canada and Australia are experiencing severe cultural dislocation, particularly in family values and relationships (see Chan, 1997; Shanas, 1997).

Furthermore, rapid technological and social changes in the modern world have proven to cause tensions in the relationship between parents and children. In middle-class families, there emerges a reversal of roles when as a result of increased use of electronic gadgets, the young sometimes play the role of teachers of their parents. While this is a development that is initially welcomed by parents and children alike, the widespread use of the Internet and mobile phones escalates the individualization of adolescents and is seen by elders as another barrier to intergenerational communication.

Greater access to educational opportunities for women has generated more consciousness of gender rights. Their emancipated consciousness usually poses problems in their relations with their husbands and in-laws, who expect the traditional submissive behavior. In newly established democracies, peoples who are not used to free expression are suddenly exposed to egalitarian ideals.

There are fears that a new approach to filial piety could arise, in which the youth may now have the right to reason out with their elders as to the wisdom of required behavior – whether it contributes to the mutual benefit of child and parent. With increased independence of children, will elders be still effective in handing down desired moral and social values? Will respect from them no longer be assumed, but will, from now on, have to be earned and justified?

Even the practice of giving will now have to be subject to intergenerational negotiation where conditions are laid before agreeing to help the other party. Does this pragmatic exchange erode intergenerational solidarity or is it time that rationality be provided the age-old concept of filial piety?

Philippe Plitaud (1999) asserts that the idea of solidarity does include the idea of exchange, which is essential for the preservation of the family and the maintenance of harmony within it. He writes that “although soli-
DUTIES OF CHILDREN TOWARDS THE ELDERLY

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darity is a new concept in social policy, it is nevertheless, a very old one whose effects have long been felt at various levels and in various forms. Some authors link dependency and solidarity because to them, true dependency is at the same level as reciprocity".

Ideally, intergenerational solidarity is based on altruistic motives reinforced by tradition and moral duty, rather than by the imperative of reciprocal benefits (Rajulton, n.d.). But the exchange theory asserts that solidarity is rooted in pragmatic motivation. Parents provide childcare in return for financial support and coresidence in the future. In turn, children extend help to their elderly parents with the hope of receiving an inheritance (Ibid.) In other words, service to the young and old within the family is actually an investment or even a bribe.

Nonetheless, it will take a long time before the traditional notion of filial piety in East Asia is replaced by purely pragmatic conceptions of intergenerational exchanges of support. The cultural and ethical foundations of its societies are much too strong to be shaken by the onslaught of globalization and growing materialism. Moreover, the “crowding out” hypothesis in which a responsive welfare state reduces the support from families to their aged parents and, therefore, erodes intergenerational solidarity (Rajulton, n.d.) does not apply to East Asia, where no welfare state that effectively cares for the elderly exists. In the absence of adequate state support, intimacy and affection between generations remain intact.

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PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION AGED 65+*

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## Appendix B

### Political, Economic and Philosophical Profile of East Asia

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PART V

INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
1. IL PROBLEMA: L’ESIGENZA DI UN NUOVO CRITERIO EQUITATIVO FRA LE GENERAZIONI

1.1. Il problema di “trattare in modo giusto” ogni generazione è vecchio quanto l’umanità. Da sempre giovani, adulti e vecchi si confrontano per sapere come si debbano comportare nei rapporti reciproci: che cosa una generazione deve dare alle altre generazioni come questione di giustizia? qual è la misura delle obbligazioni? qual è la modalità con cui si devono ottemperare gli obblighi, qualora esistano? E, ancor prima di tutto ciò: perché dobbiamo, in quanto partecipi di una generazione, essere giusti verso le altre generazioni? Perché ogni generazione non potrebbe legittimamente pensare di fare i conti soltanto con se stessa (preoccupandosi semplicemente di avere un saldo zero fra ciò che ha prodotto e ciò che ha consumato)?

Ogni società ha dato risposte differenti a questi interrogativi. In certe società sono gli anziani a detenere il potere e a fissare i criteri di ciò che è equo. In altre società questo potere appartiene ai giovani oppure agli adulti (si veda una sintesi nel contributo di Williamson e Watts-Roy 1999: 4-19). Alcune società sono statiche (mantengono fissi i criteri e le norme sociali lungo i secoli), altre sono dinamiche (mutano i criteri nel corso di intervalli di tempo molto brevi). In generale, si nota una alternanza tra configurazioni (e fasi) di solidarietà e di conflitto.

Non è mio compito fare una ricognizione storica e antropologica delle società passate, benché una tale ricerca potrebbe fornirci informazioni molto istruttive. Ciò che voglio sottolineare è il fatto che il problema di come ogni generazione debba essere trattata dalle altre generazioni è una questione (public issue) del tutto nuova nei termini in cui oggi ne discutiamo. Essa è nuova perché sono completamente cambiati il contesto e il
significato del problema, nonché le modalità di definirlo e di cercare soluzioni. Infatti, sia le norme delle società tradizionali premoderne, sia le norme della società industriale non valgono più, né come definizioni della situazione, né come orientamenti normativi. Il problema dell’equità fra le generazioni coincide con quello di elaborare una nuova normatività sociale. La caratteristica fondamentale del cambiamento sta nel fatto che la materia e la forma dell’equità fra le generazioni non sono più limitate alla sfera familiare-parentale (kinship) e neppure alle istituzioni del welfare state, ma riguardano tutte le sfere private e pubbliche della società.

Non è qui il caso di discutere questi aspetti, che sono trattati in una immensa letteratura. Basterà ricordare che il contesto è segnato dai seguenti dilemma: la crescita esponenziale della popolazione, a fronte di risorse naturali che diventano sempre più scarse, impone nuovi criteri di comportamento per salvaguardare le risorse del pianeta per le generazioni future; i cosiddetti “patti sociali” fra le generazioni che sono stati tipici delle società antiche e moderne avevano dei presupposti culturali, demografici ed economici che oggi sono scomparsi o vanno scomparendo, perché cambiano i valori e le modalità di scambio, e quindi occorre trovare nuove regole di allocazione delle opportunità di vita fra le generazioni.

Per dirla molto in breve, la novità più eclatante sta nella generalizzazione del problema, ossia nel fatto che l’intero sistema socio-economico (nazionale e mondiale) deve chiedersi, nel suo complesso e nelle sue singole parti, se ogni attore e ogni azione sociale – ovunque sia praticata – corrisponda o meno ad un criterio di equità in senso generazionale. Non sono più solo i componenti delle generazioni, cioè gli individui e le loro famiglie, oltre alle istituzioni pubbliche, che si interrogano e vengono interrogate su questo aspetto del loro agire. Qualunque attore sociale (una scuola, un’associazione, una banca, un’impresa, un gruppo di popolazione, la stessa chiesa, ecc.) deve chiedersi se, nel suo agire, prevede o meno, e se rispetta o meno, un criterio di equità fra le generazioni. La generalizzazione del problema indica che siamo in presenza della necessità di elaborare nuove norme sociali, perché quelle vecchie non bastano più o sono diventate obsolete.

Il tema dell’equità fra le generazioni è apparso in modo implicito negli anni 1960, a seguito dei forti cambiamenti sociali di quel periodo storico. I movimenti giovanili e culturali del ’68 e il Rapporto del MIT per il progetto del Club di Roma sui dilemmi dell’umanità (Meadows et al. 1972) sono stati due segnali assai significativi, per quanto essi abbiano fallito gran parte delle loro analisi e dei loro obiettivi. Sono seguiti altri Rapporti che hanno avuto più o meno lo stesso destino (Il Rapporto Brundtland Our
1.2. Il concetto di “equità fra le generazioni” (d’ora in poi abbreviato in EG) è solo in apparenza chiaro e semplice. In realtà, è oltremodo oscuro e complesso.

Le definizioni oggi correnti hanno quasi tutte un carattere indeterminato e persino paradossale. Indeterminato, perché l’EG viene riferita ad una entità del tutto generica, come ad esempio “i posteri”. Paradossale, perché il referente dell’equità di cui si parla, ossia le generazioni, sono praticamente assenti da un punto di vista sociologico pertinente. Infatti, le generazioni non sono configurate come “soggetti sociali”, non hanno alcuna realtà sociale, sono culturalmente e strutturalmente deboli, e in particolare non hanno alcuna rappresentanza (“politica” o di altro genere) dei propri interessi e della propria identità. Se sostituiamo la parola “generazione” con quella di “gente” o “popolazione” di una certa età (coorti demografiche), noi vediamo che – quasi sempre – queste parole sono del tutto intercambiabili. Ciò che viene comparato sono semplicemente individui o popolazioni con età diverse, ovvero gruppi di popolazione al tempo T₁ e al tempo T₂. Ma sono queste delle “generazioni”? L’equità fra gruppi di individui con età diverse è la stessa cosa dell’equità fra generazioni? L’equità fra “coorti statistiche di individui” è la stessa cosa della “equità fra generazioni in senso sociologico”? C’è più di un motivo per affermare che non siano esattamente la stessa cosa. Anzi, mi propongo di mostrare che i due discorsi hanno significati e implicazioni profondamente differenti.

1.3. Le tesi che vorrei sostenere in questa sede sono sintetizzabili nelle seguenti proposizioni (statements).

I concetti di EG attualmente utilizzati nel dibattito internazionale definiscono la generazione come pura e semplice coorte demografica (un aggregato statistico di individui secondo l’età) e quindi non fanno riferimento ad alcun oggetto-soggetto sociologico.
D'altra parte, se si introduce un concetto sociologico di generazione, allora anche il concetto di equità deve essere modificato. Di fatto, l'equità è oggi intesa come criterio adattativo-allocativo (è un calcolo di costi-benefici e di opportunità). Se si introduce l'ottica sociologica, l'EG deve essere ridefinita come norma sociale, la quale consiste nel riconoscimento di una nuova “titolarità” di diritti-doveri delle generazioni fra di loro, sulla base di un principio di legittimazione (come è, ad esempio, quello della reciprocità allargata fra generazioni passate e future).

La conseguenza ultima è che, se la società deve perseguire l'EG in tutti i suoi ambiti, cioè con rispetto alle diverse dimensioni e sfere di giustizia in cui la società esiste e si organizza, allora è necessario che la norma dell'EG venga differenziata in ciascuna sfera e venga articolata in modo da essere generalizzabile.

Per esplicitare ed argomentare queste tesi svolgerò i seguenti passaggi.

Innanzitutto, esaminerò le definizioni di EG oggi più utilizzate, e ne metterò in evidenza i principali limiti, ambiguità e paradossi (pr. 2).

In secondo luogo, come conseguenza di tale critica, vorrei mostrare che la necessità di introdurre un concetto adeguato di generazione comporta la necessità di abbandonare o rivedere profondamente – non semplicemente “adattare” – le teorie correnti della giustizia (che io chiamo lib/lab); in altre parole, il concetto di EG deve essere reso complesso (pr. 3).

Sulla base di ciò, cercherò di esplicitare un framework concettuale, che chiamo “paradigma relazionale”, capace di differenziare e integrare le diverse dimensioni e i diversi codici simbolici dell'EG (pr. 4).

Infine, vorrei mostrare a quali conseguenze operative può condurre il reframing della questione inter-generazionale che qui propongo. Se è vero che l'equità fra le generazioni emerge come una nuova norma sociale complessa, e non solo come calcolo delle opportunità di vita, allora occorre definire relazionalmente i compiti reciprocì dei vari attori (stato, mercato, terzo settore o privato sociale, famiglie e reti informali) per realizzare un ricambio virtuoso fra le generazioni (pr. 5).

2. LE DEFINIZIONI CORRENTI: LIMITI E AMBIGUITÀ DEGLI APPROCCI LIB/LAB AL TEMA DELL'EGUITÀ FRA LE GENERAZIONI

2.1. Il dibattito sull'EG si è sviluppato negli ultimi due decenni con riferimento a due maggiori contesti di applicazione: il contesto della crisi ambientale e il contesto della crisi del welfare state. Nel primo caso l'EG è
stata tematizzata come risposta ai dilemmi di uno sviluppo ambientale sostenibile (sustainable development). Nel secondo caso è stata tematizzata come risposta alla cosiddetta “entitlement crisis”.

In breve, la questione (issue) dell’EG è diventata il paravento (l’ombrello) sotto il quale sono stati collocati altri temi, quelli delle disuguaglianze e povertà, e soprattutto quelli dei limiti delle risorse (sia quelle naturali - natural resources o physical stock - del globo, sia quelle dello stato sociale). Sarebbe interessante cercare di capire perché certi temi (come la povertà e l’ambiente) siano considerati “di sinistra” (liberal) e altri temi (come gli entitlements del welfare state) siano considerati “di destra” (conservative).

Le ideologie cosiddette di sinistra e di destra che definiscono il problema dell’EG rimandano certamente a significati simbolici e riferimenti operativi differenti. Ma, come poi dirò, hanno molti punti in comune. Liberals e conservatives si danno oggi la mano nel “definire la situazione” (attraverso il comune framework lib/lab).

Vorrei qui presentare i due suddetti “paradigmi” in forma sintetica, mettendo in luce i loro limiti, sia quelli specifici di ciascuno di essi sia quelli comuni.

2.2. (1) Il paradigma dello sviluppo ambientale sostenibile (environmental sustainable development)

Questo paradigma si riferisce al problema dell’equità fra generazioni attuali e future nella lotta per il godimento delle risorse naturali del pianeta.

Il dibattito sull’equilibrio fra popolazione e risorse della terra, iniziato sin dai tempi di Malthus è stato ridefinito negli ultimi decenni come “teoria dei limiti dello sviluppo”. Sul piano scientifico, si può dire che i modelli di simulazione si sono in gran parte rivelati fallimentari (come aveva già da tempo avvertito l’economista Colin Clark). La questione si è arenata nelle secche delle proiezioni statistiche e delle previsioni futurologiche più discutibili. Ma, nel frattempo, si sono diffusi dei movimenti sociali, detti ecologici e anti-globalizzazione, che hanno tradotto la questione in nuovi termini culturali e ideologici, cioè come esigenza di una teoria e una pratica generalizzati della conservazione dei beni naturali e sociali (theory of sustainability) nel corso delle generazioni. Il problema della ripartizione delle risorse viene tradotto nella questione di beni quanto-qualitativi che ogni generazione consuma rispetto a ciò che conserva per le generazioni successive.

La domanda è: “quanti e quali risorse naturali e ambientali dovremmo lasciare ai nostri posteri?”. La definizione delle generazioni diventa del
tutto indeterminata, anzi scompare come nozione specifica, perché il problema riguarda le popolazioni future o parti esse, senza specificare quali legami generativi abbiano con le generazioni presenti.

L'oggetto della contesa può essere esteso, al di là delle risorse ambientali, alle risorse del welfare state considerato nel tempo. Quando ci si chiede se il welfare attuale sia più o meno sostenibile nel lungo periodo, allora la domanda diventa: “i nostri posteri (figli, nipoti) potranno o meno godere di prestazioni sociali almeno equivalenti a quelle delle attuali generazioni anziane?”. In ogni caso, all’interno di questo paradigma, i legami fra le generazioni restano in ombra. Le relazioni familiari che legano fra loro le generazioni attuali e future non sono considerate.

La definizione di equità è “ecologica” e concerne il rapporto risorse/popolazione. Essa investe la “qualità di vita”, in quanto dimensione o settore di applicazione dell’economia del benessere (Dasgupta 2001).


Esistono naturalmente tanti approcci diversi. Edith Brown Weiss (1992) individua i seguenti approcci per definire l’equità intergenerazionale: 1. the preservation model, 2. the opulence model, 3. the technology model, 4. the environmental economics model. Nel primo le generazioni presenti non distruggono o non esauriscono le risorse e non alterano l’ambiente, piuttosto conservano e salvano le risorse per le future generazioni e preservano lo stesso livello di qualità in tutti gli aspetti dell’ambiente. All’estremo opposto, nel modello dell’opulenza le generazioni presenti consumano tutto quello che vogliono e producono la maggior quantità di ricchezza possibile e questo per due motivi principali: o perché non esistono certezze che le future generazioni esisteranno o perché massimizzare il consumo oggi è il modo migliore per massimizzare le ricchezze per le future generazioni. Una variante del modello dell’opulenza è quello della tecnologia, in cui le generazioni presenti non si devono preoccupare di come devono lasciare l’ambiente alle future generazioni perché l’innovazione tecnologica sarà in grado di produrre infinite risorse sostitutive. Infine, il modello economico sostiene che è possibile avere buone teorie e pratiche che massimizzino l’utilità presente senza depredare le risorse naturali, a patto di inventare e applicare strumenti che sviluppi “economie verdi”.

Sfortunatamente, questa autrice non elabora un vero e proprio approccio alternativo. Ella ricorda la necessità di ottemperare ai dettami delle convenzioni e delle leggi internazionali, basate sulla Dichiarazione Universale
dei Diritti Umani, e poi propone un concetto di EG basato su tre principi di azione: a) the conservation of options (a ciascuna generazione dovrebbe essere richiesto di conservare le diversità delle risorse naturali e culturali in modo tale da non ridurre le opzioni possibili che le future generazioni potranno avere nel risolvere i loro problemi in base ai loro valori); b) the conservation of quality (a ciascuna generazione dovrebbe essere richiesto di mantenere la qualità del pianeta in modo tale che quest'ultimo non venga trasmesso in condizioni peggiori di quelle in cui è stato ricevuto); c) the conservation of access (ciascuna generazione dovrebbe fornire ai suoi membri uguale diritti di accesso all'eredità delle generazioni passate e dovrebbe conservare questo accesso per le generazioni future). In sostanza, si tratta di un modello basato sui principi di uguaglianza e di conservazione.

Per dirla in breve, i limiti specifici di questo paradigma (detto della sostenibilità) derivano dall'assorbire il problema dell'EG in quello del rapporto fra popolazione e risorse. Lo sviluppo è definito come sostenibile se soddisfa i bisogni delle generazioni presenti senza compromettere le possibilità delle generazioni future di fare lo stesso. Ma questa prospettiva è troppo indeterminata per poter condurre a criteri pratici efficaci. Alla fine, questa impostazione porta soprattutto a dei “teoremi di indecidibilità” circa le possibili soluzioni dei problemi dell'EG.

2.3. (II) Il paradigma della crisi delle intitolazioni sociali (entitlement crisis)

Questo paradigma definisce il problema dell’equità come conflitto competitivo nella ripartizione delle risorse relative ai sistemi di sicurezza sociale e ai benefici di welfare fra generazioni compresenti. Qui la domanda non è “quanti e quali risorse di welfare dobbiamo lasciare ai nostri posteri?”, ma: “come vanno divise oggi le risorse di welfare fra i bambini, gli adulti e gli anziani?”.

La definizione di generazione è quella semplice di coorte demografica. Vengono ignorate tutte le altre definizioni di generazioni. La definizione di equità corrisponde a quella di un criterio di riconoscimento (o concessione) dei diritti sociali che “renda uguali le opportunità” fra i vari pretendentiti (claimants) compresenti. Che cosa ciò significhi è l’oggetto di una discussione che non sembra avere soluzioni coerenti con le sue premesse.

È in questo contesto che, secondo alcuni autori, emergono due interpretative packages. Williamson, Watts-Roy e Kingston (eds. 1999), ad esempio, ritengono che i concetti di generational equity (GE) e generational interdependence (GI) siano differenti in quanto evocano modalità diverse di intendere i
problemi e le possibili soluzioni negli scambi fra generazioni. Il pacchetto interpretativo di GE fa riferimento ad una concezione residuale del welfare state, mentre il pacchetto interpretativo di GI fa riferimento ad una concezione istituzionale del welfare state e delle politiche sociali (secondo la nota tipologia di R. Titmuss). “Generational equity is a thinly veiled right-wing attack on Social Security while generational interdependence is the proper stance for people who have a concern for redistribution and the plight of the poor” (Atherton 2001: 339). In entrambi i casi il concetto di generazione è usato per scopi politici estrinseci rispetto al problema dell’EG.

In breve, i limiti di questo paradigma sono quelli che derivano dal restringere il problema dell’EG alla (re)distribuzione dei benefici del welfare. In sostanza, questo paradigma: a) non vede le generazioni come attori sociali che derivano dalla discendenza familiare, semplicemente perché il welfare state non è capace di osservare e valorizzare le relazioni familiari in quanto generative; b) identifica l’equità con la regolazione delle opportunità di vita compatibili con le risorse che il welfare state può concedere agli individui in un determinato assetto politico ed economico.

