

REPORT OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

GLENDON

We are now in the final session of this plenary meeting on the democracy project. The Programme Committee met last night. We're enormously grateful to all of you for the richness of the papers, and the comment and discussions that we've had so far. And this morning we would like to ask you for one more great effort to assist us. We'd like to ask you to reflect further on the proceedings of the past three days, and to give us the benefit of your advice on what questions need to be further explored, what new questions need to be opened up in the future as this project continues.

RAMIREZ

Last March there was a regional meeting held in Malaysia, participated in by parliamentarians, academics, representatives of NGO groups, on the theme "values and governance". This was sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme and the Just World Movement led by a Muslim scholar, Dr. Chandra Muzaffar. The objective of the meeting was to explore religious values of different religious persuasions in Asia which may contribute to the practice of democracy. I would suggest that an expert such as Dr. Chandra Muzaffar could be invited to this Academy to expound on the deliberations and conclusions of this meeting. We know for a fact that most of the major religions come from Asia, a well-spring of socio-religious values. To what extent the values derived from these religions can bring about a mentality for an authentic practice of democracy is, I believe, a significant topic to discuss. We as Catholics are supposed to promote ecumenism in the year 2000, perhaps, also, we should expand this to fostering interreligious movements towards democratic practice.

SCHASCHING

Now when we speak about democracy and values, the question always comes up: "where are values born?" Values cannot be imposed by state

authority. Values must be born in society. Now we are facing this situation that society is changing rapidly and profoundly. Before, also in Catholic social teaching, it was clear society had stable elements. Family, local unions and professions and values were born in stable elements of society. Today we face the fact that these stable elements are changing rapidly and profoundly. Therefore the question: where are values born, transmitted, in a rapidly changing society? Because values are born, transmitted in a rapidly changing society. Because values are not imposed from above. They must be born in society. Which are the places?

ARROW

I find myself in full agreement with Professor Schasching. Let me say that there is a moral element to democracy itself, in addition to the moral values derived from civil society. That moral element is procedural neutrality. It is essential to modern Western democracy, and I am encouraged by some comments here that this is a model not only for Europe and its derivatives in the Americas but also for Asia and Africa. Neutrality is the basis of constitutional protection for privacy as well as protection of minorities. The moral content of legislation comes precisely because of this neutrality from the civil society outside the government. Indeed, the moral values come most strongly from those aspects of civil society which are least concerned with influencing the government. Those most concerned already partake of the government's neutrality. For example, political parties, as Schumpeter has emphasized, are essentially entrepreneurial; they seek power and reelection. But the way to get power is to respond to the public's values.

FLORIA

I would like to focus my comment on one or two observations which seem to me to be important for the future work on a subject which we can certainly not consider exhausted. The problem of ethics and democracy, the ethical dimension of democracy, has been dealt with by Professor Arrow from a standpoint which deserves to be considered and certainly discussed. I would say that in the case of unconsolidated democracies there is an unsolved debate regarding what we might call the short and the long term in the development of democracies in transition. In the short term many emerging democracies put the emphasis on a very strong political-economic decisionism. This is more or less justified and also accepted by society as long as the technical solutions are effective. The entire problem of the presence of ethics arises between the short and long term reflection; the observation can be made that the first phase of the emergency and effective

decisionism is seemingly indifferent to ethics, or at least that the ethics amount to the effectiveness of the decision and nothing more. In the second place, it seems to be advisable to establish to what extent democracy encloses within itself values. In complex situations there are three definitions of the ethics of democracy. Ethics which are to do with the type of leadership, the type of ruling class governing the democratic systems, the type of people working in the democratic system, and the reason why democracy functions this way – and this brings us back to Robert Putnam's study on democracy in Italy mentioned earlier. It is what I call the ethics of character. Secondly, what type of decisions are made in democracy, what are the characteristics of these decisions that differentiate them from other political systems. I call this the ethics of choice: what choices are made, what is the quality of the choices made in democracy? Lastly, what type of society evokes democratic competition, what type of society do the parties propose in democracy, what type of society do they create? These are ethics which I would call of the society or community. Thank you.

