GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: ETHICAL APPROACHES*

DAVID A. CROCKER

The Nature of Development Ethics

National policymakers, project managers, grassroots communities, and international aid donors involved in development in poor countries often confront moral questions in their work. Development scholars recognize that social-scientific theories of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ have ethical as well as empirical and policy components. Development philosophers and other ethicists formulate ethical principles relevant to social change in poor countries, and they analyze and assess the moral dimensions of development theories and seek to resolve the moral quandaries raised in development policies and practice. Among numerous salient questions, one can ask: In what direction and by what means should a society ‘develop’? Who is morally responsible for beneficial change? What are the obligations, if any, of rich societies (and their citizens) to poor societies? How should globalization’s impact and potential be assessed ethically?

Sources

One finds several sources for moral assessment of the theory and practice of development. First, beginning in the 1940s, activists and social critics – such as Mohandas Gandhi in India, Raúl Prébisch in Latin America, and Frantz Fanon in Africa – criticized colonialism and orthodox economic development. Second, since the early 1960s, American Denis Goulet – influenced by French economist Louis-Joseph Lebret and social scientists such as Gunner Myrdal – has argued that ‘development needs to be redefined, demystified, and thrust into the arena of moral debate’ (Goulet 1971, p. xix). Drawing on his training in continental philosophy, political science and social planning as well as on his extensive grassroots experience in poor countries, Goulet was a pioneer in addressing ‘the ethical and value questions posed by development theory, planning, and practice’ (Goulet 1977, p. 5). One of the most important lessons taught by Goulet, in such studies as The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development (1971), is that so-called ‘development’, because of its costs in human suffering and loss of meaning, can amount to ‘anti-development’ (Cf. Berger 1974).

A third source of development ethics is the effort of Anglo-American moral philosophers to deepen and broaden philosophical debate about famine relief and food aid. Beginning in the early seventies, often in response to Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument for famine relief (1972) and Garrett Hardin’s ‘lifeboat ethics’ (1974), many philosophers debated whether affluent nations (or their citizens) have moral obligations to aid starving people in poor countries and, if they do, what are the nature, bases, and extent of those obligations (see Aiken and LaFollette 1996). By the early eighties, however, moral philosophers, such as Nigel Dower, Onora O’Neill, and Jerome M. Segal, had come to agree with those development specialists who for many years had believed that famine relief and food aid were only one part of the solution to the problems of hunger, poverty, underdevelopment, and international injustice. What is needed, argued these philosophers, is not merely an ethics of aid but a more comprehensive, empirically informed, and policy relevant ‘ethics of Third World development’. The kind of assistance and North/South relations that are called for will depend on how (good) development is understood.

A fourth source of development ethics is the work of Paul Streeten and Amartya Sen. Both economists have addressed the causes of global economic inequality, hunger, and underdevelopment and addressed these problems with, among other things, a conception of development explicit-
ly based on ethical principles. Building on Streeten's 'basic human needs' strategy, Sen argues that development should be understood ultimately not as economic growth, industrialization, or modernization, which are at best means (and sometimes not very good means), but as the expansion of people's 'valuable capabilities and functionings':

The valued functionings can vary from such elementary ones as avoiding mortality or preventable morbidity, or being sheltered, clothed, and nourished, to such complex achievements as taking part in the life of the community, having a joyful and stimulating life, or attaining self-respect and the respect of others (Sen 1997; see Nussbaum and Sen 1993, Nussbaum and Glover 1995, Crocker 1998, Sen 1999, and Nussbaum 2000).

These four sources have been especially influential in the work of Anglo-American development ethicists. When practiced by Latin Americans, Asians, Africans and non-Anglo Europeans, development ethics often draws on philosophical and moral traditions distinctive of their cultural contexts. See, for example, the writings of Luis Camacho (Costa Rica), Godfrey Gunatilleke (Sri Lanka), Kwame Gyekye (Ghana), and Bernardo Kliksberg (Argentina).