2.4. Per quanto rilevanti siano i problemi dell’equità generazionale con riferimento ai beni ambientali (environmental goods) e agli entitlements di welfare, non c’è dubbio che limitare il discorso a questi ambiti restringa in modo eccessivo il problema dell’EG. Possiamo sintetizzare i limiti degli attuali paradigmi dominanti relativi all’EG nei seguenti punti.

i) Restrizioni sui beni. I due paradigmi (I e II) dell’EG lasciano da parte moltissimi beni, a cominciare dai beni culturali, intesi non solo e non tanto come opere d’arte (le quali possono essere fatte entrare nella categoria dei beni ambientali), ma in quanto modelli di valore legati alle identità culturali e alle regole di vita. In particolare, il discorso sull’EG trascura completamente i beni relazionali primari e secondari che sono l’oggetto proprio di scambio fra generazioni.

ii) Restrizioni sugli attori. I due paradigmi (I e II) dell’EG lasciano da parte gli attori sociali diversi dallo stato e dal mercato. Sembra che le generazioni di cui si parla non abbiano né famiglia, né parentela, né reti informali, né reti associative, né scambi diretti fra di loro. Di fatto, tutte queste sfere non vengono considerate come attori e ambiti, effettivi o potenziali, di EG.

iii) Restrizioni sul soggetto a cui imputare l’equità. I due paradigmi (I e II) dell’EG considerano l’equità come un criterio morale di condotta individuale oppure come criterio di funzionamento dei meccanismi allocativi...
delle istituzioni. Essi ignorano che l'equità riguarda non solo gli individui e le istituzioni, ma anche (e più propriamente) le relazioni sociali cometal. A ben vedere, infatti, il problema della giustizia è un problema relazionale perché inerisce alle relazioni sociali, prima ancora che agli individui e alle istituzioni qua talis. Esso riguarda tutte le relazioni sociali, particolari e generalizzate, e non solo alcune di esse. Questa mancanza di chiarezza nel vedere che l'equità è primariamente una norma delle relazioni sociali, porta a soluzioni di individualismo oppure di collettivismo metodologico. Con la conseguenza, ad esempio, che risulta spesso oscuro perché certi problemi di EG siano “privatizzati” (cioè considerati pertinenti a non meglio definito “sfere private”) e altri problemi siano “collettivizzati” (cioè imputati a meccanismi del sistema politico-amministrativo). In questo gioco, la famiglia perde i suoi diritti di cittadinanza come attore dell’EG (Donati 2000b).

I tre tipi di restrizioni sopra detti sono correlate al modo di concepire le generazioni e l’equità. Vediamo brevemente questi ulteriori limiti.

iv) Restrizioni nel modo di intendere le generazioni. I due paradigmi (I e II) dell’EG utilizzano un concetto di generazione che è strumentale, implicito e indiretto (Donati 1997). Nel paradigma (I) la generazione è solo un segno di referenza per ragionare sullo sfruttamento delle risorse ambientali. Nel paradigma (II) la generazione è semplicemente un’etichetta (label) per il destinatario di entitlements in base al criterio dell’età. Le generazioni sono aggregati di individui definiti per rapporto all’economia e alla politica. La loro identità (e la loro forza) è quella dei produttori-consumatori e degli elettori. In entrambi i casi i problemi sono definiti in un contesto economico e politico. In entrambi i casi il concetto di generazione (e, in parallelo, quello di equità) maschera altri problemi: preoccupazioni di spartizione di benefici fra categorie con forza economico-politica diversa e preoccupazioni per la conservazione delle risorse ambientali.

v) Restrizioni nel modo di intendere l’equità. Si nota che il concetto di equità equivale nella maggior parte degli autori (J. Rawls, J. Le Grand e altri) a quello di uguaglianza di opportunità individuali nel godere dei benefici dati dal welfare state o nell’accesso a certe risorse ambientali. Esso ha un carattere marcatamente individualistico e utilitaristico (Videla 2001). La maggior parte delle teorie dell’equità sono state elaborate con riferimento a individui e non a soggetti sociali quali sono le generazioni. Per quanto alcune delle considerazioni valide per gli individui possano essere estese anche a soggetti sociali come le generazioni, l’impianto individualistico si dimostra poco adatto a gestire i problemi presenti nel caso delle relazioni intergenerazionali. Il quadro di riferimento comune è utilitaristico in quan-
to, al fine di definire la giusta distribuzione delle risorse, suppone di poter stimare le funzioni di utilità degli individui coinvolti. Gli individui sono considerati massimizzatori auto-interessati. Assunzioni utilitaristiche di questo genere non possono dare risposte plausibili al caso delle generazioni, perché, di fronte a individui che non sappiamo se nasceranno e quale corso di vita avranno, diventa assolutamente incerto e rischioso sia fare delle stime sulle loro preferenze o funzioni di utilità, sia fare investimenti economici. In sostanza, la concezione oggi prevalente dell'EG è quella di una giustizia distributiva configurata come vantaggio reciproco: ma ciò comporta la sua impossibilità di definizione, perché, come afferma Barry (1996: 213), "se la giustizia si identifica con il vantaggio reciproco, non può esserci giustizia fra generazioni".

Il fatto che le teorie della giustizia oggi prevalenti rendano il concetto di EG sempre più astratto e impersonale, all’interno di premesse restrittive di carattere individualistico e utilitaristico, ha gravi conseguenze. Queste teorie dimenticano che un concetto generalizzato (come quello di EG) deve avere una sua base nelle norme di vita primarie, all’interno dei mondi vitali. Non è seguendo una norma impersonale e astratta che l’individuo realizza l’equità, perché, come ci ricorda Aristotele, “il giusto ha ancora bisogno di persone ch’egli possa trattare giustamente e con le quali essere giusto” (Aristotele 1993: 1177 a 30-31).

In altri termini, i maggiori paradigmi odierni ignorano che l’EG è prima di tutto una relazione interpersonale e poi, solo in secondo ordine e riflesivamente, sistemica. La loro definizione della situazione non tiene in considerazione il fatto che, anche per l’EG, esiste una co-relazione fra mondo vitale e meccanismi di funzionamento istituzionale.

Questa osservazione ci aiuta a comprendere meglio perché, oggi, nel dibattito scientifico, culturale e politico, assistiamo ad una crescente separazione fra i concetti di equità e solidarietà fra le generazioni: il primo viene utilizzato per riferimento alla allocazione di risorse (materiali o meno), il secondo per riferimento alle relazioni sociali.¹

È banale osservare che, dal punto di vista sociologico, questa scissione è priva di senso. Essa è opera di un framework, quello lib/lab, che consiste nel trasformare la questione pubblica dell’equità in un problema di compatibilità fra utilità di individui, singoli o aggregati, nel tempo. Di fatto,

¹ Per ragioni di spazio non mi è qui possibile esporre in modo ampio il senso e le giustificazioni di questa affermazione, che rimando ad altra sede.
gran parte delle restrizioni e delle distorsioni degli attuali paradigmi dominanti dell'EG si riassumono nella concezione lib/lab. Pertanto, il nostro compito è quello di esaminare più da vicino in che cosa consista precisamente la concezione che ho chiamato lib/lab, e poi vedere se i paradigmi lib/lab possano avere delle alternative praticabili.

3. L'EG COME CONCETTO COMPLESSO E DIFFERENZIATO

3.1. In questo testo, io definisco come lib/lab un framework concettuale che è comune alla maggior parte dei pensatori liberali e socialisti (J. Rawls, R. Dahrendorf, A. Giddens sono solo alcuni esempi). Tale framework concepisce l'equità sociale come offerta di uguali chances di vita per tutti (incluse le ipotetiche future generazioni) nel quadro di un patto sociale. Tale patto consiste nel concedere il massimo delle libertà utilitaristiche agli individui a condizione che i loro comportamenti siano compatibili con quelli degli altri, in rapporto ad un tasso accettabile di equilibrio complessivo fra consumo e preservazione delle risorse. Si tratta di un compromesso fra mercato e sistema politico democratico che si basa su tre assunti fondamentali: 1. accettare la distinzione fra libertà negativa (libertà “da”) e libertà positiva (libertà “di” o “per”), secondo l'accezione di Isaiah Berlin; 2. assegnare la libertà negativa al mercato e la libertà positiva allo stato; 3. limitare la libertà (negativa) individuale del mercato con la libertà (positiva) collettiva dello stato (o sistema politico-amministrativo). Tutti questi assunti sono discutibili. Infatti: 1. la distinzione fra i due tipi di libertà è solo analitica e non empirica, perché di fatto nessuna libertà è solo negativa o solo positiva; 2. assegnare la libertà negativa al mercato comporta che la libertà negativa sia privatizzata, e, all'opposto, assegnare la libertà positiva allo stato comporta che la libertà positiva sia collettivizzata; 3. attribuire i due tipi di libertà rispettivamente al mercato e allo stato conduce ad una reificazione dei concetti e delle pratiche sociali, con conseguenze inaccettabili (per esempio, si arriva a negare che il mercato possa promuovere anche delle libertà positive e non si vede che anche lo stato promuova delle libertà negative).

Dobbiamo cercare un concetto di EG insieme più complesso e più specifico di quelli oggi utilizzati all'interno del framework lib/lab, perché quest'ultimo presenta selezioni non accettabili. Soprattutto rende indifferenti o annulla le relazioni fra le generazioni, e in questo modo porta la questione dell'EG sul terreno della indecidibilità.
Abbiamo bisogno di un concetto di EG che tenga conto di tutti i beni, attori e relazioni sociali. A tale scopo, si deve partire dall'osservazione che esiste una corrispondenza fra il concetto di equità e il concetto di generazione. Se cambiiamo il concetto di generazione, dobbiamo cambiare anche il concetto di equità. I paradigmi richiamati in precedenza hanno in comune il fatto di evitare di definire la generazione come una relazione di discendenza familiare mediata dai rapporti societari e pertanto non elaborano un concetto di equità riferito specificatamente e direttamente a tali relazioni.

Se si vuole proporre un framework alternativo a quello lib/lab, occorre non solo includere tutti i beni e gli attori sociali, ma anche definire l'equità come una norma delle relazioni sociali fra le generazioni come tali, orientandosi ad una metodologia che non può essere né individualistica, né olistica, né utilitaristica, né contrattualistica, perché tutte queste versioni non si applicano (o si applicano in maniera molto parziale) al campo delle relazioni intergenerazionali.

Io chiamo questo framework alternativo “paradigma relazionale” (fig. 1) in quanto: a) non definisce le generazioni semplicemente come coorti demografiche, bensì come relazione sociale di discendenza che ha un carattere pubblicamente rilevante; b) in parallelo, definisce l'equità come insieme di diritti e doveri relazionali propri di gruppi e relativi ai rapporti fra gruppi che hanno certe relazioni di discendenza, viste come relazioni di reciprocità.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(I) Paradigma della sustainability</th>
<th>Definizione dell’equità</th>
<th>Concetto di generazione</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pari opportunità nell’accesso ai beni naturali e ambientali</td>
<td>Popolazione in generale</td>
<td></td>
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<th>(II) Paradigma degli entitlements</th>
<th>Definizione dell’equità</th>
<th>Concetto di generazione</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pari opportunità nell’accesso ai diritti sociali</td>
<td>Generazione come coorte demografica</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>(III) Paradigma relazionale</th>
<th>Definizione dell’equità</th>
<th>Concetto di generazione</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diritti e doveri relazionali (cioè propri di gruppi e relativi ai rapporti fra gruppi che hanno certe relazioni di discendenza, viste come relazioni di piena reciprocità)</td>
<td>Gruppo di età in quanto accomunato da analoghi rapporti di discendenza (generante-generato) mediati dalla società</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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Fig. 1. Tre paradigmi.
Per questa via, il concetto di EG viene reso complesso e differenziato. L’equità comporta un complesso di diritti e doveri. Quanti e quali? Si trata di differenziarli secondo le sfere in cui ogni concetto di generazione diventa rilevante.

3.2. Vorrei illustrare il paradigma relazionale dell’EG con riferimento ai concetti-chiave di: generazione, equità e relazioni fra generazioni

Generazione. Il concetto di generazione ha avuto ed ha una pluralità di significati che conviene ricordare. Una generazione può essere intesa:

- (G) come coorte demografica,
- (I) come unità storica (nel senso di K. Mannheim), ossia come insieme di persone che hanno condiviso ideali, vissuti ed esperienze di eventi storici significativi comuni,
- (A) come categoria di consumo (l’insieme degli individui che condividono uno stile di vita rispetto al mercato),
- (L) come discendenza familiare, ossia come posizionamento nel prima-dopo delle relazioni di filiazione e parentela,
- come relazione sociale che lega coloro che hanno una stessa collocazione nella discendenza familiare (figli, genitori, nonni, bisnonni) rispetto al modo in cui tale collocazione viene trattata dalla società attraverso le sfere sociali che mediano tali relazioni all’interno e all’esterno della famiglia (questa definizione mantiene la complessità dello schema relazionale AGIL).


Personalmente ho discusso queste diverse accezioni di “generazione” in vari contributi, nei quali ho cercato di mostrare che la definizione oggi più interessante, anche dal punto di vista operativo, è quella relazionale, perché ci permette di connettere la generazione in senso familiare con quella in senso sociale, considerato che una generazione (a tutte le età della vita) è sempre più l’insieme delle persone che si definiscono rispetto ad un “prima” e a un “dopo” all’interno del legame della discendenza familiare, passando attraverso le crescenti mediazioni che la società (e in particolare il welfare state) esercita su tali legami.

Il senso del termine “generazione” dipende comunque dall’uso pratico che se ne fa: se si devono fare allocazioni di bilancio statale è evidente che la definizione più semplice è quella di coorte demografica; se si deve fare una ricerca di marketing, l’accezione più conveniente è quella della generazione come stile di consumo; se si parla di un confronto fra visioni politiche o ideali del mondo, è quella storica che risulta più espressiva e significante; se si parla di scambi nella parentela si userà l’accezione della discendenza familiare. Nell’ottica delle politiche sociali, e dell’analisi più ampia della società, la definizione relazionale è quella che risulta più capace di farci comprendere come le generazioni siano o non siano tenute in considerazione nelle dinamiche più complesse attraverso cui vengono realizzate le allocazioni di risorse e gli scambi generalizzati.

Equità. È anch’esso un concetto complesso e differenziato. Non esiste una sola concezione che possa esprimere tutte le sfaccettature, le dimensioni e le loro relazioni, di un concetto che, in senso astratto, significa “dare a ciascuno ciò che gli spetta” (Scamuzzi 1990; Cohen ed. 1993; Turner 1998). Ma che cosa spetta agli individui, alle generazioni, ai gruppi sociali? La risposta dipende da vari criteri: bisogna vedere (i) quali sono i soggetti in relazione a cui ci riferiamo, (ii) ciò che è oggetto di distribuzione e/o scambio, (iii) quali sono le regole allocative e inoltre (iv) il contesto relazionale. Infatti, se è vero che la giustizia è una qualità dello scambio (Höffe 1996), è d’altra parte vero che il valore di ciò che è scambiato dipende dalla relazione in cui lo scambio è incorporato, ovvero dal modo in cui gli attori dello scambio osservano e rappresentano la loro relazione (Donati 2000a).

Per trattare il problema dell’equità sociale si è soliti risalire alla filosofia classica. Secondo Aristotele (1993), affermare che un certo comportamento o istituzione è ingiusto può significare due cose differenti: 1) non rispetta l’uguaglianza; 2) non è conforme alla legge. Il secondo significato riguarda il problema della legalità, della giustizia legale, e in questa sede deve essere lasciato da parte. Quanto al primo significato, Aristotele distin-
gie tre tipi di giustizia: la giustizia distributiva, la giustizia correttiva e la giustizia come equità. La giustizia distributiva significa far sì che fra le persone e i beni da distribuire (beni sociali in senso lato: ricchezza, reddito, beni materiali, onori, prestigio, ecc.) sussista una proporzione adeguata: in sostanza, se gli individui A e B sono o fanno cose “uguali” dovranno ricevere la stessa quantità di beni. Alla base della concezione aristotelica della giustizia distributiva sta l’idea di proporzione, idea che implica che tra i quattro termini in questione (due individui A e B, e due panieri di beni sociali c e d) intercorra la relazione: A : B = c: d. L’idea aristotelica ha il fascino delle soluzioni semplici e piane, ma è facile riconoscere che essa non è applicabile al caso delle generazioni. La giustizia correttiva è quella tipica del giudice nel momento in cui deve definire l’ammontare di un danno per condannare l’autore del suddetto danno al risarcimento: per molta parte questo tipo di giustizia confluirà in quella che oggi chiamiamo “giustizia redistributiva” fra generazioni compresenti e fra generazioni passate e future. La giustizia come equità, sempre secondo Aristotele, è propria del giudice che si trova a dover applicare una norma astratta e generale ad un caso concreto, non previsto o non prevedibile (come certi diritti umani o, per stare al nostro caso, ai diritti delle generazioni non ancora nate, che non conosciamo e di cui non sappiamo nulla).

Aristotele formula dunque un criterio di massima, che non ci è molto di aiuto. Tutta la filosofia sociale antica e moderna è una ricerca intorno al problema di come rendere più preciso il concetto di equità. Di fatto, i filosofi classici cercano sempre un criterio fondamentale, mentre solo di recente si comincerà a parlare di giustizia (ed equità) come nozione complessa (notoriamente è questo l’approccio di M. Walzer sulle differenti “sfere di giustizia”).

Ma si deve notare qualcosa di più. Aristotele non conosce quella che noi oggi chiamiamo “giustizia commutativa” (del mercato) e non conosce quella che oggi chiameremmo la “giustizia del semplice riconoscimento”. Pertanto, come poi dirò, egli non perviene ad una concezione relazionale della giustizia (Donati 2000a).

Tuttavia la gran parte dei filosofi, seguendo lo schema aristotelico, continuano a cercare un principio allocativo sulla base del quale distribuire i beni sociali (ovvero confrontare le opportunità dei due individui in gioco). In linea generale, i principi generali discussi sono stati: il principio del dovuto (unicuique suum), il principio del libero scambio (ad esempio R. Nozick), il principio del merito (teorie meritocratiche), il principio del bisogno (ad esempio K. Marx).
Non è qui possibile entrare nei dettagli. Posso solo osservare che nessuno di questi principi può valere come criterio-guida nei problemi di equità fra le generazioni. Un criterio distributivo unico non può mai corrispondere alla varietà dei beni sociali e delle generazioni coinvolte.


Questi esiti debbono essere correlati alle caratteristiche strutturali delle teorie suddette.

(i) In primo luogo, esse si collocano quasi tutte all’interno di una prospettiva hobbesiana (in senso lato). La giustizia viene pensata come l’insieme delle regole che esprimono il patto hobbesiano tra gli individui e lo stato: gli individui, contemporanei e auto-interessati, rendendosi conto che il conflitto è svantaggioso per tutti, decidono di cooperare e definiscono, attraverso una negoziazione razionale, le norme che dovrebbero regolare questa cooperazione in maniera tale che le parti che sono contrattualmente più forti non prevarichino oltre certi limiti sulle parti più deboli; lo stato opera da garante ponendo limiti di controllo e ridistribuzione sociale (dimensione lab) alla cooperazione fra individui liberi sul mercato (dimensione lib).

(ii) In secondo luogo, queste teorie tentano di mantenere un criterio proporzionalista di equità, tradotto nel concetto di un’uguale proporzione di opportunità (pari chances di vita, di accesso alle risorse naturali e sociali, ecc.).

Entrambe queste caratteristiche sono forse applicabili agli individui visti come agenti del mercato e come singoli cittadini di fronte allo Stato, ma non sono applicabili alle generazioni in quanto relazioni sociali. Applicate al caso delle generazioni, tutte queste teorie della giustizia incontrano fallimenti, aorie e paradossi.

In sostanza, le concezioni contemporanee sono tutte alla ricerca di un concetto fondamentale o onnicomprensivo di equità, da applicare ai vari contesti. In generale, il concetto cui si fa appello ha un carattere essenzial-
mente politico, in combinazione con le esigenze economiche. In gergo sociologico, l’EG è una variante del problema della razionalità strumentale: dato il fine liberal-democratico dell’uguaglianza di opportunità per tutti coloro che partecipano al gioco di cui si parla, si tratta di discutere sui mezzi più efficienti per massimizzare l’efficienza. Il gioco è fra mercato e stato. Le relazioni interpersonali e di mondo vitale sono escluse, perché considerate un fatto privato, sfera non pubblica. Il concetto di equità viene ridotto al linguaggio dei diritti e dei meriti, ignorando i bisogni di mondo vitale e gli scambi che in tali mondi vengono realizzati.

Per il momento, è sufficiente trarre la conclusione che il concetto generale di equità può essere distinto in quattro componenti o dimensioni: A) come merito; G) come dovuto (diritto sociale); I) come esigenza di uno scambio adeguato; L) come riconoscimento di un bisogno umano fondamentale. Detto in altri termini, possiamo dire che l’equità presenta i seguenti significati e dimensioni:

- (A) come corrispettivo calcolabile in termini di equivalenza monetaria o funzionale in base a criteri come il merito (equità commutativa);
- (G) equità come ridistribuzione fra chi ha di più (chi è più ricco) e chi ha di meno (chi è più povero), nel senso ‘politico’ del termine; è l’equità intesa come ridistribuzione di un centro che raccoglie contributi dalle singole unità periferiche per operare una solidarietà calmieratrice generale nel corpo politico;
- (I) come reciprocità di equivalenti o quasi equivalenti simbolici (non mercantili o monetari) fra soggetti che hanno scambi sociali organizzati nella sfera civile; è l’equità come scambio simbolico nelle sfere del privato sociale;
- (L) come “dare a ciascuno secondo il suo bisogno”, non in quanto ‘principio comunitario’, ma come agire per reciprocità nel circuito del dono (Godbout 1992, 1994);

- (nel suo complesso =AGIL) come giustizia relazionale, ossia come distribuzione delle risorse che deve tenere conto della specificità di ogni sfera (con il suo criterio-guida) e allo stesso tempo del risultato complessivo, in modo da promuovere un’equità relazionale di ordine superiore; l’EG si configura come un principio distributivo promozionale e sinergico, che fa del’equità fra generazioni un gioco a somma maggiore di zero, anziché un gioco a somma zero.