Utz

I would like to make two observations. The first is this: from the standpoint of moral theology, value has an absolute counter, that is, something that is not variable. The true value is the ultimate finality. The means oriented towards the true finality of man also have value. For example, the method of democracy has a value in relation to the finality of the human being, but it is not absolute; it is a value with reference, in relation to something. My second observation is: taking Aristotle, I could make a systematic classification of our conference. According to Aristotle a thing such as democracy must be defined on the basis of four causalities: material causality, which is civil society; formal causality, which is the government; final causality, which is the common welfare; and efficient causality, which is the citizens. It would be possible to make a systematic classification of everything we have done on this matter by defining on the basis of Aristotle's method, but evidently it is necessary to know that this is really a systematic classification. With regard to the last factor, efficiency, the citizen, and *à propos* of the efficient causality, it is necessary to reflect well on what the current conditions are. To apply a moral norm it is always necessary to know whether it is a univocal norm, such as in my opinion the definition of marriage, or a principle, an analogous value, for example private property. Private property is not an absolute value; it is an analogous value because it is valid in proportion to the common welfare, to

the extent that private property is useful for the common welfare, but it is not valid in itself. Thank you.

ELSHTAIN

I want to associate myself with the general comments that I have been hearing to do with the need for us to be able to evaluate values. How do values arise and what status do these values have? We need to remind ourselves that all the values of our political world are relative values. This means that we are not permitted to absolutize our earthly arrangements in order to make them in some way sacrosanct and beyond criticism. That leaves us with a very interesting question: "where do the values come from that enable us to evaluate those values that are being generated by our society, at any given point in time?" Many values are problematic as they represent a distorted notion of where the human good lies, in part because of the forces of consumerism and materialism that are at work; this puts us into a very complex moral universe. Democracy must help us to aspire to and to reach toward a common good able to affirm the dignity of persons. So democracy, too, must be subject to criticism as either failing to embody and fully realize the values that are constitutive of it, or as aspiring to more than any political system, including a democratic political system, can really aspire to, and that is to make itself an absolute rather than a relative value.

DONATI

My feeling is that in some of the papers there was sort of an idealization of democracy. Thinking of democracy as a value could bring us to hypostasize in a way democracy, to make democracy an hypostasis. I think we should be more distant from such a point of view. We should emphasize that democracy can be ambivalent in respect to values. We have to qualify democracy, anyway. In some papers of this session, there was the danger of forgetting that democracy, in Western countries, is thought of as a neutral entity, as Professor Arrow said; that democracy sustains what we can call an ethical neutrality in culture. I think that this is a very serious point, because it brings us back to Mandeville's paradigm, in which private vices support public virtues. It seems that to believe strongly in some particular value would be anti-democratic. This is all ambivalent, of course. There are a lot of specifications which should be made here. But what I want to emphasize is that we should take more distance from this view in order to be more involved in promoting a real democratic process, a real concept of democracy. So, I feel that we should expand a little bit the analysis of the liberal implications of the concept of democracy. This

implies, to me, to think of the relationships which link the public and private spheres, and to think of values in these different contexts, as deeply connected. We have to contextualize, in a sense to embody values in three different domains: the public, the private and the community domains. They are different. And we have, in a way, to differentiate values according to the specific domain we are talking about, so as to be able to rank values, to elaborate some form of order therein. The dichotomy between public and private spheres allows us to see how the privatization of values is going on in Western societies today. Such a privatization of values can be very dangerous for democracy itself. Thank you.

ZIOLKOWSKI

One of the basic values of democracy is freedom of thought and speech. It is the citizen's inalienable right to be informed. The advancement and growth of a free press became the main warrant of liberty, while the development of new technologies has widened the influence of the media. However, this has created the possibility of manipulating the consent of men. Thus, the central issue of contemporary democracy is the relationship between communication and power.

MINNERATH

Ne faut-il pas aussi se demander: que devient la démocratie lorsque les valeurs qui la fondent s'effondrent? Le système démocratique peut-il lui-même contribuer à l'effondrement des valeurs? Les Lumières nous ont habitués à l'idée que lorsque la société arrivait à se donner les bonnes institutions, la partie était gagnée. Or, l'anthropologie chrétienne et même l'antiquité gréco-romaine avaient une analyse plus réaliste. Les anciens disaient: tous les régimes connaissent une vie cyclique, car ils portent en eux-mêmes les germes de leur propre corruption, aussi longtemps qu'ils ne sont plus portés par la vertu des citoyens. Aristote, Polybe, Cicéron ont tous montré que la démocratie finit inévitablement par se corrompre lorsque les citoyens au lieu de chercher le bien commun utilisent leur liberté à poursuivre leurs seuls intérêts. Alors la démocratie se corrompt en démagogie, puis en tyrannie. Et lorsque les hommes sont au fond du gouffre, ils retrouvent les grandes énergies constructives qui ramènent la raison et le droit. Après les grands drames de l'humanité, il y a toujours comme un sursaut de vertu, un nouveau départ pour le meilleur. Or nos démocraties secrètent le permissivisme éthique, qui démobilise et pousse à l'individualisme. On dit même qu'il ne peut y avoir de valeurs éthiques admises par tous, car ce serait contraire à la démocratie. Les vertus de

liberté, égalité, solidarité doivent être intériorisées par les citoyens pour que la société puisse être durablement bâtie sur elles.