Areas of Consensus

Although they differ on a number of matters, development ethicists exhibit a wide consensus about the commitments that inform their enterprise, the questions they are posing and the unreasonableness of certain answers. Development ethicists typically ask the following related questions:

What should count as (good) development?

Should we continue using the concept of development instead of, for example, 'progress', 'transformation', 'liberation', or 'post-development alternatives to development' (Escobar 1995)?

What basic economic, political and cultural goals, and strategies should a society or political community pursue, and what principles should inform their selection?

What moral issues emerge in development policymaking and practice and how should they be resolved?

How should the burdens and benefits of development be conceived and distributed?

Who (or what institutions) bear responsibility for bringing about development – a nation's government, civil society, or the market? What role – if
any - should more affluent states, international institutions, and non-governmental associations and individuals have in the self-development of poor countries?

What are the virtues (and vices) of citizens and development agents?

What are the most serious local, national, and international impediments to and opportunities for good development? For example, what are the most relevant theories and forms of globalization and how should their promise and risks be assessed from a moral point of view?

To what extent, if any, do moral skepticism, moral relativism, national sovereignty, and political realism pose a challenge to this boundary-crossing ethical inquiry?

Who should decide these questions and by what methods? What are the roles of theoretical reflection and public deliberation?

In addition to accepting the importance of these questions, most development ethicists share ideas about their field and the general parameters for ethically based development. First, development ethicists contend that development practices and theories have ethical and value dimensions and can benefit from explicit ethical analysis and criticism. Second, development ethicists tend to see development as a multidisciplinary field that has both theoretical and practical components that intertwine in various ways. Hence, development ethicists aim not merely to understand the nature, causes, and consequences of development - conceived generally as desirable social change - but also to argue for and promote specific conceptions of such change. Third, although they may understand the terms in somewhat different ways, development ethicists are committed to understanding and reducing human deprivation and misery in poor countries and regions. Fourth, a consensus exists that development projects and aid givers should seek strategies in which both human well-being and a healthy environment jointly exist and are mutually reinforcing (Engel and Engel 1990; Lee et al 2000).

Fifth, these ethicists are aware that what is frequently called 'development' - for instance, economic growth - has created as many problems as it has solved. 'Development' can be used both descriptively and normatively. In the descriptive sense, 'development' is usually identified as the processes of economic growth, industrialization, and modernization that result in a society's achievement of a high or improving (per capita) gross domestic product. So conceived, a 'developed' society may be either celebrated or criticized. In the normative sense, a developed society - ranging from villages to national and regional communities as well as the global order - is one whose established institutions realize or approximate (what the proponent believes
to be) worthwhile goals – most centrally, the overcoming of economic and social deprivation. In order to avoid confusion, when a normative sense of ‘development’ is meant, the noun is often preceded by a positive adjective such as ‘good’, ‘authentic’, or ‘ethically justified’.

A sixth area of agreement is that development ethics must be conducted at various levels of generality and specificity. Just as development debates occur at various levels of abstraction, so development ethics should assess (1) basic ethical principles; (2) development goals and models such as ‘economic growth’, ‘growth with equity’, ‘a new international economic order’, ‘basic needs’, and, most recently, ‘sustainable development’, ‘structural adjustment’, and ‘human development’? (United Nations Development Programme); and (3) specific institutions, projects, and strategies.

Seventh, most development ethicists believe their enterprise should be international in the triple sense that the ethicists engaged in it come from many nations, including poor ones; that they are seeking to forge an international consensus; and that this consensus emphasizes a commitment to alleviating worldwide deprivation.

Eighth, although many development ethicists contend that at least some development principles or procedures are relevant for any poor country, most agree that development strategies must be contextually sensitive. What constitutes the best means – for instance, state provisioning, market mechanisms, civil society, and their hybrids – will depend on a political community’s history and stage of social change as well as on regional and global forces, such as globalization and international institutions.