Si tratta di vedere quali relazioni intercorrrano fra queste dimensioni nel caso delle relazioni inter-generazionali. Equità significa che una generazione deve ricevere ciò che è giusto nei termini del criterio di ciò che è dato e con-
traccambiato nel circuito allargato del tempo generazionale. Vi deve essere una certa proporzione fra ciò che è stato dato e ciò che viene restituito (alla stessa generazione o ad altre), altrimenti è un dono (o beneficenza) o è ridistribuzione oppure è un equivalente di merito. Ma come rendere specifico questo criterio di proporzione ove venga applicato alle generazioni?

c) Equità delle relazioni (fra generazioni). Applicare il concetto di equità alle relazioni come tali (in questo caso generazionali) è un compito che nessuno ha affrontato seriamente. Infatti, esso implica l’adozione di un approccio relazionale. L’equità è in genere vista come trattamento degli individui (singoli o collettivi) in un gioco, e fa riferimento al quanto e al come viene distribuito fra loro. Si tratta di equità fra individui che usano le relazioni sociali per soddisfare i loro bisogni individuali. Il concetto di equità delle relazioni (non semplicemente “nelle” relazioni) sottolinea invece il fatto che le relazioni hanno dei valori e delle regole inerenti alle relazioni stesse, non ai soggetti in gioco. Da tale punto di vista possiamo distinguere:

– (G) l’equità fra le generazioni come ridistribuzione politica delle risorse in accordo con una scala di bisogni tradotti in diritti (civili, sociali, culturali), fra cui i merit wants (i bisogni che una società ritiene meritevoli e degni di essere garantiti),

– (A) l’equità fra le generazioni come garanzia di uguali opportunità (condizioni di giusta competizione) sul mercato,

– (I) l’equità fra le generazioni come regole di reciprocità negli scambi indiretti fra generazioni tramite sfere di privato sociale (non profit),

– (L) l’equità fra le generazioni come regole di reciprocità negli scambi diretti fra generazioni in base all’etica del dono,

– (nel suo complesso = AGIL) l’equità relazionale fra le generazioni come riconoscimento e implementazione dei diritti di ciascuna generazione da parte delle singole sfere di vita, secondo la norma per cui: (a) in negativo, l’età non deve essere un fattore di discriminazione negativa o – viceversa – di privilegio ingiustificato, ossia richiede un’attenzione specifica ai bisogni propri di ogni fase di vita; (b) in positivo, ogni generazione deve agire con le generazioni compresenti e immediatamente successive in vista del massimo aiuto reciproco, sviluppando i potenziali (le migliori capacità e possibilità di vita) di ciascuna generazione.

3 Con questa impostazione io voglio sottolineare il fatto che gli individui si trovano ad agire in un contesto sociale di valori e di regole che non hanno fatto loro, e, seppure possano modificarlo, ne sono condizionati e debbono tenere comunque conto di come lo modificano se vogliono produrre certi effetti e non altri, specie quelli indesiderati.
Il problema dell’EG rimanda ad una norma sociale. Ma la norma deve essere differenziata a seconda delle sfere di giustizia in cui deve essere interpretata e applicata. Quasi tutte le teorie correnti sull’equità generazionale sono formulate dentro il mercato (A) e/dentro lo stato (G). L’area degli interessi (opportunità e uguaglianza) prevale sull’area delle identità, sia le identità primarie (relative ai valori di dignità umana, o diritti umani), sia le identità secondarie (relative ai diritti relazionali di associazione e di appartenenza).

Visto sotto questa luce, il dibattito sull’EG appare gravemente lacunoso e problematico, semplicemente perché riflette tutti i limiti e le insufficienze di un framework lib/lab che definisce l’EG come pari opportunità (uguaglianza in G e opportunità in A) nell’area degli interessi, ignorando i problemi delle identità (area L) e delle norme sociali (area I).

3.3. Possiamo brevemente vedere come i vari sotto-sistemi e attori definiscono il nostro problema. Ogni sfera sociale, ogni sotto-sistema della società, ha una propria definizione di generazione, ha un proprio codice simbolico dell’equità, ha una propria modalità di praticare l’equità nelle (e delle) relazioni inter-generazionali e conosce i propri successi e fallimenti. Chi sono questi attori e come agiscono?

In accordo con la visione relazionale qui proposta, li possiamo descrivere nel modo seguente. 

(G) Lo stato, o sistema politico-amministrativo, vede le generazioni come coorti demografiche, ha una concezione ridistributiva dell’equità e la pratica sia direttamente tramite i propri apparati, sia indirettamente attraverso le regolazioni che impone alle altre sfere societarie. Il criterio politico dell’equità ha certamente avuto il peso maggiore negli ultimi decenni rispetto agli altri criteri. L’equità come redistribuzione per via politica (soprattutto appoggiata al sistema fiscale, oltreché alle varie casse contributive e alle assicurazioni obbligatorie gestite in proprio) ha funzionato, per così dire, come l’archetipo dell’equità fra le generazioni, assicurando soprattutto agli anziani ciò che la loro condizione di debolezza non avrebbe potuto loro garantire. Ma nello stesso tempo, possiamo dire che lo stato

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4 In termini sociologici, elaborare una normatività sociale richiede una definizione della situazione (G), la sua valutazione in termini di orientamenti di valore (L), la definizione delle relative aspettative (I) e degli strumenti (A) con cui poter realizzare la nuova norma, nell’intera società e in ciascuna sua sfera.
ha adottato una visione assai riduttiva del problema dell’EG. Di fatto, lo stato non solo ha ignorato e tuttora ignora gli altri criteri (non ridistributivi), ma ha teso e tuttora tende ad imporre alle altre sfere i propri criteri politici di ridistribuzione su comando. Il risultato è che gli apparati statali (si pensi alla scuola, ai servizi sociali e sanitari, alla previdenza e sicurezza gestita dalle istituzioni statali) includono i soggetti che fanno parte di una generazione nella società politica, ma li escludono dalle sfere di equità di altro genere, la famiglia innanzitutto, e poi del privato sociale e del mercato. In questo modo, le generazioni sono rimosse e anche represse, e diven- tano un'altra cosa. Si prende l'esempio dei servizi domiciliari per anziani. Se si intervistano gli operatori di tali servizi essi rispondono che il maggior ostacolo al loro lavoro è la famiglia dell'anziano; e allora ci si chiede: perché? Le ragioni stanno nel fatto che i familiari vedono nell'operatore socia- le una persona che offre molte opportunità all'anziano (perché lo aiuta, lo fa divertire, lo porta nella sfera pubblica), ma con il risultato di estraniare l'anziano dalla famiglia. Detto in breve, l'operatore di welfare include l’an- ziano nella società, ma lo esclude dal sistema delle generazioni in famiglia. Cioè che si vede che la triangolazione operatore-anziano-famiglia non favorisce il bene della rete dell'anziano, ma introduce un criterio di equità estrinseco che, se ha certi vantaggi immediati per il benessere individuale dell’anziano, porta agli svantaggi di una scarsa integrazione della rete sociale che lo attornia, e quindi, alla lunga, indebolisce la persona dell’an- ziano, appunto perché il criterio politico dei servizi di welfare viene a con- figgere con quello familiare (lo stesso si può dire per molti altri servizi).

Intendere l’equità come ridistribuzione realizzata da apparati pubblici è stato sinora il criterio dominante, e sembra avere una legittimazione pres- soché a priori, ossia non sembra di per sé sollevare problemi. Ma non è così. Certamente questo modo di operare è positivo quando contribuisce a tem- perare le disuguaglianze che sorgono dall’appartenere a determinati conte- sti sfavorevoli. Ma, utilizzato da solo, questo criterio può avere effetti dele- teri dal punto di vista dell’inibizione di altri criteri equitativi, soprattutto quelli di mondo vitale.

(A) Il mercato vede le generazioni sotto l’ottica economica, il suo crite- rio equitativo è quello commutativo (di merito) e quest’ultimo viene prati- cato secondo parametri di efficienza. In linea generale, i criteri allocativi del mercato seguono la regola di una giustizia contrattuale, che valorizza le relazioni generazionali in base a parametri di convenienza e utilità. Le ope- razioni economiche di mercato, da quelle finanziarie delle banche a quelle dei contratti di lavoro nelle imprese, non guardano a ciò che dovrebbe favo-
rire un trasferimento dalle generazioni più forti a quelle più deboli, ma
mirano a massimizzare i profitti e a ridurre rischi e costi dell’operatore eco-
nomico. Se il fattore età viene considerato, ciò accade sempre da un punto
di vista di maggiore efficienza e remuneratività: per le banche ciò coincide
con il favorire chi dà maggiori garanzie finanziarie e patrimoniali (quindi
più gli adulti e gli anziani che i giovani), per le imprese ciò significa tratta-
re meglio chi ha accumulato maggiori competenze, capacità, esperienze (il
che penalizza i giovani, che sono ancora in via di formazione). Il mercato è
dunque “cieco” di fronte ai problemi di una giustizia fra le generazioni che
sia espressione di valori ed esigenze meta-economiche. Se valorizza le rela-
zioni generazionali è solo in quanto le osserva come soggetti produttori e
in quanto destinatari di consumi. Sotto il profilo produttivo, le generazioni
sono considerate come competenze lavorative, che presentano certi van-
taggi e certi svantaggi a seconda dell’età. Sotto il profilo dei consumi, le
generazioni sono osservate e trattate come fasci di stili di vita ai quali rivol-
gere determinati prodotti. In ogni caso, sia per la produzione che per il con-
sumo, il mercato fa un uso strumentale delle relazioni generazionali. Solo
nelle imprese familiari le generazioni diventano evidenti e vengono valoriz-
zate dal punto di vista di un’equità generazionale che tiene conto di ele-
menti extra-economici: ma lì è il criterio familiare che diventa preminente.

(I) Le sfere di privato sociale (terzo settore non-profit) vedono le gene-
razioni come ‘soggetti storici’, hanno una concezione reciprocativa dell’e-
quità e la praticano sia direttamente tramite le proprie organizzazioni, sia
indirettamente attraverso il coinvolgimento delle altre sfere di vita nei
mondi vitali delle famiglie e delle reti informali. Tuttavia queste sfere si
fermano spesso ad un agire che non raggiunge livelli adeguati di riflessivi-
tà nell’operare l’equità generazionale. Molte associazioni e organizzazioni
di privato sociale si muovono nell’ottica di specifici problemi (single issues),
come aiutare i bambini poveri, abusati, abbandonati, oppure sostenere l’an-
ziano solo, e così via, che non hanno di per sé un’ottica di EG, in quanto
non coinvolgono le generazioni fra loro, ma sono proiettati a risolvere i sing-
goli problemi per casi singoli o collettivi, adottando una definizione di
generazione che spesso segue un codice demografico o politico-ammini-
strativo, e non corrisponde a quella di una relazione fra soggetti che sono
attori aventi “fra loro” aspettative, debiti, crediti propri di circuiti di reti pri-
marie e secondarie di scambio. In buona sostanza, le sfere di privato socia-
le che si pongono lo specifico compito di costruire legami di reciprocità fra
le generazioni sono poche e comunque, in via generale, mancano ancora di
una riflessività di ordine superiore. Un’eccezione significativa è rappresen-
tata da quelle associazioni familiari che si mobilitano e organizzano pro-
prio in chiave di una nuova relazionalità fra le generazioni che sono pre-
sentì nelle famiglie associate.

(L) La famiglia e la parentela vedono le generazioni come discendenza,
hanno una concezione donativa dell’equità e la praticano sia nelle relazio-
ni di scambio ristretto, sia nelle reti di scambio più allargato (anche a reti
informali e di privato sociale). La famiglia è stata l’operatore per eccellen-
za dell’EG (se e in quanto è stata concepita e praticata come relazione di
piena reciprocità fra i sessi e fra le generazioni). Tuttavia, a causa dei comp-
plessi cambiamenti che l’hanno investita, la famiglia si trova ora in grandi
dificoltà a continuare questo suo compito. Le difficoltà possono essere
classificate in due tipi di cause: le cause esterne, consistenti nelle interfe-
renze di stato, mercato e altre sfere di socializzazione non-familiari, che
introducono regolazioni differenti da quelle familiari e rendono più comp-
plessi e onerose queste ultime; le cause interne, consistenti nel restringi-
mento della composizione familiare a due o tre generazioni, al cosiddetto
fenomeno della semplificazione o frammentazione delle forme familiari
che conseguono ai processi interni di conflitto e rottura (separazioni, divor-
zi, aumento dei genitori soli, ecc.). È soprattutto il progressivo intervento
di stato e mercato, con i loro codici simbolici delle “generazioni” (preva-
lemente di coorte e di stili di consumo), che modifica le connotazioni e
la gestione delle generazioni dentro la famiglia.

In sintesi: i) il problema dell’EG risulta essere deficitario in ogni sfera
sociale, sia perché ogni sfera ne ha scarsa consapevolezza, sia perché non
vengono problematizzati gli strumenti per realizzarla, in particolare quando
si tratta di relazionare le varie sfere tra loro; ii) nelle politiche sociali, l’o-
biettivo dell’equità è stato e tuttora viene affidato in modo crescente allo
stato, il quale però lo gestisce con codici politici, amministrativi ed econo-
mici, che mal si accordano con quelli propri delle famiglie e delle sfere di
privato sociale; in presenza di una debolezza culturale e strutturale dei
mondi vitali delle famiglie e delle loro forme associative, queste ultime tendo-
don o a reagire assumendo i criteri di equità e trattamento generazionale
lib/lab che prevalgono nelle altre sfere (pur mantenendo alcune delle pro-
prie caratteristiche distinctive).

La modernità ha esaltato il ruolo dello stato nel perseguire l’equità
fra le generazioni, riconducendo il problema della giustizia sociale fra
generazioni a quello di eliminare o almeno attutire le funzioni disugua-
litarie delle famiglie e delle sfere private. Ciò ha prodotto alcuni vantag-
gi in termini di democratizzazione ed uguaglianza nell’accesso alle risor-
EQUITÀ FRA LE GENERAZIONI: UNA NUOVA NORMA SOCIALE

4. LA NECESSITÀ DI UN PARADIGMA RELAZIONALE DELL’EQUITÀ FRA LE GENERAZIONI

4.1. Le aperture cui i concetti lib/lab di EG vanno incontro indicano che la questione va riformulata a partire dall’idea che i problemi della EG (i) non riguardano solamente gli individui e le collettività, ma le relazioni fra le generazioni intese come soggetti sociali (cioè definite come insieme di persone che sono collocate in posizioni simili di discendenza familiare), e (ii) non riguardano solo lo stato e il mercato, ma tutti gli attori della società.

Un concetto complesso e plurale di equità fra le generazioni implica che (fig. 2):

(a) l’EG sia articolata in differenti sfere di giustizia (mercato, sistema politico-amministrativo, associazioni, famiglie), basicamente differenti perché seguono proprie distinzioni-guida nell’osservare le generazioni e nel definire l’EG; ciascuna sfera relazionale deve specificare il codice simbolico con cui osserva le generazioni e le tratta operativamente in modo da differenziarsi e integrarsi con le altre sfere;

(b) le relazioni fra le varie sfere (dimensioni con i loro codici simboli) dell’EG debbano essere individuate e gestite in maniera adeguata, cioè attraverso “principi di collegamento” come i seguenti: b1) nessuna sfera

se per le singole generazioni, ma ha avuto grossi svantaggi nel rimettere alla sfera pubblica ciò che essa non può da sola compiere. Oggi, il problema dell’EG diventa piuttosto una questione di: (a) valorizzare la specificità di criteri equitativi propri in ogni sfera, (b) relazionare in maniera adeguata le varie sfere fra loro, tenendo conto del fatto che i loro diversi processi di valorizzazione e perseguimento dell’equità fra le generazioni sono strettamente interrelati e interdipendenti. Ogni singolo sotto-sistema può e deve fare la propria parte in vista di una maggiore giustizia nella creazione e distribuzione delle risorse sociali fra le diverse generazioni, ma ciò va compreso nel quadro relazionale che connette i diversi sotto-sistemi e i loro attori.

In conclusione, pensare la società in termini di equità generazionale significa tenere conto di un quadro complesso che non ammette scorie. Una welfare society in grado di garantire ad ogni generazione ciò che le spetta, nel presente e nel futuro, dipende da come vengono esplicitati e integrati fra loro i criteri e le pratiche equitative nello stato, nel mercato, nel privato sociale, nelle famiglie e nelle reti informali connesse (quattro ambi- ti e sei relazionamenti fra di essi).
deve appropriarsi dei compiti delle altre sfere; b2) ogni sfera deve essere sussidiaria ai compiti delle altre sfere.

L'inquadramento relazionale ha due vantaggi. Primo, mostra le differenze e le connessioni fra le dimensioni sostantive e quelle procedurali dell'EG. Infatti (sempre con riferimento alla fig. 2), le dimensioni sostanziali dell'equità fra le generazioni si situano sull'asse che lega i valori della dignità umana (valori primari e motivazioni primarie dell'agire sociale) con la politicità dei diritti sociali delle generazioni (asse L-G). Le dimensioni formali dell'equità si collocano lungo l'asse adattativo-regolativo (A-I), cioè sono inerenti ai mezzi e alle regole procedurali degli scambi fra generazioni.

Secondo, l'inquadramento relazionale nonché chiarifica le differenze fra equità e solidarietà fra le generazioni. L'equità non è la solidarietà, perché equità vuol dire "trattare giustamente" (fairness) nel riconoscere esigenze, obbligazioni, diritti e doveri morali di una generazione in rapporto alle altre, mentre la solidarietà implica una motivazione altruistica e può andare oltre i criteri della giustizia distributiva o di altro genere. La solidarietà è il motore dell'equità. La solidarietà si esercita come prima mossa (primum movens) del dono e poi continua come ridistribuzione (compensatoria). L'equità ha bisogno della solidarietà come motore dell'agire sociale, ma l'equità consiste in relazioni di giustizia, non di beneficenza. Il dono è ciò che motiva, e in particolare ispira l'esigenza di una ridistribuzione sull'intero arco delle generazioni che si prendono in considerazione. Ma l'azione concreta deve poi essere condotta secondo criteri di efficienza e correttezza procedurale.

Se non ci fosse l'equità, la solidarietà verrebbe ridotta a filantropia. Detto in altri termini, l'equità fra le generazioni è lo strumento necessario per sostenere e rafforzare una solidarietà non assistenzialistica fra le generazioni. Il frutto migliore di questo interscambio fra solidarietà ed equità è la pace sociale fra le generazioni.

4.2. Per andare oltre l’assetto lib/lab, e superare le sue insufficienze e distorsioni, occorre integrare i concetti di generazione, equità sociale ed equità nelle relazioni fra le generazioni includendo le dimensioni che vanno oltre l’uguaglianza proporzionale del trattamento e oltre il calcolo dei vantaggi e delle opportunità.

Il concetto lib/lab di EG è solo una parte del problema e delle sue possibili soluzioni, e certo non è quella più importante. Lo si vede chiaramente quando si consideri il fatto che il concetto lib/lab di EG è un concetto privo di “generatività”, è impotente, debole, fiacco. Nella versione di J. Rawls (1971) (che è certamente l’esponente più emblematico del lib/lab), il principio dell’EG assume la veste di un “principio di risparmio” (savings principle), nel senso che – per dirla con Wissenburg (2000) “it is simply rational for goal-maximizing individuals to seek the mutual benefit of a savings principle”.

Al contrario, l’approccio relazionale sostiene che abbiamo bisogno di una EG concepita in senso generativo, cioè come norma capace di generare un’equità configurata come gioco a somma maggiore di zero, e non solo come conservazione/preservazione delle risorse per i posteri (come pensano gli autori che seguono Rawls, tra cui Wissenburg).
Come è possibile questo? Possiamo fare qualche esempio. i) Creare schemi previdenziali e di sicurezza sociale che non siano fatti per gli individui o per relazioni “orizzontali” (per esempio famiglie come coppie di coniugi), ma per relazioni generazionali (ad esempio per famiglie compiute su 2 o 3 generazioni successive); ii) promuovere crediti di spesa, anziché debiti di bilancio pubblico, per i nuovi nati; iii) utilizzare le risorse naturali e le bio-diversità adottando criteri che vincolino il loro uso a condizioni di rigenerazione delle stesse o di loro equivalenti, incentivando la produzione di un surplus; e così via.

In tutte queste possibili misure, è evidente che un concetto puramente economico e politico di EG è del tutto insufficiente: solo se si prendono in considerazione le dimensioni di valore e di integrazione sociale, mobilitando i relativi attori, è possibile concepire un’equità che si estenda su più generazioni.

Oggi, neo-individualismo (neo-lib) e ne-socialismo (neo-lab) si dividono il campo del dibattito pubblico senza arrivare ad un punto di vista veramente generativo. Essi lottano fra loro. Ma poi arrivano a compromessi che si esplicitano in “contratti” fra generazioni che hanno un sapore hobbesiano. Assumere un punto di vista contrattualistico significa essere sconfitti in partenza, perché le generazioni non sono e non possono essere un vero e proprio soggetto contrattuale.

L’insegnamento sociale della Chiesa sembra essere oggi l’unica alternativa a questo framework lib/lab. Tale insegnamento addita una strada completamente diversa, che non si limita a cercare di bilanciare o combinare le variabili utilizzate. L’EG secondo la dottrina sociale della Chiesa parte dalla famiglia, si estende alle reti primarie (parentela, vicinato, reti di amicizia) e secondarie (networks associativi), alle istituzioni della società civile (attori di mercato e attori di privato sociale) e poi a quelle politiche come ordini di realtà in cui l’EG deve essere configurata in maniera propria (secondo quello l’ordine di realtà) e con riflessi positivi (virtuosi) sulle altre sfere sociali.