VON BEYME

Social theory in the twentieth century mainly tried to be value-free. This had a negative consequence, however: democracy was less considered as a value but rather as a procedure to mitigate the conflict between various values within a pluralist society. There is a new normative tendency for a revival of citizens' values which would presuppose a minimal consensus about common values in society. The mainstream, however, in a civil society agrees only on one value: conflict without violence. For the rest our representatives try to be responsive to various values. This is not an easy task because representatives are working in networks of interest groups and their responsiveness is highly selective. More fruitful than waiting for an overall consensus of citizens about democratic values seems to be to work on democracy as system which facilitates responsiveness to the citizen's needs without falling into the fallacies of populism.

DE MONTBRIAL

Le Prof. de Monbrial observe que le sujet est peut-être insuffisamment défini et qu'il en résulte sans doute un certain chevauchement dans le débat avec les sessions suivantes ainsi que le besoin de revenir aux concepts de base sur la démocratie. Il propose de subdiviser le sujet en plusieurs thèmes et en propose trois. Celui de "démocratie et communication".

Celui de "la démocratie et de son environnement" (économique, sociologique, politique) qui rejoint la question fondamentale soulevée par le père Minnerath: est-il possible de construire une démocratie sur un terrain miné? Il se réfère à la Russie et cite Soljénitsyne pour qui le régime de l'Union Soviétique a laissé le pays dans un état de ruine sur le plan des valeurs. c'est à cet égard un pays à reconstruire. Mais peut-on édifier la démocratie sur de telles bases et dans les conditions actuelles? Enfin il observe que le thème classique "morale et politique" paraît inévitable. Il rappelle qu'en politique, l'on est souvent amené à prendre des décisions à *court terme* qui vont à l'encontre de ce qui peut être considéré comme moral. Par exemple, le soutien à un régime corrompu. Les Etats-Unis et la France en sont coutumiers. De telles initiatives ne sont pas nécessairement condamnables si elles peuvent être justifiées par un objectif à *long terme*, porté par des valeurs. Stanley Hoffman dans *Duties beyond borders* et d'autres ouvrages a clairement distingué entre par rapport aux objectifs moraux. Cette perspective suscite deux questions: la démocratie est-elle le

meilleur des régimes politiques pour que la politique soit conforme à la morale et qu'est ce que cela signifie exactement? Enfin, comment améliorer la moralité dans le fonctionnement des démocraties?

SCHAMBECK

Wenn wir uns mit dem Staat und der zivilen Gesellschaft beschäftigen, muß festgestellt werden, daß der Staat in juristischer Sicht so weit tätig sein kann, wie er durch das Verfassungsrecht und durch das übrige positive Recht zum Handeln legitimiert ist. Die zivile Gesellschaft ist offener. In der zivilen Gesellschaft können sich Strukturen ergeben, ohne daß sie vorher vorgeschrieben sind. Die Voraussetzung für die zivile Gesellschaft — das haben bereits Vorredner vor mir angedeutet — sind die Grundrechte. Die Grundrechte des einzelnen Menschen öffnen im Staat die Möglichkeit der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft. Dabei müssen wir heute leider feststellen, daß es viele Alternativ-Szenarien im Bereich der zivilen Gesellschaft und im intermediären Bereich, wie Anarchismus und Terrorismus, gibt, die den Staat in seiner Existenz gefährden können. Folglich muß der Staat auch die Möglichkeit haben, sich in seiner Existenz sowie auch bezüglich der Freiheit und Würde der übrigen Menschen zu schützen.

Der Primärzweck des Staates ist der Rechts- und Machtzweck, der auf die Herstellung und Aufrechterhaltung von Ruhe, Ordnung und Sicherheit gerichtet ist. Ihm dient der demokratische Rechtsstaat. Auf seinen Wegen, nämlich den der Gesetze, sind kultureller Fortschritt, wirtschaftliches Wachstum und nicht zuletzt soziale Sicherheit anzustreben und zu erreichen. Das Gesetz, und zwar sowohl auf der Ebene der Verfassung als auch der des einfachen Gesetzesrechts, dient der Sicherung des rechten Verhältnisses des Einzelnen, seiner Freiheitssicherung, der Gesellschaft und des Staates.