Ninth, this flexibility concerning development models and strategies is compatible with the uniform rejection of certain extremes. Ethically-based development is not exclusive: it offers and protects development benefits for everyone in a society – regardless of their religion, gender, ethnicity, economic status, or age. Moreover, most development ethicists would repudiate two models: (1) the maximization of economic growth in a society without paying any direct attention to converting greater opulence into better human living conditions for its members, what Sen and Jean Dréze call ‘un-aimed opulence’? (Sen and Dréze 1989), and (2) an authoritarian egalitarianism in which physical needs are satisfied at the expense of political liberties.

Controversies

In addition to these points of agreement, one also finds several divisions and unsettled issues. A first unresolved issue concerns the scope of develop-
Development ethics. Development ethics originated as the ‘ethics of Third World Development’. There are good reasons to drop – as a Cold War relic – the ‘First-Second-Third World’ trichotomy. There is no consensus, however, on whether or not development ethics should extend beyond its central concern of assessing the development ends and means of poor societies.

Some argue that development ethicists should criticize human deprivation wherever it exists and that rich countries and regions, since they too have problems of poverty, powerlessness, and alienation, are – at least in part – ‘underdeveloped’ and, hence, fall properly within the scope of development ethics. Perhaps the socioeconomic model that the North has been exporting to the South results in the underdevelopment of both. Moreover, just as the (affluent) North exists in the (geographic) South, so the (poor) South exists in the (geographic) North. Others argue that attention to Northern deprivation would divert development ethicists from the world’s most serious destitution (in poor countries). My own view is that this latter position is defective in two ways. It falsely assumes that the most severe deprivation occurs in poor countries when in fact, as Sen points out, ‘the extent of deprivation for particular groups in very rich countries can be comparable to that in the so-called third world’ (Sen, 1999, p. 21). Second, Northern and Southern poverty reduction are linked; migrants from the South making money in the North send valuable remittances to their families back home. Finally, increasingly prevalent is the application to destitution in the North of development lessons learned from ‘best practices’ in the South (as well as vice versa).

It is also controversial whether development ethicists, concerned with rich country responsibility and global distributive justice, should restrict themselves to official development assistance or whether they also should treat international trade, capital flows, migration, environmental pacts, military intervention, and responses to human rights violations committed by prior regimes. The chief argument against extending its boundaries in these ways is that development ethics would thereby become too ambitious and diffuse. If development ethics grew to be identical with all social ethics or all international ethics, the result might be that insufficient attention would be paid to alleviating poverty and powerlessness in poor countries. Both sides agree that development ethicists should assess various kinds of North-South (and South-South) relations and the numerous global forces, such as globalization, that influence poverty as well as economic and political inequality in poor countries. What is unresolved, however, is whether development ethics also should address such topics as trade, the internet,
drug trafficking, military intervention, the conduct of war, peace keeping, and the proposed international criminal court when – or to the extent that – these topics have no causal relationship to absolute or relative poverty.

Development ethicists also are divided on the status of the moral norms that they seek to justify and apply. Three positions have emerged. Universalists, such as utilitarians and Kantians, argue that development goals and principles are valid for all societies. Particularists, especially communitarians and postmodern relativists, reply that universalism masks ethnocentrism and (Northern) cultural imperialism. Pro-development particularists either reject the existence of universal principles or affirm only the procedural principle that each nation or society should draw only on its own traditions and decide its own development ethic and path (Anti-development particularists, rejecting both change brought from the outside and public reasoning about social change, condemn all development discourse and practice). A third approach – advanced, for example, by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, Jonathan Glover, Seyla Benhabib, and David Crocker (Nussbaum and Glover 1995) – tries to avoid the standoff between the first two positions. Proponents of this view insist that development ethics should forge a cross-cultural consensus in which a political community's own freedom to make development choices is one among a plurality of fundamental norms. Further, these norms are sufficiently general to permit and also require sensitivity to societal differences.

One must also ask a question related to the universalism/particularism debate: to what extent, if any, should development ethicists propose visions committed to a certain conception of human well-being or flourishing, and how thick or extensive should this vision be? There is a continuum here: at one end of the range, one finds a commitment to the values of individual choice, tolerance of differences, and public deliberation about societal ends and means; on the other end, one finds normative guidance about the good human life but less tolerance for individual and social choice.