In tale ottica, non c’è né vertice né centro della società intesa come sfere di relazioni sociali nelle quali le generazioni vengono generate, si sviluppano, si incontrano, muoiono e si rigenerano, dal momento che la struttura della società è reticolare. Nello stesso tempo, si prevede che tutte le sfere elaborino una propria norma sociale di EG. Per la dottrina sociale cristiana, l’obiettivo ultimo dell’EG non è l’uguaglianza intesa come uniformità di trattamento, neppure come uguaglianza formale di opportunità, ma la reciprocità allargata ad una pluralità di generazioni. Potremmo anche dire: l’uguale dovere nel seguire la norma della reciprocità in un circuito di scambi – il cui motore iniziale è il dono – che si estende lungo l’arco delle generazioni passate, presenti e future.
5. IMPLICAZIONI OPERATIVE SUL SISTEMA SOCIETARIO

5.1. Dietrich Bonhoeffer afferma che “the ultimate test for a moral person is how the coming generation will live”. Possiamo accettare questo test, ma a condizione che esso non sia utilizzato in chiave puramente strumentale per mascherare altri problemi, diversi da quelle delle relazioni generazionali, per esempio per determinare il grado di sfruttamento delle risorse naturali o per decidere sull’ammontare di popolazione sostenibile o per combattere le disuguaglianze sociali e la povertà. Tutti questi problemi sono della massima importanza, ma non vanno confusi fra loro. Né possiamo accettare il test dell’EG come imperativo del solo individuo preso a sé. Infatti, l’equità non è primariamente un criterio di condotta dell’individuo, ma una norma sociale che si forma nell’arena pubblica dove è in gioco il bene comune attraverso gli scambi fra gli attori sociali.

Che gli individui possano essere agenti morali dipende in primo luogo da come vengono configurate le relazioni sociali fra le generazioni, cioè dai codici culturali (valori ultimi e le regole sociali) che essi incorporano, perché gli individui qua talis non possono compiere un’opera di giustizia che li eccede.

Vista sotto questa luce, la norma sociale dell’EG è nuova per motivi (a) di contesto, (b) di forma e (c) di contenuto.

(a) Ragioni di contesto. L’EG non riguarda più soltanto la famiglia-parentela e neppure lo stato sociale, come in passato, ma investe tutte le sfere di relazione, incluso il mercato, gli apparati di socializzazione, le comunità più piccole e più grandi, fino alla scala della globalizzazione. Particolarmente delicato diventa il bilanciamento fra relazioni (e istituzioni) private e relazioni (istituzioni) pubbliche, nel senso che è finito il vecchio equilibrio basato sull’idea che sia compito del potere pubblico imporre criteri di equità ai privati, per controllare la distribuzione complessiva delle opportunità. I criteri dell’EG diventano un compito per tutte le sfere, pubbliche e private, dove il potere pubblico non deve assorbire in sé i criteri equitativi, ma operare al servizio dell’EG nelle sfere private.

(b) Ragioni di forma. L’EG non è più una norma di uguaglianza in senso moderno (cioè come uniformità o standardizzazione), ma una norma di reciprocità sociale generalizzata, che opera sia nei gruppi primari sia nelle macro-istituzioni societarie. Essa si allarga dal campo delle relazioni inter-personali al campo delle relazioni sistemiche. La forma nuova dell’EG consiste nel fatto che essa si presenta come una regola di giustizia mutua che viene trasferita ai rapporti con le generazioni immediatamente successive.
in modo da accoglierle in un contesto societario costruito su regole virtuose, tali cioè da aiutare le generazioni più giovani a crescere come soggetti capaci di reciprocità allargata nel tempo plurigenerazionale.

Ragioni di contenuto. Il contenuto dell’EG riguarda una normatività che deve essere elaborata ex novo. Tale novità può essere explicitata in alcuni punti fondamentali. 1) Nessuno (né anziano né giovane) deve essere oggetto di discriminazione positiva o negativa (cioé avere privilegi o, al contrario, penalizzazioni) per il fatto di avere una diversa età. Ciò non significa che l’età diventi un fattore indifferente, ma significa che si deve adottare un criterio di adeguatezza relazionale agli effetti del pieno godimento dei diritti umani esercitabili in ogni età della vita. I diritti umani non possono essere ristretti o allargati per il fatto di essere più anziano o più giovane, di essere già in vita o nascituro, ma devono essere declinati relazionalmente in rapporto a tale condizione. 2) Per quanto riguarda i concreti diritti sociali, una generazione non può imporre i costi del proprio standard di vita sulle generazioni successive, trasferendo i propri debiti a loro. 3) Nel caso di scarsità di risorse, la norma è quella di una distribuzione dei vantaggi e svantaggi fra le generazioni che tenga conto degli effetti diretti e indiretti che ricadono su ciascuna generazione alla luce della massima reciprocità e solidarietà possibile fra di esse. 4) In termini positivi, la norma dell’EG va declinata secondo un principio di sussidiarietà promozionale, ossia investendo su una generazione affinché questa possa sviluppare circuiti di scambio che aumentino il valore aggiunto generazionale, ossia le opportunità per le altre generazioni. 5) In ogni caso, vale un principio di equità compensativa, nel senso che un trattamento migliore deve essere riservato a chi si assume oneri di mantenimento, allevamento e promozione di un’altra generazione (in concreto, ad esempio: i trattamenti di welfare per le famiglie più numerose o per quelle che adottano bambini, sgravi fiscali per le banche che offrono migliori condizioni di prestito o di investimento a giovani o condizioni di età a rischio, agevolazioni fiscali e garanzie a compagnie assicurative che favoriscano il trasferimento delle polizze da una generazione all’altra, ecc.). Questo stesso criterio vale in tutte le politiche sociali, pubbliche e private (tariffe di servizi domestici – telefono, luce, acqua, gas, trasporti –, carichi fiscali, accesso dei figli alla scuola, uso dei servizi sanitari e sociali, benefici di sicurezza sociale, sostegno al reddito familiare, condizioni di partecipazione delle famiglie alle associazioni civili, ecc.).

La norma dell’EG è quindi nuova non solo perché viene costruita come un criterio di condotta differente dal passato, ma anche perché si configura come una relazione sociale emergente, che possiede un proprio, autono-
mo codice simbolico, e quindi acquista una propria consistenza di relazione sociale sui generis.

Alle fine, la norma sociale dell’EG consiste nel fatto che le generazioni non possono nascere e svilupparsi se non attraverso “relazioni generative” con le generazioni precedenti, le quali sono tali se adottano un sistema di azione in grado di rispondere a quattro domande fondamentali.

L) Perché una generazione deve essere equa con le altre? In altre parole: perché non dovrebbe valere il principio secondo cui “ogni generazione deve fare da sé”, cioè godere di ciò che produce e dei frutti dei suoi merit? La risposta è: perché nessuna generazione esiste per se stessa, ogni generazione riceve la vita in dono e deve reciprocare questo dono (la reciprocità è scambio simbolico, non è né beneficenza, né un do ut des).

I) Come una generazione può essere equa con le altre? La risposta è: riconoscendo i diritti degli altri (anche “altri potenziali”) ed elaborando norme che seguano il principio di reciprocità come norma di scambio sociale (non già di equivalenti monetari).

G) In che cosa una generazione deve essere equa con le altre? Benché tutti i beni siano oggetto dell’EG, esiste una scala di priorità fra di essi: la prima cosa che una generazione deve alle altre è la valorizzazione delle sue capacità, dunque la formazione umana e i potenziali di civilizzazione, che sono più importanti dei pacchetti di beni materiali, anche se tutte queste risorse sono connesse fra loro e sono oggetto dell’EG.

A) In che misura una generazione deve essere equa con le altre? La misura ha a che fare con i mezzi adeguati agli scopi. In linea generale, mezzi e strumenti di realizzazione dell’EG sono quelli che riconoscono i carichi differenziali che cadono su una generazione in termini di riproduzione della popolazione e delle sue opportunità di vita in vista della massima valorizzazione possibile delle generazioni che devono essere generate. La misura non è un poco o un molto statistico, ma l’adeguatezza dello strumento al suo fine. Per questo, l’EG non va confusa con le politiche demografiche, non è uno strumento per il controllo o la pianificazione familiare, sia essa di limitazione oppure di sostegno artificioso delle nascite. Il campo delle politiche demografiche, come quello di lotta alla povertà, ha certamente delle relazioni con i temi dell’EG, ma deve essere affrontato con altri criteri, diversi da quelli dell’EG.

5.2. Dal punto di vista della teoria relazionale, i problemi di giustizia sociale possono essere distinti in quattro grandi contesti o sfere relazionali, che
corrispondono a quattro dimensioni che definiscono la giustizia come relazione sociale generalizzata.

Questi quattro contesti (e relativi codici simbolici) sono i seguenti (fig. 3):^5

A) il mercato, cui corrisponde la dimensione commutativa della giustizia, con il suo codice simbolico della transazione contrattuale riferita ad un sistema di prezzi; qui si trovano i beni privati in senso stretto e i problemi di giustizia nei confronti del loro scambio (come scambio di equivalenti monetari);

G) il sistema politico-amministrativo, cui corrisponde la dimensione redistributiva della giustizia, con il suo codice simbolico di potere centrale che raccoglie forzosamente per garantire la solidarietà verso i più deboli; qui si trovano i beni pubblici in senso stretto, quelli che solo un sistema collettivo può garantire, e i problemi di giustizia connessi a questo sistema (come realizzare la solidarietà fra generazioni attraverso compensazioni);

I) la sfera delle formazioni sociali associative, cui corrisponde la dimensione distributiva della giustizia secondo reciprocità, che cioè si regola in base alle norme dello scambio fra membri di una associazione che stanno in condizioni non necessariamente simmetriche (quindi, né per riferimento primario a prezzi, né per comando, né per semplice riconoscimento); qui si trovano i beni relazionali secondari o collettivi, cioè frutto di azioni organizzate, come sono quelle del privato sociale o terzo settore (volontariato, cooperazione sociale, associazionismo sociale, ecc.), e i problemi di giustizia relativi a questi specifici sistemi di scambio (come definire la reciprocità in termini di scambio simbolico);

L) le comunità primarie, cioè le famiglie e le reti informali, cui corrisponde la dimensione distributiva della giustizia secondo il semplice riconoscimento

^5 Nella formulazione relazionale, l’equità ha quattro dimensioni, che possono essere così definite in prima approssimazione: equità commutativa è quella dello scambio di beni e servizi fra privati secondo misure di equivalenza (corrisponde alla A, cioè alla dimensione economica in senso analitico della giustizia); equità redistributiva è quella attuata a fini di solidarietà da un potere centrale che tassa le singole unità per poi ridarle ai meno favoriti secondo criteri di compensazione (corrisponde alla G, cioè alla dimensione politica in senso analitico della giustizia); equità distributiva è quella unilaterale di un soggetto che assegna ciò che è dovuto ad un altro o più altri in due modi, in accordo con criteri di reciprocità (quando si tratta di una formazione sociale associativa) (corrisponde alla I, cioè alla dimensione sociale in senso analitico della giustizia); secondo criteri di merito riconoscimento di bisogni o diritti naturali (quando si tratta di una comunità) (corrisponde alla L, cioè alla dimensione valoriale in senso analitico della giustizia).
della dignità umana\(^6\) e dei connessi diritti naturali umani, in accordo con la regola del “da ciascuno secondo le sue capacità e a ciascuno secondo il suo bisogno”, e quindi secondo l’etica del dono; qui si trovano i beni relazionali primari, cioè frutto di una condivisione che sorge non per mera associazione ma per via di un agire comunitario, e i problemi di giustizia relativi a questo specifico contesto (come definire i bisogni meritevoli di riconoscimento in quanto corrispondenti a diritti umani fondamentali) (O’Neill 1994).

![Fig. 3. Le sfere e dimensioni fondamentali della giustizia come realtà complessa secondo l’approccio relazionale.](image)

\(^6\) Identificata in una società “almeno decente”, secondo la definizione di Margalit (1996).
In questa visione delle cose, la giustizia sociale viene differenziata in un'area di interessi (dove vigono le regole dell'approccio lib/lab, secondo dimensioni commutative e redistributive), e un'area delle identità (dove vigono le regole della giustizia distributiva per reciprocità e per riconoscimento). Combinare fra loro queste due aree, e le dimensioni sottese, è il compito di una democrazia complessa.

Per sintetizzare, dovrebbe risultare chiaro quanto e come la teoria della giustizia intesa quale relazione sociale complessa vada oltre il dibattito attuale fra neo-individualisti e neo-comunitaristi, i quali fanno appello a singole dimensioni senza relazionarle fra loro oppure tentano impossibili mediazioni.7 Mi riferisco a tutte quelle varianti che hanno come poli emblematici i cosiddetti liberali di sinistra o liberali comunitari da un lato, e i cosiddetti socialisti libertari o socialisti individualisti dall'altro (Sandel 1982; MacIntyre 1988; Besussi 1997). Il loro comune problema è come superare una concezione meramente procedurale della democrazia (Dahl 1979), qual è stata indotta da un liberalismo che, proprio nella sua massima affermazione, trova oggi la sua sconfitta, allorché dichiara la sua impotenza a realizzare l'EG in una sfera pubblica concepita come eticamente neutrale, anziché come moralmente qualificata.

Gli approcci lib/lab alla giustizia sociale sono tentativi insufficienti, e spesso goffi, di rimediare ai difetti di una delle due teorie polari su cui si basano mediante l'introduzione di correttivi offerti dalla teoria opposta. Il loro comune difetto è duplice: (a) evitano il problema di un serio relazionamento fra le varie sfere di giustizia, e (b) non considerano la giustizia come un problema di creazione e sostegno di relazioni sociali giuste, ossia di beni che consistono di relazioni sociali come tali.

Nella teoria relazionale, la giustizia non viene posta né negli individui benevolenti né in meccanismi o in strutture collettive o comunitarie, ma nelle relazioni sociali. La giustizia si realizza allorché viene rispettata e promossa la distinzione direttrice della sfera sociale di pertinenza, e le relazioni si dispiegano in accordo con il suo codice simbolico, mentre al contempo il funzionamento di quella sfera viene opportunamente distinto e collegato con gli altri codici simbolici del sistema societario più complessivo. Rendere compatibile questa pluralità di sfere è compito di una concezione complessa della giustizia incorporata in una democrazia societaria (relazionale) capace di mantenere il collegamento fra i meccanismi funzionali e

7 Le mediazioni sono impossibili perché prive di un meta-codice simbolico (come ad esempio quello di AGIL).
il senso umano che essi debbono perseguire, attraverso il massimo coinvolgimento di tutte le soggettività che sostengono la società.

Ecco perché la teoria relazionale della giustizia è in grado di vedere come la giustizia sociale non consista solo in una tutela difensiva della persona umana e delle sue formazioni sociali, dunque nel semplice riconoscimento, ma anche nella promozione attiva della persona umana e delle sue reti associative.

5.3. Che cosa fare per sostenere in pratica l’EG? Di fronte al quadro appena tratteggiato, ci si può chiedere quale possa e debba essere una nuova filosofia pratica, di politica e di interventi sociali, per perseguire l’EG.

Nella prospettiva relazionale, il problema dell’equità riguarda cioè che sta fra le generazioni (nell’espressione inter-generazionale), e dunque è un problema di giustizia delle relazioni, nelle relazioni e attraverso le relazioni generative (Donati 2000a). Si tratta di seguire due criteri-guida e di trarre le conseguenze operative.

I due criteri-guida sono: primo, riconoscere e promuovere una pluralità di criteri equitativi differenziati per sfere che li realizzano; secondo, valorizzare in maniera promozionale (cioè con sinergie e giochi a somma maggiore di zero) le reti di scambio fra tutti gli ambiti e dentro ogni sfera sociale in modo tale da sviluppare, e non solo ridistribuire, i beni (relazionali) da trasmettere e allocare fra le generazioni secondo criteri equitativi.

Le applicazioni operative possono essere brevemente delineate come segue.

Nel mercato. Le imprese potrebbero favorire contratti di solidarietà fra generazioni, anche per riferimento alle generazioni interne alle famiglie, soprattutto nelle piccole imprese (per esempio con meno di dieci addetti). Le banche potrebbero adottare criteri di prestito e di investimento finanziario nei confronti dei giovani (studenti e lavoratori) rinunciando a privilegiare semplicemente chi dà maggiori garanzie in termini di patrimonio o reddito personale, cioè adulti e anziani, qualora vi fosse una “terza parte” in grado di sostenere i rischi; lo stesso si può dire per i prestiti che riguardano la casa o servizi sociali, sanitari, previdenziali, e così via. In altri termini, gli attori di mercato potrebbero apprendere norme di condotta che siano capaci di collocare le proprie garanzie nelle relazioni inter-generazionali piuttosto che negli assets individuali.

Nello stato. Il sistema politico ridistributivo dovrebbe abbandonare il suo carattere marcatamente assistenzialistico e di pura intitolazione a benefici passivizzanti, per assumere il volto di una ridistribuzione intelligente che
investe sul senso di iniziativa, libertà e responsabilità delle generazioni, lasciando la semplice assistenza a coloro che non hanno le possibilità di assumersi dei compiti (povertà estreme, handicap grave, individui non autosufficienti, ecc.). Il sistema fiscale potrebbe attuare una migliore equità fiscale se assumesse la famiglia come soggetto tributario plurigenerazionale. Il sistema pensionistico potrebbe espandere i criteri della previdenza basata su criteri di capitalizzazione privilegiando in questi ultimi quelli che fanno leva sull’uso inter-generazionale dei fondi pensione. Le esigenze di sicurezza e di servizi sociali potrebbero essere meglio affrontate incentivando quegli interventi che si basano su autonome reti di self-help e mutual-help fra generazioni. In generale, il lavoro sociale potrebbe orientarsi a metodologie di rete che connettano, anziché disconnettere, le generazioni fra loro (gli esempi della tagesmütter, del “buon vicino”, dell’affidamento familiare di bambini o anziani, sono soltanto alcune indicazioni di una tale filosofia di intervento sensibile all’EG).

1) Nel privato sociale o terzo settore. Il mondo associativo non ha ancora elaborato un proprio codice simbolico dell’EG. Occorre che le associazioni sociali, le organizzazioni di volontariato, le cooperative di solidarietà sociale, le fondazioni non profit, e tutti gli altri attori propri di questo ambito si distacchino dal codice “politico” (filantropico e ridistributivo) dell’EG, per assumere una riflessività di ordine superiore basata sul codice simbolico della reciprocità come scambio simbolico allargato fra le generazioni. In breve, non dovrebbero vedere le generazioni come categorie sociali di individui astratti (i bambini, gli anziani, ecc.), ma come figli, genitori, nonni, e così via, laddove le forme associative del privato sociale ne mediano i rapporti dall’esterno, tramite la partecipazione a forme di associazionismo volontario per fini di solidarietà sociale che riguardano siano i diretti interessati, sia altri soggetti della comunità. Qualora sia pensato in questa chiave, il privato sociale può esprimere nuove forme sui generis di equità sociale. Pensiamo ad esempio ad associazioni che creano fondazioni di comunità, banche etiche e banche del tempo specificatamente organizzate da generazioni, per generazioni e fra generazioni, cioè con programmi che si occupano essenzialmente di relazioni generazionali. Purtroppo, specie in Europa, queste organizzazioni sono state spesso assorbite da un codice politico dell’EG che le ha ridotte a lobbies che siedono a tavoli negoziali con i governi locali o centrali, o con altri enti pubblici e privati, per difendere categorie di interessi, o per ragionare di servizi di welfare offerti da altri attori, senza avere di mira lo sviluppo delle relazioni generazionali. Potrebbero invece diventare essi stessi operatori dell’equità fra le generazioni, solo che ne acquisissero una migliore e più profonda consapevolez-
L'esperimento dei vouchers (in tante modalità diverse) nei servizi domiciliari per bambini e anziani, ad esempio, è già oggi una felice esperienza di organizzazioni familiari che, tramite fondazioni e cooperative, si associano per migliorare le relazioni fra generazioni mantenendo gli anziani in famiglia o in abitazioni prossime alla famiglia.

L') Nella famiglia e nelle reti informali. Le famiglie, nonostante siano i primi operatori del ricambio generazionale, sono ambienti particolarmente 'opachi' a riflettere su come spendono o investono le proprie risorse in chiave generazionale. Spesso i consumi familiari sono privi di un minimo di progettualità; i risparmi e gli investimenti vengono fatti sulla base di impulsi che non hanno criteri di EG. Occorre una riflessione culturale sulle regole allocative delle risorse fra le generazioni (compresenti e future) così come vengono praticate dalle famiglie. Grande importanza potrebbero avere i fondi previdenziali affidati alla gestione diretta delle famiglie, che potranno investire la previdenza individuale sulle generazioni della stessa famiglia. Il ruolo delle reti familiari e informali per uscire dal welfare assistenziale è oggi sempre più riconosciuto, ma manca ancora una lettura generazionale del modo in cui tali reti funzionano.

Per concludere. Affinché l'EG possa diventare una norma sociale diffusa, circolante in tutta la società, è importante che tutti gli attori si vedano reciprocamente, cioè relazionalmente e riflessivamente.