MENSAH

I wanted to react to the point made by both Professor Schasching and, I think, Professor Elshtain. When we speak of values, I think it is important to recognize that sometimes we may be talking about two different things. First there are what I would call fundamental values, and then there are the means to achieve those values. Sometimes what appears to be a dispute about values may in fact turn out to be arguments about how to achieve a value on which there is basic agreement: for example, an argument about divorce may be about basic values, but it could also be only about the means to a value. To some the disagreement may be seen to be wrong in principle, while others may be addressing it in terms of whether divorce

undermines or supports the integrity of the family. The two groups may both agree on the sanctity of the family but may nevertheless disagree about the role of divorce in maintaining or undermining it. Differences about fundamental values and arguments about the most effective ways to achieve agreed values will persist in a democratic society. The important thing to remember, I think, is that one of the values of democracy, perhaps one of the essentials of democracy, is what I would like to call the “imperative of limitation”. Limitation not only as to the reach of state authority, not only also as to the reach of the power of the various components of society, but more fundamentally a limitation as to the reach and effect of the views and interests of any particular person or group in a democratic society. What I mean is even when the majority clearly believe in a value and the means of achieving that value, that view should not predominate to the exclusion of all others in a democratic society. There should be a limit to the reach of that majority view which enables other views and other conceptions and values to have their effect on the way of life of at least some of the people. I believe that it is important to recognize and accept that there will always be differences of opinion about the validity and relative importance of some values, and also about the most effective means of promoting values on which there is general agreement. But, above all, it is crucial to recognize in a democratic society the imperative of limitation because it is what makes it possible for different values to co-exist, even if there are clearly identifiable values which are accepted as the predominant and operative guides for the society as a whole. The need to balance opinions about values is essential in a democratic society, for otherwise we have a situation in which it is not possible to handle the problem of competing values in a creative way. Do we merely count heads and rigorously enforce the values of the majority on everybody or do we follow the “anything goes” approach and permit all and every view to have their way? If we are to enforce some values and suppress others what criteria are to be used to determine which is which? Is it possible to evaluate the predominant value, if so how do you do it? Who guards the guardians? Thank you.

MORANDE

I got the impression that notwithstanding the richness of the whole debate, we stand as at the beginning. We have not gained more clarity of the concepts and also not more consensus on many fundamental points. This moves me to suggest the organization of more workshops in the future, upon particular and differentiated aspects of the global phenomenon of democracy. Among the many problems that we should discuss in the future,

I would like to draw your attention to the following one. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of the UN, and also the whole Western understanding of the “rule of law”, implies that government is the most important social virtue. We have inherited this conception from Aristotle, as Professor Utz observed. Sociologically speaking, that implies in turn that the political subsystem must have a rule role over all the other social subsystems. Up to the philosophy of Enlightenment this was the approach. Hegel even stated that human beings become rational only under the existence of the state. Notwithstanding this, sociologists agree nowadays in saying that the political subsystem no longer plays a rule role over all other social subsystems. It is properly a subsystem in relation to others and not a global system at all. The state becomes a new and powerful social actor, also a mighty entrepreneur. It owns and manages corporations in different social spheres, such as health, social communications, infrastructure and even production. As a particular social actor, with particular interests, it cannot be the neutral guarantor of the “common good” or, at least, it has serious difficulties in accomplishing this role. So I think that the Aristotelian virtue of government must be reviewed when it is applied to the state, adapting his view to the specific social circumstances of the present time. I make this comment as a contribution for the future determination of the subjects that our Academy will address.

BETANCUR

Gracias señor Presidente. Me dejó muy impresionado la referencia que hizo el profesor Solowski a la libertad de prensa y al derecho de estar informado y les quería hacer partícipes de una reciente vivencia. A mediados del año pasado se reunió en Panamá, en América Central, el Congreso de la Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa; y éste, el derecho de estar informado, fue el tema fundamental. Pero siempre encontramos el vacío “¿y quién garantiza esa libertad de prensa, y quién garantiza el derecho de estar informado, y quién le garantiza al que informa, es decir al periodista, sus comportamientos?” Esa reunión en ese congreso, de la Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa, era como un cementerio, porque estaban los hijos de los periodistas asesinados por informar, o la hija o la viuda. Es decir que el que lo presentaba, la Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa, como alegato para sustentar lo que el profesor Solowski decía, de la libertad de prensa y libertad a ser informado y a ser bien informado, era una serie de mantos fúnebres. Y entonces nos hacíamos la reflexión de ¿Y a quién se apela para garantizar el derecho de estar informado? Por ejemplo, ¿a quién se apela por una información incorrecta, inexacta de CNN?

