

Discussion of the paper by T. de Montbrial

ELSHTAIN

The model with which international relations thinkers tend to work is a model of international anarchy, a world in which States are engaged in self-help. You rejected that as an inadequate characterization of the international situation. You also reject any strong notion of community or “*gemeinschaft*” as a model, saying that that’s something that is perhaps being worked toward in the European Union, but it can’t actually be used to characterize the international arena. It would seem that the best characterization for the situation you describe would be something loosely described as an international society at work. We aren’t simply in a free for all; rather we are in a world with complicated agreements and with rules governing the situations between people. That being the case, how do you think it would be most effective for groups to build something like an international civil society and to move toward an ever more robust normative regime whereby one can evaluate the policies of States and of groups of States and of the international arena as a whole with reference to certain goods and ends having to do with the good of persons and with a more fluid and fair international arena? How would you start to suggest one could do that?

GLENDON

Just a short question: whether you want to say a few words about international interventions of a more indirect and subtle kind, such as interventions by conditioning grants of aid.

MARTIN

It’s important again always to stress that the building block of the international arena are sovereign States.

The European Union, for example, has attempted to move out of the category of an intergovernmental organization and to present itself as a sovereign international entity, but it has always been refused access to the United Nations in that category. The United Nations is only an organization open to sovereign States in the traditional sense.

With regard to the use of the term “international community”, this term is actually dangerous. The repeated use of this in a superficial way creates the impression in public opinion that an international community exists, and that it could, or should, intervene.

An article in *The Herald Tribune*, used the term on the recent Gulf crisis. In four occasions it was a meaningless phrase, but in three occasions it had a meaning, but a dangerous meaning. In all those three occasions it said: “The international community led by the United States has ...”. I think everybody knows what that means, but the consistent repetition of this phrase in a superficial way can lead to misunderstandings and manipulation.

There is another type of intervention. It is “get yourself invited in ...”: United States intervention in Panama and Granada, where a country would decide on the basis of its own national interest that a way can be found to intervene, and it happens. This question comes out when you begin to analyse the motivations of the use of the term “international intervention”.

MINNERATH

I’ll ask you only one question about the definition of nation which you have chosen. You mentioned a beautiful sentence by Renan according to whom a nation has to do with common memory and the will to live together. This conception refers to the French definition of nation since the Revolution. But there is another definition of nation in Europe, as witnessed by the famous debate between Fustel de Coulanges and Mommsen. The German way of understanding a nation is based on preconscious and pre-rational elements, such as language and culture. A definition of nation based on preconscious data has an impact on the way in which citizenship is conceived. *Jus soli* in the French conception, *ius sanguinis* in the German one. I wonder whether Mommsen’s approach is not the one that is most widely spread all over the world.

DE MONTBRIAL

Yes. The last point: I’m well aware of Mommsen’s definition. I am not really sure that it is so different from Renan’s one. Renan stresses the conscious aspect. There may be preconscious or subconscious aspects too, which are all part of the common heritage of the will to live together that is mentioned by Renan.

What we are creating is a Europe which looks towards the future. This may sound optimistic, but this is an optimism based on reason. I think that in fifty years time our great-grand-children will understand that for a hundred years we have been fighting many battles, albeit peaceful ones, to

create a new Europe taking advantage of our common culture. This is my interpretation. I think that each and every day we fight a battle – the Euro is one of them – in order to try and learn how to live together and how to settle our conflicts not by wars, as we have done for centuries, but through peaceful procedures as indeed is the case within a single State. It takes time. Even people who have a historical culture wish to give Europe time to constitute itself. It takes time. But let's not talk in terms of nations, or confederations: these definitions are misleading. Let's say that we are creating a new political entity, a common culture, based on pre-rational elements, but also quite a few rational elements.

Let me go back to what Monsignor Martin said. For the time being, the European Union is not as such represented at the UN. It would make it easier to elaborate a common and foreign security policy. It will take a long time. But it is not insignificant that F. Mitterand and H. Kohl went together to Moscow and that the French and German foreign ministers go together to the former Yugoslavia, which means that we're slowly changing our attitude. The Weimar triangle which has initiated regular meetings between France, Germany and Poland has a historical meaning which goes beyond reconciliation between Germany and Poland. In the last two centuries the French and the Germans have always been playing ping-pong with Poland. This attitude has changed completely.