La famiglia dovrebbe specificare il proprio compito come luogo del dono che crea fiducia e scambio di reciprocità fra le generazioni, differenziandosi e integrandosi con quanto viene fatto dallo stato, dal mercato e dal privato sociale. Il privato sociale dovrebbe adottare al proprio interno dei criteri di EG che siano in sinergia con il contributo delle famiglie, dello stato e del mercato. Il mercato dovrebbe aprirsi ad una visione generazionale delle sue attività economiche, senza isolare la ricerca del profitto e dell'utilità dal potenziamento delle relazioni di reciprocità fra generazioni. Lo Stato dovrebbe adottare un criterio di EG nella propria funzione ridistributiva, e inoltre intervenire perché ciascun attore si attivi per rimediare ai propri difetti allorché si constata che persegue l'EG in modo difettoso o fallimentare.

In questo quadro, il problema dell'equità sociale fra le generazioni diventa un compito che può essere adeguatamente affrontato solo in una visione relazionale dei criteri e dei mezzi per realizzarlo. Non si tratta di smuovere il ruolo dello stato, ma di specializzarlo nei suoi criteri e interventi, rendendo il sistema politico-amministrativo sussidiario alle iniziative che cercano di realizzare l'EG attraverso un maggiore sviluppo di iniziative specifiche per ciascuna sfera della società civile.
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PART VI

THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
1. Disclaimers

The history of development economics, like the history of any other major subject, is, I would imagine, complex. Passions are strong when developmental concerns are debated. Moreover, political agenda cloud matters. For example, it is now a commonplace to suggest that concern about absolute poverty and economic inequality are relatively recent in the development literature. It is suggested too that early development economists were so single-minded in their search for policies that would generate economic growth, that they soon took economic growth to be an end in itself, not merely a means to an improved quality of life for all. Given the contemporary mood, the World Bank not surprisingly comes in for routine criticism in this regard. However, the little time I have been able to devote to reading the development literature in preparation for this article was enough to confirm (to my satisfaction at least) that the prevailing orthodoxy of what earlier writers said is untrue. For example, the first issue of the World Development Report of the World Bank, which was published in 1978, spoke at considerable length of absolute poverty and stark economic inequality, and the reasons why economic growth could be expected to reduce those evils. Moreover, the end tables of the Report offered international data, not only on gross national product, but also life expectancy at birth and literacy. The latter two are not inventions of the United Nations Development Programme!

This said, I shall in what follows stress that aspect of the development literature that focuses on aggregate economic growth. There are both
practical and intellectual reasons for doing so. The practical reason is that, to do so will enable me to keep the article to a readable length. The intellectual reason is that, by making use of social weights for different income categories, both absolute poverty and income inequality can be incorporated in the measure of gross national product (GNP). The real weakness of GNP lies not in that the measure is unable to accommodate the phenomena of absolute poverty and economic inequality, but in not being able to take the future adequately into account. As this article is about sustainable development, I focus on the distribution of the standard of living across time and generations.

2. Institutions and Policies for Economic Development

As a subject of inquiry, economic development is only half a century old. Although classical economists were much concerned with identifying the social processes that generate national wealth (recall the title of that most famous economics treatise of all, Adam Smith's "An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations"), it was not until the 1950s that the prospects of economic development in the then newly emerging countries of Asia and Africa came to be an established subject of economics research. In order to study contemporary development processes, economists rightly considered not only the present and the near future, but the distant future too. Unfortunately, they also became enamoured of the idea that increases in gross national product (GNP) is the key to economic development. To be sure, GNP growth was recognised to be only a means to improve quality of life for everyone (claims to the contrary, I have found no evidence that anyone took it to be an end in itself), but the means in question soon took on a life of its own in policy discussions, to the extent that to ask "growth in what?" was to be informed at once of the answer, namely, "growth in GNP". With this as background, development economics rapidly acquired a central dogma, that for poor countries, raising the rate of investment is the route to sustained economic development.¹

In time, two problems with this line of thought were noted. First, raising the rate of investment is all well and good, but unless goods and services are valued at their appropriate prices, investment would be directed at the production of wrong sorts of goods. In fact, the development experience

¹ The classic on this is Lewis (1954).
soon became littered with examples of industries that managed to survive only because of protection from domestic and foreign competition. Secondly, even if the right investment projects were chosen, the returns could be abysmally low if the prevailing institutions are weak (for example, when property rights and the laws of contracts are ill-specified or unreliably enforced). If during the decade of the 1970s development economists focussed on the first of these problems and searched for ways to identify socially productive investment projects and defendable economic policies, their focus during the past two decades has been on the second problem. This shift has come about because of a growing acknowledgement that governments in poor countries all too frequently have not functioned in the interest of their citizens. So, development economists today study institutional reform – for example, ways to increase the efficacy and reach of markets, and measures to reconstruct local communitarian institutions where they have weakened or failed. The emphasis on institutions as a vehicle for economic development has meant that policy analysis has to a certain extent been sidelined. But good economic policies cannot be plucked from air. A policy that is desirable in one institutional setting could well be undesirable in another. Policy choice and institutional reform are interconnected exercises and need to be seen as such.

3. Wealth and Well-Being

Interestingly, even if the focus of development research has changed over the years, the coin with which economic development is measured has continued to be based on that old indicator of social well-being – GNP per head –, to which the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) has been added in recent years. The problem is that both GNP and HDI reflect short-run concerns, while the question of whether or not contemporary patterns of development are sustainable requires of us to peer into the distant future.

2 See the literature on social cost-benefit analysis (e.g., Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen, 1972; and Little and Mirrlees, 1974).
3 See the annual World Development Report of the World Bank over the past several years.
4 HDI is a combined index of GNP per head, life expectancy at birth and literacy. Country estimates of HDI are offered annually in the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme. Since the weaknesses that I identify below in GNP as a measure of social well-being are shared by HDI, I shall not comment on the latter here. For an account of HDI’s particular weaknesses, see Dasgupta (2001).
An economy's long run prospects are shaped by its institutions, and by the size and distribution of its capital assets. Taken together, an economy's institutions and capital assets form its productive base. A society's productive base is the source of its well-being through time. It is tempting to regard institutions also as capital assets (witness that we often refer to a society's "institutional capital"). But institutions are distinct from capital assets, in that they guide the allocation of resources (among which are the capital assets themselves!).

Economists have a name for the value of an economy's capital assets: wealth. The notion of wealth I adopt here is a comprehensive one, and the list of assets includes not only those that are manufactured (roads and buildings; machinery and equipment; cables and ports), but also human capital (knowledge and skills), and a wide array of natural capital (oil and natural gas; fisheries and forests; ecosystem services). To say that wealth has increased is to say that, in the aggregate, there has been a net accumulation of capital assets. In what follows I shall call the net accumulation of capital assets genuine investment. This is to be contrasted from recorded investment. As the services of any number of capital assets are missing from national accounts, recorded investment can be positive even while genuine investment is negative.

It can be shown that wealth (or more accurately, a wealth-like index) is a measure of a society's well-being, taking both the present and the future of that society into account. In saying this I mean that, correcting for population change, the well-being of present and future generations, considered together, increases if genuine investment is positive. This means that changes in the wealth-like measure brought about by economic policies can be used to identify whether or not the policies lead to a pattern of development that is sustainable.5

In contrast, consider GNP. As it is the sum of aggregate consumption and gross investment, GNP is insensitive to the depreciation of capital assets. It is therefore possible for GNP to increase for a period of time even while the economy's genuine investment is negative and wealth declines. This can happen if, say, increases in GNP are brought about by mining cap-

5 For a proof of the relationship between wealth and intergenerational well-being, and for proofs of various extensions to this relationship, see Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), Dasgupta (2001), and Arrow, Dasgupta, and Mäler (2002). Arrow, Daily, et al. (2002) contains a wider discussion of the relationship, in that it includes the recent experience of rich countries.
ital assets – for example, degrading ecosystems and depleting oil and mineral deposits – without investing some of the proceeds in substitute forms of capital, such as human capital. So, there is little reason to expect movements in GNP to parallel those in wealth. The moral, though banal, is important: GNP cannot be used to identify sustainable development policies. As we will confirm presently, nor can HDI identify them.

4. Nature as a Capital Asset

The emphasis I have given to natural capital in the previous paragraph is not accidental. National accounts are highly sophisticated today, but they continue to miss not only the changes that are brought about by economic activities to the stocks of many natural resources, they also fail to record the use we make of a myriad of Nature's services. The latter include maintaining a genetic library, preserving and regenerating soil, fixing nitrogen and carbon, recycling nutrients, controlling floods, filtering pollutants, assimilating waste, pollinating crops, operating the hydrological cycle, and maintaining the gaseous composition of the atmosphere. A number of services filter into a global context, many are local. The reason such services are frequently missing in national accounts is that they most often do not come with a price tag. The reason for that is that property-rights to natural capital are often impossible to establish, let alone to enforce. And the reason for that is that natural capital is frequently mobile (birds, butterflies, river water, and the atmosphere are proto-typical). But none of this means that with effort it would not be possible to assign notional prices to Nature's services, prices that would go some way toward reflecting their scarcity values. As matters stand, though, the effect of the interconnectedness of various forms of natural capital often go unrecorded in economic transactions. So it can be that those who inflict damage on others (for example, destroying mangroves in order to create shrimp farms, or logging in the uplands of watersheds) are not required to compensate those who suffer the damage (local fishermen dependent on the mangroves and farmers and fishermen in the downlands of the watersheds).

Rural communities in poor countries recognised this deep underlying problem with Nature's services long ago and developed institutional mechanisms to overcome it in the case of local capital assets. Ponds, tanks, threshing grounds, grazing fields, and woodlands harbour mobile

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6 For a fine collection of essays on the character of Nature's services, see Daily (1997).
resources, making them unsuitable as private property.\textsuperscript{7} In recent years anthropologists, ecologists, economists, and political scientists have identified a wide variety of non-market institutions in rural communities that mediate economic transactions in Nature's services. These institutions are frequently communitarian. Moreover, they were designed to respond to the character of the natural capital under their jurisdiction. For example, communitarian institutions for coastal fisheries have been discovered to be quite different in design from those governing local irrigation systems.\textsuperscript{8}

Unhappily, in recent years communitarian institutions have eroded in many of the poorest regions of the world. There are a number of reasons why this has happened, among which State interferences in the way they function would appear to have been prominent, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Ironically, the growth of marketable goods and services may have contributed as well. When decaying communitarian institutions are neither stayed nor adequately replaced by other institutions, the poorest frequently are the most to suffer, in particular because their local environmental-resource base deteriorates.\textsuperscript{9}

When choosing economic policy, decision makers need to be sensitive to the interplay of market and non-market institutions. Any system, human or otherwise, responds when perturbed. A policy change can create all sorts of effects rippling through unnoticed by those who are unaffected, because there may be no obvious public signals accompanying them. Tracing the ripples requires an understanding of non-market interactions and of their interplay with markets. Identifying sustainable development policies involves, among other things, valuing the ripples and, therefore, valuing Nature's services. We can now appreciate in which ways the weaknesses of present-day national accounts mirror the weaknesses in the practice of contemporary policy evaluation. It is reasonable to fear that because Nature's services are typically underpriced, modern economic development has all too likely been rapacious in its use of natural capital.

5. An Application to Poor Countries

There is then a presumption that genuine investment is less than recorded investment. But by how much?

\textsuperscript{7} There are other reasons why they were found to be unsuitable as private property. In the text I am focussing on mobility.
\textsuperscript{8} The literature on this is now huge. See Dasgupta (2001) for references.
\textsuperscript{9} For why and how, see Dasgupta (1993; 2001).
The World Bank has provided estimates of genuine investment in a number of countries by adding net investment in human and natural capital to estimates of investment in manufactured capital. There is a certain awkwardness in the steps the investigators have taken to arrive at their estimates. Their accounts are also incomplete. For example, among the resources making up natural capital, only commercial forests, oil and minerals, and the atmosphere as a sink for carbon dioxide were included (not included were water resources, forests as agents of carbon sequestration, fisheries, air and water pollutants, soil, and biodiversity). So there is an undercount, possibly a serious one. Moreover, some of the methods deployed for estimating prices are dubious. Nevertheless, one has to start somewhere. It will prove instructive to use the World Bank figures and assess the character of recent economic development in the poorest regions of the world. The accompanying Table does that. It covers sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian sub-continent, and China. Taken together, the bulk of the world's 1 billion poorest live there.

The first column of figures contains the World Bank's estimates of genuine investment, as a proportion of GNP, during the period 1973-93. Notice that Bangladesh and Nepal have disinvested: aggregate capital assets declined there during the period in question. In contrast, genuine investment has been positive in China, India, Pakistan, and sub-Saharan Africa. So, the figures could suggest that the latter countries were wealthier at the end of the period than at the beginning. But when population growth is taken into account, the picture changes.

The second column of figures contains the annual rate of growth of population over the period 1965-96. All but China experienced rates of growth in excess of 2 percent per year, sub-Saharan Africa and Pakistan having grown in numbers at nearly 3 percent per year. Following the lead of the theory I sketched earlier, we next estimate the average annual change in wealth per capita during 1970-93. To do this, I have multiplied genuine investment as a proportion of GNP by the average output-wealth ratio of an economy to arrive at the investment-wealth ratio, and have then compared changes in the latter ratio to changes in population size.

Since a wide variety of capital assets (for example, human capital and various forms of natural capital) are unaccounted for in national accounts, there is a bias in published estimates of output-wealth ratios, which traditionally have been taken to be something like 0.30 per year. In what follows,

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10 Hamilton and Clemens (1999).
### TABLE

Genuine Investment and Wealth Accumulation in Selected Regions: 1970-93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>I/Y (%)</th>
<th>g(L) (%)</th>
<th>g(W/L) (%)</th>
<th>g(Y/L) (%)</th>
<th>g(HDI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-2.40</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-2.60</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(a\) I/Y: genuine investment as percentage of GNP. (Source Hamilton and Clemens (1999, Tables 3 and 4; and personal communication from Katie Bolt, World Bank). Genuine investment includes total health expenditure (i.e., public plus private), estimated as an average during 1983-1993, from data supplied by the World Health Organization.

\(b\) g(L): average annual percentage rate of growth of population, 1965-96. (Source World Bank (1998, Table 1.4)).

\(c\) g(W/L): average annual percentage rate of change in per capita wealth at constant prices.

\(d\) g(Y/L): average annual percentage rate of change in per capita GNP, 1965-96. (Source World Bank (1998, Table 1.4)).

\(e\) g(HDI): sign of change in UNDP’s Human Development Index, 1987-97. (Source UNDP [1990, 1999]).

Assumed output-wealth ratio: 0.15 per year.
I have used 0.15 per year as a check against the bias in traditional estimates for poor countries. Even these figures are almost certainly too high.

The third column of the Table contains my estimates of the annual rate of change in per capita wealth-like index I mentioned earlier. The procedure I followed in arriving at the figures was to multiply genuine investment as a proportion of GNP by the output-wealth ratio, and then subtract the population growth rate from that product. This is a crude way to adjust for population change, but more accurate adjustments would involve greater computation.

The striking message of the third column is that in all but China there has been capital decumulation during the past 30 years or so. This may not be a surprise in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, which is widely known to have regressed in terms of most socio-economic indicators. But the figures for Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan should cause surprise. Even China, so greatly praised for its progressive economic policies, has just about managed to accumulate wealth in advance of population growth. In any event, a more accurate figure for the output-wealth ratio would almost surely be considerably lower than 0.15. Using a lower figure would reduce China’s accumulation rate. Moreover, the estimates of genuine investment do not include soil erosion or urban pollution, both of which are thought by experts to be especially problematic in China.

How do changes in wealth per head compare with changes in conventional measures of the quality of life? The fourth column of the Table contains estimates of the rate of change of GNP per head during 1965-96; and the fifth column records whether the change in the United Nations' Human Development Index over the period 1987-1997 was positive or negative.

Notice how misleading our assessment of long-term economic development in the Indian sub-continent would be if we were to look at growth rates in GNP per head. Pakistan, for example, would be seen as a country where GNP per head grew at a healthy 2.7 percent per year, implying that the index doubled in value between 1965 and 1993. The figures imply though that the average Pakistani became poorer by a factor of about 1.5 during that same period.

Bangladesh too has decumulated capital. The country is recorded as having grown in terms of GNP per head at a rate of 1 percent per year during 1965-1996. The figures imply that at the end of the period the average Bangladeshi was about half as wealthy as she was at the beginning.

The case of sub-Saharan Africa is, of course, especially sad. At an annual rate of decline of 2 percent in wealth per head, the average person in the
region becomes poorer by a factor of two every 35 years. The ills of sub-Saharan Africa are routine reading in today's newspapers and magazines. But the ills are not depicted in terms of a decline in wealth. The Table reveals that sub-Saharan Africa has experienced an enormous decline in its capital assets per head over the past three decades.

India can be said to have avoided a steep decline in wealth per head. But the country has been at the thin edge of economic development. If the figures are taken literally, the average Indian was slightly poorer in 1993 than in 1970.

What of the Human Development Index? In fact it misleads even more than GNP per head. As the third and fifth columns show, HDI offers a picture that is the precise opposite of the one we should obtain when judging the performance of poor countries. The index for sub-Saharan Africa grew during the 1990s and it declined for China. Bangladesh and Nepal have been exemplary in terms of HDI. However, both countries have decumulated their capital assets at a high rate.

As the figures in the Table are rough and ready, we should arrive at conclusions very tentatively. But the figures show how accounting for human and natural capital can make for substantial differences in our conception of the development process. The implication should be depressing: the Indian sub-continent and sub-Saharan Africa, two of the poorest regions of the world, comprising something like a third of the world's population, have over the past decades become even poorer. In fact, some of the countries in these regions have become a good deal poorer.

REFERENCES


The purpose of this brief is to identify a range of demographic and behavioural aspects which might feature in the Academy's discussions on what could prove to be one of the defining issues of the 21st century. In what follows, I have put a number of propositions – some are no more than conjectures, others are factual statements – to enable us to focus on the main topic and its major determinants: science, economics and society.

1. The first scenario that has to be noted is the increasing burden of economic and social dependency arising from existing demographic trends: rapidly declining fertility together with increasing longevity in most developing countries as a force likely to undermine intergenerational solidarity. The spectre of ageing and consequential increase of the dependency burden falling on the proportionately reduced cohorts of young taxpayers defines the parameters of battles between the young and the old. This will dominate politics in the same way as the battles between the workers and bosses, rich and poor, did in the past.

The developing countries with their high fertility statistics will not be spared the clash, although given the age distribution it may come somewhat later. Here science combined with the better diet is gradually making just about everyone, outside the AIDS-affected areas of Sub-Saharan Africa, live longer. With every decade that the age of death recedes and the fertility rate (largely for social and economic reasons, helped by technology) declines, so the same problem will arise as in affluent, developed countries: a large group of elderly needing some form of assistance and health care, supported by a smaller group of younger workers paying taxes. Unless these countries are then much richer, the pain imposed by the demographic imbalance is likely to be more severe than in the affluent West.
Throughout the developing world the volatile mix of demography, science and society is likely to dominate the coming decades. The industrial and social change will shift millions into cities in search for work and better living conditions. One is tempted to speculate about such conditions as a fertile ground for the rise of terrorism.

2. The scenario of conflict and unrest rooted in demographic imbalance might well be corrected initially in developed countries of the West - by a recent trend which like the ageing population structure is also a change brought about by economics, science and society in the affluent West: paradoxically even as the old have become more numerous so opportunities for the young have been proliferating thus lessening intergenerational tensions.

Certainly in the last two decades industrial organizations and even societies have become less hierarchical. Seniority counts for less, initiative and creativity for more. Such striking advances in technology that produced the internet boom provide extra rewards to those with flexible minds and the balance shifts sharply towards the young. In these circumstances the line between young and age could become blurred, hence the demographic factor alone need not necessarily undermine intergenerational solidarity. Here medical science is the factor at work: people feel young and look young for far longer than in the past. That trend ought in time to ease the conventional worries about too many pensions and too few youthful workers. The line between work and retirement ought to fade as more people choose to carry on working (part-time or even full-time) into their old age. But this implies the need for a change in pension schemes and hours of work. In the long term, the potentially divisive problem of an unequal tax burden might lessen the degree and intensity of intergenerational conflict.

3. The optimistic scenario outlined above and its outcomes providing for a measure of solidarity between generations will come to pass only in a world that develops in a benign way. In the long-and short-run the chances of maintaining intergenerational solidarity must depend on a third factor at work: economics or, more precisely, the prospect of growth in a globalized economy. This means, above all else, that the forces generating economic expansion will not continue to be adversely affected by the repetition of such events as the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the downward trend in the US and Japanese business cycles of the past 18 months and, more importantly, by the events of September 11, 2001 and their worldwide repercussions on trade.
We are already witnessing the impact of these adverse developments on developing countries where tension is rising between, on the one hand, people who are young, better educated, more dynamic and therefore likely to find jobs in cities (and if really very lucky to get an immigration visa to a developed country) and, on the other hand, those who are left behind who tend to be older and less enterprising.

Is this scenario – or rather description of the existing state of affairs – to be analyzed in terms of primarily demographic criteria to determine the extent of intergenerational solidarity or conflict? I do not think so because here we are concerned with the capacity of the present system – primarily ‘Western’ in its origin and ideological orientation to conceptualize the problem of poverty. The failure to find answers to certain urgent questions about poverty must raise doubts about the validity of the whole Western system of economics and politics. I quote from Donald Doob Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Vatican Social Teaching, Dublin 1983, p. 271-2:

- Can international agencies such as the UNCTAD and its offshoots be used more effectively to overcome the imbalances and injustices of the international economic order?

- Will there be a willingness to make the necessary changes in those agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and others which may need to be reformed?