ARCHER

What is crucial is the relationship between democracy and civil society, but this is also variable. Firstly, democracies themselves lack homogeneity and thus display varying degrees of openness, semi-openness and closure. Therefore they have different degrees of responsiveness to civil society because the political structure functions as a gatekeeper. Secondly, the institutional processes through which parts of civil society can get their demands discussed in the central political arena require attention in their own right as filters. Thirdly, if democracy is to be participatory, then attention must be given to pressure groups and interest groups which link civil society to democratic institutions. Both the form of democracy and the nature of these oppositional groupings change simultaneously: we can only understand this mutual elaboration by examining their interplay.

ELSHTAIN

One of the issues that came up yesterday was the question of how we are to evaluate the different manifestations of civil society and of group life. Anyone who knows anything about history knows that there are groups that often have pernicious effects through their actions. Here I would suggest that we cannot talk about a decent, democratic civil society without asking ourselves fundamental anthropological questions about the nature of persons, and "in what does the good of persons consist?". That question has to precede all our considerations of how we evaluate the different embodiments of civil society. There is sometimes a mistaken presupposition in certain democratic societies that every institution in society must look like a majority "one person, one vote" institution. That is, the institution must be modelled on a majority system, including the family and Churches. In fact, a rich democratic society is one that does not pre-suppose homologous structures that reinforce one another. Rather, there is a rich plurality of ways in which people associate. Families cannot be democracies in the way parliaments embody certain aspects of democracy. We do not decide Church doctrine by a majority vote. An emphasis on a plurality, or variety of different kinds of forms and structures as parts of a robust and well-functioning democratic society is the key. There is something else that needs to be emphasized, and that is the difference between participation and mobilization. The notion of participation, of persons being called to action in their communities in service to certain ends, goods and purposes is central to democracy and involves the wider good of a community. This is very different from people being available for mobilization. It is difficult to be swept up in great causes if you have the isolation of subjectivism. But

that is not of what a democratic civil society consists; rather, it consists of our capacities for being political in a civil way, as good neighbours building an ethic of solidarity through participation. Mobilization turns on people's isolation and people's loneliness, and a prior depoliticization and subjectivism of persons.

ZUBRZYCKI

I wish to suggest a paradigm within which we might focus our discussion on what Ludwig Erhard once called the social market combining the principle of the freedom of the market-place with that of social justice for the individual and the individual's moral responsibility towards society as a whole. The social market, the civilized market, contains three elements which make up its functioning profile. First, the safeguarding of human dignity: the state must respect the right of every person to a fully human existence. Therefore personal development, social justice, are basic freedoms of the civilized market-place. Second, solidarity to encourage people to see themselves as members of a common partnership or enterprise, in the family, local community and the workplace. And thirdly the principle of subsidiarity. The role of the state must be to encourage the market economy by providing a consistent legal framework and a system of regulation, but at the same time promoting personal responsibility and self-help rather than dependence. Hence, it cannot abrogate the functions of intermediate mediating structures as the essence of civil society.

VILLACORTA

I'm glad that Professor Archer emphasized the need to desegregate the concept of civil society and to derarefy democracy, because it is very important, especially for a social scientist like me, to be aware of this and to bring home the different frameworks that you have offered. They will help me and my students and colleagues understand the different issues. Now, whenever I am invited to forums on democracy in other countries, I am always asked: "what is the Catholic approach?" Or: "what is the Catholic framework to various social and political issues?" And I must confess that I am unable to answer these questions satisfactorily, not because of the inadequacy of Catholic social and political thought itself, but because of my lack of access to publications and materials on this subject. May I appeal to the distinguished members of this Academy, as well as my fellow professors who were invited here as guests, to share their writings? Even though they're not in English, we have translators back home. Now, I would like to be clarified on certain issues, rather than wait for your materials. I'd like to

be enlightened on certain, pressing civil society issues that I feel must be addressed as we approach the twenty-first century, in an increasingly post-modern world. I think that as Catholic intellectuals, we must be proactive and anticipate the emergence, if not the intensification, of certain issues that will be more the concern of social scientists and leaders in the next century. This coming century, as we know, will witness prominent tendencies. First there is the impact of high technology. And secondly, greater pluralism and particularism of interests and consequently greater demand for these interests to be represented and for interest groups to participate in the decision-making process. And a lot of these interests are not the usual ones that we are confronted with, and that we are discussing right now. For example, gender rights. I don't think that our discussions have fully given attention to this aspect. More and more, for example, we will be confronted as Catholic intellectuals with the issue of alternative life-styles. Gay rights, for example. How do we address this problem? What about the demand of certain feminist groups to reinterpret the Bible, referring to a unisexual God and changing the prayers and even the Liturgy to make it more gender-sensitive.