Now, as far as unilateral interventions are concerned, I think that the great danger is the increasing American unilateralism which we witness everyday in the relationship between the U.S. and the UN.

To Professor Glendon I would say that the World Trade Organization is an inter-State organization which is functioning rather well because all countries, including the United States, realize that it is in their interest to respect the rules of the game. These interstate relations may evolve towards a kind of community, but it will take time.

I'll answer very quickly about interventions. The negative aspect is that we intervene once our intervention is legitimized and legalized, but more than often we lack a clear perception of the goal to be attained and we are short of a strategy. I will just give two examples: first the intervention in Somalia in 1991 which ended in disaster because emotional reactions prevailed; second, the intervention in Lebanon at the beginning of the eighties. As soon as they were attacked the American and French withdrew troops which was exactly the aim pursued by terrorists in Lebanon. A positive example is that some sanctions can sometimes achieve results.

Going backwards, I would like to say something about the first question. I didn't hint at a complete anarchy. What we have is an international society, some of the elements of which are welded to each

other and some are not. Let's take an Academy. What an Academy says is important only if people listen to what is being said. And this depends on the respect that an Academy may inspire. Your question raises a point which is connected to often forgotten aspects of international law and procedures. The discussion is going on about the creation of an international criminal court. Within a state the judiciary is part of a whole. The three traditional branches – the executive, legislative and judiciary – are independent, but they are a part of a state. You cannot create a judiciary in a vacuum. I don't think we've stressed enough this point when we think about democracy. The independence of the various branches of government is only meaningful within a community.

KAUFMANN

I have three comments to make. First on your optimism in relation to Europe, particularly as far as Serbia is concerned. My impression is that Europe will be created within what were the boundaries of western Christianity. Up until now no Orthodox country with the exception of isolated Greece has been included in the European architectural design. This should give us some food for thought. Second, I go back to the problem that Professor Elsthain raised about the role of ethics: to what extent do you think that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a sort of ethical code for the future international community?

My third comment concerns the term "world society". In Germany we discuss a great deal whether there will be a *weltgesellschaft*, or whether this is a wrong description. In my opinion what is emerging is something sectorial, but what is missing is the co-ordination between all these sectors. This was at the nation level the crucial task of the state. The state was the agent that co-ordinated all the sectors, and this is an unusual problem for international relations.

VILLACORTA

I just have two questions for Professor De MontBrial. First of all, what do you exactly mean by Asia being comparable to the nineteenth-century conditions? It's not very clear to me. Maybe I missed it in your oral or written presentation.

Moreover, we know there's no international civil society yet in its ideal form, but we are all trying to build such an international civil society and that is possible through agents that would promote an ideal, a positive form of international intervention. I was just thinking of the role of the Papacy. No other non-governmental agent has that effective function, no Head of

State or Head of Government can equal the role that the Pope is performing. There is the accompanying role of the Holy Spirit even on people who are not Catholics. Could you kindly elaborate on these aspects?

FLORIA

About the nation and democracy: I think what does complicate the subject is when you look at the *organic* form of the state, the cultural idea of a nation is therefore something that starts to touch on certain questions which the authors of the nineteenth century had not even imagined; no one could imagine what an “organic” nation was going to be like, the way that Tocqueville had foreseen democracy could be, and the twentieth century furthermore has been the century of nationalist passions in their absolute form, and this is one of the major crimes, and on behalf of these “passions” there are thousands upon thousands who die. That’s why when we speak of the nation it’s very important to be clear, because the organic sense of the nation in its absolute form is incompatible with democracy. I’m certain of that. Thank you.

ZACHER

As you mentioned, you have chosen a relatively narrow interpretation of the subject. The subject as a whole would also have included what Professor Glendon meant: I am thinking of the “soft interventions”. When the World Bank intervenes in national affairs for example by saying: “you can only get some credit if your social security system is reformed in a certain way” there is a real conflict between international institutions and national democracy. And sometimes we have national democracy deeply discouraged because of that. And that really means a danger. On the other hand it is important that impacts come from outside, but on the other, for the development of national democracies, it’s also very risky that these interventions take place.