- Is it possible to slow down “the growth imperative” in capitalist society to a level that is environmentally acceptable, without creating large scale unemployment?

- Can the problem of “structural unemployment” be overcome?

The above are only some of many complex issues currently on this Academy’s pluralist agenda. All I wish to suggest is that in carrying forward the debate on intergenerational solidarity we promote at all times the need for dialogue with either of the major systems which dominate the world today.
PART VII

THE WELFARE STATE
Only five years before the publication of Keynes’ “The General theory of employment, interest and money”, Pius XI warned that “... Free competition, however, though justified and quite useful within certain limits, cannot be an adequate controlling principle in economic affairs. This has been abundantly proved by the consequences that have followed from the free rein given to these dangerous individualistic ideals... More lofty and noble principles must therefore be sought in order to regulate this supremacy firmly and honestly: to wit, social justice and social charity”. With these words, and at a time when humanity was being particularly badly crippled by the Great Depression, Pius XI laid down the foundations for the construction some years later of what we now know as the welfare state.

The welfare state involves the state using its power to modify the free play of market forces, particularly in three areas. First, guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum level of income – one that would allow them to lead a decent life – regardless of the market rate for wages and the market value of their property. Secondly, insuring against those risks that exist throughout one’s working and personal life; that is, limiting insecurity that is caused by uncertainty that, could otherwise cause families and individuals to suffer crises and depressions, both economic and psychological. Examples include making provision for the sick, the unemployed, the elderly, the disabled, the widowed or the orphaned. Finally, guaranteeing full access of all citizens, whatever their economic or social

circumstances, to those services that are considered essential for a harmonious life in society, as is desirable for a developing community.  

The period of approximately one hundred years, between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century, was notable for its relative intellectual stability although it was also not free of social upheaval. Throughout the industrialised world – with the exception of those countries that had fallen victim to the Marxist revolution – a balanced view of the economic system arose. While this view recognised the market’s superiority in allocating scarce resources, it also saw that the market had defects. Thus, certain objectives did not come within the free market’s scope, nor was the free market capable of achieving them. These objectives related to the common good, and they must be satisfied with the same guarantees with which the market provides goods and resources, channelling them towards the satisfaction of needs, in a free and competitive manner.

An historical outline

Concern for those problems that would eventually lead to the establishment of the welfare state was not new at the end of the nineteenth century, and still less so during the years following the Second World War, as frequent theoretical references to these issues show. In addition, governments attempted occasionally to deal – albeit on a piecemeal basis – with such problems during particularly difficult times.

In fact, two schools of thought laid down the philosophical foundations on which the welfare state was built. On the one hand there was the school of thought influenced by liberalism, with its roots in the individual materialism of Hobbes. This school would acquire, with important qualifications, the nature of an economic theory in the Classical School. On the other, there was the socialist school of thought, particularly that of Bernstein and Lasalle, that began to gain ground in political circles as well as have greater economic importance. In this context, it is worth mentioning the Fabian Society, Herman Heller or the creation of political parties concerned with social issues, such as the British Labour Party.

In the case of Bentham, much more than in the case of Smith, every subject’s aspirations are manifested through the incessant search for personal pleasure and therefore the avoidance of everything that may involve

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sacrifice, dissatisfaction or pain. This hedonistic function of existence is an inherent part of all individuals and shapes their rational behaviour throughout their development. At the beginning of his first book, Bentham stated what he considers to be the ultimate goal in the shaping of the social and legal order "... it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong." 4

The happiness that Bentham referred to as a human objective, or, what is the same thing, that quantity of pleasure to be obtained or pain to be avoided, is capable of being estimated, calculated or measured, particularly because it is possible to deduce from the empirical evidence that there are different factors influencing such feelings of pleasure or dissatisfaction. 5

This hedonism, satisfied through the consumption of useful goods, becomes utilitarianism: a formulation of an individual's rational action in making a choice, both as regards economic and political and social matters. These factors can still be identified today in those decisions taken according to pragmatic reasoning, whether on the basis of opportunity or convenience.

Indeed, John Stuart Mill himself was not free of that influence, although in his case we find it clothed in a certain degree of moral and social concern; the social concern that, within the limits of the overall liberalism in which it is set out, is present throughout his work. This social concern would lead him to intend the reform of society in the interests of a very rudimentary concept of what we could loosely call "social justice". Three objectives are present in Mill's idea. First, he wished to defend ethical rationalism against intuitive theories of ethics. Secondly, he wished to defend utilitarianism from those attacks made against it because it does not allow an independent assessment of virtuous actions to be made, nor can it explain why each individual has to do what he has to do. Finally, he wished to show that utilitarianism can explain the reason for justice; in other words, that utilitarianism can justify our belief that the rules of justice take priority over any other rules, and can form the basis of moral laws. 6

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Mill's objectives would have a fundamental influence on later liberal thought, as regards his proposal for a free and egalitarian society and how it is possible to move from a calculation of individual happiness to one of collective happiness. This collective dimension was already present in Adam Smith: "Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society".7

Adam Smith gave form to the liberal viewpoint. According to Smith, the state would have a role to play – see book V of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations – but in general it should let the "invisible hand" of the market operate, with its supreme capacity to allocate scarce resources in the most efficient manner possible, in accordance with human intelligence. The state should do no more than offer a legal framework that provides economic agents with the necessary certainty to conduct their business.

However, certain liberals considered the state to be an essential element for the functioning of the economic model that they put forward. Bentham argued that the state was necessary for the administration of justice and to redistribute wealth and income between citizens. Mill went somewhat further, considering that in order to achieve maximum utility, the intervention of the state was necessary. Accordingly it is not unusual that even in periods dominated by liberal ideas, states start to intervene more and more in economic affairs, correcting, replacing and even competing with private operators, when in previous times, the free play of market forces had been preferred.

At the same time as this process was taking place, the influence of socialism, the second school of thought was gaining ground as regards economic, political and social affairs. If for liberalism the individual was the essential nucleus upon which society is constructed, society simply being the total of all the individuals that compose it, for early socialism, society is what gives sense to the individual, in such a way that the existence of the latter is secondary to the shape that the former takes.

While liberals saw the common good as the sum of individual good, there being no divergence of interests between the two, socialists believed that there was a natural divergence of interests; human beings, driven by their conflicting interests, would make their version of well-being prevail over those who attempted to stop them. It is society, embodied by the state, and not a union of the specific interests of individuals, that defines the objective good of the community. It is even possible that this objective good is not desired by any of the subjects that make up society. The possible divergence of interests between the individual and the collective good is, therefore, simply part of the natural state of things.

Putting the social nature of man before his existence as an individual subject, his needs are shaped in the context of the society in which he lives. Such rights can only be properly satisfied when they are recognised by society as a whole. Once they are so recognised, social rights of man will arise that guarantee the satisfaction of those needs in the context of assured equality, effective not only in the political field but also in the economic sphere. The existing inequalities would generate violence and lead to the class struggle as an expression of rebellion against social injustice.

Some of the revolutionary changes of a theoretical nature were put into practice, above all in the nineteenth century, for example, the revolutions of 1830 and 1838. Then, following a century of frequent upheaval, a different type of revolution would make its presence felt even more decisively: the Industrial Revolution.

The discovery of new productive procedures, technical advances, more efficient and sophisticated means of production, as well as certain very important raw materials, both in the USA and the most advanced parts of Europe, led to the development of industrialisation that would have an impact on practically all economic sectors of those countries.

Attracted by this new situation but also the prospect of – theoretically at least – greater remuneration of work, the commencement of industrialisation would be accompanied by internal migration from the countryside to urban or industrial communities. In the short term, these communities were unable to give a decent reception to those who came looking for work, housing and, in general, the means to survive.

In this way, initially, the Industrial Revolution dashed many hopes, and meant misery for many human beings and despair for those who only wished for a decent life and a fair wage, capable of satisfying the most basic needs.

The labour issue had become the main social issue. At the end of the century, Pope Leo XIII would say that “But all agree, and there can be no
question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor... Hence by degrees it has come to pass that workingmen have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition".8

Logically, such a scenario could only lead to situations of intense general discontent, a breeding ground for conflict: the violence of the needy was directed at the society that had failed to provide for them. As Leo XIII also said: "It is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change, which has long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy. The elements of a conflict are unmistakable: the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changed relations of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals and the poverty of the masses; the increased self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population; and, finally, a general moral deterioration".9

Twenty years after these Leo XIII’s pronouncements, in Germany a debate was beginning that called into question the liberal approach to meeting the needs that had been created as a result of the Industrial Revolution.

In 1872, in Eisenach, a small group of university intellectuals, sociologists and individuals active in economic affairs, published a Manifesto setting out the model of the state that they believed could resolve the urgent problems that were facing the German people. Rejecting liberal theories, they proposed the intervention of the state in order to protect the working-class, favouring its incorporation into the political and social establishment, and where possible, protecting workers from the abuses of capitalists or businessmen.

Two members of the historicism school, Adolph Wagner and Gustav von Schmoller, created an association called the Verein für Sozialpolitik, or Association in favour of Social Policy. Its goal was to raise societal awareness of the idea of a strong interventionist state, capable of guaranteeing economic success and the well-being of the whole nation as well as its individual members, and of controlling the effects of industrialisation and attending to the needs of the poorest through aid.

From the outset, the Association gave particular attention to work in its social context. Wage levels and wage improvements, the training of employees (the improvement of human capital), the working time, social security and social services and so on were the areas where the Association promoted by these two economist above mentioned was most active.

It should not be forgotten that social reform and justice are the fundamental issues addressed in Schmoller's thought. Schmoller supported a degree of paternalism in social policy in order to increase the education of the working-class, as well as to satisfy them materially as a means of achieving social peace. He considered this to be the best way, if not the only way, to avoid revolutionary uprisings and even contemplated the possibility of a degree of closeness – even an alliance – in the relationship between the monarchy and the working-class.10

The strong state advocated by the promoters of the Verein, which was present in the Eisenach Manifesto, would come to fruition in Chancellor Bismarck's government. It would be more difficult to claim that the objective of the state under Bismarck was the well-being of everyone, as Ludwig Erhard,11 another Chancellor and former Minister of Germany, would claim some years later. Nevertheless, Bismarck's efforts were appreciated by Kaiser Wilhelm I, who, on the 17 November 1881, made the following statement to the German Reichstag: "In February of this year, we expressed our conviction that the solution to the social problems is to be found not only in the repression of social democratic abuses, but more importantly in improving the welfare of the workers. We consider this to be our imperial duty and fervently urge once more that the Reichstag attends to this task...".12

There were, without doubt, measures to protect workers and the least favoured classes. Nevertheless, it is difficult to be sure whether such measures came within the objective of the welfare state or, by contrast, they were simply a means by which a more satisfied working class would increase its contribution to the national economy. If the goal was simply to increase workers' productivity, the Iron Chancellor's forerunner of the welfare state was a poor one, even though social measures were implemented.

At that time, however, Bismarck was held in great esteem and his influence felt in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, where concern for

11 See Ludwig Erhard, ”Wohlstand für alle”. Econ-Verlag GMBH. Düsseldorf, 1957.
the most needy – the poor – had existed since the beginning of the seventeenth century. Thus, the Poor Laws, under which the parishes of each area provided various forms of public aid, had existed since 1601. Malthus’s attacks on these measures aimed at providing relief for the destitute should not be forgotten. However, the Bismarckian approach flourished in Great Britain, resulting in a fruitful exchange of information about such measures and their results which undoubtedly brought the experience of the two countries closer together.

With the existence of such theories and the resulting introduction of public social measures, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century provided the setting for the development of what we now call the welfare state. If we contemplate what took place during the first half of the twentieth century, we could not find a better justification for the welfare state’s existence: two world wars and, sandwiched between them, the Great Depression, which spread desolation, unemployment and hunger throughout a large part of humanity, perhaps with greatest intensity in the most industrialised countries.

The desire for a strong and interventionist state, capable of correcting the deficiencies of market economies and of allocating resources and achieving the well-being of the nation and its citizens, appeared to be more than justified.

A society was therefore contemplated in which the central role of the individual was absent. This model could be called a society without individuals, in contrast with the domination that individuals had enjoyed in previous times. So much so that, for a time, not only the liberal principles against which this reaction took place seemed to be forgotten but also the statements of the person who would become the architect of a new economic model: John Maynard Keynes. Keynes stated “Government is not to do thing, which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at the present are not done at all”.¹³

State intervention, which eradicated the individual as solely responsible for his own acts, created as many problems as it solved. Therefore it is not surprising that at a time when the Great Depression of 1929-1930 was at its height and therefore when the way seemed clear for this model of the state as a substitute for the individual to triumph, the voice of Pope Pius XI was

heard, arguing that the state should play a secondary role with respect to the individual in decision making.

“The State authorities should leave to other bodies the care and expediting of business and activities of lesser moment, which otherwise become for it a source of great distraction. It then will perform with greater freedom, vigour and effectiveness, the task belonging properly to it, and which it alone can accomplish, directing, supervising, encouraging, restraining, as circumstances suggest or necessity demands. Let those in power, therefore, be convinced that the more faithfully this principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is followed and a hierarchical order prevails among the various organizations, the more excellent will be the authority and efficiency of society, and the happier and more prosperous the condition of the commonwealth”.

Structure of the welfare state

On the basis of theories that, from very different sources and different geographic origins, led to the existence of a coherent body of theory, the welfare state came into being. This process, started in the second half of the nineteenth century, has been part of political, economic and social affairs to the present day, with the mutations and adaptations that have proved necessary at any given time, according to social requirements on the one hand and economic conditions on the other.

In its first phase, from 1870-1920, the welfare state tried to establish itself through defining its fundamental principles, including the specific shape of the state. Legal provisions aimed at organising the employment market, protecting the worker from possible abuses by employers and the introduction of obligatory insurance, were the two main features during this initial period. Thus the substitution of UK-style “Poor Laws” by obligatory insurance not only meant a quantitative difference but, particularly, a qualitative difference. The objective was to attempt to change from a charity-based system to one based on the recognition of the workers’ rights to subsidies or other state benefits.

Between 1920-1950, that is, from before the First World War until after the Second World War, was a period of consolidation and coordination of

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the plans put into effect in the previous stage. What is perhaps more important, the social policy that had been developed through various initiatives, in which spontaneous mutual insurance activity played a fundamental role, became a state activity that would provide the basis for a social security system with wide coverage, as opposed to the system of unemployment insurance that existed in the previous period.

The two Reports published by William Beveridge during the Second World War in 1942 and 1944 were a decisive step in building on the experiences of the previous period. These reports set out the starting point of a welfare state model together with its means and ends.

The 1950s and 1960s was a period of economic recovery. The rhythm and intensity of this recovery varied greatly from country to country, but the sustained economic and social growth during this period was capable of supporting a great expansion in the social security system and the provision of social goods.

This was a period in which, according to many, we were all Keynesians. As will be recalled, Keynes’ General Theory, which appeared in 1936, was extraordinary influential throughout the whole of the Western world – with the obvious exception of those countries with Marxist economic systems. It was hoped that the model of the Keynesian state would guarantee economic growth, stability and redistribution of wealth; this latter objective to be achieved fundamentally through a social policies funded by fiscal policy.

In the 1970s, the world economy suffered severe crises, set off by the energy crisis at the end of 1973. These crises had two equally alarming effects, which, moreover, occurred at the same time: an increase in unemployment, at a rate not seen since 1929-30, coupled with inflationary pressures, that, in turn, caused interest rates to rise.

Given this situation, it was not surprising that there was a substantial increase in social spending, in order to meet the new needs that, without widening the coverage, caused by the economic recession that the developed world was experiencing. The level of public revenue at equal fiscal pressure fell in absolute terms which led to the introduction of two new measures: on the one hand tax reforms that could lead to greater tax collection and on the other the public debt that, by being placed on the financial markets, encouraged interest rates to rise even more.16

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The crisis of the welfare state: unforeseen difficulties

The problem was complicated and public finance theorists and economists in general started to view the situation as a crisis in the model of the welfare state that had existed until that moment.17

The reason for this crisis was not only the scarcity of resources. While this was an important problem, it was not the only one, nor the most difficult. Together with the scarcity of financial resources at that time to deal with the problems caused by economic contraction, the very nature of the welfare state model was called into question. It was necessary to revise the model in order to evaluate its capacity to deal with the difficult moments that it would have to be able to deal with. At the same time, over the medium or long term its reform was necessary in order to, on the one hand, give it a new identity and legitimacy and, on the other, ensure that there was a balance in the income-social spending relationship in the public budget.

The reforms were soon noticeable. Their diverse nature and their wide ranging effect depended on the scale of the problem caused by the insufficiency, which, unsurprisingly, was different in each country. Most states rushed to rid themselves of their productive activities of goods and services. This task had little to do with the functions of welfare that normally meant market intervention and distortion and, in most cases, a significant public budget burden.

Thus the privatisation process was commenced, most aggressively in Great Britain, less so in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and so on; the USA hardly suffered from this problem. The result of this process was twofold. First, funds from the sale of assets provided the state with a financial injection and, secondly the ending of heavy losses, generally suffered by state-owned companies, meant the need for resources to finance them no longer existed.

In turn, a reform of the system of benefits began in many countries – perhaps practically all those with a system based on redistribution – mainly the pensions system – in the method of distribution as opposed to capitalisation. The effect of these reforms, whatever the technicalities, was

clear: a reduction in the rights of future pensioners, with the consequent
decline in benefits and their move towards sufficiency at a time of budg-
etary constrain that did not appear to be transitory.

It was clear that the welfare state had become a mistaken application of
Keynsian theory, characterised by a continuous increase in competences
and activity that had led it into a serious financial crisis. Many academics
agreed with this diagnosis and in the need for reform.

Pope John Paul II himself stated at the beginning of the 1990's that 
"... excesses and abuses, specially in recent years, have provoked very harsh
criticisms of the welfare state, dubbed the 'social assistance state'.
Malfunctions and defects in the social assistance state are the result of an
inadequate understanding of the task proper to the state. Here again the
principle of subsidiarity must be respected: a community of higher order
should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order,
 depriving the latter of its functions...", 18

Some began to question the raison d'être of the welfare state in the mod-
ern world. In fact, there was some movement back towards a micro-eco-
nomic approach to the concept of welfare. In this approach, welfare is sim-
ply the result of an economic action based on the choice between alterna-
tives in the context of freedom and diversity of choice, something that is not
reflected in the structure of the welfare state.

From this perspective, man is seen as an actor, who, through his action,
"... is eager to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satis-
factory". 19 Alternatively, "Strictly speaking the end, goal, or aim of any
action is always the relief from a felt uneasiness". 20

This involved a return to liberalism, with a clear reduction of the social
functions of the state, reduced, at best, to the provision of welfare for cases
of destitution; recalling, perhaps, the circumstances that gave rise to the
Poor Laws in Great Britain.

In a very different context, the warnings of Pope Pius XI fifty years ear-
lier were still relevant: "Just as the unity of human society cannot be build
upon ‘class’ conflict, so the proper ordering of economic affairs cannot be
left to the free play of rugged competition. From this source as from a pol-

luted spring have proceeded all the errors of the ‘individualistic’ school. This school, forgetful or ignorant of the social and moral aspect of economic activities, regarded these as completely free and immune from any intervention by public authority, for they would have in the market place and in unregulated competition a principle of self-direction more suitable for guiding them than any created intellect which might intervene”. From a state that, in 1931, it was hoped capable of providing for the common good of society and which, at the height of the economic recession, was considered to be the only possible solution as an instrument regulating the economy, capable of guaranteeing stability and full employment.

Pius XI was correct in his comments about the dangers of individualism, with its egoism and its exclusive utilitarianism. A society based upon such notions disintegrates, becoming a conglomerate of individuals incapable of living together, far removed from the idea of a community that shares in all forms of human activity, of which economic activity is only one - and not the most important - part.

Man is, by his very nature, a social being and therefore sociable. From this it can be deduced that he has a natural commitment towards other members of the community. This commitment is only endangered when man makes the mistake of feeling himself to be worth more, which leads to his desire to dominate others.

The community is simply an extension of the most restricted unit: the family. In the same way that everybody is born, grows up and develops within the family, from which he receives and gives up different talents, the family and its members are, in turn, simply units of a greater being that we call the human family. That family, as the smallest unit, is a living example of what society needs, of the type of person capable of uplifting himself and society, to which he sacrifices himself and from which he obtains great benefits.

The family is the mirror in which its members must examine themselves in order to be able to give social life a meaning and to give their full support to the welfare state. “In order to overcome today's widespread individualistic mentality, what is required is a concrete commitment to solidarity and charity, beginning in the family with the mutual support of husband and wife and the care which the different generations give to one another. In this sense the family too can be called a community of work and solidarity”.

The family is the school par excellence where the individual learns to distinguish the permanent from the temporary, the significant from the ephemeral, the important from the superfluous. The family is where the occasion exists to cultivate the spirit and to make the key distinction between material and spiritual, a distinction without which man chooses the wrong path, wrapped up in a consumerist spiral.

Mises pointed out the importance for the individual as an economic agent of not only material possessions. "It is arbitrary to consider only the satisfaction of the body's physiological needs as 'natural' and therefore 'rational' and everything else as 'artificial' and therefore 'irrational'. It is the characteristic feature of the human nature that man seeks not only food, shelter, and cohabitation like all other animals, but that he aims also at other kind of satisfaction. Man has specifically human desires and needs which we may call "higher" than those which he has in common with the other mammals".