Even supposing that development principles have some substantive content (beyond the procedural principle that each society or person should decide for itself), there remain disagreements about that content. If one accepts that societal development concerns human development, one still must explore the moral categories crucial to human well-being and development. Candidates for such fundamental moral notions include utility (preference satisfaction); social primary goods (Rawls), such as income and wealth; negative liberty (Nozick, Bauer); basic human need (Streeten); autonomy (O'Neill); valuable capabilities and functionings (Sen); and
rights. Although some think that a development ethic ought to include more than one of these moral concepts, development ethicists differ about which among these values ought to have priority. The alternative that I favor endorses the development of an understanding of minimal human well-being (not flourishing) that combines, on the one hand, a neo-Kantian commitment to autonomy and human dignity, critical dialogue, and public deliberation with, on the other hand, neo-Aristotelian beliefs in the importance of physical health and social participation. Development duties might then flow from the idea that all humans have the right to a minimal level of well-being, and various institutions have the duty to secure and protect this well-being as well as restore it when lost. One also finds an ongoing debate about how development’s benefits, burdens, and responsibilities should be distributed within poor countries and between rich and poor countries. Utilitarians prescribe simple aggregation and maximization of individual utilities. Rawlsians advocate that income and wealth be maximized for the least well-off (individuals or nations). Libertarians contend that a society should guarantee no form of equality apart from equal freedom from the interference of government and other people. Capabilities ethicists defend governmental and civil responsibility to enable everyone to advance to a level of sufficiency (Sen, Crocker) or flourishing (Nussbaum) with respect to the valuable functionings.

Development ethicists also differ about whether (good) societal development should have – as an ultimate goal – the promotion of values other than the present and future human good. Some development ethicists ascribe intrinsic value equal to – or even superior to – the good of individual human beings, and to such human communities as family, nation or cultural group. Others argue that non-human individuals and species, as well as ecological communities, have equal and even superior value to human individuals. Those committed to ‘eco-development’ or ‘sustainable development’ do not yet agree on what should be sustained as an end in itself and what should be maintained as an indispensable or merely helpful means. Nor do they agree on how to surmount conflicts among competing values.

Finally, one finds disagreement over the roles of expert advice versus popular agency, especially in resolving moral conflicts. On the one hand, people’s beliefs and preferences are at times deformed by tradition and by efforts to cope with deprivation. On the other hand, many experts believe in an ‘agent-oriented view’ of development:

With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen
primarily as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs. There is indeed a rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency – and even of constructive impatience (Sen, 1999, p. 11).

Globalization and Development Ethics

Development ethics faces the new and pressing task of understanding and ethically evaluating ‘globalization’ and proposing ethically appropriate institutional responses to this complex and contested phenomenon. The debate about globalization in the last few years reminds one of earlier controversies about development. Like the term ‘development’ in the 60’s through mid-90’s, ‘globalization’ has become a cliché and buzzword that the mainstream celebrates and dissenters condemn. Moreover, like ‘development’ earlier, ‘globalization’ challenges ethicists to move beyond simplistic views – such as ‘globalization is (exceedingly) good’ or ‘globalization is (terribly) bad’ – and analyze leading interpretations of the nature, causes, consequences, and value of globalization. Development ethicists, committed to understanding and reducing human deprivation, will be especially concerned to assess (and defend norms for assessing) globalization’s impact on individual and communal well-being and to identify those types of globalization that are least threatening to or most promising for human development.

It is important to ask and sketch the answers to four questions about globalization:

What is globalization?

What are the leading interpretations of globalization? Does globalization result in the demise, resurgence, or transformation of state power? Does globalization eliminate, accentuate, or transform the North/South divide?

How should (different sorts of) globalization be assessed ethically? Does globalization (or some its different varieties) undermine, constrain, enable, or promote ethically defensible development?

Can and should globalization be resisted, contested, modified, or transformed? If so, why? And, finally, how should globalization be humanized and democratized?