BARTOLINI

In general, I agree with the core of what you said, but there is one implicit element in your speech in which I completely disagree, and, very briefly, I’m going to say why.

The issue is the building of Europe, and, more precisely, your attitude towards such a process. You said there are too many people, particularly among the intellectuals, who don’t give Europe time to grow up. I feel I am one of those, but I think you are putting the question in a wrong way. The issue is not to give or not to give time for Europe to grow up. It is not an

issue of patience versus impatience. The issue is what Europe do we want to see growing and at what moment and on which aspects will we be allowed to express our preferences. Do we want a Europe on the basis of Article 85 in the Constitution, which constitutionalizes the goal of unbounded economic competition? It's something that has to be discussed. We can't wait for things to simply "mature". I think this is a very dangerous attitude. I heard you saying: "we are beginning to build and our children and grand-children will tell us ..." Well, I'm building nothing at all, I don't know about you. Somebody is building for us, maybe. Do we have to accept it in the name of the future or shall we discuss it?

But there is another important negative aspect in the attitude "give time", "let this grow up". This attitude risks blocking, not helping, European unification. This is because the building of Europe requires rigorous and contentious debates if it wants to avoid strong negative reactions of a "yes" "no" radical alternative. The process of integration has to be politicized; its aspects and crucial choices have to be discussed openly. The attitude that we should let the little animal grow up, even if it's not democratic, it's not national, is driven by more economic calculations, etc., is a risky attitude in my opinion. We do not know if we are going to like what it is growing into and I do not think we can wait until adulthood before judging and discussing.

DE MONTBRIAL

I would like to answer the last question first. Are we constructing Europe with a well defined plan and design or is it of self-organization? I think that the latter case applies. I think that in very complex matters the process is somewhat biological; the part that is deliberate is only a very small one. The Euro, for example, has become the focus for the future of the construction of Europe, but things could have been entirely different. So the question remains: how will Europe develop in the long term? I would like to tell Professor Zacher that I fully agree with him: we probably need a second meeting.

As far as my reference to the nineteenth century regarding Asia is concerned I meant two things: first the way in which countries like China envisage their relations with the rest of the world is power politics, as this was the rule in the nineteenth century; and Japan also pursues this kind of approach. The second point is that there's no institution of collective security in Asia such as we have in Europe. Japan has a virtual security treaty with the United States and at the regional level there is the Asian Security Forum, which is very limited.

You raised the crucial question of the role of the Papacy as a player in international relations. I would like to make two comments, actually two comments and one suggestion. The first comment is that the institution of the Catholic Church has evidently an enormous moral power, reflecting the size of the Christian community, but this power is somewhat hindered by its own memory. Let's think for example of the Shoa. Although the Pope recently made public a very courageous text, the Church has not stamped out entirely out of the fray, and this goes back to the first question which was raised about the geographical limits of Europe and western Christianity. If you look at the role of the Church in Serbia, or in Russia, the interests at stake are not exclusively spiritual interests. The Church is a major moral authority, but it does not keep aloof from matters because it is also a temporal institution.

The other comment is that the foreign policy of the Catholic Church is first and foremost concerned to preserve its vested interests. This somehow limits its scope of intervention. How can the Church as such become a more important player in international relations? This would be a wonderful subject for your Academy to discuss.

The third point was about how the geographical boundaries of Europe were to be those of what was Western Christendom. I would be ashamed, both for Europe and for Christendom. The construction of Europe is a lengthy process, the limits of which are still unknown. Will Russia or Turkey join the European Community? Probably not. But I reject a distinction between Western Christianity and Eastern Christianity. Then you raised another problem concerning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As you know the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was primarily supposed to be called the International Declaration of Human Rights. Professor Cassin requested that the word "International" be replaced by the adjective "Universal" at the last minute. Can we really claim that we elaborated universal rules in a club which is not universal but only representative of the Western world? This is a question of democracy. In other words, should there not be representatives of great civilizations in formulating such important statements?