There is also the matter of children's rights. The increasing demand on the part of the younger generations to speak out and to participate in family decisions, and even the decisions of government and business. There are other issues. Animal rights. The right to die. The death penalty. We're getting mixed signals about the Church's stand on the death penalty. Maybe it's my own ignorance, but I know that the Vatican has made a statement with respect to the killings or executions in Rwanda. But is the international Catholic community fully aware of the Church's stand on the death penalty? The right to information as a crucial element of democracy in civil society was also brought up. But where does the Church stand on censorship in cable and electronic communications? Does the right to information involve the lack of censorship or any kind of control over what comes out in the Internet, and so on? Then we also have to be clearer in the coming century about our approach to international relations, as we are confronted with greater transnationality. What is our approach towards global capitalism? I know that various people's statements have taken a stand against the excesses of capitalism, of free enterprise and so on. But as the world develops more complex modes of global capitalism, perhaps we should be equipped to respond to certain issues that might crop up.

There is also the issue of "terroristic" regimes. And how would we define "terroristic"? The balance between the welfare of the people, especially the children of Iraq, versus the need to censor the actions of the Saddam regime. Furthermore, how do we respond to the erosion of

national sovereignty? And – I don't know if this is a taboo subject – democracy within the Catholic Church itself. I'm always asked this question whenever I attend seminars on democracy in non-Catholic countries in Asia. Is there democracy within the Catholic Church? Then comes the role of women in the Catholic Church And what about abortion and divorce in legal systems? What if these laws are sanctioned by the majority of people and their representatives? This can create conflict between democracy and absolute values. What if the majority of people want divorce and abortion, or some kind of family planning? Because this goes against the teachings of the Catholic Church, how do we grapple with this kind of dilemma? And lastly, the atomization of civil society, or of society itself. We see that communications, even education, have been highly atomized, made portable and individualized. This has implications for moral and religious education, and even democratic and other forms of political education. With the robotization of production, what are the consequences for labour, for social justice and democracy? Lastly, this may be my last chance to express my thanks to the Pontifical Academy for this privilege of participating for the second time in its forum on democracy. It has been tremendously enriching and fulfilling for me, both intellectually and spiritually, to be interacting with the leading minds of the world. I wish to thank you very much.

NOJIRI

I would like to repeat my opinion. Firstly, as I tried in my paper, the values of democracy must be distinguished into two categories: that is values as democracy as a form of rule, and those of democracy in the mind. And in the former case, values of democracy consist in a suitability or adaptability for the effective or just administration of social group. That is an instrumental value. But in the latter case, values of democracy lie in the mind respecting everyone as a person. This comes from a consideration of the dignity of man as a person. Secondly, the democracy which the Church supports must be that from the viewpoints of democracy in the mind. Thirdly, in connection with democracy, every culture has a speciality and a universality. And concerning democracy the universal value must be dignity of man as a person. If this is denied or missed, one would lose the reason why one recommends or asserts democracy. However, almost all culture have in some way a common recognition of this point, that is of human dignity, however different their forms of expression are. But universal values are realized only in concrete reality. This reality is specific and changeable with social and historical conditions. So, in order for democracy to be achieved, it is inevitable to grasp the universality and speciality of

cultures, and to develop social and historical comparative studies of cultures. Thank you.

SCHAMBECK

Am Ende unserer mehrtägigen Konferenz über Demokratie möchte ich betonen, daß die Demokratie an und für sich als eine Form der Staatswillensbildung wertneutral ist. Es kommt darauf an, was man mit dieser Möglichkeit der Demokratie anfängt. So können auf demokratischem Weg Werte akzeptiert, positiviert und auch negiert werden. Wir sollten in diesem Zusammenhang auf den Ursprung der Werte hinweisen. Viele sind präpositiv und können von Religionen, Ideologien und Weltanschauungen, aber auch als Wertungen von beruflichen Interessen kommen. Diese Werte können ausgehen vom Einzelmenschen, von der Gesellschaft und vom Staat, aber auch vom intermediären Bereich, wie etwa den Massenmedien, die ab- und aufbauen. Der Staat der Gegenwart wird aber nur dann von seinen Einwohnern — und das ist mehr als bloß die Staatsbürger — ein bestimmtes Annehmen von Pflichten und Aufsichnehmen von Opfern verlangen, wenn mittels positiven Rechts der Einzelne nicht bloß normiert, sondern auch motiviert wird. Dabei müssen wir in einem Zeitalter des Terrorismus erkennen, daß die Menschen Werte anerkennen, aber auch nicht anerkennen. Terrorismus und Anarchismus sind leider auch in unserer Zeit erlebbar und verlangen eine wehrhafte Demokratie.