What is Globalization?

First, what should we mean by ‘globalization’? Just as it is useful to demarcate development generically as ‘beneficial and voluntary social
change' prior to assessing particular normative approaches to the ends and means of development, so it is helpful to have a (fairly) neutral concept of globalization. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton have suggested an informal definition useful for this purpose:

Globalization may be thought of as the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual' (Held et all, 1993, p. 2).

More formally, the same authors characterize globalization as

A process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generation of transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power' (Held et all, 1999, p. 16).

Three Interpretations of Globalization

Interpretations or theories of globalization – which all contain historical, empirical, and normative components – differ with respect to (i) the number, variety, and relation of processes or flows, for example, tokens (money), physical artefacts, people, symbols, and information; (ii) causation: monocausal or reductive (economic or technological) approaches versus multi-causal or non-reductive approaches; (iii) character: inevitability versus contingency and open-endedness; (iv) consequences, for example, the impact on state sovereignty and the division of countries into North or South; (v) desirability (and criteria for assessment).

Although no one generally accepted theory of globalization has emerged, at least three interpretations or models of globalization are available for consideration. Following Held et al, I label these approaches (i) hyperglobalism, (ii) skepticism, and (iii) transformationalism (Held et al, 1999, pp. 2-16).

(i) Hyperglobalism, illustrated by K. Ohmae and Thomas L. Friedman, conceives of globalization as a new global age of economic (capitalist) integration – open trade, global financial flows, and multinational corporations. Driven by capitalism, communications, and transportation technology, integration into one world market is increasingly eroding state power and legitimacy. The North/South dichotomy will be rapidly
replaced by a global entrepreneurial order structured by new global ‘rules of
the game’, such as those of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although for hyperglobalism there are short-term winners and losers, the rising global tide will eventually lift all national and individual boats — except for those who resist the all-but-inevitable progress. As Dani Rodrik observes, ‘global integration has become, for all practical purposes, a substitute for a development strategy’ (Rodrik, 2001, p.55). According to this view, governmental attention and resources should be focused on rapidly (and often painfully) removing tariffs and other devices that block access to the globalizing world. Tony Blair succinctly expresses the hyperglobalist faith:

[We] have an enormous job to do to convince the sincere and well-motivated opponents of the WTO agenda that the WTO can be, indeed is, a friend of development, and that far from impoverishing the world’s poorer countries, trade liberalization is the only sure route to the kind of economic growth needed to bring their prosperity closer to that of the major developed economies. (quoted in Rodrik, 2001, p. 57).

(ii) Skepticism rejects hyperglobalism’s view that global economic integration is (or should be) taking place and that states are getting weaker. Skeptics argue that regional trading blocks are (or should be) getting stronger, resurgent fundamentalisms either insulate themselves from or clash with alien cultures, including those shaped by North Atlantic consumerism, and that national governments are (or should be) getting stronger. These skeptics of hyperglobalism include P. Hirst and G. Thompson (Globalization in Question) and Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order). In a more explicitly normative version of skepticism, Herman Daly concedes that hyperglobalist trends exist but he argues that states should be ‘brought back in’, should resist economic openness, and should emphasize national and local well-being. Instead of extinguishing the North/Side divide, skeptics argue that economic integration, cross-boundary financial investment, the digital revolution, and multinationals mire poor countries in the South in even greater poverty. Rodrik, for example, argues:

By focusing on international integration, governments in poor nations divert human resources, administrative capabilities, and political capital away from more urgent development priorities such as education, public health, industrial capacity, and social cohesions. This emphasis also undermines nascent democratic institutions by removing the choice of development strategy from public debate (Rodrik, 2001, p. 55).
Marxist skeptics, contend that the hyperglobalist thesis is a myth perpetuated by rich and developed countries to maintain and deepen their global dominance over poor countries. Countries - especially poor and transitional ones - must resist the Sirens of economic and cultural openness; instead, they should aim for national or regional sufficiency and develop themselves by their own lights. Authoritarian skeptics endorse efforts - such as those by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or Fidel Castro in Cuba - to centralize power, bring top-down improvement in living standards, and weaken civil society. Democratic skeptics promote dispersed and local control, target health and education, and promote public deliberation about development ends and means. Both variants conceive of globalization as something inimical to genuine development.