Following this statement, there is nothing unusual about the lament of the Pope Juan XXIII, in the Mater et Magistra, when observed "... we note with sorrow that in some nations economic life indeed progresses, but that not a few men are there to be found who have no concern at all for the just ordering of goods. No doubt, these men either completely ignore spiritual values, or put these out of their minds, or else deny they exist. Nevertheless, while they pursue progress in science, technology, and economic life, they make so much of external benefits that for the most part they regard these as the highest goods of life".

From the criticism of the welfare state to the need for the welfare state

In the previous section reference has been made to the general criticisms of those theorists of public spending – some more radically than others – directed fundamentally at the welfare state as it existed at the end of the 1970s. In spite of the radical position adopted, always present in times of revision, it was clear that the solution to a possibly overstretched public sector could not be the ending of those functions that, for reasons of justice, equity and solidarity could and must be exercised by the state, without of course destroying similar functions that may be carried out by individuals.

One well-measured criticism was made by John Paul II, who said as follows: “... in exceptional circumstances the state can also exercise a substitute function, when social sectors or business systems are too weak or are just getting under way, and are not equal to the task at hand. Such supplementary interventions, which are justified by urgent reasons touching the common good, must be as brief as possible, so as to avoid removing permanently from society and business systems the functions which are properly theirs, and so to avoid enlarging excessively the sphere of state intervention to the detriment of both economic and civil freedom.

In recent years the range of such intervention has vastly expanded, to the point of creating a new type of state, the so-called 'welfare state'”.

This is the basis of the criticism and of the correct degree of state intervention in the economy. Man is the focal point of economic activity, as with any social activity. Everything in the universe is at man’s service. Technical instruments and advances, scientific knowledge, all the goods that nature, in conjunction with the work of man and the availability of capital, are capable of meeting a single objective: to serve man and the whole of mankind. Accordingly, state intervention must never stifle the potential of the community’s members.

The warning is therefore appropriate, particularly when most recent events have shown how real this conflict is. “It should be noted that in today’s world, among other rights, the right of economic initiative is often suppressed. Yet it is a right which is important not only for the individual but also for the common good. Experiences show us that the denial of this right, or its limitation in the name of an alleged ‘equality’ of every one in society, diminishes, or in practice absolutely destroys, the spirit of initiative, that is to say the creative subjectivity of the citizen”.  

This right of economic initiative was not only repressed but actually destroyed in the past in countries with central planning systems. However, it must also be recognised that it has been notably restricted in those systems where, with the intention of guaranteeing welfare for all through the public sector, the state has competed with the private sector on unfair terms. In this way, it has restricted the creativity of individuals, which should be one of a community’s main assets.

However, it is not only private creativity that is reduced, with the damage that this entails; personal solidarity is also diminished, as experience

has clearly shown us, in favour of the “institutional solidarity” of the state. Avoiding calling solidarity a personal responsibility in society has been the general rule that has found favour and justification in the institutions established by the welfare state.

Faced with this phenomenon, it should not be forgotten that “Although in our day, the role assigned the State and public bodies has increased more and more... it is quite clear that there always be a wide range of difficult situations, as well as hidden and grave needs, which the manifold providence of the State leaves untouched, and of which it can in no way take account. Wherefore, there is always wide scope for humane action by private citizens and for Christian charity. Finally, it is evident that in stimulating efforts relating to spiritual welfare, the work done by individual men or by private civic groups has more value than what is done by public authorities”.

The truth of this statement could not be clearer. The state cannot provide assistance in all situations, particularly if what is needed is proximity and acceptance. Yet at the beginning of the twenty first century we cannot rely on the spontaneous reaction of individual solidarity to provide such assistance.

Nowadays, it must be recognised that “It is also quite clear that today the number of persons is increasing who, because of recent advances in insurance programs and various systems of social security, are able to look to the future with tranquility. This sort of tranquillity once was rooted in the ownership of property, albeit modest”. And contemplation the future peacefully is an essential part of all welfare states.

Solidarity is the inspiration for and an essential part of the system, acting as a means of communication and transferral of wealth and goods between different subjects and families in a community. However, this point needs emphasising. Solidarity is based on commitment and in turn creates commitment. Otherwise, the bankruptcy of the system is guaranteed: whoever has most resources will avoid his obligations towards those who have least; he who has least and has his needs covered may opt for idleness. A warning to this effect was given by the Second Vatican Council: “... in highly developed nations a body of social institutions dealing with insurance and security can, for its part, make the common purpose of earthly goods effective. Family and social services, especially those which provide for culture and education, should be further promoted. Still, care must be taken lest, as

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27 John XXIII, “Encyclical Letter ‘Mater et Magistra’”. Rome, 15.05.1961, num. 120.
a result of these provisions, the citizenry fall into a kind of sluggishness toward society, and reject the burdens of office and of public service”.29

These are all dangers of which the naivety of the public sector may make the system in which citizens have put their trust to cover their future needs into risky and insecure. A failure to appreciate the true situation or clumsy regulation should not be allowed, otherwise the system's survival will be endangered.

Towards a new welfare state

As has been said, the welfare state has evolved through history, taking on a new dimension, new objectives and new methods in accordance with the circumstances both as regards time and place. At the same time, it has adapted to the requirements of a society which largely accepts its existence and essential function, even though different views may exist as regards its definitive shape.

In the twenty first century that has just commenced, the welfare state will need to be equally capable of adapting and meeting the challenges that it will undoubtedly face. The social function, which constitutes the essence of state intervention to achieve what we call “welfare” takes a very different form today than it did in the past. The welfare state is today built on the foundations of a free and efficient market, in other words one that is competitive, which should not be distorted by public action; in fact the opposite is true, the role of the state being to guarantee the exercise of freedom of choice within a legal context that is ordered and fair.

An ordered world, without which a free economy is impossible, was a requirement of Adam Smith's economic model. It is the essential difference between freedom of action and chaos and forms part of the Church's social doctrine. “Economic activity, specially the activity of a market economy, cannot be conducted in an institutional, juridical or political vacuum. On the contrary, it presupposes sure guarantees of individual freedom and private property, as well as stable currency and efficient public services. Hence, the principal task of the state is to guarantee this security...”30

The state has been deprived of its productive function, which it carried out under the erroneous presumption of encouraging employment in a

society that, in all probability, needed to reduce levels of unemployment. As a result, state action has now been reduced on the one hand to the regulatory action guaranteeing the principal objectives of the human community and on the other to satisfying public needs, essential for co-existence in society on the basis of fraternity and solidarity, through instruments of fiscal policy, both sides, revenues and expenditures.

This function is not altered by the fact that the production of public goods is carried out by the public sector itself or such production is contracted out to the private sector where the public service is reserved for the task of assigning and distributing such goods.

These two instruments of regulation and social policy without doubt constitute specific areas within which the welfare state may operate. Through the first, the state tries to ensure that society progresses towards the goal of the common good; through the second, it remedies shortages and covers needs. However, analysing with a critical eye the present structure of the welfare state, certain tendencies exist. While these are obvious it is worth stating them expressly in order to consider the chances of the system surviving, and if so the chances of modifying its scope.

Recalling the title of the book written by L. Erhard, “Welfare for all” cited above, at the beginning of this third millennium of Christianity we must ask ourselves the question: “to whom does the word all refer?”. It is honest to recognise that all refers exclusively to those who live in a given place – a nation – at a given time. However, within this restriction it is necessary to break the information down further, differentiating between those who vote and those who do not, nationals and foreigners, old people and young people and so on.

In fact, the welfare state is a long way from having incorporated the meaning of interdependence and universal mutuality. “Every day human interdependence grows more tightly drawn and spreads by degrees over the whole world. As a result the common good, that is, the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfilment, today takes on an increasingly universal complexion and consequently involves rights and duties with respect to the whole human race. Every social group must take account of the needs and legitimate aspirations of other groups, and even of the general welfare of the entire human family”.

Nevertheless, the model of the welfare state hardly takes into account the needs and the objective of welfare of those who live outside a given territory – the objective of the 0.7% of GDP, to be reduced to 0.35%, following the Barcelona Summit, March 2002 – to which certain public spending applies.

In addition, the nature of welfare even in the most developed nations has become reduced to welfare in a material sense, based on comfort, the lack of worry and an easy life; in other words, what has come to be known erroneously as ‘quality of life’, robbing society of the values that make it grow in stature, make it more human and, above all, commit it to a common objective.

“... the confusing concept of ‘quality of life’ in the context of a welfare state cannot be accepted without criticism as a valid point of reference for the promotion of the life of all. Its materialistic and utilitarian connotations make it difficult to understand and put into practice as a true stimulus for the development of man, and mankind, as a whole...

There will be no true quality of life if the religious and human dimension of new generations and also of the elder members of society is not looked after. There will be no true quality of life for anyone as long as there are families affected by poverty, young people without access to a decent home, old people alone, handicapped people badly cared for, immigrants discriminated against, the arms trade, drugs and ‘human flesh’ available for prostitution”32 [Author’s translation].

However, it is not only the territorial jurisdiction that sets the limits of application of the welfare state; time is also a factor that defines its beneficiaries. Only those that live at the time in question can, in general, be considered subjects, contributors or beneficiaries vis-à-vis the programmes that make up the welfare state. Further, under the system of redistribution, the method most generally applied, the beneficiaries and more particularly the benefits depend on the contributions made by those paying into the system at the time.

All of the above leads to the first question for the new shape of the welfare state: can it continue to be based on the same principles, that is, is it viable? If it is viable, should other considerations be incorporated? If not, how should it be amended?

A changing scenario: the population

One of the presumptions on which the current model of the social security system – the most significant part of which is the welfare state – was based and a possible condition for its viability was that the population structure would remain largely the same. It is clear today, however, that the population structure has changed markedly and will change even further throughout the first half of this new century. This is so both as regards the growth of the total population and as regards the dependent population with respect to the total population. Even more importantly, the change in the proportions of those contributing to and benefiting from the system is substantial, which will only increase in the years to come.

The situation provides food for thought. The first question that is a matter of concern is the survival of the population as such. The birth rates, which are currently extremely low in comparison to previous periods, cast doubt on the ability to sustain in the future the volume and composition of the existing population, or rather it ensures that such an objective is impossible.

The average birth rate in the European Union was 1.5 children per woman in 2000 and it is predicted that this figure may rise to 1.7 by 2050. At this rate, it is impossible to maintain the population level (see Table I, Figure I, page X at the end of this volume). These low birth rates reflect society’s attitude towards procreation that involves certain ordering of social values. The welfare state itself may have some influence on the establishment and possible modification of such values, through the education system.

Comparing the demographic trends existing in countries in the north and south, John Paul II stated that, “One cannot deny the existence, especially in the southern hemisphere, of a demographic problem which creates difficulties for development. One must immediately add that in the northern hemisphere the nature of this problem is reversed: here, the cause for concern is the drop in the birth rate, with repercussions on the ageing of the population, unable even to renew itself biologically. In itself, this is a phenomenon capable of hindering development”. On this point the Second

33 To consider this problem and in support of the arguments put forward, apologies are made for only using the statistical data published or to be published by the European Union. There are, however, two good reasons for this: first, the Member States of the EU have gone further in establishing universal welfare states more than anywhere else, and secondly, as regards the quality of the information, there is an advantage in using a single statistical – and therefore homogeneous – source.

Vatican Council would have said that, “Within the limits of their own competence, government officials have rights and duties with regard to the population problems of their own nation, for instance, in the matter of the social legislation as it affects families... of information relative to the condition and needs of the nation...

For in view of the inalienable human right to marry and beget children, the question of how many children should be born belongs to the honest judgement of parents. The question can in no way be committed to the decision of government. Now since the judgement of the parents supposes a rightly formed conscience. It is highly important that everyone be given the opportunity to practice upright and truly human responsibility. This responsibility respects the divine law and takes account of circumstances and the time”.

It is worth noting that while society is hypersensitive about the conservation of animal species that are in danger of extinction, which has led the state to produce a great deal of protective legislation on this point, there is no similar commitment to protect humanity from its tendency to reduce in size. Having children has become a problem about which the welfare state appears to take no action. “In the social sphere, individualism also influences the value given to human life. It can be observed that when the subject of human life is discussed in a social context, the terms of reference are almost always utilitarian; the calculation of goods. Human life, in a consumerist society, is evaluated by the way in which it contributes to an increase in general welfare and not as a gift to develop in accordance with one’s personal vocation.

The birth of a child is seen as a social problem, as an economic burden that will give rise to a series of difficulties in the future, particularly as regards education. The child is no longer seen as a source of hope for the rejuvenation of society and as a precious gift for the family” [Author’s translation].

Faced with this justifiable desire to protect flora and fauna, above all plants and animals in danger of extinction, man (and the welfare state) has overlooked the most important conservation project of all: the conservation of humanity itself. “The first and fundamental structure for

‘human ecology’ is the family, in which man receives his first formative ideas about truth and goodness, and learns what it means to love and to be loved, and thus what it actually means to be a person. Here we mean the family founded on marriage, in which the mutual gift of self by husband and wife creates an environment in which children can be born and develop their potentialities, become aware of their dignity and prepare to face their unique and individual destiny”.37

This failure to attend to human ecology will result in the population of the European Union, which in 2000 totalled 375 million inhabitants, being reduced to 265 million inhabitants in 2050 (see Table II, Figure II, page XI). This will entail a reduction in the working population, those people that create income for the benefit of society, through their participation in the process of production of goods and services. The working population – those aged between 15-64 years – which in the European Union is estimated at 251.7 million people, is expected to fall to 210.3 million by 2050; a fall of more than sixteen per cent in a period of fifty years.

At the same time as the birth rate and the working population are falling, the proportion of the population aged at least 65 years old will increase from 61.3 million in 2000 to 102.7 million in 2050 for the countries of the European Union. Among this number, it should be noted that the most spectacular growth is of people aged at least 80 years old, which will increase from 13.9 million in 2000 to 38.1 million in 2050 (see Table III and Figure III, page XII). This is a consequence of the advances that have taken place in medicine and health, food, customs and general way of life whose overall effect will be to increase life expectancy to 85.5 years for women and 80 years for men in 2050.

It is very clear that what we have just described goes beyond mere statistics. The change in the nature of the population, the reduction in fertility and the consequent fall in the birth rate, together with increased life expectancy, will cause a complete transformation in the demographic pyramid. This will have clear effects on the possibility of sustaining the welfare state.

The change in the relationship existing between those contributing to and those directly or indirectly benefiting from the system underlines the need to readjust the balance between the two aspects of the programme so that the security that the system aims to give those relying on it does not become risk and insecurity. This is particularly so in those systems whose financial model is based on redistribution rather than capitalisation.

In this sense, the dependence of those aged 65 years old or more of the working population is a cause for concern. The situation in the European Union is worrying, where the proportion of those depending on the working population will rise from 24% in 2000 to 49% in 2050. This means that for each two people aged between 15 and 64 there will be one person aged 65 or more by the year 2050.

While the statistics are revealing, the situation is even more alarming if the figures are broken down on a country by country basis. Thus, in Spain the respective figures are 25% in 2000 and 60% in 2050. (For more information see Table IV and Figure IV, page XIII).

Even more enlightening is the relation of dependence if the unemployed are included within the dependent population and as beneficiaries of the social security system or welfare state. Table V and Figure V, page XIV, clearly shows this relationship of effective economic dependence; by 2050 the number of dependents will be greater than those in employment. The figures for Italy, Spain and Greece are particularly striking, since all three countries already have, and will continue to have throughout the next 50 years, more dependants than employed. In the case of Italy, this percentage will rise from 134% in 2000 to 142% in 2050.

Initial economic consequences of these changes

As has been stated time and again the figures that have been supplied, are more than just bare statistics. They represent a different world to that imagined at the time of the construction of the welfare systems that are now with us and that make up what we call the welfare state. These differences mean that we must revise concepts, objectives, categories and forms to restructure, where necessary, such systems.

From the above it is easy to reach certain economic conclusions that should be taken into account if and when the time comes to redesign this model.

It has been seen that a fall in the fertility rate leads to a reduction in the youngest part of the population which, within the next ten to fifteen years, will result in a significant reduction in the working population. A lower working population will lead, ceteris paribus, to a reduction in economic growth and, also, a reduction in the Gross Domestic Product, unless the decrease in labour supply is compensated by an increase in the level of employment or occupation, or by an increase in levels of productivity, neither factor being mutually exclusive.
It is worth making an additional observation. As regards the reduction in the level of unemployment – equivalent to the increase in the level of employment or occupation, as we have just called it – may clearly be an objective, although there is little margin for its effects to be appreciable. With the exception of certain cases, such as Spain, where the level of unemployment is still very high (approximately 14 per cent), or Greece, Italy and Belgium, (around 11 per cent) the majority of the remaining countries in the European Union have levels of unemployment that, given the legal structure of the European labour market, could be considered as having natural unemployment.

In fact, it would not be surprising if total unemployment in the European Union increased slightly over the next 50 years. Breaking down the figures, we find that in certain countries it is more than likely that unemployment will increase – for example in the Netherlands – or remain stationary – for example, in the Republic of Ireland and Portugal.

As regards increases in productivity, these require improvements in either of the following two circumstances, or in both: the quality of human capital, since the quantity of this factor is greatly restricted, or technical progress.

It is difficult to improve significantly the level of human capital within developed countries and in particular within the European Union, even supposing that lifetime training became the general norm. This is because human capital is already highly educated and therefore while improvements are possible they are likely to be incremental rather than dramatic.

As regards technical progress, this is the result of research directed at productive efficiency and not simply at technological sophistication aimed at segmenting the market, thus facilitating the existence of monopolistic competition or, at best, imperfect competition. However, technical progress does not just mean research. Technical progress requires that the results of research be reflected in productive terms, either through transferral to capital equipment or changes in management structures and information procedures that improve the employment of resources used in the production of goods and services.

Improvements in production through research obviously require there to be a sufficient volume of savings to provide the necessary financial resources. Yet given the foreseeable reduction in the growth of the Gross Domestic Product, even in absolute terms, savings are likely to fall. This in turn will slow down the possibilities of increasing technical progress associated with the means of production.
These economic factors have an effect on public spending. The greater number of people of 65 years old or more results in a higher demand for pensions and all those goods and services associated with a prolonged life. This is the case of the greater need for medical assistance, particularly prolonged medical assistance, both at home and in hospitals, connected to the exponential growth of people aged 80 years old or more, as can be seen in Table III and the corresponding graph.

In addition, other goods which old people benefit from and which are present in many situations are not taken into consideration, such as central heating, public transport, telephone, even holidays, with transport and lodging included. In the first place, because of their relative importance compared with other spending patterns and also because, in the case of important budgetary constrains, the cost of supplying them could noticeably improved.

The financial needs arising from this situation and disregarding for opportunity reasons other alternatives, would show in the basic case the need to increase expenditure within the European Union from 10.4 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 13.3 per cent of GDP in 2050. The case of Greece is particularly striking, with 12.6 per cent of GDP being spent in 2000, rising to 24.8 per cent in 2050. See Table VI and Figure VI page XIV for more information.

It should be added that in 2000, the weighted average of spending on all types of health care within the European Union amounted to 6.6 per cent of GDP. This percentage will increase, as a result of the increased age of the beneficiaries, by 2.2 per cent over the next fifty years.

Looking to the future

The objective of the foregoing is to highlight the possible conflict between ends and means and the similar conflict that can arise from the competition itself between ends to choose, subject to a greater restriction, as a result of the greater relative scarcity of available resources.

As a footnote to the above, it is worth mentioning that it is highly likely that the extraordinary increase in public spending that the pensions system will require in the next few years, as an immediate consequence of the increase in the beneficiary population, will make it necessary to carry out a revision of the current system as a whole, to the extent that their structures are not viable. Reform of the system could take many forms. Thus, it could range from a change in the method of calculating the pension, by including all contributing years in the basis of the calculation, to putting back the age
at which full rights to the maximum pension under the scheme are obtained. This second measure would undoubtedly be the most effective way of saving resources.

The first measure has been gradually introduced in most EU countries. The second measure has met with more resistance, on the one hand from the forces of tradition and on the other, and equally important, the trade unions.

This second possibility has started to appear in countries where the conflict is most critical. It has taken the form of a voluntary increase in the retirement age, through incentives to companies providing employment – by reducing their contributions – and to workers themselves by increasing by a certain number of percentage points the level of pension that would be paid if retirement took place at the age established to receive the full pension.

As has been said, there are no grounds for optimism that the system will establish and guarantee economic expansion, with increasing employment and a significant increase in employment productivity. If, in the best case scenario, these two variables do improve, this would help, although it would not be sufficient to solve the financial problem facing us.

The impact of an ageing population will be felt on public spending, which will have to rise by between 4 and 8% of GDP in most countries within the European Union. This figure does not take into account other expenses, such as education, child care, which, as more women join the workforce, will become increasingly necessary, and expenses relating to the increased demand for conservation of the environment, which is not currently a major concern.

In turn, while public pressure for further tax reductions may not be successful, it will at least prevent tax increases, with an impossible increase in real terms of public revenue. In fact, some taxes, such as those on employment, will have to be reduced if the objective is to boost the labour market.