MARTIN

I'm going to push the definition of civil society farther, perhaps for some of you too far, to mention one societal actor and one societal phenomenon which we have not mentioned, but which greatly influences the quality of democratic life in all of our societies. The group is organized crime, and the phenomenon is corruption. It would be foolish to underestimate the significance today of the phenomenon of organized crime as a real threat to the functioning of democracy in many countries. We could look at, for example, the question of corporate corruption, particularly in the area of public sector contracts. It actually damages the democratic process. We could look at the corruption within political parties, and the corruption of political parties. There is corruption within the political administration where citizens' rights are effectively and severely damaged. We may joke about a phrase like "crony capitalism", but here again is an indication of how corrupt links between the corporate, the banking and the political sector undermine democracy, damage the economy, and eventually hurt the poorest sectors of all those societies. And

then there's the question of the corrupt citizens. The citizens who don't pay their taxes, and who do not play their fair share in a very important aspect of the democratic process. Maybe I should re-phrase all of this in a more positive way, in order to end with a positive thought. That transparency in the private sector and a certain culture in the business, banking and management of the economy are pre-requisites for effective democracy.

ZACHER

I'd like to comment on the deliberations of the ad hoc Committee on Democracy. As the Council of the Academy sees a chance of another meeting on democracy in the year 2000, the Committee was quickly ready to recommend that another meeting on democracy should be prepared. Hence the Committee has already accepted Professor Morande's suggestion. However, it's up to the Academy to discuss this.

Starting from the idea of another meeting on democracy, we asked what the subject of such a meeting could be. For this purpose we went through the programme and the discussions of this meeting and we asked which fruitful or even necessary points should be continued. But we also referred to the old list of subjects from our workshop, and we asked which are the major points that we should come back to. And there was one result. The report on the social teaching of the Church on democracy which our colleague Schooyans had prepared for the workshop made us become too much accustomed to the fact of being well-informed about this teaching, and we hence lost contact with this dimension during our further work. We did not really continue to see our subjects in the light of the social teaching of the Church and ask for the respective results which could contribute to a further development of this social teaching. So we found that for another meeting we should ask for a second report on the social teaching of the Church being elaborated after the workshop and after this meeting and especially directed towards the subjects of the next meeting.

Then we agreed that, as the discussion of this morning has already confirmed very intensively, much has still to be done in the field of values. The new paper of our colleague Schooyans points in the same direction. More and more individualism and individual attitudes are being defended and get enhanced room in our societies. But there is a decline in the protection of values which other parts of the society may find important. A prominent instrument in this direction are the non-discrimination clauses in the constitutions, laws, international agreements etc. They have a long tradition of protecting freedom, especially freedom of religion. But meanwhile we have an inflation of non-discrimination clauses. And individual attitudes

protected by a non-discrimination clause are conflicting with value convictions of other parts of the society. These parts have to give way. This is only one approach to the problem of values and democracy. But it underlines that for the further work of this Academy we should continue our debate in the context of the relationship between values and democracy. Another point coming from our old programmes is civil society. We saw that we did not find an answer for the situations where no civil society really exists. But I am also very grateful to Dr Mensah's contribution when he said that for Africa it's not so much a problem that there's no civil society, on the contrary, there may be a very strong civil society, but this civil society is not fitting into the democratic nation. But also for this reason we did not find a recipe how to produce civil societies, and how to bridge the gap between native civil societies and the needs of a democratic organization of a nation. We felt the Academy should not try to go further in questioning how to invent civil societies, how to produce them. However, we should come back to the question of the civil society in special contexts. We also found that we should not continue to discuss the international and the supranational aspects in a separate manner. We should rather include these aspects of international organization, international agreements, international interventions in broader subjects as suggested by Professor de Montbrial. On the other hand, we found that we lost contact with the problem of the real functioning of the democracy. With democratic structures, as Professor Archer made us think of before and as she said, there is an interplay between the democratic structures and civil society. We found that this is an important direction. We should talk about the right functioning and the right structures of democracy and correspondingly the dangers for the development of democracy. Democracy and civil society, this interplay, is always in peril of frictions and imbalances. Also, coming from the old list of topics, we found that there are a lot of very specific points where the problem of democracy is reflected in a concentrated and very concrete way, perhaps education, public opinion, media, market, labour etc.