(iii) Transformationalism, such as Held and his colleagues advocate, conceives of recent globalization as an historically unprecedented and powerful set of processes (with multiple causes) that is making the world more interconnected and organizationally multileveled. They argue that it is too simple to say that states are either being eroded or reinforced - it is more accurate to conclude that states are (and should be) reconstituting themselves in a world order increasingly populated by global and regional economic, political (regulatory), cultural institutions, and by social movements.

Transformationalists insist that globalization is not one thing - and certainly not merely economic - but many processes with diverse consequences. The new economic (trade, finance, MNCs), political, cultural, criminal, and technological global processes proceed on multiple, sometimes inter-linked, and often uneven tracks. Rather than being inexorable and unidirectional, globalization is contingent, open, and multidirectional. Rather, than uniformly integrating communities, globalization results in new global and regional exclusions as well as novel inclusions, new winners and new losers. The nation state is increasingly reconstituted in relation to regional, hemispheric, and global institutions; the old North/South dichotomy is being replaced by a trichotomy of elite/contented/marginalized that cuts across the old North/South polarity (and justifies development ethics confronting poverty wherever it exists):

North and South are increasingly becoming meaningless categories: under conditions of globalization distributional patterns of power and wealth no longer accord with a simple core and periphery division of the world, as in the early twentieth century, but reflect a new geography of power and privilege which transcends political borders
and regions, reconfiguring established international and transna-
tional hierarchies of social power and wealth (Held et al, p. 429).

Just as development ethicists have stressed that development – while
complex and multi-causal – is a pattern of institutionalized human activity
that can and should be a matter of voluntary and humanizing collective
choice, so transformationalists emphasize that globalization can and
should be civilized and democratized. Transformationists insist that a glob-
alizing world shows neither the intrinsic good that the hyperglobalists cel-
brate nor the unmitigated evil that the skeptics worry about. Instead, glob-
alization at times impedes, and at times enables, good human and com-
munal development.

Ethical Assessment of Globalization

Regardless of how globalization – its nature, causes, and consequences
- is understood, development ethics must evaluate it ethically. Throughout
its history development ethics has emphasized ethical assessment of the
goals, institutions, and strategies of national development and constructively
proposes better alternatives. In a globalizing world, development ethics
takes on the additional task of offering an ethical appraisal of globalization
and suggesting better ways of managing new and evolving global
interconnectedness.

How is this evaluation to be done? There are both empirical and nor-
mative aspects of inquiry. Globalization’s multiple, often uneven, and fre-
quently changing influences on individuals and communities admit of
empirical investigation, while deciding which consequences are ethically
significant requires the application of ethical criteria and a theory of jus-
tice. Absent from much investigation into globalization are precisely the
efforts to clarify and defend criteria to identify whether and in what ways
globalization is good or bad for human beings, enhances or limits freedom,
violates or respects human rights, unfairly or fairly distributes benefits and
burdens. It is not enough to inquire how or why globalization affects
human choice and institutional distribution. One must also have a rea-
soned normative view of what counts as beneficial and deleterious conse-
quences, and how justice should be understood.

The most promising approach to such explicitly normative dimen-
sions of globalization is, I believe, the capabilities perspective discussed
above. Applying a conception of human well-being (understood as a plu-
rality of capabilities and functionings that humans have good reason to
value), the capabilities development ethicist can inquire into the effects different kinds of globalization on everyone's capabilities for living lives that are - among other things - long, healthy, secure, autonomous, socially engaged, and politically participatory. Because these valuable capabilities (or functionings) are the basis for human rights and duties, a development ethic will also examine how globalization is a help or a hindrance as individuals and institutions fulfill their moral duties to respect rights. The long-term goal of good national and global development must be to secure an adequate level of morally basic capabilities for everyone in the world - regardless of nationality, ethnicity, age, gender, or sexual preference. With a multifaceted notion of globalization, some kinds of globalization, for instance, such global phenomena as a worldwide network of illegal drug distribution, sex tourism, forced migrations, and HIV/AIDS are bad and should be resisted. Other kinds of globalization, such as the global dispersion of human rights and democratic norms, are good and should be promoted. Most kinds of globalization, such as open trade, foreign direct investments, and multinationals, are a mixed blessing. The extent to which these sorts of globalization enhance, secure, or restore human capabilities will depend on context and especially on how a national polity integrates and shapes global forces.