Action on the basis of solidarity as part of the human family

Appealing to the responsibility of each and everyone, the first point that must be made clear is that we are not alone. Before us, at least one generation exists and we will be followed by many future generations. In addition to this inter-relationship of generations over time, there is the equally important spatial relationship: we form part of humanity as a whole, the human family, in whose life nobody can avoid their responsibilities. “In his desire to have and to enjoy rather than to be and to grow, man consumes
the resources of the earth and his own life in an excessive and disordered way... In this regard, humanity today must be conscious of its duties and obligations toward future generations”.38 “Not only is the material environment becoming a permanent menace – pollution and refuse, new illnesses and absolute destructive capacity – but the human framework is no longer under the man's control, thus creating an environment for tomorrow which may well be intolerable”.39

What Paul VI called the human consortium is, as we have just said, simply the feeling of belonging to the human family, so that any problem that affects it affects us too and we must commit ourselves fully in order to find a solution. This is not only for reasons of justice or mutual correspondence but, above all, for reasons of solidarity. This is based on "... a question of interdependence, sensed as a system determining relationships in the contemporary world, in its economic, cultural, political, and religious elements, and accepted as a moral category. When interdependence becomes recognised in this way, the correlative response as a moral and social attitude, as a 'virtue', is solidarity. This then is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all".40

For gifts received, not only of a physical or material nature, but fundamentally of an intellectual nature, we assume the responsibility for their correct administration, of their fruits and that these fruits are enjoyed by everybody, both in the present and in the future. “Thus the attempt to provide for the satisfaction of our needs is synonymous with the attempt to provide for our lives and well-being... But men in civilised societies alone among economising individuals plan for the satisfaction of their needs, not for a short period only, but for much longer periods of time... Indeed, they not only plan for their entire lives, but as a rule, extend their plans still further in their concern that even their descendants shall not lack means for the satisfaction of their needs”.41

This concern for future generations is what defines a committed society: one that uses the gifts that it has received in a responsible way and shares the common destiny of them.

This sense of mutual responsibility, of a task shared among generations, of the desire to share requires, above all, generosity and a clear vision of the human being and his function in society. The place where this solidarity is particularly evident is in the basic building blocks of society: the family. The family is the unit that provides the best defence against the temptations of individualism, accompanied by egoism. For this reason, being the mirror in which society sees itself, both at a personal and social level, both as regards the action of the individual economic agent and that of the state, the family, the cradle of the community, must be preserved and defended in its true nature, so that it can be seen as the image of a society based on greater solidarity.

“It is urgent therefore to promote not only family policies, but also those social policies which have the family as their principle object, policies which assist the family by providing adequate resources and efficient means of support, both for bringing up children and for looking after the elderly, so as to avoid distancinal from the family unit and in order to strengthen relations between generations”.42

It is the breakdown of the family and of its social sense and responsibility which takes man down a blind alley. Robbed of his sense of dedication and solidarity, materialism and its various allies – economism, consumerism, hedonism and utilitarianism – take over the human being, filling him with egoism and blinkering his vision of existence so that he can only see what is most comfortable or convenient over a very short period of time. Neither the future nor the present generation fit into his scheme of things.

The future generation – children – is seen as a problem, as an economic and personal burden. Children represent hope for society, they are necessary to sustain society, yet they are now seen in terms of a series of difficulties, of conditioning factors, of risks, of uncertainty, of lack of comfort, so much so that the idea of having children is abandoned in favour of living a comfortable existence.43 Nevertheless, “No country on earth, no polit-


A NEW SHAPE FOR THE WELFARE STATE

ical system can think of its own future otherwise than through the image of these new generations that will receive from their parents the manifold heritage of values, duties and aspirations of the nation to which they belong and of the whole human family".44

At the same time, from a materialistic point of view an old person is of limited use and therefore fits with difficulty into family and social life. Old people, like handicapped people or those that require more intense dedication and care, are seen as being a cost component. Far removed from the productive utility that they once represented, today they are considered to be a burden on both the family and society, on a personal and economic level, since caring for them requires time and money. Here also, in favour of an apparently freer and, naturally, easier life, they are confined to institutions to be looked after away from the family where they belong. In this way, the value of life in old age, at least as a rich reference point for the next generation, is given up.45

From an exclusively individualistic view of society in which each person lives by himself and for himself, without any social responsibility at all, such considerations are devoid of meaning. However, even from an egotistical perspective, a man who is only concerned about himself, without any commitment to society, sees, with alarm, that his very egoism is in fact his main enemy. It is this which makes him consider the insufficiency and lack of viability of a world created by himself, based on the exclusion of the values of brotherhood and solidarity.

By acting in an exclusively egotistical manner man ends up creating a rod for his own back. It is the concern for and commitment to the common good that is capable of alleviating the problems facing humanity. “Individual citizens and intermediate groups are obliged to make their specific contribution to the common welfare. One of the chief consequences of this is that they must bring their own interests into harmony with the needs of the community...”46

The immediate task of a new welfare state is to inculcate into man and society the values of brotherhood and solidarity in order to foster a spirit of inter-generational commitment, in which everybody participates and is responsible for the welfare of each other. “There can be no progress toward the complete development of man without the simultaneous development of all humanity... we must... begin to work together to build the common future of the human race”.47

Moderation: an ingredient of the new welfare state

In the Holy Scriptures, the idea of waste was considered to be contrary to the natural destiny of man. Abusive spending, the submission of the human being to the eager enjoyment of possessions is a form of slavery we now call consumerism. Long before the general consumerist attitudes that are prevalent nowadays, the voice of Leo XIII sounded loud: “Christian morality, when it is adequately and completely practised, conduces of itself to temporal prosperity... it powerfully restrains the lust of possession and the lust of pleasure – twin plagues, which too often make a man without self-restrain miserable in the midst of abundance; it makes men supply by economy for the want of means, teaching them to be content with frugal living, and keeping them out of the reach of those vices which eat up not merely small incomes, but large fortunes, and dissipate many a goodly inheritance”.48

In the Church’s teachings saving has constantly been seen as the result of the virtues of austerity and generosity, and also as a guarantee of the ordered development of all the present and future needs of the human family, above all of the less fortunate members. “Every effort, therefore, must be made that at least in future only a fair share of the fruits of production be permitted to accumulate in the hands of the wealthy, and that an ample sufficiency be supplied to the workingmen. The purpose is not that these become slack at their work... but by thrift they may increase their possessions and by the prudent management of the same may be enabled to bear the family burden with greater ease and security, being freed from that hand-to-mouth uncertainty which is the lot of the proletarian. Thus they will not only be in a position to support life’s changing fortunes, but will also have the reassuring confidence that

when their lives are ended, some little provisions will remain for those whom they leave behind them”.  49

This aspect of saving as a virtue must, in a universal welfare state, be added to the strictly economic aspect of saving as the means of financing investment. If the need to save has always been necessary, it becomes even more so before a period when hours worked will tend to fall because the working population has fallen, inter alia to provide sufficient funds for investment. Investment that should be made not only for the present generation but for future generations as well.

The Second Vatican Council stated that, “The distribution of goods should be directed toward providing employment and sufficient income for the people of today and for the future. Whether individuals, groups, or public authorities make the decisions concerning this distribution and the planning of the economy, they are bound to keep these objectives in mind. They must realise their serious obligation of seeking to it that provision is made for the necessities of a decent life on the part of individuals and of the whole community. They must also look out for the future and establish a proper balance between the needs of present-day consumption, both individual and collective, and the necessity of distributing goods on behalf of the coming generations”. 50

Public and private savings, at the service of the present and future needs of humanity, in the right balance between the present and the future as recommended by the Council’s Apostolic Constitution. In the same way as the welfare state has - justly - been able to create the present culture of responsibility as regards the rational use of non-renewable resources as an attitude based on solidarity towards humanity and, particularly, towards future generations, the new welfare state should be drawn up with the capacity to introduce this same culture of solidarity, more widely applied. On the one hand, solidarity with the actual human existence manifested with the generosity and greatness of the family function of procreation and caring for children and old people. On the other hand, solidarity with future generations, manifested through moderation, austerity and the growth of productive resources, increased through savings, in order to ensure a future without anxiety and full of humanity.

There is an urgent need for straight thinking, to have clear in our minds the terms of reference and the concepts with which we are dealing. It is our

obligation not to pass on to the next generation a world that is worse than the one we have received from the previous generation and, for better or worse, this means not only the provision of material goods but also spiritual matters, whose values are based on the capacity of survival of the universal community itself. This obligation is fair, given the previous generation’s commitment to us. In fact, we need to go beyond fairness, since solidarity with the next generation requires us to deliver to them a world that is better than the one that we received, offering them, as the good and faithful servant did, proof of our good administration.51

Solidarity in the administration of public resources

It is perhaps unnecessary to add that what has just been said relates both to the personal sphere of activities of the individual as member of society and the whole human family, and to institutions, both national and international, and in particular the state. Only the state has the capacity to meet certain social needs, both as regards present and future generations.

Nevertheless, it is worth establishing what specific action and which objectives need to be carried out. The principle of solidarity that is built into the concept of savings described above is crucial. Satisfying the needs of life, even with certain generosity, is an unavoidable obligation; consuming beyond this point has more to do with squandering than satisfaction.

The classic principles of public finance, whereby a balanced budget was a sign of good administration and practices that led to a deficit were condemned, are a distant memory. It is clear that a deficit, as an instrument of fiscal and economic policy in Keynesian economic theory, is a burden that is shifted from the present to the future generation. This is so except in those cases where the deficit is a simple financial result as a consequence of the investment in real assets of which future generations will benefit.

Apart from a deficit, financed immediately by the same generation that produces it by new money creation, and avoiding at this moment considering the inflationary consequences that it will produce, a public-sector budget that is in deficit will be financed through indebtedness – strictly speaking public debt, bonds or treasury bills. The generation that has to pay back this borrowing is saddled with an extra burden. Thus, over consumption in the present – almost certainly of goods that are superfluous or petty

51 See Mat. 25:14–30.
forces the reduced consumption of future generations and, in this case, perhaps, of essential material or spiritual goods.52

Finally, the public pensions system, set up in a large number of countries on the basis of distributive “Pay As You Go” principle and not of capitalisation, provides a particularly acute example of the constitution of a pool of savings: The deficit created by such pensions system, passed from generation to generation, becomes particularly complicated when, as at present, the degree of dependence of the elder generation of the younger generation is increasing.

A different approach is necessary. For reasons of solidarity, the present generation must start to combine in a transitory fashion the move from a system based on distribution to one based on capitalisation. An effort to save that is imposed in order to, on the one hand, cover the social obligations contracted with the generation that is no longer working or is on the point of retirement and on the other to accumulate capital that will guarantee the payment of a pension when the time to give up productive activity is reached.

In addition, the generation which is about to retire must understand the need to postpone retirement in order to reduce to the financial burden of pensions within the social security system.

These, and all the other spheres of activity, where the state enters into future obligations on the basis of present information, must be the object of accounting and provision must be made. If not, there is a great risk that the burden will be shifted from the present generation to future generations or, quite simply, the system will go bankrupt.

The need for generational accounting arises as a consequence of the budget restrictions established in values discounted to the base year, year \( t \). The principle that the obligation assumed in year \( t \), regardless of when it takes effect and its duration, must be equal to the net taxation effort – discounting positive transfers – that the beneficiaries of the payment will have to realise throughout their life, is a principle that cannot be challenged if

the objective is not to shift the burden to future generations. A present debt, discounted as of today, is either financed through taxation that the present generation satisfies throughout its working life – discounted to the present value – or has to be covered by taxation raised from future generations that have yet to be born, in terms of actual value as well.

\[ PD_t = \sum_{s=0}^{G_t} \frac{NT}{(1+i)^t} \]

Where \( PD_t \) is the public debt assumed by the state in year \( t \) that, in order for there not to be any shift in the burden between generations, will have to equal total net revenue from taxation \( (NT) \) – that is, net of transfers – for the generation that benefits from the payment, \( (G_t) \), discounted to the year \( t \) of reference.

If the present generation, which is the one that has caused this public debt to exist in the first place, is not capable of financing the total amount, this will have to be paid back, at least partially, by future generations. This can be represented in the following manner:

\[ PD_t = \sum_{s=0}^{G_t} \frac{NT}{(1+i)^t} + \sum_{s=G_t+1}^{\infty} \frac{NT}{(1+i)^t} \]

The second term on the right hand of the equation expresses the burden that future generations will have to debt through net taxation \( (NT) \), discounted to year \( t \), showing in this way the present generation’s lack of solidarity, unless this burden was to finance investments of which the future generation would benefit.

Conclusions

The current demographic situation is of cause for concern and casts doubt on the ability to sustain the welfare state, of which a significant part is the social security system, in its present form. Health care, the care of old people and children, contributory and non-contributory pensions and a good number of other examples of social spending require a large number of contributors. Within the next fifty years it is not expected that such a large number of contributors will exist.
This means that less emphasis should be placed on legal obligations and more on solidarity and generosity between people, not only those living at a given moment and in a given place, but rather those that may form part of the human family over time.

The model of the welfare state is implicitly based on the presumption that the composition of the working and non-working population, of contributors and beneficiaries, would not change significantly. Social preferences have shown us that this is not the case. As a result, the welfare state that is needed is one that can meet the challenge of providing a new social, individual, family and community education, so that a plan for society's survival can be drawn up. Solidarity, in the form of a commitment towards future generations, is an element that must be taken into account when decisions are made. Future generations also have the right to share in the goods offered to humanity, goods that must conserved and, if possible, increased by the previous generation.

The financial needs that will exist in the very near future require the problem to be addressed now. The welfare state, to which society's hopes have been entrusted, has to introduce the necessary adjustments to ensure it can satisfy needs, while introducing procedures of generational accounting to ensure the maximum viability of the system by not shifting the present burden to future generations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


It is very difficult to make critical comments on a paper when there is a so close agreement with the author. This is precisely what happens to me with the thoughtful paper by José Raga Gil, "A New Shape for the Welfare State". For this reason the following comments will be divided into two parts. First I will briefly mention a couple of suggestions that could help to further develop the paper. Secondly, I will refer to some weaknesses that, from my point of view, underlie both the analytical and behavioral paradigms of modern economic development and that can help us to explain the crisis of the welfare state analyzed by Raga Gil.

The severeness of the crisis of pensions systems in developed countries

The paper mentions that two types of reforms are needed in order to overcome the actual and, particularly, the potential crisis of pensions systems in developed countries. The first type includes changes in methods of calculating pensions and, particularly, the increase in the age of retirement. The second type is the transformation of the pay-as-you-go systems that currently prevail in most developed countries into capitalization systems that, as we know, could be either private or public, individual or collective. My comment on this point is that the crisis is so severe that the second reform is unavoidable and, for that reason, should have deserved a stronger emphasis in the paper. For the same reason, the inclusion of tables with the present value of the actuarial debt of pension systems in developed countries would have helped to emphasize the point. These debts greatly vary among countries. The average of twenty OECD countries is astonishingly high: 193.4% of GDP. Excluding the less indebted countries, i.e., USA (69%), United Kingdom (36%) and Ireland (28%), the OECD average
amounts 219.8%. These figures show with incredible eloquence the magnitude of the crisis of the welfare state in developed countries. Finally, since the assessment of the true situation of pension systems is very dependent on population projections I wonder if the demography that underlies Raga’s paper include, and to what extent, different immigration hypothesis. These are very critical, because as we all know, not only pension systems but also economic development per se is under risk in the present demographic context of developed countries, and particularly in Europe. Immigrations are and will be more and more badly needed in spite of the serious political troubles that we can read almost everyday in the press.

Weaknesses of some behavioral assumptions of modern economic development

1. The assumption of perfect (or wise) foresight and the permanent income hypothesis (PFPI). One of the most critical assumptions of the utilitarian-rationalistic model of the economic man is that agents act as if they had perfect foresight, or at least a very wise one. For that reason, personal (or familiar) savings and consumptions depend not on the current income but on the (assumed) permanent income. This is clearly illustrated in the following quotation by Menger included in Raga’s paper:
   But men in civilized societies ... plan for the satisfaction of their needs, not for a short period only, but for much longer periods of time. Indeed, they not only plan for their entire lives, but as a rule, extend their plans still further in their concern that even their descendants shall not lack means for the satisfaction of their needs.
   Sociologists and humanists, on the other hand, have normally been more skeptical on this point. With his wonderful penetration, Tocqueville wrote more than a century and a half ago that conditions in modern secular societies foster “a brutish indifference to the future, an attitude all too suited to certain propensities in human nature” and predicted that in times of religious skepticism men would be more inclined to “give themselves over to the satisfaction of their least desires without delay.”

1 Taken from the central projections presented in Deborah Rosevaere, Willi Leibfritz, Douglas Fore and Eckhard Wurzel (1996), Ageing Populations, Pension Systems and Government Budgets: Simulations for 20 OECD Countries, Paris, OECD, Table 1.

2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, edited by Mansfield and Winthrop, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002, 521. Taken from Mary Ann Glendon Comment in this same Plenary Session.
Even taking into account that for the last decades the PFPI assumption has been relaxed through methodological devices like bounded rationality and different forms of decision making under uncertain conditions, the basic premise still holds. In contrast, the historical process of the development of the welfare state happened in such a way that we did not have the opportunity to know if the PFPI assumption really applied or not to the behavior of people regarding pensions. Why governments gradually and all over the world behaved replacing the (assumed) individual responsibility regarding the future? What is evident is that they did not trust in the PFPI assumption. Was it just demagogy or were governments at the end more wise than citizens would have been?

We have some evidences, on the other hand, that not all social actors or economic agents behave in the way predicted by the model. Let me give just one example. Evasion of the contributions to social security in Argentina have been roughly the same in the pay-as-you-go system and in the individual and privately managed capitalization pension funds. Theory, on the contrary, would have predicted higher compliance in the second since the contributions are savings owned by the contributors. Another evidence of less than perfect foresight arises from the fact that the so-called Ricardian equivalence (after David Ricardo) does not hold most of the times. According to it, when governments begin to run a deficit and this is financed through an increase in public debt, private savings should increase because people will know that in the not so far future taxes must be increased to service the public debt. However, there is no evidence of an increase in private savings to compensate the huge increase in the actuarial debt of the social security systems.

2. The price of time and the economization of human life. The price of time has different operational definitions. Most of them, like the interest rate, are associated to its opportunity cost. We define here the price of time as the opportunity cost of domestic (and other forms of) non-paid labor, proxied by the average wage or workers on own account income. The “secular” increase of this price is in the essence of economic growth. One of its consequences is the gradual replacement of domestic labor by services offered in the market. This has, in turn, positive and not so positive outcomes. The main one of the first category is the increase in the opportunities given to women to develop their marketable abilities and vocational

3 As can be seen in the recent contribution by R. Guesnerie, “Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge”, Econometrica, 70, 2, March 2002 (439-480).
careers. On the negative side we can count at least two. One is the fact that, through the same process just described, the market is not only replacing domestic “services” but also other things, like affection, than can not so easily be substituted for. Secondly, the facts analyzed by Raga Gil, and associated to a huge decrease in fertility rates can also be interpreted as a consequence of the increase in the price of time: this is so high, and increasing, that it is not worth it anymore to have babies.

It seems that the time has came to put the following question. Has the increase in the opportunity cost of domestic labor reached a critical point beyond which a “sustainable development” at the national level, that naturally requires the reproduction of human life, can not take place anymore? This question, of course, it is not only referred to capitalist societies. On the contrary, it applies even more properly to XXth century socialism that, for ideological reasons too, had an explicit policy of replacing the family by the state, combined or not with the market.

My conclusive point is a conjuncture, and it is referred to a normative question related not only to Raga's paper, but also to the presentation of Professor Zampetti in this same session. If it were true that the welfare state development has gone to far and beyond its logical limits, invading in that way the responsibilities and developments of the families, would not it be convenient to completely rethink it? Would not it be better to give more economic resources directly to the families and, at the same time, to give them more freedom to choose their own children's education, the health services they want or the retirement plan they prefer? This could be perfectly performed maintaining at an income redistribution policy through progressive taxation. But, at the same time, it would allow families to be more sovereign (Zampetti’s words) and, on the other hand, to reduce the high bureaucratic costs and to avoid authoritarian face of the welfare state.
Table 1, part I. Adult Filipinos (AF). **LEGEND:** SPI = Score Per Item, MPI = Mean Per Item, SPR = Score Per Respondent, MPR = Mean Per Respondent.
Table 1, part II. Adult Filipinos (AF).

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Notes: (AF) Adult Filipinos.
Table 2, part I. Non-Filipino Asian Adult (NFAA). **LEGEND:** SPI = Score Per Item, MPI = Mean Per Item, SPR = Score Per Respondent, MPR = Mean Per Respondent.
Table 2, part II. Non-Filipino Asian Adult (NFAA).
Table 3, part I. Urban/Rurban Low Income Youth (URLIY).

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Legend: SPI = Score Per Item, MPI = Mean Per Item, SPR = Score Per Respondent, MPR = Mean Per Respondent.
Table 3, part II. Urban/Rurban Low Income Youth (URLIY).
Table 4, part I. Urban High Income Youth (UHIY). 

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
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| 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
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| 9 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 10| 10| 10| 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |

Table 4, part I. Urban High Income Youth (UHIY). LEGEND: SPI = Score Per Item, MPI = Mean Per Item, SPR = Score Per Respondent, MPR = Mean Per Respondent.
Table 4, part II. Urban High Income Youth (UHIY).

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Figure I. FERTILITY RATES (number of born children per woman)
Table II. TOTAL POPULATION (millions of persons)

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Figure II. TOTAL POPULATION (millions of persons)
Table III. ELDERLY (65+) AND VERY ELDERLY (80+) POPULATION (millions)

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Table IV. OLD-AGE DEPENDENCY RATIO (aged 65+ / 15-64 per %)

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Table V. EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO
(% of persons aged 15+ not employed / persons employed)


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Figure V. EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO
(% of persons aged 15+ not employed / persons employed)