And so we came to the *idea of a possible programme*. This could start with another and actualised approach to the *relationship between democracy and the social teaching of the Church* and then continue to ask about the *relationship between values and democracy* in a more specific sense. Our idea was to ask how to advocate, how to foster values in a pluralistic society by democratic means and within democratic structures. Perhaps we should, in the light of the intervention of Father Schasching, ask again about the generating of values.

The third point could be the interaction between civil society and

democratic structures and the adequate development of democratic structures. An interesting title for that could be "*The Ideal of Democracy and Political Reality*". Or: "*The Specific Situation of Certain Civil Societies in Relation to Democracy*". And then we should like to come back to the list of *special workplaces of democracy* like the *welfare state*, the *economy*, *labour*, also *labour organization*, *education*, *public opinion*, *media*, *religion* and *religious communities*, and finally *ethnic minorities* and *national democracy*.

That is about the line we would like to suggest for a further meeting of the Academy, which perhaps should then be the final meeting on the subject. We should find room for a broad discussion. Not to come to conclusions. We should not have majority decisions on recommendations on democratic policies. But perhaps we could find some outlines to finish with.

McNALLY

We have had two sessions on democracy – three if you count the workshop – and our final discussion is in the year 2000. My background as a judge inclines me to hear the case for both sides and then come to a conclusion. I know that you will tell me, and I accept, that one cannot come to conclusions on a subject-matter like democracy. But I remain hopeful that our final meeting will somehow draw the threads together.

Secondly it has occurred to me, and to others at this meeting, that we might impart a tremendous sense of focus and purpose into our deliberations if we were to invite representatives of other major religions to a future meeting. I think especially of Islam. The relationship of Christendom and Islam has the potential to become confrontational in the next century. We could improve on previous relationships and add purpose to our discussions, if we were to prepare a synthesis of our thinking on democracy as a basis for a discussion with representatives of Islam.

Otherwise I fear that all these ideas, wonderful as they are, will hang in the air and fade gently away.

GLENDON

Most of the matters we have been discussing at this session of the Academy could be gathered under the heading "social ecology". Supranational entities, national and local governments, the market, the structures of civil society and the individual human person all have great potential both for good and for harm. Various speakers have puzzled long and hard over their optimal relations to one another. How can societies maximize the benefits of government (at various levels), the market (at various levels), the mediating

structures, and individual liberty? How can each element of the social ecology be kept within some kind of normative or juridical framework without stifling the good that is proper to it? And without enabling any one element in the mix to overwhelm any other?

The ecological metaphor helps us to keep in mind that we are dealing with dynamic relations among complex systems that are constantly changing. It thus also suggests links between our work and what our brethren in the natural science academy call “complexity theory”, the infant science of complex, interacting systems in biology, fluid dynamics, and economics (an area where our two academies overlap).

The fruits of our deliberations, it is to be hoped, will help us to fulfil our duty under the statutes of our own Academy to “offer the Church the elements which she can use in the development of her social doctrine”. Our Academy, however, has also the duty to “reflect on the application” of that doctrine “in contemporary society”. Professor Villacorta remarked at one point that he is often asked what the Catholic Church teaches on these subjects. The frequency with which that question arises illustrates the truth of Pope John Paul II’s oft-repeated remark that the Church’s social teaching is one of its best-kept secrets!

Father Schooyans has performed an inestimable service by reminding us of the great principles of Catholic social thought (such as subsidiarity) that bear so closely on our democracy project. To his magisterial exposition, I would add only one reference that seems to me to be particularly relevant to the problems that have provoked the most lively discussion in this meeting.

In his October 1995 speech to the United Nations, Pope John Paul II spoke of a “legitimate pluralism” in forms of freedom. That notion of legitimate pluralism has important implications for our discussions of democracy and values, democracy and civil society, and democracy and international institutions. On the one hand, the approving reference to “pluralism” counsels against the “one right answer” temptation. There are many different ways, the Holy Father said, of pondering the tensions between freedom and order, the individual and the group. Thus, there is scope for many different versions of the democratic experiment. On the other hand, the word “legitimate” makes clear that not all activities carried out in the name of freedom are conducive to human flourishing.

This opens the door to a move from social ecology to “moral ecology” and to questions which our academy may be uniquely suited to pursue.