Although I offer no arguments in this article, I contend that a capabilities development ethic judges both hyperglobalism and skepticism as empirically one-sided and normatively deficient. Nation-states are neither obsolete entities of the past nor possess a monopoly on global agency. A globalizing world weakens some states and strengthens others, and all states find themselves interconnected. The capabilities approach challenges national and sub-national communities to protect, promote, and restore human capabilities, among them the capabilities of political participation. The capabilities approach also challenges both territorial and non-territorial political communities in two related ways. First, territorial political communities and transnational agencies - the EU, UN, WTO, World Bank, International Commission of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and an eventual International Criminal Court (ICC) - are responsible for setting policies that improve the chances of all persons to live decent lives. Second, these overlapping political communities should themselves be 'civilized and democratized' (Held et al, 1999, p. 444). They must be venues in which people exercise their valuable capabilities, including some kind of political participation and democratic deliberation. They should also be imaginatively restructured so as to achieve greater democratic accountability:
National boundaries have traditionally demarcated the basis on which individuals are included and excluded from participation in decisions affecting their lives; but if many socio-economic processes, and the outcomes of decisions about them, stretch beyond national frontiers, then the implications of this are serious, not only for the categories of consent and legitimacy but for all the key ideas of democracy. At issue is the nature of a political community – how should the proper boundaries of a political community be drawn in a more regional and global order? In addition, questions can be raised about the meaning or representation (who should represent whom and on what basis?) and about the proper form and scope of political participation (who should participate and in what way?) (Held et al., 1999, pp. 446-47).

As Held and his colleagues insist, the new normative challenge is ‘how to combine a system of territorially rooted [and deepened] democratic governance with the transnational and global organization of social and economic life’ (Held et al., p. 431).

Humanizing and Democratizing Globalization: Three Projects

Again, following Held, one can identify three projects that have emerged to respond to this normative challenge. If development ethics has the task, as Goulet once observed, of ‘keeping hope alive’, one way to do so is to identify best practices and promising projects for globalization with a human and democratic face.

(i) Liberal-Internationalism, expressed for example in the Commission on Global Governance’s Our Global Neighborhood, aims at incremental reform of existing the international system of sovereign nation-states, and international organizations and regimes. Popular governance takes place in nation-states in which democracy is either initiated or made more robust. In the face of cross-border threats of various kinds, nation-states cooperate in regional and global trade, and in financial, military, legal, environmental, and cultural institutions. To protect national self-interest and sovereignty, national governments try to negotiate favorable loans and loan forgiveness with international financial institutions. The International Criminal Court (ICC) will come into being when a treaty, which national delegates signed in Rome in 1998, is ratified (probably in 2002 or 2003) by 60 national governments. The ICC will have jurisdiction over war crimes and other violations of internationally-recognized human rights only when
a nation-state is unwilling or unable to try its own citizens for war crimes or crimes against humanity. It is anticipated that, with the existence of the ICC, the UN will increasingly represent the will of the majority of participating states and not (so much) the members of the Security Council. Although human individuals have rights and responsibilities and international bodies have responsibilities, the rights and duties of nations are the most fundamental.

(ii) Radical republicanism, represented by Richard Falk’s On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, and many anti-globalizers, seeks to weaken – if not dismantle – existing nation-states and international institutions in favor of self-governing alternative communities committed to the public good and harmony with the natural environment. Giving priority to the empowerment of grassroots and indigenous communities that resist and struggle against the many forms of globalization, this bottom-up approach (ironically enough) utilizes communications technology to enable grassroots groups to become a global civil society of concern and action. One can anticipate that institutions such as the World Bank will become obsolete or decentralized. An elite-dominated ICC would be no better and perhaps worse than national judicial processes. Indigenous communities, whether or not located within only one nation-state, should govern themselves according to their own rules and traditions. Democracy, largely direct and local, must operate on the basis of consensus.

(iii) Cosmopolitan democracy seeks to ‘reconstitute’ rather than reform (liberal-internationalism) or abolish (radical republicanism) the current system of global governance. This reconstitution, to be guided by an evolving ‘cosmopolitan democratic law’, consists in a ‘double democratization’ (Held et al, 1999, p. 450). First, nation-states should either initiate or deepen and widen both direct and representative popular rule. Such internal democratization will include some devolution of power to constituent territorial units and civil society. Rather than merely a democracy from above, public debate and democratic deliberation will take place robustly in various sub-national political and civil communities (some of which extend beyond national boundaries). Second, one can anticipate that nation-states would come to share sovereignty with transnational bodies of various sorts (regional, intercontinental, and global), and these bodies themselves would be brought under democratic control. Although the details will vary with the organization, this cosmopolitan democratizing will institutionalize popular and deliberative participation in institutions
such as the UN and the WTO, in regional development banks and international financial institutions, and in the ICC and such bodies as NAFTA.

Necessary for this institutional democratization will be new and complex individual moral identities, and a new ideal of multiple citizenship. People will no longer view themselves as nothing more than members of a particular local, ethnic, religious, or national group, but rather as human beings with responsibilities for all people. And one can anticipate that citizenship will become multi-layered and complex – from neighborhood citizenship, through national citizenship (often in more than one nation-state), to regional and ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’:

Citizenship in a democratic polity of the future, it is argued, is likely to involve a growing mediating role: a role which encompasses dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of expanding the horizons of one’s own framework of meaning and increasing the scope of mutual understanding. Political agents who can ‘reason from the point of view of others’ will be better equipped to resolve, and resolve fairly, the new and challenging transboundary issues and processes that create overlapping communities of fate (Held et al, 1999, p. 449).

Regardless of scope, citizenship is neither trivial nor absolute. Each kind of citizenship is partially constituted by a commitment to human rights, including the right of democratic participation, and the duty to promote human development at every level of human organization:

Democracy for the new millennium must allow cosmopolitan citizens to gain access to, mediate between and render accountable the social, economic and political processes and flows that cut across and transform their traditional community boundaries. The core of this project involves reconceiving legitimate political authority in a manner which disconnects it from its traditional anchor in fixed borders and delimited territories and, instead, articulates it as an attribute of basic democratic arrangements or basic democratic law which can, in principle, be entrenched and drawn on in diverse self-regulating associations – from cities and subnational regions, to nation-states, regions and wider global networks (Held et al, 1999, p. 450).

What is the relation between these three political projects for humbly responding to globalization? Although they have different emphases and normative commitments, the three projects can be seen as compatible. Liberal-internationalism has current institutional salience and can become
a platform for (as well as a constraint on) the more substantive changes that cosmopolitan democracy requires. Cosmopolitan democrats share many democratic and participatory values with radical republicans, but the former judge the latter as too utopian about grassroots reform that is not accompanied by ‘double democratization’ and too pessimistic about the democratic potential of transnational institutions.

Insofar as the globalization processes are neither inexorable nor fixed, development ethics must also consider the kinds of globalization most likely to benefit human beings. Again, such an inquiry requires that one have criteria for normative appraisal as well as a basis for assigning duties as to the various agents of development and globalization.

The challenges of globalization expand – rather than narrow – the agenda of development ethics. Interdisciplinary and cross-cultural dialogue and forums of democratic deliberation allow development ethics to understand and secure genuinely human development at all levels of political community and in all kinds of regional and global institutions.

REFERENCES AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY


